India India - China Relations

[SHOX]

With Chinese Navy positioning itself for dominance in the Indian Ocean through strings of ports in Myanmar, Pakistan and Iran, India is planning rapid infrastructure upgrade in its Island territories to ensure that there is no restriction on navigation or a replay of the South China Sea in Indian backyard.

According to top military officials, India will upgrade the airstrip at INS Kohassa, Shibpur in north Andamans and at the Campbell strip at Nicobar into full-fledged fighter bases. The airstrip at Agatti, in Lakshadweep will also be upgraded for military operations to secure both the Bay of Bengal upto Malacca Straits and Arabian Sea up to Gulf of Aden.

“The two Island territories will be like the new aircraft carriers for India, extending the navy’s reach in the region far from the mainland. Both the Islands sit on the busiest sea lanes of the world with more than half the world trade going through this route,” said a tri-service commander.

Lakshadweep sits on the Nine Degree Channel, so named because it lies on the 9-degree line of Latitude, north of the equator. The Andamans and Nicobar Islands will allow the navy to dominate the Six Degree and Ten Degree Channels towards Southeast Asia and North Asia.

Officials said the infrastructure upgrade had also acquired urgency due to efforts by China, much of it backroom, to get Thailand to start work on the Thai Canal aka Kra Canal that has been on the drawing board for the last 70 years. The canal has been proposed to slice through the Malay peninsula some 800 km south of Bangkok and connect the Gulf of Thailand with the Andaman Sea.

It would let ships bypass the choked Malacca Strait, the main shipping channel between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean that has become the world’s busiest trade route. For ships passing between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, it would shorten the distance by at least 1,200 km.

There is no unanimity in India’s strategic community on the approach to the Kra canal. One view is that the canal, promoted by China under its Belt and Road Initiative, would pose a risk to India’s long-term maritime security but there is an influential section that sees the construction of the Thai Canal as inevitable given the money China is believed to be throwing at powerful elements in Bangkok.

Like when Thailand was to decide on setting up an ad-hoc committee to carry out a study earlier this year, there were raised eyebrows at how Thailand’s fragmented political class demonstrated unprecedented unity in supporting the move. Even parties that are known to be anti-China had ended up supporting the canal. The Thai King, however, is still opposed to the Kra Canal.

National security planners believe that India should capitalise on the opportunity - bundled with its own set of challenges - that the Kra Canal offers and offer transhipment ports to vessels bound for either Malacca or Kra Canal. As of now, ships wait for their turn at Sri Lankan ports, earning Colombo precious foreign exchange as well as leverage.

It is argued that the infrastructure upgrade in the island territories would serve twin objectives: one, enable India to maximise the economic gains as well as raise its military presence in the Indian Ocean Region.

The continuing focus on the infrastructure upgrade also comes against the backdrop of China’s aggressive moves in Ladakh and its reluctance to restore status quo ante. The Chinese aggression has not only prompted New Delhi to reinforce force deployment along hotspots along the LAC but also in the high seas.

The Indian Navy is on high alert from the Persian Gulf to the Malacca Strait in the context of the standoff with China. The instructions to the navy are clear: That they should be prepared for military action if China mounts an attack along the Line of Actual Control, people familiar with the matter said.

Indian military officials stressed that the upgradation of air bases in the Island territories would ensure that China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy under its President and commander in chief Xi Jinping, does not dominate the area to extract leverage from all countries in the region.

Also Read: Military option on table if talks fail: CDS General Rawat on China

For now, the United States earlier this month flew in its three B-2 stealth bombers to the naval support facility in Diego Garcia in the south Indian Ocean to support the Pacific Air Forces’ Bomber Task Force to deter China from flexing its muscles in the region. Around the same time, the US decided to sell 66 new American-made F-16 fighter jets in the biggest arms sale to the island, a democracy of 24 million people that Beijing claims to be an inseparable part of its territory.

