Conflict has extracted only one sentence from the article, but there are some very important points in it that give a sense of the German point of view. To save you time I have translated the text into English, you should definitely read it. Maybe we can even open a separate thread about it
Summary of the issues addressed in the paper:
- Turkiye is striving for sovereignty in its arms and defense policy.
- individual sectors of the Turkish economy have been increasingly geared towards the defense sector.
- The transformation of the Turkish defense industry has been picking up speed since 2015 in particular.
- The focus on expanding local research and production capacities is leading to a rapid increase in the number of employees in the defense sector.
- Recruiting engineers and skilled workers, software developers and marketing experts from among graduates of Turkish universities and from abroad is not a problem for the domestic defense industry. The talent development ecosystem between defense companies, innovation clusters and research institutions with a military focus has been systematically networked.
- Highly symbolic presentations of armaments projects, such as most recently in April 2023, when the first Turkish-made aircraft carrier, the "TCG Anadolu", was presented by President Erdoğan in the Istanbul district of Tuzla, are intended to consolidate Turkiye's "regional leadership position".
- It should also be noted that the Turkish defense industry is particularly dependent on foreign trade due to a lack of its own raw materials. Russia is the main energy policy partner. In short, the rhetoric of self-sufficiency continues to be countered by tangible external dependencies.
- The business model of Turkish defense companies such as Baykar, TAI, Roketsan, STM and Aselsan is increasingly based on selling their products in countries and regions that were closed to Turkiye just a decade ago, particularly on the African continent, in Asia (including Taiwan) and, more recently, in Latin America.
- With a few exceptions, for example with regard to Israel, no restrictive export policy of the Turkish Ministry of Defense can be observed. The rising figures for arms exports signal that Turkiye is also trying to assert its security policy interests by supplying military equipment to crisis and war zones. The arms export policy reflects Turkiye's positioning under President Erdoğan as a middle power between NATO obligations on the one hand and the foreign policy goal of representing the global South and arming itself militarily on the other.
- After the start of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, it was Bayraktar drones that decisively halted the advance of Russian armored units on Kiev.
- More than 185 countries purchased military equipment from Turkiye in 2023. President Erdoğan sees this international expansion as proof that the second century of the Republic has ushered in the "century of Türkiye".This is linked to the geographical realignment of strategic partnerships and a reassessment of Western alliance commitments.
- Turkish defense companies, which had been involved in the development of the F-35 fighter jet and were then excluded due to the US sanctions, suffered considerable financial losses.
- The Turkish Ministry of Defense and the companies working with it have learned lessons from the Russian invasion of Ukraine that are not only relevant for the domestic arms industry.
- The image of the Turkish arms industry reflects a changed political reality with far-reaching consequences. Planning and production are no longer limited primarily to national defense. They now include the regional and global market.
- Arms cooperation is secured through the granting of export licenses and is characterized by regional diversification. Ankara's foreign policy objective is to use arms exports strategically. In doing so, it also includes countries that other NATO partners are cautious about, such as Saudi Arabia, Taiwan and China.
- The change in the architecture of the Turkish defense industry over the last ten years is the result of political efforts to link civilian and military innovation capabilities. The Turkish defense industry has hardly been affected by the national currency crisis and the continuing threat of inflation. On the contrary, it is recording full order books with increasing international demand.
- it should be emphasized that the dynamic development of the military sector in Turkiye has also been reflected in the militarization of Turkish foreign policy. In particular, the repeated direct military interventions in Syria, Iraq and Libya demonstrate the nexus between political sovereignty and an interventionist foreign policy with military readiness.
- Turkiye's goal of positioning itself as an international arms specialist and becoming a global exporter of state-of-the-art military technology poses political challenges for its NATO partners. The insistence of the government in Ankara and the leading Turkish arms companies on the expansion of domestic production capacities makes it clear how determined Turkiye is to expand its strategic autonomy.
- Eurofighters opens up room for maneuver for NATO partners. The Eurofighter consortium is a lever for exploring possible conditionalities between Berlin and Ankara.
- As a NATO member, Turkiye has been seeking to participate in the EU's "Permanent Structured Cooperation" (PESCO) defense initiative since 2021. The project-based initiative is an attempt to further develop the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Turkiye is maintaining its veto to exclude EU member Cyprus from all possible forms of defense cooperation between the EU and NATO.
