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Watched the whole thing just now....not much new to gleam for me past a few details I didn't know.
It just angered me again, why couldn't Nehru treat PRC seriously and credibly (especially after Tibet was fait accompli by them and Nehru recognised it and went with policy of panchsheel in supposed good faith).
WW2, Chinese civil war (resumption and resolution) and the Korean war were not unknown events by 1954 (even without panchsheel approach).
The whole thing could have been wrapped up and solidified by expansive demilitarised zone (given the topography) on both sides.
The relationship long term would have had so much potential to harness downstream too.
The ending part I dont agree with fully (i.e once 62 had happened and "legacy CCP" Zhou Enlai requested some DMZ again, and that would be sanctified this far downstream without question by "new CCP"...or even during the cold war era whenever PRC wanted to pressure India in some way). To me blood spilled has to be prevented altogether to keep CCP sniffing for it elsewhere....i.e 1962 should not have come to pass at all for it to be somewhat ironclad thing for later.
They really went hard at Nehru on this throughout (esp given hindsight is 20/20), but I think more Indians that knew of the issue should have kept speaking up and trying to convince him on it too...it wasn't some short stretch of time. So I think there is more to blame than just Nehru.
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Link
edition.cnn.com
When the United States, Japan, Australia and India first resuscitated their informal dialogue from a decade-long hiatus in late 2017, China was confident it would soon fail.
"It seems there is never a shortage of headline-grabbing ideas," Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said dismissively of the grouping in early 2018, months after it convened its first working-level meeting in Manila.
"They are like the sea foam in the Pacific or Indian Ocean: they may get some attention, but soon will dissipate," Wang concluded.
More than four years on, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue -- better known as "the Quad" -- is far from dissipating. Instead, it has only grown in momentum, profile and clout.
Convened around the mantra of promoting a "free and open Indo-Pacific," the four countries have held two naval exercises since 2020. Their leaders have assembled three times since last year -- including an in-person summit at the White House.
On Tuesday, the four leaders will meet face to face again in Tokyo. Their summit will be a highlight of Joe Biden's first trip to Asia as the US President, as he seeks to strengthen alliances and partnerships to counter China's growing influence in the region.
The renewed activity has seen China's initial scorn turn into alarm, with Beijing viewing the grouping as part of Washington's attempt to encircle the country with strategic and military allies. Wang, the foreign minister, has decried the grouping as an "Indo-Pacific NATO," accusing it of "trumpeting the Cold War mentality" and "stoking geopolitical rivalry."
"The Indo-Pacific strategy cooked up by the United States, in the name of 'freedom and openness,' is actually keen on forming cliques," Wang said Sunday as Biden wrapped up his trip to Seoul and headed to Tokyo.
"It claims that it intends to 'change China's surrounding environment,' but its purpose is to contain China and make Asia-Pacific countries serve as 'pawns' of US hegemony," Wang added.
China is alarmed by the Quad. But its threats are driving the group closer together | CNN
When the United States, Japan, Australia and India first resuscitated their informal dialogue from a decade-long hiatus in late 2017, China was confident it would soon fail.
When the United States, Japan, Australia and India first resuscitated their informal dialogue from a decade-long hiatus in late 2017, China was confident it would soon fail.
"It seems there is never a shortage of headline-grabbing ideas," Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said dismissively of the grouping in early 2018, months after it convened its first working-level meeting in Manila.
"They are like the sea foam in the Pacific or Indian Ocean: they may get some attention, but soon will dissipate," Wang concluded.
More than four years on, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue -- better known as "the Quad" -- is far from dissipating. Instead, it has only grown in momentum, profile and clout.
Convened around the mantra of promoting a "free and open Indo-Pacific," the four countries have held two naval exercises since 2020. Their leaders have assembled three times since last year -- including an in-person summit at the White House.
On Tuesday, the four leaders will meet face to face again in Tokyo. Their summit will be a highlight of Joe Biden's first trip to Asia as the US President, as he seeks to strengthen alliances and partnerships to counter China's growing influence in the region.
