Live Conflict Iran-Afghanistan tension

[Ecderha]

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https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1663916075346534408

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1663915949991370758

 

[Ecderha]

Does the taliban have any air defence? Because if they don't you would think these guys would be easy pickings for Iranian drones?

I do not know

 

[Agha Sher]

Does the taliban have any air defence? Because if they don't you would think these guys would be easy pickings for Iranian drones?

Most likely no. They said they would try to acquire some earlier this year but I think we have a hard time finding a seller. Potentially they acquired some MANPADS from the Ukrainian black market. However nothing sufficient or capable enough to deal with the drone threat

 

[YeşilVatan]

Does the taliban have any air defence? Because if they don't you would think these guys would be easy pickings for Iranian drones?

Not all drones are created equal. Iranian drones are makeshift home projects compared to an Anka or a TB-2. They are toys compared to cutting edge US stuff.

No precision strike capability = worthless against mobile targets. Taliban formations are mobile targets, they have little to no static targets like military bases or whatever AFAIK.

 

[Anastasius]

Not all drones are created equal. Iranian drones are makeshift home projects compared to an Anka or a TB-2. They are toys compared to cutting edge US stuff.

No precision strike capability = worthless against mobile targets. Taliban formations are mobile targets, they have little to no static targets like military bases or whatever AFAIK.

Yeah, funnily enough the Taliban is the one kind of opponent that Iranian suicide drones are not well-suited for. They are too mobile and don't have a lot or any significant military infrastructure to target.

 

[Agha Sher]

Iran cannot afford a major conflict with Afghanistan. They now that if they commit significant resources to the Afghan border, Israel will have a golden opportunity to strike them. Afghanistan knows this as well, thus, the government is being very aggressive with the Iranians.

 

[UkroTurk]

Talibs don't need air defense! Because they don't have strategic assets to secure

 

[Saiyan0321]

Hmmmm Quite frankly my views are different regarding this conflict and they may not be desirable for some but they are not absent reality. First of all the Iran-Taliban clash of 2023 stemmed from the historical issue regarding the distribution of the waters of the Helmand River. The Helmand river is the largest river within Afghanistan, cutting through the half the state and the main watershed of the Sistan Basin. The historical importance of this river cannot be understated as it supplied water to some of the most historic cities and the river along with its main tributary Arghandab were the main water supply to Qandahar. I would say the old Mughal and Persian province of Qandahar was bordered around the river as its boundary. Anyhow the Helmand is the main source of irrigation and energy supply to Afghanistan.

For iran, the river enters through the Sistan-Baluchistan border with Afghanistan and feeds the Hamouns. What are the Hamouns? The Hamouns are transboundary wetlands on the Iran-Afghan border made up of three lakes: Hamoun-e Helmand, which is entirely in Iran, Hamoun-e Sabari on the border, and Hamoun-e Puzak, almost entirely inside Afghanistan. The three lakes are linked and fed by water from the Helmand River. These great lakes have been present there for thousands of years, feeding the local civilization These lakes and wetlands once supported great plant and animal diversity in the Sistan Basin.

Afghanistan has looked to utilize the waters of Helmand River, since the large river, located 95% within Afghanistan and roughly constituting 40% of Afghanistan’s surface water, through building of dams, irrigation canal networks and barrages. Germany and Japan build some very old canals within Afghanistan in the late 1930s but the projects ended when they were defeated in WWII and post this disaster, Afghan government sought aid from US and the US firm Morrison-Knudsen was hired to build canals and roads along the southern Helmand-Arghandab valleys through the use of said aid and this was done in 1946. Half-way through rehabilitating old canals, Morrison-Knudsen suggested that to make the best use of the renovated water, a storage dam and reservoir should be built. In an effort to keep costs down, the work was done without first conducting surveys, which turned out to be a “fatal weakness” of the project according to a subsequent study by the US Agency for International Development. [1]

The Arghandab Dam was completed in 1952 and had a storage capacity of 388,000 acre-feet of water and after a few months, in april of 1953, the Kajaki Dam, seventy two miles upstream from Lashkar Gah was also completed, creating the most important water reservoir within Afghanistan. As with the Arghandab Dam, appropriate soil and topography studies were not conducted, even though a 1950 United Nations report had cast doubt on the economic soundness of the project and predicted negative environmental effects in the lower valley, including waterlogging and salinization downstream from the dam.[2]