- On the one hand, the EU and NATO are striving to integrate Ankara; on the other hand, President Erdoğan is pursuing the strategic goal of developing Turkiye into an arms policy power center through production and export capability. This is a constellation that harbors potential for conflict and requires diplomatic skill.
- The targeted networking of security interests with the innovative capacity of the arms industry and expanding arms exports will strengthen Turkiye's foreign policy weight in the coming years.
- The sale of Eurofighter Typhoons to Turkiye would be far more than a commercial arms export agreement. In terms of defense policy, the decision would mean continuing to integrate Turkiye into Western military-industrial systems instead of indirectly promoting its strategic autonomy.
- Finally, opportunities for new forms of cooperation could also open up, for example in the form of the export of Turkish armaments, such as drones, to the German Armed Forces.
***
Full article
Die Türkei auf dem Weg zum globalen Rüstungsexporteur ( Turkiye on its way to becoming a global arms exporter )
Wachsende Konkurrenzfähigkeit und strategische Neuausrichtung der türkischen Rüstungsindustrie Jens Bastian
(Growing competitiveness and strategic realignment of the Turkish arms industry)
Jens Bastian
SWP-Aktuell
The Turkish arms industry has developed rapidly over the last ten years and its products have repeatedly demonstrated their military capabilities. Bayraktar TB2 drones from the Turkish company Baykar are exported to numerous countries. The Ukrainian armed forces used them after the Russian invasion, the Azerbaijani armed forces used them in the conflict with Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh and they are also being used in Syria, northern Iraq and Libya. However, the drone is only the most visible sign that a new era has dawned in Turkish arms policy. The defense industry and the innovation eco-system that has developed around it are intended to position Turkiye as a "tech nation". This poses new security policy challenges for NATO partners in their cooperation with Ankara. Blocked deliveries of combat aircraft to Ankara, whether by Washington or Berlin, could further reinforce the strategic realignment of Turkiye's arms policy.
Turkiye is striving for sovereignty in its arms and defense policy. It wants to be less and less dependent on partners from third countries in terms of logistics, technology, concepts and the manufacture of weapons systems; in other words, Ankara is focusing on in-house production rather than procurement from abroad. In order to achieve this goal, companies in the defense sector are being networked, supply chain capacities
Armaments projects such as the development of the unmanned TB2 drone systems, the Atak helicopter, the Altay tank, the Anka-3 stealth combat drone or the KAAN stealth fighter aircraft show that Ankara is guided by three principles:
(1) the systematic promotion of a "know-how offensive" through cooperation with technoparks, start-ups and universities,
(2) increasing independence from foreign producers, and
(3) the continuous increase in the export capability of its own weapons systems.
The implementation of the last two principles in particular means that the higher the proportion of domestic arms production, the lower Turkiye's export restrictions will be.
Turkiye's current arms policy thus follows the central goal of organizing the development and production of weapons systems entirely under the seal "Made in Türkiye". However, there are discrepancies between the political-strategic decision-making processes in Ankara and the timeframe for implementation and the production capacities of the arms companies involved.
Turkiye's armaments projects are developed and produced on behalf of the State Defense Industry Agency (Turkish: Savunma Sanayii Başkanlığı, SSB). With the SSB, an institution was created in 1985 that provides billions in investments for the modernization of the Turkish armed forces. These funds are not included in the annual budget of the Ministry of Defense, which means that they can be used as a special fund. Under company law, SSB is a state holding company that reports directly to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. It is therefore bound by political instructions. Formally, export licenses are issued by the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while the Ministry of Finance has the right to veto arms expenditure from the SSB's special fund.
The Turkish arms industry as an economic factor
The origins of the transformation of the Turkish arms industry towards a focus on domestic production go back several decades and are by no means only associated with the name of the current President Erdoğan.The various sanctions and embargoes that Western governments, especially the USA, imposed on Turkiye a long time ago can be seen as the trigger for this process of military-industrial reorientation and modernization.The impetus or the realization of the need to expand domestic production capacities can be dated back to the mid-1970s.