The renewed activity has seen China's initial scorn turn into alarm, with Beijing viewing the grouping as part of Washington's attempt to encircle the country with strategic and military allies. Wang, the foreign minister, has decried the grouping as an "Indo-Pacific NATO," accusing it of "trumpeting the Cold War mentality" and "stoking geopolitical rivalry."
"The Indo-Pacific strategy cooked up by the United States, in the name of 'freedom and openness,' is actually keen on forming cliques," Wang said Sunday as Biden wrapped up his trip to Seoul and headed to Tokyo.
"It claims that it intends to 'change China's surrounding environment,' but its purpose is to contain China and make Asia-Pacific countries serve as 'pawns' of US hegemony," Wang added.
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There is a good ocean arc between India and Australia to engage increasingly on for example.
A very strategic stretch of ocean.
Australia is also the closest developed nation of scale to India's proximity (especially with direct sea + air access)....that is crucial thing to expand upon I feel.
Ryder
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A deeper look into especially doklam:
MappingDoklam - org.au
ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre has built 3D satellite imagery— through the collection and analysis of new satellite imagery and using open-source datasets we have compiled (such as geolocated military & infrastructure positions) —to help assess current developments along the...
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One of the reasons was the PRC's own decision to isolate itself behind a wall of flinty rhetoric. These were the days when the Chinese behaved far more like today's North Koreans than their current demure statesmanlike attitudes (compared to the way they were, today they behave demure and reserved). This was when only one country in the world, not Soviet Russia, nor Mongolia, nor even North Korea supported them in all manner of ways, and that was Albania under Enver Hoxha.
As I said, that was not the China that people saw.
Again, some history intervenes.
In fact, the border territory known as North-East Frontier Agency, NEFA, was first explored by an adventurous Indian civil servant only in the mid-50s. At the time of the dispute peaking, and hostilities breaking out, in 1962, neither China knew its conquered domain Tibet fully, nor did India have complete knowledge of all of the NEFA region.
The administration of Assam was busy gathering ethnographic, geographic and trade information about the region. They would have advised strongly against anything other than intensive efforts at further exploration.
There is no evidence, to date, about this being a given element of the PRC dealings with its neighbours. Not until very recently was there much to be said about its relations with Nepal; Sikkim, a British protectorate on the sorts of terms that prevailed with the Khanate of Kalat, rather than the Indian states with which the United Kingdom had a subsidiary alliance relationship, was taken over while it watched, and subsequently, there were very hostile moves by the PRC; Burma/Myanmar was treated as hostile until the SLORC paid homage, again, less than twenty years ago; Laos and Vietnam are too well-known to require explanation; Japan has always been regarded as a criminal nation; North Korea and Kazakhstan, to some extent, Tajikistan, and Pakistan are the only countries where there have been friendly relations along mutual borders.
Nehru did get advice - it was confirmatory advice. B. N. Mullik, the storied very senior policeman who was Director IB at the time, and enjoyed great influence over Nehru, gave him the picture of an over-stretched, undermanned, less-than-competent force in occupation, faced by a hostile population and armed outbreaks in some parts, a dismal picture that Nehru, and, with him, the Indian Army shared.
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@Viva_vietnamm , interesting China considers India, Vietnam the two big winners
China-India Brief #206
June 18, 2022 - June 30, 2022
Centre on Asia and Globalisation
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy
Published Twice a Month
Guest Column
The last few months has seen the Chinese economy battered by a complex set of domestic-international challenges, including the intensifying great power competition with the United States, a domestic resurgence of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the devastating Russia-Ukraine war. This has accelerated the relocation of industries out of the Chinese mainland, contributing to a rising sense of anxiety within Chinese policy circles. Although the economic impact of this trend is often downplayed by the state-controlled media, there are growing domestic concerns that China’s industrial chain is losing ground and will face increasingly stiff competition from the emergence of new manufacturing centres around the region.
