TR Propulsion Systems

That would be an ideal thing. I really hope these companies ensures solid economic stability rather than living on the edge.

Fire breaks out at TEI factory in Eskişehir

A fire broke out in the washing section of the TEI factory located in Eskişehir. Firefighters are currently battling the blaze. The incident occurred at the TEI factory operating in the Esentepe neighborhood.

According to reports, the fire started in the factory's washing section for an as yet undetermined reason. Upon notification to the 112 Emergency Call Center, more than five fire crews were dispatched to the scene. In addition to the crews that quickly arrived, the factory's own fire department also mobilized to bring the flames under control.


While intense firefighting efforts have been ongoing for about an hour, it is not yet known whether there have been any injuries or fatalities. Teams are continuing their efforts to bring the fire under control without interruption.

President of the Defense Industry, Prof. Dr. Haluk Görgün:

“The fire that broke out in the manufacturing section of our TEI campus in Eskişehir is being tackled from the air and land.

There have been no casualties. Teams are continuing their efforts to bring the fire under control.

Developments regarding this unfortunate incident will be shared with the public, and information other than official statements should not be trusted.

Our condolences to TEI and our defense industry family.”

Sabotage?

IC3M@N FX said:

Sabotage?

Click to expand...

Most likely , even if a fire broke out the people around would put it down before spreading ,
Thats the result when u keep inside the bordets 10+ million separatist scums of iranüc indian origin ,
We had to treat them at ww1 same as we did with armenians & greeks , now its too late , only WW3 will open the gate to face them since when massive war (WW3) start everybody will look after his own ass and economic sanctions and threats will not work anymore

I don’t think it went in that direction – that is, via Kurds, Syrians or Iranians of Indian descent. Ethnic background, in itself, says nothing about possible treason or sabotage. The former head of MKE wanted to sell the design and patent drawings (Construction drawings) for the MPT-76 rifle to the USA (US Company) at the time, and he was Turkish descent… and he was caught – so ethnicity is initially completely irrelevant when it comes to money or other forms of remuneration.

I am more inclined to believe it was a cyberattack involving a short circuit in the power supply (a cable fire); the Israelis are capable of compromising terrorists’ pagers and blowing them up by overloading them. It is therefore also possible to overload the power grid, for example, feeder lines – they simply need access via a cyberattack and infiltration.

At TAI, TEI, Aselsan, Roketsan and similar organisations, extremely strict security regulations apply to the recruitment and monitoring of staff – you are not vetted 100%, but 1000%. Family, background, financial situation and whereabouts over the last 10 years or more.
As soon as the alarm bells ring, the prospective employee (traitor) is politely turned away and blacklisted system wide.

It is precisely because of things like this that security regulations in Turkey are so strict.

You simply have to ask the logical questions: Who stands to gain from this fire in TEI? The US, Israel and Greece – no one else.

Of course, I can’t say for certain because there isn’t enough information, but you should expect a Cyberattack Sabotage.

PDR phase is completed for TF35000. The PDR closing meeting will convene soon. The CDR phase has started, and it is expected to be completed in 1.5 years, which means it will be completed by Q1 2028 if no delays happen. A technology demonstrator prototype will be assembled and tested. Later, in parallel with CDR progress, a more mature prototype will be put on the test cell. A mechanical fitting engine will be delivered to TUSAS by the end of 2029. Flight tests expected to start by the end of 2030. The first serial production Kaan (block 30) with national TF-35000 engine is expected to be delivered by the end of 2032 to Q1 2033.

TheInsider said:

PDR phase is completed for TF35000. The PDR closing meeting will convene soon. The CDR phase has started, and it is expected to be completed in 1.5 years, which means it will be completed by Q1 2028 if no delays happen. A technology demonstrator prototype will be assembled and tested. Later, in parallel with CDR progress, a more mature prototype will be put on the test cell. A mechanical fitting engine will be delivered to TUSAS by the end of 2029. Flight tests expected to start by the end of 2030. The first serial production Kaan (block 30) with national TF-35000 engine is expected to be delivered by the end of 2032 to Q1 2033.