Afghanistan’s water supply is derived from rain and melting glaciers. Three out of five of the country’s major rivers flow into neighboring countries. The Helmand is one of two that flow into Iran; the other is the Hari River. Two-thirds of Afghanistan’s water capacity of seventy-five billion cubic meters is surface water and the country has the capability to use only 25 to 30 percent of its river water flow. The dams and canals for irrigation schemes in the provinces of helmand, nimrooz and Kandahar have resulted in lower lake water levels and as a result the, Hamoun Lakes have nearly disappeared along with the birds and fishes upon which the local population once depended on for a living.

However, the combination of drought and water diversion for irrigation, including dykes on the Iran-Afghan border and four reservoirs Iran built in the province of Sistan-Baluchistan, have diverted water away from the Hamouns as well causing serious issue to the Lakes. Iran’s mismanagement has played a critical role as well since in 1983, Iran introduced an alien species of fish into the lake by the Iranian Fisheries Company causing devastation the eco system as the fish devoured all the reeds in the wetlands.[3]

Now the mismanagement of Iran and Afghanistan regarding the Helmand River is a long topic that deserves its own write-up but for better understanding the short summary would be that the dispute is very old. Disputes over water between Iran and Afghanistan date to the 1870 when Afghanistan was under British control. A British officer drew the Iran-Afghan border along the main branch of the Helmand River. In 1939, the Iranian government of Reza Shah Pahlavi and Mohammad Zahir Shah’s Afghanistan government signed a treaty on sharing the river’s waters, but the Afghans failed to ratify it. In 1948, another attempt to resolve the dispute began in Washington. Based on an American suggestion, a three-person commission was selected by Iran and Afghanistan to investigate the issue and recommend a settlement. On February 28, 1951, the Helmand River Delta Commission presented its report, recommending that Iran’s share of the Helmand waters amount to twenty-two cubic meters per second. Iran, however, rejected the report, asking for a larger share.[4] A long period of renegotiation ensued. Asadollah Alam, the Shah’s minister of court, wrote in his diaries in 1969 that Afghanistan had offered to provide more water, if Iran would give Afghanistan improved access to the Iranian ports at Chabahar and Bandar Abbas, as well as development assistance.[5] Four years later, in 1973, Iranian Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveida and Afghan Prime Minister Mohammad Musa Shafiq signed an accord that accepted the flow of water into Iran at twenty-two cubic meters per second with an option for Iran to purchase an additional four cubic meters per second in “normal” water years. In return, Iran agreed to allow the ports of Bandar Abbas and Chabahar to be available to Afghanistan without preconditions. However, this agreement was neither ratified nor fully implemented due to the political developments in both countries including a 1973 coup in Afghanistan, the 1979 Iranian revolution, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan that same year, and finally the rise of the Taliban in 1995 and then with the rise of the Afghan government and then the rise of the Taliban again. Absence of ratification creates many legal questions regarding enforceability yet both sides give the treaty a defacto recognition as despite sharing waters with each other, Iran and Afghanistan do not have any other significant water treaty and in absence of such a treaty, constant conflict is not in the interest of any party.

Now Iran has repeatedly accused Afghanistan of using the river as a political tool and as a means of punishing Iran for any mistreatment of Refugees whereas Afghanistan has accused Iran of using the Afghan Refugees as the sword of Damocles through mistreatment and forced repatriation to put undue pressure on Afghanistan and both sides through this back and forth have repeatedly diverted from the main issue which is the growing drought in the region and the immediate need for diplomatic discussions regarding water conservation and preservation to preserve the integrity of the Sistan Basin. While the Hamouns have suffered for decades due to the mismanagement of two states, most are quite unaware of their existence much less of their significance. As the drying of the Hamoun Lake created an economic crisis in the vicinity, thousands of villagers, left the area and moved to cities and the drying did not just impact the Iranian side but the Afghan Side as well and this downturn of the economic situation and loss of income from agriculture has resulted in the creation of smuggling rackets, drug trafficking and human trafficking which bodes ill for both sides and the neighboring countries of Iran and Afghanistan.[6]

This mistrust has grown rapidly. According to Mohsen Milani, executive director of the Center for Strategic and Diplomatic Studies at the University of South Florida, “there could be a popular backlash against Afghans in Iran if there is a perception that Kabul is blackmailing Tehran.”[7] In October 2015, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif was asked in a parliamentary session to press the Afghans for more water and

“to devote more time and attention to the issue of Hamouns.”