New Round of Industrial Transfer: The Reasons
Chinese commentators argue that unlike the labour-intensive industries (clothing, furniture, etc.) that relocated from China in the last decade, the latest pull-out appears to be dominated by technology-intensive industries. Three main reasons have been put forward to explain this trend:
First, this is part of the natural process of industrial transformation where low-value industries flow towards countries with lower labour and land costs. Second, challenges in the external environment such as geopolitics and the pandemic have made operating in China untenable, forcing many foreign-funded enterprises to opt for a “China+1” operation model. Third and most importantly, Sino-US trade frictions which have been intensifying since 2018, and have greatly impacted important sectors like electronic components. The US-China trade competition is viewed by some as the biggest driving force for multinational companies to leave China, with high-end manufacturing moving to the US and low-end industries relocating to Vietnam and India.
China sees two big winners: Vietnam and India
Chinese experts are of the opinion that in the past few years, the manufacturing capabilities of emerging economies like Vietnam, India, and Indonesia, have started to catch up with China. For example, while China used to be the global mobile phone manufacturing hub, accounting for 75% of the world’s mobile phone production in 2016, its share fell to 67.4% in 2021 as production centres began to move to alternative locations like India and Vietnam.
In the Chinese assessment, Vietnam has been the biggest beneficiary of this round of industrial transfer from China. Between 2019 and 2021, Vietnam's exports to the US increased by almost 25% to US$96.3 billion. Notably, the export of items like computers, electronic products and their parts exceeded US$10 billion, demonstrating the impressive growth of Vietnam’s high-tech manufacturing sector.
On the other hand, India has emerged as a key destination for low-value industries leaving China, particularly mobile phone manufacturers. Many have been attracted by India's low labour cost and high tariff policy. The supply chain of global brands like Samsung and Apple, as well as Chinese companies like Oppo, Vivo, Xiaomi, Lenovo, TCL, Haier, Midea and other electronics and home appliance industry chains have taken root in India.
“Cooperative Vietnam” v/s “Competitive India”
Undeniably, the outflow of industries will be a blow to the Chinese economy. However, some Chinese experts believe that the negative impact to China would be far less if these industries relocated to Vietnam rather than India. After all, Vietnam is constrained by a small domestic market, meaning that it could only play a minor role as a processing and transhipment hub in the global electronics industry chain. Thus, China need not feel threatened by the loss of manufacturing to Vietnam, and could still treat it as an extension/spill over of China's economic space, as an expansion of the international influence of China's industrial chain.
But the feeling is quite different when it comes to India. The South Asian giant, which is currently not quite a part of China-centric supply chain/network system but is set to maintain a higher economic growth rate than that of China for the foreseeable future, has an extended demographic dividend, a vast domestic market, an improving electronic industry chain, a more developed software and information industry, and language competencies in line with Europe and the United States. Unsurprisingly, Chinese experts see India as an imminent challenger to China’s position in the global supply chain and an adversary to be wary of.
Therefore, a popular view in China is that even though Vietnam may be a pain-point in the short term, India, which has ambitions of becoming a manufacturing great power, is a bigger threat to China in the long run. It is within this context that China should strive to “distinguish between friend and foe” (分清敌友) between a cooperative Vietnam and a competitive India.
Growing Competition, Rising Pessimism
In the light of the above discussion, the Chinese response to Apple’s recent decision to shift production of the current generation of iPhones from China to India is worth highlighting. A report in the Chinese media noted with concern how India’s share of Apple's global manufacturing capacity grew from 1.3% in 2020, to 3.1% in 2021, and is expected to reach 5% to 7% in 2022. The report cautioned that India may become the next regional centre of Apple's global industrial chain.
Apple’s strategic importance to the Chinese economy cannot be understated. Some credit Apple with helping China build an advanced and efficient consumer electronics industry chain and for boosting China's profile in strategic industries such as new materials, chip semiconductors, new energy vehicles, high-end equipment manufacturing, and big data. With Apple now transferring some of its businesses to India, will it allow the latter to establish an industrial system in direct competition with China? And will other international companies follow Apple’s lead and move their businesses from China to India? These are some of the critical questions doing the rounds in various discussion forums in China.
