A New Route from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean
It is no longer enough to look at recent developments in the Middle East only through the Gaza war, developments in Syria, or tensions between Iran and Israel.
The real struggle is taking place along the routes that connect continents.
Where will energy flow? Which ports will handle trade? Through which route will the Gulf be connected to Europe? Who will have the final say in the Eastern Mediterranean? And who will guarantee the security of the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab?
Türkiye’s increasingly active diplomatic engagement with Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Palestine and Syria needs to be viewed in this broader context.
A New Equation in the Eastern Mediterranean
For years, Israel, Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration have been trying to establish an order in the Eastern Mediterranean that leaves Türkiye out.
Türkiye’s response, however, is not limited to military measures.
Hakan Fidan’s meetings with both sides of Libya’s civil conflict, followed by his visit to Egypt and his contacts with the head of Egyptian intelligence, and then his informal dinner with his Egyptian and Saudi counterparts, are all noteworthy.
What makes these meetings even more significant is that they are taking place at a time when Egypt’s possible accession to the
Mecca Alliance is being discussed.
The Palestinian map placed between Fidan and the Libyan Prime Minister during their meeting was another striking detail. Symbolically, it reflected the fact that the region’s problems can no longer be treated as completely separate issues.
When we add the recent high-level contacts with Lebanon, Palestine and Syria, a much larger picture begins to emerge.
Rather than simply responding to individual crises, Türkiye appears to be working towards a new regional balance stretching from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Red Sea.
The Real Issue Is the Corridors
It would be a mistake to see this struggle as being only about military alliances.
At its heart, it is about energy and trade routes.
The emerging alignment between India, the UAE, Israel and Greece, and the increasingly close relations between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Türkiye, need to be viewed together in this context.
One of the most important issues here is IMEC.
The project aims to connect India to the Eastern Mediterranean and then to Europe through the Gulf. It could also strengthen Israel’s economic and strategic position in the region.
But as Türkiye strengthens its relations with Egypt, Libya, Lebanon and Syria, projects designed to bypass Türkiye become much more difficult to implement.
In particular, if Türkiye, Egypt, Libya, Lebanon and Syria develop a common understanding on the Eastern Mediterranean, it could seriously undermine Israel’s strategy of containing and isolating Türkiye.
This is why Egypt’s possible accession to the Mecca Alliance matters not only from a military perspective, but also for the future of the Eastern Mediterranean.
The Corridors Ahead of Türkiye
The security problems in the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea have reminded the world of a simple truth: the security of trade routes is just as important as trade itself.
This is where Türkiye’s geography becomes a major advantage.
The Development Road aims to connect the Persian Gulf to Türkiye through Iraq and then to Europe. It is much more than a transportation project. It could bring together Gulf capital, Iraq’s geographic position and Türkiye’s routes into Europe along a single strategic corridor.
The Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, Iraq-Syria oil connections, Gulf-Ceyhan energy routes, the Zangezur Corridor and the Middle Corridor are also part of the same broader picture.
Even the historic Hejaz Railway carries an important lesson for today.
The Hejaz Railway was not built simply to transport people and goods. It became a strategic artery carrying the Ottoman Empire’s military logistics, communications, security and administrative power deep into the region.
The question today is still the same:
Who will build and protect the routes that connect the region?
Where Does the Power of Great Powers Come From?
Throughout history, one of the defining characteristics of great powers has been their ability to control not only territory, but also the flows moving through it.
(Trade routes and the Islamic World before Europeans' geographical explorations)
Once, all roads led to Rome. The Mongols secured the Silk Road and controlled a significant part of Eurasian trade. Britain built one of the world's greatest empires by controlling the seas and the routes of maritime commerce.
After the Second World War, the United States took over much of this role.
Today, however, we see the United States struggling to guarantee uninterrupted security at some of the world's most critical chokepoints, including the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.
At the same time, China is rebuilding a modern Silk Road through massive projects linking land and maritime routes.
This is exactly where Türkiye’s importance comes into focus.
As the world order changes, the value of countries located along major trade and energy routes increases.
The Ottoman Experience Tells the Same Story
Turkish history also shows the close relationship between trade routes and political power.
The changing routes of the Silk Road and Spice Route were among the developments that gradually weakened the Ottoman Empire’s economic and geopolitical weight.
Of course, the decline of the Ottoman Empire cannot be explained simply by changes in trade routes. Economic problems, the cost of wars, changes in the military system, administrative difficulties and major transformations in Europe were all part of the same story.
But the lesson is clear:
When a state loses its trade routes, it does not only lose money. It also loses geopolitical weight.
This is why Türkiye’s corridor policies today should not be seen merely as economic projects. Doing so would mean missing the bigger picture.
Where Is the Mecca Alliance Heading?
The Mecca Alliance should also be viewed in this context.
If it remains limited to military cooperation, its impact will be relatively narrow. But if it brings security, energy, economic, trade and transportation issues under the same framework, it could take on a much greater significance.
Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan each bring different strengths to the table, and those strengths complement one another.
Saudi Arabia has financial power, investment capacity and a global diplomatic and lobbying network.
Türkiye and Pakistan, meanwhile, have strong militaries, defense industries, military experience and significant strategic capabilities.
Egypt’s participation could change the balance even further.
Egypt would give the alliance a direct Eastern Mediterranean dimension.
Over time, such a structure could develop into a broader security network stretching across the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab, the Gulf and the Indian Ocean.
From security problems in Yemen and the Red Sea to Sudan and Somalia, from the stability of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Libya to the security of energy and trade routes, many of these issues could be addressed within the same strategic framework.
This is why seeing the Mecca Alliance simply as a military agreement would miss the bigger picture.
If developed in the right way, it could become a structure capable of reshaping the region’s security and economic order.
Türkiye’s Great Opportunity
Türkiye has two choices.
It can accept the place assigned to it within systems built by others.
Or it can connect the security, energy, transportation and trade networks within its own geography and become one of the architects of its own regional order.
This is why the Development Road, the Middle Corridor, energy routes, Eastern Mediterranean diplomacy and the Mecca Alliance should not be seen as separate issues.
They are all trying to answer the same question:
Who will stand at the center of the great flows of trade, energy and power between Europe and Asia?
Türkiye’s goal should not be merely to be a transit country that others pass through.
Türkiye should be a country that can shape the direction of those routes.
A Türkiye dependent on neither East nor West, seeking no one’s approval, capable of protecting itself, deterring its adversaries and having a say over the world’s most important energy and trade arteries.
That is the real issue.
Throughout history, great powers became great not only because of their armies, but because they had the power to determine how and where the world moved.
That is exactly the opportunity before Türkiye today:
To build its own security order, open its own trade routes and secure its own energy corridors.
If Türkiye succeeds in doing this, it will no longer be a country merely responding to regional developments. It will become one of the countries shaping the future of the region and the wider world.