Zarif in turn promised that his ministry

“will do everything to ensure that the Hamouns’ water rights are upheld.”

He went on to say that

“the issue is not at all political, adding “restoring the Hamouns can
benefit everybody.”

Zarif added that “all cooperation and agreements with Afghanistan currently depend on this issue.”[8]

On the contrary Mr. Najeed Fahim, director of International Treaties and Conventions at the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and an expert on the legal aspects of Afghanistan’s transboundary waters, rejected Iranian media claims that Afghanistan does not respect Iran’s water rights.

“In the last 40 years Iran has taken several times more water than stipulated by the water treaty between the two countries,”[9]




And there you have it. Two countries are on the brink of a water conflict stemmed from decades of hostile behavior and absence of diplomatic acumen on both sides and while Afghanistan can claim that it has been embroiled in conflict for nearly a Century, Tehran cannot claim such an excuse nor can it ignore its own role in the destruction of the Hamoun Lakes however the instability within Afghanistan has also not made life easier for Iran which is why a democratic and stable Afghanistan was necessary for the region. Even the mishmash under Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani was more acceptable. Now the Taliban have a history of conflict with Iran and they have prioritized internal water needs for local legitimacy as opposed to international obligations as could be witnessed by the blockage of Kajaki Dam water in 1998-2001 during which Iran suffered a seriously damaging drought in the region. The history of the Salma Dam is fraught with deteriorating circumstances within Afghanistan and Iran. During the building of the Dam in 2011, the insurgents repeatedly targeted the dam causing massive delays and casualties. AdbulQudos Qayam, the governor of ChishtiSharif was assassinated along with his guards in 2010. He was a fierce advocate for the dam. The US forces deployed, along with the ANA helped with the construction of the dam however the larger perception within the ANA was that the Taliban, at the behest of Iran and being supplied by Iran to target the dam which is another evidence of interests and clandestine trade subverting all religious and regional notions. Dozens of engineers were targeted and many ANA and security officials died to build the dam. Ashraf Ghani was adamant that the dam should be built at all cost as it could hold 640 million cubic meters of water and generate 42 megawatts of energy but more importantly, irrigate 80,000 hectares of land. When it became functional, its importance was so great to the nearby region that Taliban, after capturing it in 2021, did not target the dam despite artillery shells falling here and there. An Afghan commander protecting the dam referred to Iran’s “interference” with the process, accusing “some circles in Iran” of desiring to blow up the dam, which will significantly reduce their share of the river’s water.[10] Shah Hussain Murtazawi, a deputy spokesman for the Afghan president, commented,

“the Salma Dam was constructed despite the efforts made by the enemy to disrupt it.”[11]

There is a lot of lack of trust here that needs to be covered and this has been a thorn in the relations between Afghanistan and Iran and thus we witnessed the incident.

On May 27th clashes broke out between both sides and there is little to no knowledge on how these clashes initiated as both sides blame each other. Iran has accused the Taliban of not having the understanding for International Borders and International Obligations whereas the Taliban was accused Iran of being bellicose and stated that they wish for de-escalation of the situation.

"The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan considers dialogue to be a reasonable way for any problem," Taliban Defense Ministry spokesman Enayatullah Khawarazmi said in a statement on May 28, referring to the official name of the Taliban's unrecognized government. "Making excuses for war and negative actions is not in the interest of any of the parties."[12]

Whereas Iran’s national police commander Brigadier-General Ahmadreza Radan stated the same day that "the border forces of the Islamic republic of Iran will decisively respond to any border trespassing and aggression, and the current authorities of Afghanistan must be held accountable for their unmeasured and contrary actions to international principles." However the officials have expressed the need for a diplomatic solution, with high-ranking security official Mohammad Ismail Kothari describing the dispute as "fighting between children of the same house" while rejecting that Tehran would resort to the "military option."[13]



The Taliban have struggled with international legitimacy and have looked to build ties with Tehran however Tehran has neither recognized the Taliban and the view the same with great skepticism.



