Since 2009, China has become the
largest supplier of arms to Dhaka. At one point, estimates indicated that Chinese weapons made up
82 percent of the BAF’s total inventory. These include
Ming-class diesel electric attack submarines,
Shadhinota-class C13B corvettes,
MBT-2000 Type 90-II and
VT-5 light tanks,
HQ-7 short-range surface-to-air missiles, and dozens of
F-7BGI fighter interceptors, among other arms and equipment. Dhaka’s tank inventory is entirely of Chinese manufacture, showing its reliance on Beijing for its armaments. Beijing has also given Dhaka
permission to build a variety of Chinese small and light weapons.
Currently, Bangladesh is the world’s second-biggest purchaser of Chinese weapons, with two-thirds of its arms supplied by Beijing. Credit and soft loans facilitate these acquisitions.
Using Chinese technology, Bangladesh inaugurated a new naval base,
BNS Sheikh Hasina, near Pekua. This was the Bangladesh Navy’s first dedicated submarine base. Beijing has since regularly
facilitated officer training for the BAF to increase people-to-people ties in the defense sectors. This year, both countries conducted joint military drills, codenamed “
Golden Friendship-2024.” This counterterrorism exercise was the first-ever BAF-PLA joint exercise. Along with anti-hijacking exercises, the collaborative effort practiced
eliminating terrorist training camps.
As their cooperation grows to encompass joint exercises, notably in the naval domain, personnel training programs aimed at improving public awareness, and the construction of military infrastructure, the defense relationship between the two countries is transforming.
Keeping the Military Bond Strong
Several factors are behind Beijing’s successful defense cooperation and military diplomacy with Dhaka. Apart from the positive views of China that Bangladeshi officers derived from the Pakistan era, regime type, availability, cost, and geopolitical balance issues are substantial factors behind the emboldened defense ties.
China has been keen to sell arms irrespective of the recipient country’s internal
political situation. This was one of the reasons why Hasina, whose regime stood accused of corruption,
money laundering,
undermining democratic systems, human rights abuses, and
enforced disappearances, received arms from Beijing more readily than from any Western suppliers. Even the previous regime of Khaleda Zia, which faced
severe corruption allegations and had connections with
extremist outfits, embraced Beijing’s arms sales.
China also sells arms at a
cheaper cost than other countries and agrees to sell sophisticated weapons like drones, long-range missiles, and fighter jets. High-end technology at relatively low costs is desirable for a country like Bangladesh. The military allocates a weighty portion of its
military budget to personnel salaries, subsidies, pensions, and development initiatives. Therefore, for its new acquisitions, the BAF aims to purchase current equipment within a restricted budget.
The final reason for acquiring Chinese-made arms is geopolitical balance. Regardless of Bangladesh’s regime, India holds substantial geopolitical leverage over the country. Both share the world’s fifth-longest land border and close economic ties. Dhaka’s robust defense cooperation relations with Beijing functioned as a strategic
counterbalance, upholding the official foreign policy stance of friendship towards all. These factors served as the foundation for the forging of strong bilateral defense relations between the two countries.
Bangladesh’s Contemporary Strategic Needs
In addition to its internal problems, Bangladesh faces daunting external ones. The
Indian media is increasingly portraying Dhaka as a new threat to national security, causing growing concern. Recently, during high-level meetings of Indian Armed Forces commanders, Rajnath Singh, the defense minister of India, declared his
military readiness for war, mentioning the situation in Bangladesh alongside the ongoing wars in Gaza and Ukraine. New Delhi is also concerned about the possibility of Dhaka disbanding Hasina’s
security cooperation with India. The Indian Border Security Force has
a long history of border killings, making the situation considerably more
tense.
Meanwhile, the situation in Myanmar, Bangladesh’s other neighbor, remains ambiguous. Dhaka has yet to account for the shift of power in Myanmar’s Chin and Rakhine states, which border Bangladesh. Two main concerns relate to Myanmar. The
Kuki Chin National Front, a new insurgent group in Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts, is allegedly taking shelter in Myanmar and has
received training from Burmese rebels.
The
motivation of the Arakan Army (AA), which currently controls more than half of Rakhine State, is another cause for concern.
Growing tensions between the AA and the long-persecuted Rohingya, epitomized by the recent
attacks on Rohingya in Buthidaung, are troublesome for Dhaka. Armed Rohingya groups like the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army and Rohingya Solidarity Organization are
allegedly cooperating with Myanmar’s military, which only adds heat to the prevailing ethnic tensions. Moreover, there has been a
resurgence of Rohingya incursions into Bangladesh, compounding the already
chaotic conditions in the existing Rohingya refugee camps.
Regional developments appear to have led Dhaka to recognize that the BAF requires further upgrading to mitigate risks and escalation from both state and non-state actors. The BAF will need to acquire multiple updated systems to improve strategic deterrence.
Combating insurgency and conventional forces necessitates the adoption of assault helicopters and drones by the Army. These systems can carry out joint surveillance operations and accurately reveal the enemy’s positions and movements when paired with cutting-edge reconnaissance vehicles. To deter and prevent neighboring states like
Myanmar from regularly breaching Dhaka’s airspace, as it has done multiple times, the Air Force will need multi-role combat aircraft and medium- and long-range surface-to-air missiles. A more capable Navy, armed with diesel-electric submarines and frigates, could better patrol the country’s seas and safeguard its rich maritime resources.
China’s thus has an ideal opportunity to showcase its arsenal to the new interim government, just as it did when Hasina assumed office. Dhaka may consider buying arms from Beijing to bypass geopolitical problems and security concerns. This scenario is probable in light of the present circumstances and the over
10 percent drop in Bangladesh’s military procurement budgets this year. Meanwhile, the wars in Gaza and Ukraine are extending delivery times and limiting the quantity of Western defense exports, further giving China’s defense industry an advantage.
Beijing is likely to offer Dhaka a plethora of weapons and systems, including J-10C multirole combat aircraft, Z-10 attack helicopters, Wing Loong 1 attack drones, HQ-9 surface-to-air missiles, Yuan-class submarines, Type 054 frigates, and likely more.
As India’s influence diminishes and Western countries, particularly the United States, lack incentives such as low cost, rapid delivery, less accountability, and a legacy of familiarity, Beijing appears to have a potential advantage. This is true even though China lacks high-quality, battle-tested weapons, given that its military has not seen
combat since 1979. As a result, it is not surprising that the defense partnership between Beijing and Dhaka will strengthen in the coming days, with the former choosing to compromise quality over national security. That, in turn, presents an opportunity for China to enhance its influence in Bangladesh.
Beijing is keenly aware of the opportunities arising from the ouster of PM Sheikh Hasina, and will seek to strengthen its existing defense diplomacy with Dhaka.
thediplomat.com
www.tbsnews.net