The multi-year arms embargo imposed on Turkiye by the US Congress in 1975 following the occupation of the northern part of the island republic of Cyprus played an important role in this.This was followed by further restrictions on arms exports to Turkiye, for example by the black-yellow federal government under Helmut Kohl in 1992. Most recently, the US administration imposed punitive measures against the SSB at the end of 2020. These were in connection with the procurement of the Russian S-400 air defense system by NATO partner Turkiye . The sanctions had consequences for the Turkish air force in particular. The USA excluded Turkish companies from the further development and production of the NATO fighter aircraft F-35.
Because the Turkish armed forces were (temporarily) cut off from individual arms imports and excluded from cooperation projects as a result of the various restrictive measures, Ankara turned to the increased expansion of its own arms industry. In the interests of securing its resilience, Turkiye realigned its arms policy in the shadow of the international sanctions policy. This change in strategy was also reflected in reforms that institutionally realigned Turkiye's defense and security policy.In particular, the incorporation of the SSB into the Office of the President in 2018 and the agency's exemption from budgetary obligations enable it to promote specific armaments projects. In other words, individual sectors of the Turkish economy have been increasingly geared towards the defense sector.
The military aviation industry (development and production of fighter planes, military drones and military helicopters) is at the center of support. Since 2005, 54.49 percent of the state-owned aerospace company Turkish Aerospace Industries (TUSAŞ) has been owned by the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation and 45.45 percent by SSB (0.6 percent of the shares are held by the Turkish Aeronautical Association).This means that the military is also an entrepreneur.In addition to TUSAŞ, other semi-state-owned defense companies such as Baykar, Roketsan, STM and Aselsan are leaders in the industry.Together, they receive a large proportion of SSB orders and play a key role in gradually increasing the share of local production. In addition, the increase in domestic manufacturing is shortening supply chains.
The transformation of the Turkish defense industry has been picking up speed since 2015 in particular.Various indicators point to an investment offensive that is accompanied by significant growth in the number of employees in the industry. At the same time, annual defense spending is increasing rapidly.
Although the Turkish government's "unorthodox" monetary policy and the inflationary trend in recent years have had a negative impact on the domestic economy, they have not significantly affected defense spending. In 2001, this amounted to 7.22 billion US dollars. Almost two decades later, it reached a volume of 20.44 billion US dollars (2019).In 2021, defense spending fell to USD 15.48 billion - due to the pandemic - and still amounted to USD 10.64 billion in 2022.In the following year, it rose again to USD 16 billion.In 2024, the defense budget is expected to reach a new high of over 40 billion US dollars. This would correspond to an increase of 150% compared to the previous year.
This increase in spending goes hand in hand with a growing proportion of the country's own development and production capacities.According to government figures, Turkish companies accounted for 80 percent of total arms production in 2023. A year earlier, in 2022, the share of domestic companies was 73% (Türkiye Investment Office 2023). The focus on expanding local research and production capacities is leading to a rapid increase in the number of employees in the defense sector. While a total of 35,502 people were employed in the sector in 2016, three years later this figure had already risen to 73,771. At the end of 2022, a total of 81,132 people were working in the Turkish defense industry.
Recruiting engineers and skilled workers, software developers and marketing experts from among graduates of Turkish universities and from abroad is not a problem for the domestic defense industry. The talent development ecosystem between defense companies, innovation clusters and research institutions with a military focus has been systematically networked. Numerous universities, six innovation clusters (Istanbul, two in Ankara, Bursa, Izmir and Eskişehir) and various "teknoparks" with associated companies and start-ups conducting research in the field of defense innovation are evidence of this conceptual approach.
The architecture of this ecosystem of innovation centers, research networks, financial resources and bridges to companies in the defense industry points to two side effects of Turkish defense policy.Firstly, the narrative of Turkiye as a "tech nation" is underpinned with substance.Regular aviation and technology trade fairs under the name "Teknofest" provide a public audience of millions with examples of development projects and institutional transitions between innovation clusters and entrepreneurial implementation.
On the other hand, the government in Ankara and arms manufacturers are increasingly succeeding in anchoring themselves in the center of society. Highly symbolic presentations of armaments projects, such as most recently in April 2023, when the first Turkish-made aircraft carrier, the "TCG Anadolu", was presented by President Erdoğan in the Istanbul district of Tuzla, are intended to consolidate Turkiye's "regional leadership position".