Now the clashes happened and resulted in the Iranian Check Post being destroyed. First of all it is important to understand how these things function. Check Posts are targeted and could be destroyed in clashes. The Pak-Afghan Clashes have been happening since the 1950s and often times check posts are targeted even destroyed or occupied. Happens along the LOC in the Pak-India border however no side then declares the check post as their territory. Often the check posts are targeted resulting in and injury and loss of security forces and in the event it is destroyed, the security forces simply abandon it. In modern times, they may take an image here and there because of the simple reason that occupation of posts is neither of strategic consequence or tactical consequence and will be retaken the moment the host country counter attacks resulting in unnecessary losses defending an area that is just not worth defending. Terrorist operate to capture posts so that they can smuggle in a large number of items that will help their operations. Often posts are engaged by forces or terrorists to allow for smuggling of all kinds. For example the Iran posts around the Pak-Iran border are engaged sometimes and this is often by terrorists who are actually either bringing in a large shipment of smuggled which ranges from humans to weapons to fuels.[14] This is often done when they need to get the supplies across but feel that normal small time smuggling operations will be too costly and time consuming. Human Smuggling was heavily researched by my mother who wanted to bring in a strong law during Musharraf Era and in her research, she found out that large scale human smuggling operations, who can afford such, place two or three individuals with automatic weapons and tell them to engage the post on either Pakistan side or Iranian side and then post is engaged. The 10-15 individuals, if the post is big, are immediately engaged and enter into a defensive position and start counter attacking which continues for a few hours before the assailants vanish into darkness. The soldiers engaged stay within the post since the SOPs demand that you stay in defensive cover and counter-engage and not take any drastic steps like telling guys to move for pincer since you don’t have all the information nor how many are about to engage further nor how many are waiting for you to leave cover which is advantageous for the smugglers. They smugglers smuggle the humans and whisk away. A lot of times they just pay the guards and stuff. A lot of times, they become target practice. Remember, not all “Terrorists” killed across the border are “Terrorists”.

So this question of Afghanistan occupying Iranian territory are not believable. I have studied these conflicts on all sides of the borders. There is no occupation because there can’t be any occupation. It’s a flat arid terrain and rebuilding defensive positions against a counter attacking enemy is a nightmare in a small time frame is a nightmare especially when there are no natural defenses and the opponent has all the cards to play and rapidly quick deployment options. Flat terrain check posts are largely meant for patrolling and securing areas that are sensitive or for keeping movements in check. They are often connected to a central HQ from where all patrols take place. Larger number of troops are stationed on strategic posts like we see in the LOC or the Durand Line or on mountain hills where reinforcement against any engagement will not be able to respond quickly. These can number anywhere between 30 to 60 security personnel. So lets put to rest the Ghaurid fantasies.



So lets talk about responses. What is the Taliban response and whether their response is appropriate?

First it is important to understand that before the Taliban, the Afghan National Army was responsible for the defense of the country and this army was divided into about 7 corps in addition to force commands like the capital division and special commandos or the air force. Now first of all the ANA (Composed of all troops and border police) was 317000 on paper however many of them were Ghost Soldiers, [15] individuals that were either falsely mentioned on papers or were dead but their salaries were being collected by officers. Infact one study stated that a third of the army did not exist and the recruitment and yearly loss ratio was decreasing the number of actual troops as the recruitment was around 500-600 whereas the losses were 5000 average a year.[16] These were reported losses. You can’t have ghost soldiers with reported losses so clearly the loss was higher. Much higher than reported.