It is against this backdrop that Chinese discourse on India is getting increasingly critical. India is being blamed for being “opportunistic”, for exploiting the West’s anxiety vis-à-vis China to further its own interest. There are also allegations that India’s frequent high-level exchanges with Europe, Japan, US, Australia, are attempts to convince them to transfer their investment and technology from China to India.
Chinese observers are also very critical of what they refer to as India’s “replace/substitute Chinese industries” (对华产业替代) policy, aimed at “forcefully decoupling” Chinese and Indian economy. According to them, this policy has three objectives: the first is to replace ‘Made in China’ with ‘Made in India’; the second is to replace ‘Chinese capital’ with Indian or third-party capital; and the third is to replace the ‘US+West+China’ industrial cooperation model with the ‘US+West+India’ industrial cooperation model.
Adding to Beijing’s anxiety is the Biden administration’s unveiling of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) in June 2022, a new economic bloc of thirteen countries that includes India, and conspicuously, excludes China. According to Hu Shisheng, Director of the South Asia Institute at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, the realignment of supply chains (particularly innovation chains) between the US and India under the IPEF represents the single biggest challenge facing China and its economy. Hu believes that the Indian market has the potential to grow to a size on par with that of China’s in the future. Hence, if the new ‘US+West+India’ model does emerge, then critical supply chains could very well bypass China. This will deliver a blow to China’s power and position in the future digital economy and its ability to take advantage of the upcoming fourth wave of industrialization.
China’s course of action?
As evident from the writings of Chinese scholars, China’s policy priority at the moment is to prevent the formation of a US-India supply chain collaboration as the engine of fourth wave of industrialization. To achieve this, the view in Beijing is that China must pull India into the existing China-centred economic circuit (US+West+China) and forge a close China-India supply chain system. By tying India closely to China through economic and trade means, Beijing plans to prevent the ‘US+West+India’ industrial model from ever coming to fruition.
But even as China wants to win over India, it does not want to bear the strategic cost for it, nor offer any tangible benefit to India in return, which in Beijing’s view, would further aid India’s rise. Instead, it has developed a two-pronged strategy towards India. On the one hand, it contends that at a time when the US is employing various resources to attract India, Beijing will use the resources at its own disposal to contain India, including the disputed border, the Russia factor, and a highly efficient propaganda machinery to sow discord between India and the US. After all, India, in its pursuit of benefitting from the US and the West, cannot let China-India relations to decline all the way to the point of a large-scale conflict.
Worryingly, the present Chinese discourse on India is, in fact, very similar to that seen in the run up to the Galwan Valley clash in June 2020. Between late 2019 and early 2020, opinions like ‘India is an opportunist’, ‘India is seeking to replace China’, and ‘China should teach India a lesson’ were all gaining currency in China. There are echoes of that discourse today, suggesting that there is a possibility of China once again stirring up trouble at the LAC or taking other punitive actions against India in the coming days. The idea is to remind India not to stray too far into the US/Western camp or else face the possibility of military conflict.
On the other hand, China continues to try lure India into a tighter embrace, economically. To compensate for the shrinking space for bilateral trade and economic exchanges due to the conflict over territory, China has been keen to use various multilateral platforms such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the BRICS cooperation mechanism, etc., to nullify India’s decoupling tendencies, to reconstruct the China-India industrial chain and expand the fields of economic and trade cooperation between the two (including improving the quality of cross-border industrial chain financial services, promoting the signing of the China-India digital trade agreement and letting small and medium-sized enterprises become the main driving force for future bilateral economic cooperation). Most recently, the 14th BRICS Summit Beijing Declaration gave primacy to enhancing cooperation on supply chains, trade and investment flows, the role of MSMEs, and growing the digital economy partnership among the member nations.
