India Army Indian Army General Archive

[Marlii]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1730009789638549911

 

[Marlii]

AoN for procurement of two types of Anti-tank Munitions namely, Area Denial Munition (ADM) Type - 2 and Type-3
AoN for procurement of state-of-the-art Towed Gun System (TGS) 105mm has been granted which will become a mainstay of Artillery forces of Indian Army
AoN was also accorded for 155 mm Nubless projectile for use in 155 mm Artillery guns
AoN for procurement and integration of Automatic Target Tracker (ATT) and Digital Basaltic Computer (DBC) for T-90 Tanks under Buy (India) category
AoN for procurement of Medium Range Anti-Ship Missiles (MRAShM) for surface platform of Indian Navy
AoNs for procurement of Light Combat Helicopter (LCH) for Indian Air Force (IAF) & Indian Army and Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Mk 1A for IAF from Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL)
AoNs have also been accorded by the DAC for upgradation of Su-30 MKI Aircraft indigenously from HAL

 

[Joe Shearer]

AoN for procurement of state-of-the-art Towed Gun System (TGS) 105mm has been granted which will become a mainstay of Artillery forces of Indian Army

Hang on.
I thought that TGS was guided by their wanting the Israeli 155 mm howitzer.

 

[Nilgiri]

Hang on.
I thought that TGS was guided by their wanting the Israeli 155 mm howitzer.

Yeah its essentially ATAGS v2.0 (a lighter ATAGS variant, <15 tons) or barring that the Israeli ATHOS (or variant) likely will be licence produced under some JV since it already is less than 15 tons. IA is firm about this weight requirement.

Have to wait for details of this TGS program to shake out as to which route this actually takes in the end.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Yeah its essentially ATAGS v2.0 (a lighter ATAGS variant, <15 tons) or barring that the Israeli ATHOS (or variant) likely will be licence produced under some JV since it already is less than 15 tons. IA is firm about this weight requirement.

Have to wait for details of this TGS program to shake out as to which route this actually takes in the end.

This is disturbing.

First, for decades, you don't get guns. Everything winds down and the entire machinery and the people handling it look more and more tired.

Now, you get guns. You get all the guns you can want. So what would the natural way forward be?

Forgive me for thinking that the first impulse would be to fill up the gaps. That one would focus with steely determination on making viable formations, fit to fight tomorrow, not in 2045. That one would adopt every single piece of equipment that allows smooth and effective functioning at brigade level, at division level, at corps level. Heck, even at battalion/regiment level.

All this assuming that the Indian Army has completely lost its way, and cannot make its way forward to integrated battle groups, as a half-way house to service-level integration, and thence to integrated theatre commands, and instead, being a tired and frightened force, spends all its time trying to project whe .

Do notice that starting top downwards is not going to work. The reasons are simple. It will take time for the changes, for the knitting together of the three services and their unique capabilities. While that takes place, top to bottom, there is that entire interval when the lower-level formations, right down to a rifle squad, or a flight of fighter planes, or a squadron of small ships, are not operating at the necessary levels of capability and competence to hold their own against visible enemies.

Instead, it is vital to carefully revise doctrine (not re-write it, that takes too much time) and ensure that each ground level formation and its higher combinations is clear about the way that it would fight battles, and is equipped - fully - to fight those battles, the way the doctrine suggests that they should.

This is where the Indian Army comes out looking like the second-worst of the three services, the Air Force being the worst (it is the worst for very good reasons, but that cat is best skinned elsewhere, else-when). Instead of feverishly completing its levels of armament, at regiment, brigade and division level, finishing at Corps level, heck! instead of drilling with great focus at troop and battery level, our pundits in uniform keep looking feverishly for the best solution to each of the problems faced.

Does nobody in the military read history? Don't they remember that in 1940, the French were better equipped than the Germans, but had no doctrine with which to oppose what they would face in the next few weeks. It was German war-fighting doctrine that won, not their equipment.