It should be noted, however, that despite all this expanded security policy commitment, Turkiye does not have the technological maturity to compete with the USA, Russia or China, for example. In other words, the pursuit of self-sufficiency in weapons systems and military services is being implemented in terms of industrial policy; in practice, however, Turkish defense companies, like all Europeans, are still dependent on imports.
This applies in particular to semiconductors and microchips, which have to be sourced from foreign technology companies.It should also be noted that the Turkish defense industry is particularly dependent on foreign trade due to a lack of its own raw materials. Russia is the main energy policy partner. In short, the rhetoric of self-sufficiency continues to be countered by tangible external dependencies.
Growing export capability
Export capability is of central importance for the profitability of Turkish arms production. A decade ago, the country's defense industry exported weapons systems worth 1.9 billion US dollars. In 2022, the export volume rose to 4.4 billion US dollars and reached a new high of 5.5 billion US dollars last year - an increase of 27 percent compared to 2022.
This increase in exports is the result of conquering new markets. The business model of Turkish defense companies such as Baykar, TAI, Roketsan, STM and Aselsan is increasingly based on selling their products in countries and regions that were closed to Turkiye just a decade ago, particularly on the African continent, in Asia (including Taiwan) and, more recently, in Latin America.The aforementioned companies have a global presence, comprehensive product portfolios in the civilian and military sectors and have proven the performance of their weapon systems in various conflict regions. Finally, it should be noted that military equipment manufactured in Turkiye is also competitive in terms of price and is increasingly in demand internationally.
With a few exceptions, for example with regard to Israel, no restrictive export policy of the Turkish Ministry of Defense can be observed. The rising figures for arms exports signal that Turkiye is also trying to assert its security policy interests by supplying military equipment to crisis and war zones. The arms export policy reflects Turkiye's positioning under President Erdoğan as a middle power between NATO obligations on the one hand and the foreign policy goal of representing the global South and arming itself militarily on the other. The Turkish defense industry and its growing export capability represent a central hinge for the implementation of this strategic orientation. One example of its success is the attractiveness of the Bayraktar-TB2 drones from the Turkish company Baykar on international markets.
Bayraktar TB2 drones
A core element of Turkiye's defense industry policy is the production and export of (military) drones.In 2022, Baykar, Aselsan, TAI and Roketsan were the first four Turkish companies on the list of the 100 largest arms companies compiled annually by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The total revenues of the four companies from the arms business amounted to 5.5 billion US dollars, an increase of 22 percent compared to 2021.
One example of this rise is the drone specialist Baykar from Istanbul. The company now sells its Bayraktar TB2 military drone to 30 countries. Baykar recorded a 94% increase in sales from 2021 to 2022. The company was Turkiye's largest arms exporter in 2023. In total, Baykar's exports reached a volume of 1.76 billion US dollars. According to its own statements, Baykar does not supply drones to Israel. Instead, Selçuk Bayraktar, Chairman and CTO (Chief Technology Officer) of the company, has donated millions from the company to aid organizations in Gaza since October 2023.
The successor model TB3, which is still under development, is to be 100% "Made in Türkiye".The different generations of drones are used for both civilian and military purposes. Within Turkiye, the TB2s are used to detect forest fires, monitor earthquake zones (such as the last one in February 2023 in the south-east of the country) and track migration routes.
TB2 drones have been and are being used militarily in Syria, northern Iraq, Libya and to provide military support to Azerbaijan in the war with Armenia. After the start of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, it was Bayraktar drones that decisively halted the advance of Russian armored units on Kiev. NATO partners Albania, Poland and Romania have also ordered and in some cases already received the drone. In January 2023, a contract was signed with Kuwait for the delivery of TB2 drones worth 370 million US dollars. This was followed in July by a deal with Saudi Arabia worth 3.1 billion dollars.
With the TB2 drone, Turkiye has become an important player in the international arms export league. Ankara has thus gained great importance in various conflict areas and export markets. More than 185 countries purchased military equipment from Turkiye in 2023. President Erdoğan sees this international expansion as proof that the second century of the Republic has ushered in the "century of Türkiye".This is linked to the geographical realignment of strategic partnerships and a reassessment of Western alliance commitments.
Cooperation with NATO partners
Cooperation with NATO partners continues to be an important part of Turkiye's defense and security policy. Even though the focus of Ankara's armaments policy is increasingly shifting to domestic development and production, there are still security and defense projects in joint venture constellations with NATO partners. One example is the NATO-Intel FS2 project. Here, the Turkish company STM is developing the entire software for NATO's reconnaissance infrastructure.