Has China’s two-pronged strategy worked? As evident in the last two years, an active LAC or a looming threat of a large-scale China-India conflict has not been able to deter India from pursuing its economic interests or seizing opportunities arising out of the current flux in the international situation. Nor has the Modi government agreed so far to the Chinese proposition of delinking the border dispute from the rest of the relationship or creating a new economic ballast for stabilizing political ties. On the contrary, China’s approach has only created strong anti-China sentiment in India, pushed it further away from China, thereby making any kind of progress in China-India relations virtually impossible. Under present circumstances, it is highly unlikely that China can make much headway in its relations with India, without accommodating at least some of India’s long-held concerns or aspirations vis-à-vis China, be it in the realm of the disputed border, economy, South Asia or India’s membership of certain international organizations.
Antara Ghosal Singh is a Fellow at the Strategic Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. Her area of research includes China-India relations, China-India-US triangle, China in South Asia, Chinese foreign policy, China’s domestic development among others.
China-India Brief #206
June 18, 2022 - June 30, 2022
Centre on Asia and Globalisation
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy
Published Twice a Month
Guest Column
The last few months has seen the Chinese economy battered by a complex set of domestic-international challenges, including the intensifying great power competition with the United States, a domestic resurgence of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the devastating Russia-Ukraine war. This has accelerated the relocation of industries out of the Chinese mainland, contributing to a rising sense of anxiety within Chinese policy circles. Although the economic impact of this trend is often downplayed by the state-controlled media, there are growing domestic concerns that China’s industrial chain is losing ground and will face increasingly stiff competition from the emergence of new manufacturing centres around the region.
New Round of Industrial Transfer: The Reasons
Chinese commentators argue that unlike the labour-intensive industries (clothing, furniture, etc.) that relocated from China in the last decade, the latest pull-out appears to be dominated by technology-intensive industries. Three main reasons have been put forward to explain this trend:
First, this is part of the natural process of industrial transformation where low-value industries flow towards countries with lower labour and land costs. Second, challenges in the external environment such as geopolitics and the pandemic have made operating in China untenable, forcing many foreign-funded enterprises to opt for a “China+1” operation model. Third and most importantly, Sino-US trade frictions which have been intensifying since 2018, and have greatly impacted important sectors like electronic components. The US-China trade competition is viewed by some as the biggest driving force for multinational companies to leave China, with high-end manufacturing moving to the US and low-end industries relocating to Vietnam and India.
China sees two big winners: Vietnam and India
Chinese experts are of the opinion that in the past few years, the manufacturing capabilities of emerging economies like Vietnam, India, and Indonesia, have started to catch up with China. For example, while China used to be the global mobile phone manufacturing hub, accounting for 75% of the world’s mobile phone production in 2016, its share fell to 67.4% in 2021 as production centres began to move to alternative locations like India and Vietnam.
In the Chinese assessment, Vietnam has been the biggest beneficiary of this round of industrial transfer from China. Between 2019 and 2021, Vietnam's exports to the US increased by almost 25% to US$96.3 billion. Notably, the export of items like computers, electronic products and their parts exceeded US$10 billion, demonstrating the impressive growth of Vietnam’s high-tech manufacturing sector.
On the other hand, India has emerged as a key destination for low-value industries leaving China, particularly mobile phone manufacturers. Many have been attracted by India's low labour cost and high tariff policy. The supply chain of global brands like Samsung and Apple, as well as Chinese companies like Oppo, Vivo, Xiaomi, Lenovo, TCL, Haier, Midea and other electronics and home appliance industry chains have taken root in India.
“Cooperative Vietnam” v/s “Competitive India”
Undeniably, the outflow of industries will be a blow to the Chinese economy. However, some Chinese experts believe that the negative impact to China would be far less if these industries relocated to Vietnam rather than India. After all, Vietnam is constrained by a small domestic market, meaning that it could only play a minor role as a processing and transhipment hub in the global electronics industry chain. Thus, China need not feel threatened by the loss of manufacturing to Vietnam, and could still treat it as an extension/spill over of China's economic space, as an expansion of the international influence of China's industrial chain.