These Corps did not function as other army corps but were largely composed of brigades, formations of 600 or so individuals within the Afghan Army, who were under the control of local war lords. The ANA had a ridiculously high number of Generals which would often be hereditary as the local chieftains would bully the central government into awarding them to their candidate. This was rampant under Hamid Karzai but full credit to Ashraf Ghani, he tried to stop this but by the time, he put his foot down and wanted to reform the ANA, it was too late. The US was no longer interested, the ANA was corrupted and incapable beyond repair and the Taliban had made many inroads including those within the ANA as well as with tribal leaders. Around 2009ish, the US had this brilliant idea that stemmed from their dealing with Iraq, I think it was General Petraeus proposal that local militia groups be empowered to help secure Afghanistan and alleviate the burden on the nascent ANA and US did do that but what it created was a well-equipped militia men whose loyalty was more to their handler rather than to the central government. This weakened the writ of the Kabul government and enhanced the control of non-state elements over security and if these handlers were to change side then large tracts of strategic areas could immediately fall out of the hand of Afghanistan. The reason why I am telling this is to understand the state of the ANA and how the Taliban came to take over this army. As the influence of warlords grew, the central writ became weak and with US wrapping things up the Taliban started talking with these elders. They made inroads after inroads and formed a very powerful front that resulted in 60% of Afghanistan contested, 17% under the control of Taliban and the rest under the control of the government. This was the weakness that was exploited. The Quetta Shura played a serious role in utilizing this weakness supported and prompted by the ISI. So in August, even if we go by a generous estimate of 260K ANA, they surrendered, were massacred but surrendered as city after city just gave up. Where did these Corps go? Within the Taliban as they renamed them with Islamic names although the numbers and their nature remain the same like 203rd corp is still employed for the protection of Paktia, Ghazni, Gardez and other area. Let me highlight further. A 2016 report by the US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (Sigar) claimed that "neither the United States nor its Afghan allies know how many Afghan soldiers and police actually exist, how many are in fact available for duty, or, by extension, the true nature of their operational capabilities".

In a more recent report, Sigar expressed "serious concerns about the corrosive effects of corruption... and the questionable accuracy of data on the actual strength of the force".

Mr Payenda said that troops who did exist were often not paid on time, while there were leaders of government-backed militias who were "double-dipping" - taking their government wage, and then also accepting payments from the Taliban to give up without a fight.

"The whole feeling was, we cannot change this. This is how the parliament works, this is how the governors work. Everybody would say the stream is murky from the very top, meaning the very top is involved in this," he said.

He said he did not think former President Ashraf Ghani was "financially corrupt". Responding to accusations of corruption within the finance ministry, Mr Payenda said: "I agree with that to a certain extent but in these issues, absolutely not."

He added that the West was "part of" some of the failures in Afghanistan, and described the US and Nato's involvement in the country as "a great opportunity lost".[17]

By the time, the offensive was launched the Taliban largely controlled the handlers of the militia and generals of the ANA and Taliban was now suddenly in an alliance control of a trained, (even the weakest soldier programs produce decent soldiers and many in the ANA were trained in good soldier programs) army that had a lot of equipment. In 2022 the Taliban announced that they would reform and remake the army into a Grand Afghan Army.[18] The reformation is largely continuation of the ANA structure as the CORPS are still there and still as regional or warlord central and as time goes by, they brought in more and more individuals as the ANA soldiers also need to eat and feed their families. So do they have 300K army. No they don’t. Not even close but they do have an army and considering the supplies they have, it is strong enough to hold out for a small period of time thus we come to the response.

The Taliban response was quite frankly adequate considering the situation they find themselves in. No nation is giving the Taliban arms which means that their military supplies are largely dependent on smuggling, which they cant pay since they don’t have the funds for it and drugs is a way to get funds but not at the amount where you can arm a massive army and conflicts are a great way to burn through stored ammunition which would be heading slowly but surely towards their expiration and not to mention since regime change does not mean societal or system change, the corruption still exists which is why the, already precious, military stores are being found in different conflicts because arm dealers and corrupt individuals are selling military equipment. 7 billion dollars worth of gold mine and the Taliban are struggling to keep it under check. The reformation of a complex entity like the ANA is simply not possible especially for a government that is formed through conflict based alliances and lets not forget that Pakistan intelligence is heavily involved in Afghanistan especially after the loss of the Afghan government and the rise of the emirate and while the Pakistan military has no need for that equipment, it could easily use that and sell it to supply insurgent and terror groups.[19]