A few days later, the United States also moved aircraft carrier Ronald Reagan and its strike group for maritime air defence operations to the restive South China Sea. The US Navy said the training said the Carrier Strike Group participated in cooperative sea drills with the Air Force’s B-1B Lancer to improve “joint readiness response capabilities. The US Navy said the units conducted air-to-air operations, combat search and rescue drills and air defence exercises, according to the Navy.

India’s answer to China-backed Thai Canal plan is a huge military upgrade in islands

China will be one of the biggest beneficiaries of the Thai Canal project, aka Kra Canal, thalt will give Beijing an alternative route to the congested Malacca Strait

www.hindustantimes.com

 

[Maximilian Veers]

I have been reading about this proposed canal for quite some time. The building of this canal in itself has a couple of glaring problems that Thailand will have to overcome. Longhao, a Chinese construction company is the one given the responsibility to build this Canal. Interesting fact is that this is the company that has been building the controversial Island bases in the SCS. Also, rumors that they plan to build two more bases near the KRA canal area. Unsure on which side this will be built though.

The first problem is the amount of investment required to actually build the canal. The estimated cost to build the canal is nearly $30 billion. The Chinese have promised to fund the canal and provide the resources and the workers necessary to build the canal. Such a massive investment will undoubtedly lead to a massive increase in Chinese influence in the country. Economic subservience to the Chinese is hardly the right option now-a-days. Thailand has requested investment form the US, Japan, and even India. Considering, how this is a Chinese project. The chances of that are minimal.

The second problem is the insurgency going on in Thailand in the southern regions. If the US and allied powers do fail to convince Thai's on how bad of an idea this is, one can expect this insurgency to go to the next level. Especially considering this project will essentially separate the insurgency filled southern regions from the northern areas. Can fully expect, this to be the next Islamic terror central stage. Not that I support such a move. I feel this is how things will end up anyway.

This will possibly take at least 10-15 years to build this. Even if this is built, I still fail to understand how the Chinese will be able to circumvent the blockade. If you look at the map, the western side of the Canal entrance/exit has a slew of Islands part of A&N Islands with enough Naval Radar surveillance network to detect whatever comes out of that canal.

 

[Nilgiri]

Multinational String-Of-Pearls Emerging In Southern IOR & Andaman Sea Through Algorithmic Alliance

Multinational String-Of-Pearls Emerging In Southern IOR & Andaman Sea Through Algorithmic Alliance

Since mid-May, following a series of behind-the-scenes parleys and deliberations, a variety of steps have been taken toward the adoptio...

trishul-trident.blogspot.com

Since mid-May, following a series of behind-the-scenes parleys and deliberations, a variety of steps have been taken toward the adoption of a multinational sea-control strategy that aims at nullifying China’s irrational assertiveness within both the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). For instance, in their first virtual Summit-level meeting held in the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic, Australia and India on June 4, 2020 elevated their bilateral ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership (CSP) and signed seven key accords, including a mutual logistics support agreement that is expected to enable the two countries to access each other’s military bases, including Australia’s Christmas Island, located south of Indonesia’s Island of Java.

This was followed a month later by a three-day official visit to India (from July 26 to 28) of Indonesia’s Defence Minister Gen (Ret’d) Prabowo Subianto during which he and his Indian counterpart Rajnath Singh discussed various ways and means of strengthening the military-to-military and military-industrial ties between the two maritime neighbours.

In particular, India expressed her intention to financially and materially assist Indonesia in transforming the existing naval and air bases at Sabang Island (located northeast of Banda Aceh in Sumatra) into fully operational installations and in return secure access for Indian Navy seaborne and airborne assets to such installations. Indonesia also evinced interest in procuring India-developed integrated platform management systems, combat management systems and hull-mounted sonar suites for a family of shallow-water multi-purpose vessels developed by its state-owned, Surabaya-based shipbuilder PT PAL.

But, as the saying goes, the best is yet to come. And this event will take place between mid-September and end just before Indian Air Force Day (October 8) and will comprise a series of joint services exercises taking place in the Andaman Sea, with a strong emphasis being laid on sea-control being exercised through anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and maritime-strike operations (with both IAF Jaguar IMs armed with AGM-84A Harpoon ASCMs and Su-30MKIs armed with BrahMos-A ASCMs), and the enforcement of maritime exclusion zones (MEZ).