But the feeling is quite different when it comes to India. The South Asian giant, which is currently not quite a part of China-centric supply chain/network system but is set to maintain a higher economic growth rate than that of China for the foreseeable future, has an extended demographic dividend, a vast domestic market, an improving electronic industry chain, a more developed software and information industry, and language competencies in line with Europe and the United States. Unsurprisingly, Chinese experts see India as an imminent challenger to China’s position in the global supply chain and an adversary to be wary of.
Therefore, a popular view in China is that even though Vietnam may be a pain-point in the short term, India, which has ambitions of becoming a manufacturing great power, is a bigger threat to China in the long run. It is within this context that China should strive to “distinguish between friend and foe” (分清敌友) between a cooperative Vietnam and a competitive India.
Growing Competition, Rising Pessimism
In the light of the above discussion, the Chinese response to Apple’s recent decision to shift production of the current generation of iPhones from China to India is worth highlighting. A report in the Chinese media noted with concern how India’s share of Apple's global manufacturing capacity grew from 1.3% in 2020, to 3.1% in 2021, and is expected to reach 5% to 7% in 2022. The report cautioned that India may become the next regional centre of Apple's global industrial chain.
Apple’s strategic importance to the Chinese economy cannot be understated. Some credit Apple with helping China build an advanced and efficient consumer electronics industry chain and for boosting China's profile in strategic industries such as new materials, chip semiconductors, new energy vehicles, high-end equipment manufacturing, and big data. With Apple now transferring some of its businesses to India, will it allow the latter to establish an industrial system in direct competition with China? And will other international companies follow Apple’s lead and move their businesses from China to India? These are some of the critical questions doing the rounds in various discussion forums in China.
It is against this backdrop that Chinese discourse on India is getting increasingly critical. India is being blamed for being “opportunistic”, for exploiting the West’s anxiety vis-à-vis China to further its own interest. There are also allegations that India’s frequent high-level exchanges with Europe, Japan, US, Australia, are attempts to convince them to transfer their investment and technology from China to India.
Chinese observers are also very critical of what they refer to as India’s “replace/substitute Chinese industries” (对华产业替代) policy, aimed at “forcefully decoupling” Chinese and Indian economy. According to them, this policy has three objectives: the first is to replace ‘Made in China’ with ‘Made in India’; the second is to replace ‘Chinese capital’ with Indian or third-party capital; and the third is to replace the ‘US+West+China’ industrial cooperation model with the ‘US+West+India’ industrial cooperation model.
Adding to Beijing’s anxiety is the Biden administration’s unveiling of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) in June 2022, a new economic bloc of thirteen countries that includes India, and conspicuously, excludes China. According to Hu Shisheng, Director of the South Asia Institute at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, the realignment of supply chains (particularly innovation chains) between the US and India under the IPEF represents the single biggest challenge facing China and its economy. Hu believes that the Indian market has the potential to grow to a size on par with that of China’s in the future. Hence, if the new ‘US+West+India’ model does emerge, then critical supply chains could very well bypass China. This will deliver a blow to China’s power and position in the future digital economy and its ability to take advantage of the upcoming fourth wave of industrialization.
China’s course of action?
As evident from the writings of Chinese scholars, China’s policy priority at the moment is to prevent the formation of a US-India supply chain collaboration as the engine of fourth wave of industrialization. To achieve this, the view in Beijing is that China must pull India into the existing China-centred economic circuit (US+West+China) and forge a close China-India supply chain system. By tying India closely to China through economic and trade means, Beijing plans to prevent the ‘US+West+India’ industrial model from ever coming to fruition.
But even as China wants to win over India, it does not want to bear the strategic cost for it, nor offer any tangible benefit to India in return, which in Beijing’s view, would further aid India’s rise. Instead, it has developed a two-pronged strategy towards India. On the one hand, it contends that at a time when the US is employing various resources to attract India, Beijing will use the resources at its own disposal to contain India, including the disputed border, the Russia factor, and a highly efficient propaganda machinery to sow discord between India and the US. After all, India, in its pursuit of benefitting from the US and the West, cannot let China-India relations to decline all the way to the point of a large-scale conflict.