Click to expand...

What are PDR and CDR?

TR_123456 said:

What are PDR and CDR?

Click to expand...

Preliminary design review and critical design review

Security cameras wired and not WiFi types need to be installed. A closed system that can't be hacked. Recordings need to be fed / saved in a locked vault guarded.

It was not so long ago that terrorists attacked one of our defense companies.

Saithan said:

Security cameras wired and not WiFi types need to be installed. A closed system that can't be hacked. Recordings need to be fed / saved in a locked vault guarded.

It was not so long ago that terrorists attacked one of our defense companies.

Click to expand...

An intranet is a private, secure computer network used exclusively by an organization's employees to share information, collaborate, and access computing services. It operates using the same standard internet protocols (TCP/IP) but restricts access to authorized users via firewalls and authentication barriers.

Information on how to infiltrate intranets has been shared in academic journals as articles. Therefore, intranets do not guarantee security.

Abstract​

The Industrial Control System (ICS) encompasses various control systems, industrial equipment, and instrumentation critical to manufacturing processes. As cyber threats have exponentially increased in recent years, large organizations allocate substantial portions of their budgets to safeguard sensitive information. One effective security measure is the use of air-gapped systems (isolated networks), which are intentionally isolated from unsecured networks. However, despite their perceived reliability and uniqueness, air-gapped systems (isolated networks) remain vulnerable to attack vectors that can lead to significant financial loss and physical damage. This paper explores various methods attackers use to establish covert channels to infiltrate or exfiltrate sensitive data from isolated ICS environments. These methods are categorized into acoustic, electromagnetic, optical, magnetic, power, and thermal techniques. Additionally, the paper presents realistic attack scenarios and offers countermeasures to prevent and detect data leakage in industrial air-gapped systems (isolated networks).

Bogeyman said:

An intranet is a private, secure computer network used exclusively by an organization's employees to share information, collaborate, and access computing services. It operates using the same standard internet protocols (TCP/IP) but restricts access to authorized users via firewalls and authentication barriers.

What is an Intranet? Definition, Benefits and Features

Learn what an intranet is, how it works, its benefits and shortcomings, and best practices for implementing and using one.

www.techtarget.com

Information on how to infiltrate intranets has been shared in academic journals as articles. Therefore, intranets do not guarantee security.

Abstract​

The Industrial Control System (ICS) encompasses various control systems, industrial equipment, and instrumentation critical to manufacturing processes. As cyber threats have exponentially increased in recent years, large organizations allocate substantial portions of their budgets to safeguard sensitive information. One effective security measure is the use of air-gapped systems (isolated networks), which are intentionally isolated from unsecured networks. However, despite their perceived reliability and uniqueness, air-gapped systems (isolated networks) remain vulnerable to attack vectors that can lead to significant financial loss and physical damage. This paper explores various methods attackers use to establish covert channels to infiltrate or exfiltrate sensitive data from isolated ICS environments. These methods are categorized into acoustic, electromagnetic, optical, magnetic, power, and thermal techniques. Additionally, the paper presents realistic attack scenarios and offers countermeasures to prevent and detect data leakage in industrial air-gapped systems (isolated networks).

A survey on malware attacks in industrial air-gap systems - International Journal of Information Security

The Industrial Control System (ICS) encompasses various control systems, industrial equipment, and instrumentation critical to manufacturing processes. As cyber threats have exponentially increased in recent years, large organizations allocate substantial portions of their budgets to safeguard...

link.springer.com

Click to expand...

Meanwhile, what I've written above reflects the technical realities of pre-2008. From 2008 onwards, the US developed the Stuxnet virus to cripple Iran's nuclear program. Even then, the virus identified vulnerabilities that professionals couldn't detect, causing mechanical destruction in centrifuges. Today, these capabilities can be used in the field by even highly skilled hacker groups through artificial intelligence language models.