Moreover, apart from the Indian Navy (IN) and Indian Air Force (IAF), the US Navy and Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) too are likely to be invited to take part in these exercises, with the US Navy contributing about four warships from its Yokosuka-based 7th Fleet, and the JMSDF despatching a Kawasaki P-1 LRMR-ASW platform.

Details of this multinational naval exercise will be firmed up during the three-day naval commanders’ biannual conference in New Delhi (from August 19 till 21), which will also be the first naval commanders’ conference since the institution of Department of Military Affairs (DMA) and creation of the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS).

And as a curtain-raiser event, three B-2 Spirit stealthy bombers recently deployed from the USAF’s 509th Bomb Wing at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, to Naval Support Facility Diego Garcia in the southern Indian Ocean to support the US Pacific Air Forces’ Bomber Task Force missions. They arrived on August 12 at Diego Garcia on Wednesday after a 29-hour sortie.

(Rest of the analysis and pictures at the link....)

@#comcom @Joe Shearer @Maximilian Veers @SHOX @Paro

 

[Nilgiri]

The strategic significance is quite obvious for cooperation between IND and INA at this maritime chokepoint:

Here is bit more focus into the main areas of note for Sabang island:

 

[Nilgiri]

Even if this is built, I still fail to understand how the Chinese will be able to circumvent the blockade. If you look at the map, the western side of the Canal entrance/exit has a slew of Islands part of A&N Islands with enough Naval Radar surveillance network to detect whatever comes out of that canal.

Yes this is true, though logistically they can do a breakout hugging Myanmar coast and then slip through coco island (where I believe they have presence for SIGINT etc to coordinate) area as follows...assuming best case scenario for the canal project itself:

After improving sensoring and capability in Andaman + Nicobar island chain and then doing same between nicobar and Aceh with cooperation with INA.... India will also have to improve to best of ability here in this northern channel area (important to do even if the canal doesn't materialise tbh).

Sea bed + aerial + space based sensoring regimen and C4 integration of those basically for this area, it wont be as good as the other two regions given PRC has strong relations with Myanmar which they will likely maintain and even increase in foreseeable future....but it will be developed and implemented as best it can be with sufficient Indian military planning right now.

 

[Gary]

This is good news, but I must stress that a hypothetical Indian Navy blockade of the Malacca strait could turn many SE Asian countries against India, consider that that waterway is vital to many of SE Asia major economies such as Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia.

India must find a way to balance between having to choke China (in a case of war) while at the same time making sure not to upset ASEAN

 

[Nilgiri]

This is good news, but I must stress that a hypothetical Indian Navy blockade of the Malacca strait could turn many SE Asian countries against India, consider that that waterway is vital to many of SE Asia major economies such as Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia.

India must find a way to balance between having to choke China (in a case of war) while at the same time making sure not to upset ASEAN

I think:

a) This very much depends on who is involved in the conflict/war in first place (given geopolitical alliance domino nature for something of this scale in first place). Whole thing changes drastically for example if if US + allies are involved against PLAN....compared to just IN vs PLAN.

b) Running with your argument for the moment and say India promises to not blockade malacca straits (and/or other straits in vicinity) physically...what happens to shipping insurance companies when either IN or PLAN interdict each other (or there is even just a potential horizon approaching where they will in some escalation etc) and something gets sunk/shot down in the vicinity etc and there is likely going to be larger cascade of events (with further blockades and actions and larger geopolitical involvement etc) after it? That's just going to be effectively a blockade of its own anyway. Economically speaking there is no way to neatly delineate and sequester wartime operations of this scale that bring blockades etc to the table in first place.

c) I believe this decade India in general will be increasing further overtures to plan stuff out with INA, ASEAN (esp those with US cooperation/alliance) and Australia in this operational area as to what the likely contours are and roles/expectations are for each (broadly friendly) country in various scenarios (esp USN vs no USN) regarding PLAN etc... This will of course be stuff way above our paygrade, we can only speculate mostly...or do very broad grey analysis on it for now.