If the artillery loses its way, for good reasons, a desire to get the best for the country, or bad, a hankering for dem d'ar lovely golden puppies, then we continue with the disarray that we have seen in contemporary military commanders.

 

[Nilgiri]

Forgive me for thinking that the first impulse would be to fill up the gaps.

They don't think in such useful ways. That's the whole root problem in a great many messes in India.

There isn't actual rational effective thinking when someone has come into some role of power and responsibility, the squandering we see in more visible apex continue in the less visible layers just underneath (that the apex surfaces from).

i.e to address an issue with thought, execution and then feedback to over time distill what is good and true and what is not (and be able to move onto more tasks and accomplish as many of them as possible in the end)....all with the interests of scarcity of human productive time (the greatest resource)....which must be cognitively and psychologically separated away from "larger time" rather than treated as equally infinite or near-infinite like we perceive the latter to be.

i.e The very deep understanding of what the definitions are regarding: human, productive and time to then have any real chance to put the 3 together cogently and set an example for larger society to harness and redeem its potential.

Rather a loop is created to use as much time as possible and launder some ideology or status signalling....to hoard and protect what you have in some zero-sum stratified way and "someone else will eventually deal with it or pick up the tab". The results are thus poor. Overall self-esteem and trust are lacking greatly as reality transmission speed is low.

The oasis of successes come about despite this when this whole thing got short-circuited someway....but it remains a large default burden in India.

 

[hellfire2006]

This is disturbing.

First, for decades, you don't get guns. Everything winds down and the entire machinery and the people handling it look more and more tired.

Now, you get guns. You get all the guns you can want. So what would the natural way forward be?

The people who make GSQR and PSQR are not competent enough.
The branch needing the equipment floats it's requirements and then RFI is sought from vendors for technical specifications of their equipment. suggestions are then sought from DGQA, DGMO, DRDO, EnC branch etc which will be responsible for operationalising and maintaining the equipment. The process may look well planned but there are many instances of the drafting branches producing conflicting requirements, overstating technical parameters ( stars wars type stuff) , constant ammendments made to the document to accomodate conflicting views. This makes army procurement a hot mess. Sometimes officers drafting the GSQR lack the technical experience and skill to comprehend the level of technological advancements made in the contemporary field hence time and time again requirements are modified to keep them upto date with whatever is being produced by the top tier nations.

Forgive me for thinking that the first impulse would be to fill up the gaps. That one would focus with steely determination on making viable formations, fit to fight tomorrow, not in 2045. That one would adopt every single piece of equipment that allows smooth and effective functioning at brigade level, at division level, at corps level. Heck, even at battalion/regiment level.

Standardisation was the norm till the 80s. All that was lost after we became embroiled in meaningless CI ops. Focus was given on meeting tactical requirements of the army rather than having a systems thinking approach at the operational level.

All this assuming that the Indian Army has completely lost its way, and cannot make its way forward to integrated battle groups, as a half-way house to service-level integration, and thence to integrated theatre commands, and instead, being a tired and frightened force, spends all its time trying to project whe .

Actually IBGs already exist with XVII corps. But IBGs will be meaningless unless we have modern equipment for network centric warfare. Since IBGs have less manpower the idea is to augment their fighting capabilities by introducing networked fire and maneuver elements within the formation. But we need to invest more in modernisation of our equipment especially self propelled artillery for that to be effective.

Do notice that starting top downwards is not going to work. The reasons are simple. It will take time for the changes, for the knitting together of the three services and their unique capabilities. While that takes place, top to bottom, there is that entire interval when the lower-level formations, right down to a rifle squad, or a flight of fighter planes, or a squadron of small ships, are not operating at the necessary levels of capability and competence to hold their own against visible enemies.

Navy is holding up pretty well in that regard. The force has made a very healthy transition to the 21st century thanks to a smart and resourceful leadership. They gave their entire time and effort towards creating a modern force capable of mutli spectrum operations on a theatre level which they indeed have demonstrated in TROPEX. Even post 26/11 navy refused to take up much of the role of patrolling and sea policing and instead asked the government to handover that role to the coast guard so that they could focus on the modernisation of their capital fleet. But army didn't have that luck and had to devote resources towards counter insurgency and policing operations.