So in such a situation where you suddenly have a hostile neighbor engage you in a firefight and the ground soldiers, adhering to how Afghanistan has acted repeatedly in the past[20], what will you do? You cant stay quite as you need to prove to the people as well as the international community that you have legitimacy and capability to defend the nation. You show a display of power like sending mass troops by upping the ante and showing the opposition that you will engage in a larger conflict and on the other hand hold an olive branch. You throw the ball at the opposition court and Afghanistan has done this repeatedly especially with Pakistan giving Pakistan two options on whether they can engage and get embroiled in an objectiveless war or they stabilize their position and come to the table. For Pakistan most Pak-Afghan conflicts were based on fencing and Durand line issues and whenever such were engaged, Pakistan found a third form of response which was to act answer build up with buildup, respond with artillery and look to accomplish the objective at hand aka the fencing or the check post building. This actually worked well even with a recalcitrant and bellicose individual like Raziq but Iran does not have this option. There is no objective for Iran to take.

Lets get something clear. The Taliban cannot win a military engagement. They neither have the cohesiveness of command nor the military supplies necessary to fight a war. They may hold out and may create costs but they will be beaten back simply because they don’t have the supplies. Iran has a military industrial complex behind its military and International trade with economy and natural resources. It can engage another country for quite a long time. The Taliban can fight a small time engagement but they cannot and do not have the military equipment to fight any military engagement and will most likely give ground after ground before dispersing for guerilla tactics which is why we see the Taliban immediately extending and opening for talks as they are well aware of their own limitations. Taliban tactics is fine. Most likely this was soldier to soldier incident and my money is on smuggling cover which went bad. People are giving it a water spin but there is no evidence to suggest that water issue was the catalyst. Border post conflicts are hardly like that and probing conflicts to check the readiness of the enemy is not like this at all and very continuous.

On the other hand, Iran could respond with a buildup and could military respond with artillery and shelling at posts but pre-2021 you were dealing with a government, no matter how weak the government but a government with US in the country as a major stakeholder. So there were many channels you could use to de-escalate even a built up conflict but here you are dealing with a volatile organization that you don’t know much control could it exert if you escalate or on how much diplomacy can you employ which is especially true in case of Iran because despite the limited options available to Pakistan, Pakistan still has clandestine channels. Iran does not have that luxury and on top of this Iran would be aware that neither Pakistan nor the Gulf will look kindly on an aggressive Iran against Afghanistan especially Pakistan which would not look towards growing Iranian influence into Afghanistan very kindly. So escalation is a dangerous option that can backfire especially in absence of any objective that could be the center for argument. So de-escalation from Iran is a smart step.[21] Look Iran can fight and can “win” battles with Afghanistan but what will be the cost? Fact is that they just cant afford it and by afford I don’t mean they cant pay. They can pay just like I can buy an item but after purchase of said item, I will struggle financially thus just like that they can pay but it’s the afterwards that matter. Look there is a reason you have individuals going through tough examinations and competitive environment to reach top positions because you cannot be a fanboy or let emotions control you. You need to be calm and you need to keep a cool head. Both sides are deescalating which is good.[22]