 

[SHOX]

The Chinese are not just inside Indian territory, they seem to be closing in and around India as well. From Afghanistan in the north-west to Nepal in the north to Bangladesh in the east, the Chinese are no longer just expanding influence in South Asia, they are close to becoming its pre-eminent power.

Less than 24 hours ago, India received another jolt to her regional ambitions as Pakistan foreign minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi invited China’s special envoy to Afghanistan, Liu Jian, to Islamabad to help end the 19-year-war in that country. Qureshi is today meeting a Taliban delegation, led by Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar – who the Pakistanis kept in a jail safe-house for more than eight years before releasing him back to the Taliban in 2018 – to set the stage for the meeting with Liu.

Back in the east, in Bangladesh, the Chinese have been wooing Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her powerful army long enough for her to consider an equidistance between Beijing and New Delhi.

A complex mix of airport contracts (the Chinese have just won the tender to build a second terminal in Sylhet, nearby India), defence agreements — which include an ultra-modern submarine base called BNS Sheikh Hasina in Cox’s Bazaar, a new naval base in Patkhauli and the delivery of a Chinese Corvette to strengthen its naval forces — and 97 per cent duty-free access for Bangladeshi goods, have made China not just Bangladesh’s largest trading partner, but also its largest investor.

In Nepal, meanwhile, a report said that China had occupied large tracts of land in seven districts bordering the country – in Dolakha, Gorkha, Darchula, Humla, Sindhupalchowk, Sankhuwasabha and Rasuwa – pushing the Nepali boundary further south. However, Nepal strongly denied these claims and the newspaper apologised for publishing it. Beijing is also pushing Kathmandu to sign a memorandum to seal a 2019 draft agreement allowing both countries to survey and map Mount Everest.

Also read: Pakistan invites Taliban, China to discuss Afghanistan peace talks aimed at ending 19-yr war

Bangladesh sends a message
So even as China digs its heels in Ladakh, reinforcing physical infrastructure and airlifting troops to guard the Line of Actual Control (LAC), Prime Minister Narendra Modi sent Foreign Secretary Harsh Shringla to Bangladesh last week on a special aircraft with messages of peace and friendship.

Certainly, there’s something special about Bangladesh. There’s the 1971 blood tie, the fact that Bangladesh nestles into the Bay of Bengal and is the early transition into Southeast Asia. When India looks east, it first espies Bangladesh.

But when Foreign Secretary Shringla’s plane landed, no senior official of any consequence came to receive him, or see him off. In sharp contrast, when a team of 10 Chinese doctors arrived in Dhaka to help Bangladeshis combat the coronavirus in June, foreign minister A.K. Abdul Momen came to the airport to welcome them.

According to the Bangladeshi media, Hasina kept Shringla waiting for several hours before finally seeing him. No photos were released to the media of their meeting – the only ones that found its way to the newspapers was a photo of Shringla in Dhaka in March. Nor was there a proper briefing to the Bangladeshi media afterwards by Hasina’s office, except for a couple of predictable statements. Shringla came quietly and left quietly.

If this was a diplomatic reprimand by Hasina, the message was loud and clear. Fact is, Shringla is well-liked in Dhaka where he was High Commissioner from 2016-2019. He knows everyone across the political spectrum. It seems the implied rebuke was not personal.

Also read: India, China work on date for next round of talks as CDS Rawat explores ‘military options’

A break in ties
One key reason for the missing warmth is the Home minister Amit Shah’s charge in 2018 that illegal immigrants in Assam are like “deemak” or termites who take away the jobs of locals; Shah repeated the charge in West Bengal during the 2019 campaign, adding that if the BJP came to power, it would throw all infiltrators into the Bay of Bengal.