Instead, it is vital to carefully revise doctrine (not re-write it, that takes too much time) and ensure that each ground level formation and its higher combinations is clear about the way that it would fight battles, and is equipped - fully - to fight those battles, the way the doctrine suggests that they should.

This is where the Indian Army comes out looking like the second-worst of the three services, the Air Force being the worst (it is the worst for very good reasons, but that cat is best skinned elsewhere, else-when). Instead of feverishly completing its levels of armament, at regiment, brigade and division level, finishing at Corps level, heck! instead of drilling with great focus at troop and battery level, our pundits in uniform keep looking feverishly for the best solution to each of the problems faced.

Our leadership dosen't seem to realise that investing in modernisation of the average soldier generates far more returns than procurement of big ticket items to augment fire power at the division corps level. The battles at the tactical level determine the outcome at the operational level.

Does nobody in the military read history? Don't they remember that in 1940, the French were better equipped than the Germans, but had no doctrine with which to oppose what they would face in the next few weeks. It was German war-fighting doctrine that won, not their equipment.

Germans came in inferior in numbers and quality , but with a superior mindset. They had thinkers like Heinz guderian and Eric Von Manstein in their ranks. We have no one to match that level of skill in the senior leadership.
Our army is still regarded as a very professional fighting force only because of the junior and mid level leadership which constantly innovates and enforces the highest standards of discipline and drill across the force. Senior leaders have lost their vision and foresight. They care more about career progression than their own troops. They don't even remember the Cheetwoode motto

If the artillery loses its way, for good reasons, a desire to get the best for

the country, or bad, a hankering for dem d'ar lovely golden puppies, then we continue with the disarray that we have seen in contemporary military commanders.

 

[Joe Shearer]

The people who make GSQR and PSQR are not competent enough.
The branch needing the equipment floats it's requirements and then RFI is sought from vendors for technical specifications of their equipment. suggestions are then sought from DGQA, DGMO, DRDO, EnC branch etc which will be responsible for operationalising and maintaining the equipment. The process may look well planned but there are many instances of the drafting branches producing conflicting requirements, overstating technical parameters ( stars wars type stuff) , constant ammendments made to the document to accomodate conflicting views. This makes army procurement a hot mess. Sometimes officers drafting the GSQR lack the technical experience and skill to comprehend the level of technological advancements made in the contemporary field hence time and time again requirements are modified to keep them upto date with whatever is being produced by the top tier nations.

Standardisation was the norm till the 80s. All that was lost after we became embroiled in meaningless CI ops. Focus was given on meeting tactical requirements of the army rather than having a systems thinking approach at the operational level.

Actually IBGs already exist with XVII corps. But IBGs will be meaningless unless we have modern equipment for network centric warfare. Since IBGs have less manpower the idea is to augment their fighting capabilities by introducing networked fire and maneuver elements within the formation. But we need to invest more in modernisation of our equipment especially self propelled artillery for that to be effective.

Navy is holding up pretty well in that regard. The force has made a very healthy transition to the 21st century thanks to a smart and resourceful leadership. They gave their entire time and effort towards creating a modern force capable of mutli spectrum operations on a theatre level which they indeed have demonstrated in TROPEX. Even post 26/11 navy refused to take up much of the role of patrolling and sea policing and instead asked the government to handover that role to the coast guard so that they could focus on the modernisation of their capital fleet. But army didn't have that luck and had to devote resources towards counter insurgency and policing operations.

Our leadership dosen't seem to realise that investing in modernisation of the average soldier generates far more returns than procurement of big ticket items to augment fire power at the division corps level. The battles at the tactical level determine the outcome at the operational level.