Another joint project with Turkish participation is the NATO Innovation Fund. This is the world's first multinational venture capital fund. 23 members of the alliance are participating with a total capital contribution of one billion US dollars. The fund is intended to finance start-ups that focus explicitly on military research and applications.
With regard to bilateral arms cooperation with Germany, President Erdoğan's visit to Berlin in November 2023 revealed a new development. Turkiye's desire to procure 40 Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jets had not been publicly articulated until then. The Eurofighter is being produced by a four-member consortium that includes Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK. The latter two countries have already given the green light. Berlin and Rome have yet to give their approval.
The Ministry of Defense in Ankara regards the approval of the purchase of Eurofighters as a natural part of its loyalty to a NATO partner. However, it should be noted that Turkiye has a two-pronged approach to the procurement of fighter jets. In 2021, it applied to Washington for the purchase of 40 Lockheed Martin F-16 fighter jets and 79 modernization kits for its old stock. This purchase intention had been blocked in the US Congress since 2022.
After the parliament in Ankara finally ratified Sweden's application to join NATO on January 23, 2024, the State Department informed Congress that the USD 23 billion sale would be approved immediately. However, the State Department is attaching conditions to the agreement with Turkiye, namely that the F-16s will only be used for NATO alliance purposes and not for overflights over Greek islands.
The German government faces the challenge of balancing domestic policy aspects and NATO alliance commitments. German arms exports reached a record value of 11.71 billion euros in 2023. The licenses granted by the traffic light government for the delivery of defence equipment to Turkiye amounted to just 1.22 million euros. The coalition in Berlin rejects war weapons exports to Ankara. Since January 2024, export licenses for military equipment are to be accelerated by the Federal Office of Economics and Export Control. However, Turkiye will not benefit from the simplified procedures.
Geostrategic aspects
Erdogan's decision in 2019 to purchase the S-400 mobile air defense system from Russia was not only a political affront to NATO partners, but also led to serious diplomatic disagreements at bilateral level, particularly with the USA. Turkish defense companies, which had been involved in the development of the F-35 fighter jet and were then excluded due to the US sanctions, suffered considerable financial losses.
However, the rapprochement between Russia and Turkiye in the area of arms policy is not an isolated case. Within the framework of bilateral energy cooperation, Ankara's dependencies on Moscow have become structurally entrenched and are not being questioned domestically because Erdoğan rejects the European sanctions policy towards Russia.
The Turkish Ministry of Defense and the companies working with it have learned lessons from the Russian invasion of Ukraine that are not only relevant for the domestic arms industry. On the one hand, the aim is to rapidly increase the number of military goods produced and exported. Secondly, Turkish companies are prepared to expand their cooperation with Ukraine. Even before the Russian invasion, several agreements were concluded with Ukrainian companies, for example in December 2020 for the construction of Ada-class corvettes for the Ukrainian navy. In addition, Turkiye has provided Ukraine with marine power plants to ensure the supply of electricity. A corresponding memorandum of understanding was signed with the Ukrainian state energy company ECU at the beginning of 2023. The drive units for the Anka-3 stealth drone will be supplied by the Ukrainian manufacturer Ivchenko-Progress.
New alliances in arms policy
The image of the Turkish arms industry reflects a changed political reality with far-reaching consequences. Planning and production are no longer limited primarily to national defense. They now include the regional and global market. Two parameters play the main role here: (i) ensuring Turkish security and (ii) expanding the export capability of the weapons systems produced. In addition, Turkiye is increasingly entering into arms alliances with other countries. In doing so, it presents itself as a middle power that has found access to arms markets on various continents.
The example of arms export policy makes it particularly clear that and how Turkiye is agreeing new partner alliances outside of NATO. Arms cooperation is secured through the granting of export licenses and is characterized by regional diversification. Ankara's foreign policy objective is to use arms exports strategically. In doing so, it also includes countries that other NATO partners are cautious about, such as Saudi Arabia, Taiwan and China.