For a prime minister whose Awami League party has been joined at the hip with India since 1971, Shah’s remarks were not just a cold shower, they undermined her. They put at risk the affections of a whole political party in power in a subcontinent India likes to call her own.

Hasina had already been tempted by Chinese president Xi Jinping’s $24 billion generosity when he came visiting in 2016. When she visited China in mid-2019, premier Li Keqiang promised to better synergise China’s Belt and Road with Bangladesh’s development strategy. The Sylhet airport came in April this year. Less than a fortnight ago, China agreed to fund a massive project for the management of the Teesta river for nearly $1billion – a river that flows into Bangladesh from north Bengal.

Time is now
Certainly, India hasn’t lost Bangladesh – at least, not yet – notwithstanding all the goodies the Chinese are offering. There are several connectivity projects underway, the most recent being the movement of cargo from Kolkata to Agartala, via Chittagong port.

Just like the fact that India hasn’t lost Afghanistan – at least, not yet – despite the fact that Pakistan is very much back in the game, brokering the future with its good friends, the Taliban, with a little help from Big Brother China.

Clearly, New Delhi is worried that the neighbourhood, once very much under its spell, could be slipping from its grasp. The key, of course, lies in PM Modi improving political ties with leaders in the neighbourhood and keeping the atavistic tendencies of his party, the BJP, in check. Will he be able to do it?

Here’s what China is doing in Bangladesh, Nepal, Afghanistan. It doesn’t look good for India

New Delhi is worried that S. Asia, once very much under its spell, could be slipping from its grasp. The key lies in PM Modi’s charisma now.

theprint.in

 

[Maximilian Veers]

I fail to understand why China right now is being so aggressive towards its Southeast Asian and its western neighbors when its military in its current form simply isn't ready to deal with either the USN in the pacific or the IN in the Indian ocean. Let's ignore the fact that they plan to take on the QUAD.

One of the main problems with the PLAN is its complete lack of experience with its mariners and officers. The main problem with expanding a navy so Rapidly is that you will be unable to find the experienced crews required to man the navy and ensure that the crew is trained and experienced enough to handle blue water deployment and operations.

Commander Wei Xiaohui to be Chinese Navy's first female warship captain

She became a captain of a PLAN warship in just seven years, compare that to the USN, where someone serving for seven years would just be a rank Lt. Commander. You have to be serving for at least 21-22 years in the USN to captain your own warship. While in the IN, this is around 15 years. Imagine, if the captain itself is that young, what would be the experience level of other officers and sailors. This is why I have said both here and elsewhere that, PLAN needs at least another 10-15 years to even think of matching USN in terms of developing the operational warfighting doctrines and crew experience. Even then the size of USN is predicted to increase its fleet size from 301 to 355 ships by 2034. Shiny toys will only get you so far.

As for the blockade, I doubt any IN or USN blockade will mean a 100% blockade. It's likely that any ship heading to or from China will be blockaded and any ships entering from elsewhere will be most likely allowed to go through. We have the information fusion center which is already in collaboration with 21 countries. I don't think it will be that difficult to set up a precise blockade without any collateral damage. Also from what I understand, the majority of Chinese shipping is basically Chinese merchant shipping which can be blockaded. While the majority of the Indian shipping is actually flagged as foreign vessels. So I am not sure if PLAN can actually blockade any ships going from Pacific/SCS side to India without collateral(diplomatic) damage.

PLAN right now cannot operate in the IOR region. They tried quite a lot to develop their string of pearls and create the infrastructure necessary for PLAN warships to be deployed extensively. The only place they can deploy, maintain, and resupply is in Gwadar port. Maldives is not an option, Srilanka has clearly said they will not allow anything in Hambentota. Maybe Myanmar, but even they won't be bend over as willingly as the Pakistanis did. Except for Nuclear Subs(maybe), any PLAN warship that enters the IOR is extremely vulnerable.

 

[Nilgiri]

 

[Paro]

India doesnt have to actually do a blockade to begin with. Indian navy boarding vessels heading to chinese ports to perform regular checks on cargo and paperwork is enough to delay the timelines driving up the insurance costs many folds making air cargo more viable option.