Umm so question of airforce came up. The ANA did have an airforce, ANAF and it was quite active and effective and had a success rate of 88% when it came to targets which is pretty good but the US policy of shutting everything down and the fall of the ANA. The ANAF, which is now the Airforce of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, did not have fighter jets. It has attack helicopters as the ANA was largely meant to be counter-terror offensive driven rather than airstrikes across the border and jets would have raised many many eyebrows everywhere including in Washington. At the height of their operational capabilities they had 8000+ airforce personnel including all the engineers and about 145+ plans which largely included helicopters and fixed wing planes. Now, unlike the ANA, the Airforce was quite different and could actually be called a proper national force as they owed their allegiance to state rather than to local warlords or local generals which is why you rarely witnessed any improper or arbitrary action from the Afghan Air Force despite the fact that fencing caused a lot of conflicts within the border region. Why? Because they were the only force that were within state writ in contrast to many sectors of the ANA and the militia and they were effective as mentioned. When the Taliban did their offensive, they made it their mission to attack the airmen since they inflicted massive casualties to the Taliban. Whenever the Taliban would take a major city or cut off any supply, the ANA would either be cutoff or would be struggling and the airforce would bail them out. Taliban attacked Kunduz multiple times and multiple times, they would be driven out after impressive ingress. The point is that Taliban members did not like them and the airmen knew it but the Taliban wanted to make sure that they would have some form of serviceable airforce for the purpose of legitimacy as a proper armed force rather than rag tag group of terrorists and there is quite some thinking on this within the Taliban. So when base after base fell, the airmen had to run away as well since the doors to bases were being opened by their fellow army men and you cant stay in the air without a base to resupply in. They damaged many planes and then fled across the borders and many who couldn’t were killed however the Taliban wanted engineers to stay and issued orders against their killing but ground level soldiers do not listen. After they took control, they announced special amnesty scheme to airmen to rebuild the airforce and while they claim to have 70 operational helicopters, there is a lot of question on that number. By the time the US left there were about 131 planes which were operational and 25% of them were flown out in the 2021 conflict and many were damaged. Now it is possible that Taliban may have repaired them but airplanes require massive resources and equipment especially if said airforce is an entirely foreign construct. You don’t just need engineers. You need to have military trade. Without supplies, a modern army cannot function much less exist.

Amin Tarzi, an Afghan analyst does not have a rosy view at all on the situation of Afghan Air Force.

"I don't see the Taliban air force as something to worry about," said Amin Tarzi, director of Middle East Studies at the U.S. Marine Corps University. "If anything, it can become more symbolic….Despite the Taliban propaganda, this air force won't become a major threat to anyone in the region."

Tarzi says that even before the United States indicated it wanted to withdraw from Afghanistan by signing a peace agreement with the Taliban in February 2020, the Afghan Air Force was an anemic institution. He pointed out as critical deficiencies its overreliance on Western support, a lack of discipline, and an incapability to operate independently.

"The idea that the Afghan Air Force was intact and operational was erroneous," he said.[23]



So the Taliban Airforce is something that we cannot factor nor rely on when speaking of military engagement and the Taliban know this. Secondly as Taliban grow in power, they need to carve some form of central control especially when dealing with their neighbors. The 1973 water agreement, along with afghan treaties with its neighbors cannot be whisked away and if the Taliban want to display their legitimacy then they need to create a formal legal ministry that deals with the foreign ministry to work with, not just with Taliban’s own legitimacy but also with their treaty agreements but I am literally talking about an extremist group that believed in violence to adhere and understand International Law but they need it and they need it fast especially in their constant case for recognition. Sending in some mullah as an ambassador is not gonna work nor is ignoring these issues. They need an educated and well-read class to form and that in itself looks like a herculean task.