Worryingly, the present Chinese discourse on India is, in fact, very similar to that seen in the run up to the Galwan Valley clash in June 2020. Between late 2019 and early 2020, opinions like ‘India is an opportunist’, ‘India is seeking to replace China’, and ‘China should teach India a lesson’ were all gaining currency in China. There are echoes of that discourse today, suggesting that there is a possibility of China once again stirring up trouble at the LAC or taking other punitive actions against India in the coming days. The idea is to remind India not to stray too far into the US/Western camp or else face the possibility of military conflict.
On the other hand, China continues to try lure India into a tighter embrace, economically. To compensate for the shrinking space for bilateral trade and economic exchanges due to the conflict over territory, China has been keen to use various multilateral platforms such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the BRICS cooperation mechanism, etc., to nullify India’s decoupling tendencies, to reconstruct the China-India industrial chain and expand the fields of economic and trade cooperation between the two (including improving the quality of cross-border industrial chain financial services, promoting the signing of the China-India digital trade agreement and letting small and medium-sized enterprises become the main driving force for future bilateral economic cooperation). Most recently, the 14th BRICS Summit Beijing Declaration gave primacy to enhancing cooperation on supply chains, trade and investment flows, the role of MSMEs, and growing the digital economy partnership among the member nations.
Has China’s two-pronged strategy worked? As evident in the last two years, an active LAC or a looming threat of a large-scale China-India conflict has not been able to deter India from pursuing its economic interests or seizing opportunities arising out of the current flux in the international situation. Nor has the Modi government agreed so far to the Chinese proposition of delinking the border dispute from the rest of the relationship or creating a new economic ballast for stabilizing political ties. On the contrary, China’s approach has only created strong anti-China sentiment in India, pushed it further away from China, thereby making any kind of progress in China-India relations virtually impossible. Under present circumstances, it is highly unlikely that China can make much headway in its relations with India, without accommodating at least some of India’s long-held concerns or aspirations vis-à-vis China, be it in the realm of the disputed border, economy, South Asia or India’s membership of certain international organizations.
Antara Ghosal Singh is a Fellow at the Strategic Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. Her area of research includes China-India relations, China-India-US triangle, China in South Asia, Chinese foreign policy, China’s domestic development among others.
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CN's economy only look good when having support from its daddy US like in 1979. When daddy US slap sanction on CN, even Xiaomi boss also flee CN to VN to avoid 25% tariff
----------------
Xiaomi starts making smartphones in Vietnam
Xiaomi starts making smartphones in Vietnam
Xiaomi starts making smartphones in Vietnam China-based electronics company Xiaomi has invested in smartphone parts production in Vietnam as it competes against local market leader Samsung, reported Nikkei. Xiaomi plans to cater to the growing local demand for smartphones in Vietnam and...
defencehub.live
Jagdflieger
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It's the natural evolution of an economy - Initially China was in need for cheap industry and products to get a significant push, now it's e.g. India's or Vietnam's turn.
In many economic meetings this issue was already addressed by China from 2005 onward and respective steps had been initiated - due to Covid - a worldwide economic drawback has come up now - and is naturally also felt in China.
I was in Australia in 2018 and everyone was euphoric an happy with business - since then the Australian GDP has dropped around 10%, and is presently forecast to achieve the same GDP as in 2011, with a drop in GDP/capita of around 20% in 2022 compared to 2011.
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xizhimen
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Low end manufacturing will go to Xinjiang, Tibet , Qinghai.. before moving out of China.
Jagdflieger
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That too, but Chinese companies have also invested heavily in Vietnam for a good reason ....
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Not only cheap industry is moving out of CN but also high tech industry like chip plant (TSMC build chip plant in Singapore) due to trade war (US threaten to ASML to stop selling chip making gear to CN ).