In coming years we will see bureaucratic harassment of vessels heading to china which i think is the natural talent of indian red tape bureaucracy.

 

[SHOX]

More than 70 days have passed since the deadliest clash in half a century along China’s Himalayan border with India, and Beijing has yet to reveal the number of its casualties.

China’s defence ministry admitted there had been Chinese casualties during violent brawls on June 15 in Galwan Valley that took the Asian giants to the brink of armed conflict. But Beijing has made no mention of the death toll or the reason for its secrecy.

It is not in China’s interest to keep people in the dark on this issue of great public interest, and there are multiple reasons for the government to come clean.
Firstly, secrecy will not help to break the impasse in talks and is harmful to China’s deeply strained relations with India, marred by misperceptions, mutual distrust and enmity.

China’s state-controlled tabloid Global Times claimed withholding information about the death toll signalled “goodwill”, to avoid comparisons and manage nationalist sentiment, but this makes little sense.

In contrast with a deafening silence on the Chinese side, New Delhi confirmed the deaths of 20 Indian troops within hours of the incident and released their names soon afterwards. China’s awkward position failed to stop Indian media speculating about its casualties, citing anonymous sources and putting the number of dead and injured at between 35 and 43.

Tensions remain high as the military stand-off that began in early May drags on, with no sign of any quick solution from diplomatic and military talks.

That “goodwill” did little to prevent the regional rivals’ border dispute spilling over into a broad, hostile fight over trade, investment, technology and geopolitics.

With China fixated on the unfolding new cold war with the United States and on repairing its coronavirus-hit image, persistent border tension – risking war on two fronts – seems not to be in its strategic interest.

It’s also hard to see how Beijing’s secrecy over casualties would discourage India from taking the Americans’ side in US-China friction.

Silence over the deaths will further erode confidence in China’s credentials to be a responsible global power, adding to the case made by critics that its authoritarian system is obsessed with secrecy and information control.

Commenting on China’s infamous censorship 50 years ago in his book on the bloody 1962 India-China border war, Australian journalist Neville Maxwell wrote: “No government is more secretive as to its inner processes than that of the People’s Republic of China.”

China is apparently aware that its global ambitions are at stake and, in the face of mounting calls at home and abroad for greater transparency, has been increasingly assertive about its record in this regard.

Amid international criticism for alleged cover-ups in its initial handling of the coronavirus, Chinese officials even insisted China had been “the most transparent”. Yet we have seen little if any real progress overall towards openness.

Lastly but not least, the Chinese public has the right to know what happened on that fatal night in Galwan, and how many were killed or injured.
As some people said online after the Indians who died had been honoured: shouldn’t the country at least acknowledge Chinese troops’ sacrifice?

Why it’s in China’s interests to reveal its death toll in India border clash

Silence over the number of Chinese soldiers killed or injured has not helped to resolve the dispute, and openness could serve China’s wider ambitions.

www.scmp.com

 

[Blackeyes90]

An Indian military contingent will take part in "Kavkaz 2020" ("Caucasus 2020"), strategic command-post exercise next month where various countries, including China and Pakistan, will also take part.

Far away from the border hostilities, militaries of India, China and Pakistan will be carrying out drills together in Russia next month.

An Indian military contingent will take part in "Kavkaz 2020" ("Caucasus 2020"), strategic command-post exercise next month where various countries, including China and Pakistan, will also take part.

The Indian contingent would include around 180 troops and officers from across infantry, artillery, mechanised, and armoured forces along with Special Forces, air defence and signals. The contingent would also include personnel from the Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force (IAF).

Sources said China is sending an army contingent and three ships as part of its naval deployment to the exercise.

The exercise to be held next month will include 19 counties including host Russia where over 12,500 troops will participate.

Other than the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) members, that include India, China, Pakistan, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, 11 other countries will be part of the exercise. The other nations included in the drills are Mongolia, Syria, Iran, Egypt, Belarus, Turkey, Armenia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.