Germans came in inferior in numbers and quality , but with a superior mindset. They had thinkers like Heinz guderian and Eric Von Manstein in their ranks. We have no one to match that level of skill in the senior leadership.
Our army is still regarded as a very professional fighting force only because of the junior and mid level leadership which constantly innovates and enforces the highest standards of discipline and drill across the force. Senior leaders have lost their vision and foresight. They care more about career progression than their own troops. They don't even remember the Cheetwoode motto

Beautiful post.

I would like to keep up this conversation. That was not an ego trip; there is a plan of analysis.

Will return very shortly.

 

[Marlii]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1734574565060210816

 

[Afif]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1734574565060210816

Which model?

 

[Marlii]

Which model?

Sig 716i

 

[tereit]

Sig 716i
View attachment 63851

looks great.

 

[Marlii]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1734960755634544858

 

[Joe Shearer]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1734960755634544858

Overdue, but the Pinaka by itself is hopelessly overmatched. The Pakistan Army has missiles with 200 kms range, and can make mincemeat of rear echelons, logistics hubs and fixed point concentrations. Very worrying.

 

[Marlii]

Overdue, but the Pinaka by itself is hopelessly overmatched. The Pakistan Army has missiles with 200 kms range, and can make mincemeat of rear echelons, logistics hubs and fixed point concentrations. Very worrying.

Which missile?

 

[Joe Shearer]

Which missile?

Hatf 1A, Hatf1B, and Nasr are all up to 100 kms; Ghaznavi 200 kms.*

@Nilgiri, if you remember, Desert Fox wreaked carnage on our logistics and forming up place attacks.

* These are grouped under Tactical Ballistic Missiles, and are emphatically not either the full Ballistic Missiles, nor Cruise Missiles.

 

[Afif]

Hatf 1A, Hatf1B, and Nasr are all up to 100 kms; Ghaznavi 200 kms.*

I would say all of them are full fledged balistic missiles with much heavier payloads and more than cheap guided Rockets. Which means they are big and expensive and cannot be produced and used how Pinaka MBRL is fielded.

On the other hand, India also has its similar TBMs. Pralay, prahaar.


What India should really worry about, is Pakistan newly developed FATAH-1 & 2

Which seems to me very capable GMLRS with 140km and 250km range respectively. (Fatah-1 has been already developed and Fatah-2 is in active development)

(Fatah-2)

But if I am not mistaken DRDO is also developing similar ranged GMLRS.

 

[Marlii]

Hatf 1A, Hatf1B, and Nasr are all up to 100 kms; Ghaznavi 200 kms.*

@Nilgiri, if you remember, Desert Fox wreaked carnage on our logistics and forming up place attacks.

* These are grouped under Tactical Ballistic Missiles, and are emphatically not either the full Ballistic Missiles, nor Cruise Missiles.

Hatf1A is unguided and is best used as a terror weapon there are claims that Hatf1B has rectified all these issues but even in the most optimal case its still a 100Km missile. Nasr is a joke and ghaznavi a scud knockoff. Even then these missiles havent been made in numbers and are mainly used for nuclear delivery i believe. And the other hand we have no shortage of missiles in the case with pakistan.

 

[Joe Shearer]

DRDO?

I would say all of them are full fledged balistic missiles with much heavier payloads and more than cheap guided Rockets. Which means they are big and expensive and cannot be produced and used how Pinaka MBRL is fielded.

On the other hand, India also has its similar TBMs. Pralay, prahaar.


What India should really worry about, is Pakistan newly developed FATAH-1 & 2 View attachment 63877

Which seems to me very capable GMLRS with 140km and 250km range respectively. (Fatah-1 has been already developed and Fatah-2 is in active development)

View attachment 63878
(Fatah-2)

But if I am not mistaken DRDO is also developing similar ranged GMLRS.

I would say all of them are full fledged balistic missiles with much heavier payloads and more than cheap guided Rockets. Which means they are big and expensive and cannot be produced and used how Pinaka MBRL is fielded.

You may be right, Pakistan doesn't seem to have MBRLs, but I am assuming a worst case scenario, where the Pinaka competes with these devices.

 

[Afif]

@Nilgiri @Joe Shearer