Without DUV machines from ASML, I think CN may not able to make even 25nm chip.
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American officials are lobbying their Dutch counterparts to bar ASML from selling some of its older deep ultraviolet lithography, or DUV, systems, the people said. These machines are a generation behind cutting-edge but still the most common method in making certain less-advanced chips required by cars, phones, computers and even robots.
US Wants Dutch Supplier to Stop Selling Chipmaking Gear to China
(Bloomberg) -- The US is pushing the Netherlands to ban ASML Holding NV from selling to China mainstream technology essential in making a large chunk of the world’s chips, expanding its campaign to curb the country’s rise, according to people familiar with the matter.Most Read from...
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It will cost more money to build factories in Xinjiang, Tibet than in VN due to supply chains are around Shenzen - Guangxi, much closer to VN than Xinjiang. Not mentioning CN bosses (like Xiaomi) only can avoid 25% tariff when fleeing to VN.
Jagdflieger
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I don't know where you get your information from.
To build a factory in e.g. Tibet - the m2 cost is around 1500Rmb - furthermore the Chinese state is willing and able to subsidize any cost related to investments in it's "underdeveloped belt" - incl. land for free, plus incentives such as no tax for 10-15 years - ask e.g. VW in regards to their mega plant in Xinjiang.
These were the sort off plans discussed from 2005 onward - as how to attract investment towards these areas. And they have been huge so far.
China isn't a single state like e.g. Vietnam - but compare it's issues with Europe. So if e.g. a German company has it's HQ in Munich - doesn't prevent it from investing in Portugal or Greece if there is a market, independent of supply-chains. Whereas transportation logistic costs in Europe are far more expensive then in China. The population of Tibet/Xinjang and Sichuan is around 120% of Vietnam - and 80% are centered around 20 cities/towns.
Chinese investment towards Vietnam has more or less nothing to do with cheap labor costs - but to supply Vietnamese customers with products made in Vietnam
becoming an important employer and as such gaining influence in Vietnam - just as anywhere else.
It's great for any country to receive foreign investments - however in regards to electronics and IT (being fully automated manufacturing processes) it might be of interest to the respective city/province in regards to GDP and corporate taxes - but in view of creating jobs it's the least effective industry worldwide.
Vietnam is far more communist then China - it's laws are a huge minefield compared to China's law minefield, especially for foreign investors. So one needs to differentiate between the US momentarily propagating Vietnam as an investor-friendly country to the actual situation. If Vietnam doesn't bend to US requests in regards to "equal and fair competition" and democracy/freedom etc. the present positive economic outlook situation can turn rapidly.
That is also the main reason as to why most Western investors are still holding back and prefer to remain in China or view onto India.
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Yeah, but don't forget that Nike move to VN cos they accuse CN using Slave labour in Xinjiang, not mentioning Nike can't avoid 25% tariff if building a factory there.
VN is small country, we can't consume a large amount of goods like China, so most of factories in VN are built for exporting goods to EU-US.
Of course VN is not so friendly, we burned and looted factories and beat up people from Sing,JP,SK, Taiwan, CN etc during 2014 riots, but US need VN to contain CN now so US will not dare to make too much trouble for VN at least till CN lose in trade war.
German don't like VN cos our spy kidnapped some bad guys in German without sayign a word and make their police look like idiot (VN has a strong spy network in East German before 1990), but thats ok, German is just US's vassal state, she will not dare to make trouble for VN when US tell her not to make trouble.
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Germany accuses Vietnam of Cold War-style kidnapping of businessman
WOLFSBURG, Germany (Reuters) - Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel said on Friday Germany was considering measures against Vietnam for kidnapping a former oil executive and described the abduction, denied by Hanoi, as reminiscent of Cold War spy movies
Germany accuses Vietnam of Cold War-style kidnapping of businessman
Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel said on Friday Germany was considering measures against Vietnam for kidnapping a former oil executive and described the abduction, denied by Hanoi, as reminiscent of Cold War spy movies.
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