The exercise will be held in Astrakhan region of South Russia between September 15 and 26.

The aim and scope of the exercise is to improve cooperation. The idea is for militaries to prepare for joint action with units of armies of foreign states.

All participating nations will be required to strictly follow Covid-19 protocols. After a Covid test, the participants will spend 14 days preceding the departure in quarantine and will be tested again on arrival in Russia.

The joint exercise is of immense significance as it comes amid the over three-month-long standoff between India and China at the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Despite several levels of dialogue, there has not been a breakthrough and the deadlock continues.

There have been several clashes between Indian and Chinese troops without the use of firearms and 20 Indian soldiers were killed in one of such melees in Galwan on June 15. There were casualties on the Chinese side but those were not made public by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of China.

Other than the tensions with China, Indian and Pakistani armies have been involved in frequent skirmishes at the Line of Control (LoC).

https://www.indiatoday.in/india/sto...rcise-in-russia-next-month-1714685-2020-08-25

 

[Blackeyes90]

Indian forces have deployed soldiers equipped with shoulder-fired air defence missiles on crucial heights near China border in eastern Ladakh.

“Indian forces have deployed troops armed with the Russian-origin Igla air defence system which can be used for thwarting enemy’s intent to enter into our air space,” government sources told India Today.

The Russian-origin air defence systems, used by the Indian Army and Air Force, are supposed to be used when the enemy fighter jets or choppers come close to own locations or deployments during hostilities.

These can bring down any enemy aircraft, including fighters and slow moving helicopters.

The Igla missiles are a potent threat for any enemy aircraft if they come close and using the heights, they can prove to be deadly for them, the government sources said.

The India side has enhanced its surveillance through the deployment of radars and surface to air missile systems to keep track of the enemy air movement there.

Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat on Monday said a military option to deal with transgressions by the Chinese Army in Ladakh is on but will be exercised only if talks between the two armies and the diplomatic option fail.

Indian and China have held multiple rounds of military talks which includes Lieutenant-General level talks.

https://www.indiatoday.in/india/sto...defence-missiles-in-ladakh-1714885-2020-08-25

 

[SHOX]

You could cut the tension with a knife there I suppose. The competition will be fierce.

 

[Nilgiri]

Interesting to see SCMP applying pressure on CCP for it. Lately SCMP has been more pro-CCP last decade or so.

 

[Nilgiri]

India doesnt have to actually do a blockade to begin with. Indian navy boarding vessels heading to chinese ports to perform regular checks on cargo and paperwork is enough to delay the timelines driving up the insurance costs many folds making air cargo more viable option.

In coming years we will see bureaucratic harassment of vessels heading to china which i think is the natural talent of indian red tape bureaucracy.

Yah this is somewhat what I was referring to earlier too. But % wise how much of the cross IOR traffic (i.e CHN to gulf and CHN to suez and CHN to RSA cape etc) stops at Indian ports? I don't think very many as bulk carriers and tankers are quite long range these days:

 

[SHOX]

Interesting to see SCMP applying pressure on CCP for it. Lately SCMP has been more pro-CCP last decade or so.

Why would you wanna be labelled as state sponsored media.

 

[Nilgiri]

Why would you wanna be labelled as state sponsored media.

Well they never went that far to get that kind of tag (and doubt they were headed that way even with the CCP brazen takeover of HK recently), but definitely heavily CCP influenced/edited compared to before lets say.

I remember reading SCMP from the 90s growing up in HK, it was very different newspaper back then. They ran lot of anti-CCP articles I remember and there was an overall looming fear of the handover and post-handover scenario.

 

[SHOX]

Well they never went that far to get that kind of tag (and doubt they were headed that way even with the CCP brazen takeover of HK recently), but definitely heavily CCP influenced/edited compared to before lets say.

I remember reading SCMP from the 90s growing up in HK, it was very different newspaper back then. They ran lot of anti-CCP articles I remember and there was an overall looming fear of the handover and post-handover scenario.

Who owns it ? Jack Ma ?