The change in the architecture of the Turkish defense industry over the last ten years is the result of political efforts to link civilian and military innovation capabilities. The Turkish defense industry has hardly been affected by the national currency crisis and the continuing threat of inflation. On the contrary, it is recording full order books with increasing international demand. Rising industry sales and growing export capacities are proof that leading Turkish defense companies such as Baykar, TAI, Roketsan, STM and Aselsan now have flexible production capacities and stable supply chains.
Finally, it should be emphasized that the dynamic development of the military sector in Turkiye has also been reflected in the militarization of Turkish foreign policy. In particular, the repeated direct military interventions in Syria, Iraq and Libya demonstrate the nexus between political sovereignty and an interventionist foreign policy with military readiness.
Challenges for NATO partners and the EU
Turkiye's goal of positioning itself as an international arms specialist and becoming a global exporter of state-of-the-art military technology poses political challenges for its NATO partners. The insistence of the government in Ankara and the leading Turkish arms companies on the expansion of domestic production capacities makes it clear how determined Turkiye is to expand its strategic autonomy.
This intention extends to ever more and ever more modern weapons systems. Turkiye is currently developing its first stealth fighter aircraft, the KAAN, which is being built exclusively domestically and financed from Turkish sources. Series production of the KAAN is to be secured by 2028. This would enable Turkiye to gradually replace its old stocks of American F-16 fighter jets. Against the background of these development prospects, the possible procurement of Eurofighters can be seen as an alternative for the transition. However, in the event that the purchase does not materialize, there are indications that the Turkish government is considering purchasing the Chinese-Pakistani JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft.
The Turkish request to the German government to agree to the sale of Eurofighters opens up room for maneuver for NATO partners. The Eurofighter consortium is a lever for exploring possible conditionalities between Berlin and Ankara. When it comes to air defense, Turkiye remains dependent on the USA in particular, but also on its European NATO partners. This also has consequences for the increasing arms race between Turkiye and Greece in the eastern Mediterranean. The government of Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis has ordered French Rafale fighter jets in 2022 and agreed the purchase of 40 F-35 stealth fighters with the USA. In practice, this will call into question the existing military dominance of the Turkish air force over Greece in the eastern Mediterranean in the medium term.
As a NATO member, Turkiye has been seeking to participate in the EU's "Permanent Structured Cooperation" (PESCO) defense initiative since 2021. The project-based initiative is an attempt to further develop the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). With its interest in participating in the PESCO project "Military Mobility", Ankara has signaled its willingness to cooperate on security policy at EU level. However, as a third country, Turkiye does not yet meet all the conditions for participation in PESCO projects.
In addition, Turkiye participation in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) could be expanded. According to the Türkiye 2023 Report published by the European Commission in November 2023, Turkiye had only achieved an alignment rate of 10 percent with the CFSP objectives by August 2023. In addition, Turkiye is maintaining its veto to exclude EU member Cyprus from all possible forms of defense cooperation between the EU and NATO.
Outlook
On the one hand, the EU and NATO are striving to integrate Ankara; on the other hand, President Erdoğan is pursuing the strategic goal of developing Turkiye into an arms policy power center through production and export capability. This is a constellation that harbors potential for conflict and requires diplomatic skill.
The rapid increase in Turkish arms exports in recent years and Erdoğan's accompanying political promotion of the industry have shown that Turkish industry can deliver. The demand for Turkish military goods and the reputational capital acquired with these products on the global arms markets indicate that Turkiye will remain a permanent fixture in the international arena of arms production and military services in the future. The targeted networking of security interests with the innovative capacity of the arms industry and expanding arms exports will strengthen Turkiye's foreign policy weight in the coming years.
The sale of Eurofighter Typhoons to Turkiye would be far more than a commercial arms export agreement. In terms of defense policy, the decision would mean continuing to integrate Turkiye into Western military-industrial systems instead of indirectly promoting its strategic autonomy. It is important to keep an eye on the risks of approval and to try to engage Ankara constructively. Turkiye's desire for armaments should be linked to conditions, for example compliance with the sanctions policy against Russia, which goes beyond the UN framework. Finally, opportunities for new forms of cooperation could also open up, for example in the form of the export of Turkish armaments, such as drones, to the German Armed Forces.
Dr. Jens Bastian is a Fellow at the Center for Applied Turkish Studies (CATS).
The Center for Applied Turkiye Studies (CATS) is funded by the Mercator Foundation and the German Federal Foreign Office.
defencesecurityasia.com