---

[1] A.I.D. Evaluation Special Study No. 18, The Helmand Valley Proj- ect in Afghanistan, US Agency for International Development, December 1983, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnaal028.pdf.
[2] John W. Whitney, “Geology, Water, and Wind in the Lower Helmand Basin, Southern Afghanistan,” Scientific Investigations Report 2006–5182, US Geological Survey, US Department of the Interior, 2006, http://pubs.usgs.gov/sir/2006/5182/pdf/SIR06-5182_508.pdf.
[3] United Nations Development Programme I. R. Iran, “Restoration and Sustainable Use of the Shared Sistan Basin: A Baseline Situation Analysis,” February 2005, http://www.undp.org/content/dam/iran/docs/News/2014/March%202014/Towards%20a%20solution%20for%20Iran’s%20dying%20wetlands/Hamoun%20Wetland/Hamoun%20Wetland%20Base-line%20Situation%20Analysis%202005.pdf.
[4] Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, “Foreign Re- lations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, Africa,” Vol. V, Department of State, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v05/d824.
[5] Alinaghi Alikhani, ed., The Shah and I (London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1991).
[6] Iran’s Presidential Center for Innovation and Technology Cooperation, “United States’ Support for Building Two Dams on the Helmand’s Main Branches,” http://www.citc.ir/?fkeyid=&siteid=1&pageid=134&newsview=1054
[7] Mohsen Milani, executive director of the Center for Strategic and Diplomatic Studies at the University of South Florida, interview with the Fatemeh Aman, July 2016
[8] “Zarif Left Majlis Fully Achieved,” Donya-e Eqtesad Daily, 2016, (Reporting on the parliament’s session attended also by Foreign Minister, Javad Zarif,) http://donya-e-eqtesad.com/SiteKhan/951717.
[9] Najeeb Fahim, director of International Treaties and Conventions at the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interview with Fatemeh Aman, July 2016.
[10] RFE/RL, Afghanistan Service, “Rashidi: Some Circles in Iran Want to Explode Salma Dam,” 2015, http://da.azadiradio.com/a/27406575.html.
[11] Hussein Sirat, “How Will Afghanistan provide Security for Large Economic Projects?” Deutsche Welle, http://goo.gl/vq3MxM.
[12] https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-taliban-water-dispute-/32435442.html
[13] Ibid, 12
[14] https://ifpnews.com/iran-foils-terrorist-attack-on-post-near-pakistan-border/
[15] https://www.dw.com/en/why-the-afghan-army-folded-to-the-taliban/a-58889507
[16] https://www.voanews.com/a/extremism...oops-killed-us-taliban-agreement/6193660.html
[17] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-59230564
[18] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/22/taliban-create-grand-army-afghanistan-old-regime-troops
[19] https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/us-weapons-afghanistan-taliban-kashmir-rcna67134
[20] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023...-afghan-iran-border-clashes-what-happens-next
[21] https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/...tan-border-calm-after-clash-interior-minister
[22] https://en.irna.ir/news/85127985/Taliban-will-never-violate-Iran-s-rights-Envoy
[23] https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-taliban-air-force-aircraft-helicopters-training/32427528.html

 

[Saiyan0321]

Lastly I would say that frankly Ashraf Ghani was wronged. He was a very intellectual man that wanted to bring reforms in Afghanistan, especially to the Afghanistan Army and he very readily realized two things. First that Afghanistan cannot sustain nor function with a recalcitrant Pakistan which has a massive influence in Afghanistan whereas Afghanistan has little counter-influence and secondly that Afghanistan needs to open itself as much as possible to all countries for it to function because a landlocked state with large arid areas needs a trade network to sustain itself and if US had backed Ghani and Pakistan had worked with him, then he could have actually brought proper reforms not just in the ANA but also within the Afghan Society. Pakistan is a massive player in Afghanistan and he knew this but we repeatedly undermined him and what resulted was that he lost legitimacy infront of his and his army which he wanted to reform. He became so weak that he couldn’t even influence to appointment of the Border police when raziq was killed as he wanted an experienced individual from the central commando corp, the commandoes that had seen a lot of action but the local chiefs wanted Tandoo khan, the brother to Raziq to inherit the title of “General”. The guy looks like a drug addict from the slums of Peshawar. This was, I think 2019-2020 and by then Ashraf had given up and had lost too much power and now we have a volatile alliance based organization of violence to deal with. I do not share the sentiments of Agha Sher that they will eventually morph into a proper government or that this will be good for Afghanistan. Yes a day of peace when compared to a century of conflict does look like hope but under the Taliban, it is not. I hope I am wrong but I don’t have high hopes. A-Team, a fine poster on PDF, who was bullied away thanks to morons, was right that dealing with Ghani is a million times better than dealing with the Taliban and while we haven’t had any clashes with the Taliban since they came to power, which could be due to the massive fence we built and the huge number of fortresses and check posts and nearly 110K to 150K Frontier Corp troops manning the border region. FC Baluchistan alone has 50K personnel and there are four wings to FC. Iran may have to do something similar as well.

Anyhow hopefully the post was helpful. All in all, I hope things are better and Taliban improve themselves but I just don’t see it happening.



Also P.S as for empires of past and who owned what region in the past. It doesn’t matter now. The present and the future are all that matters and hopeful nations look to the future. Its was very Bakhti and cringey of Indian twitter but they were kind of right when the Taliban posted images of offering prayers on their visit to the grave of Muhammad Ghori at Ghor and declared him the destroyer of somnath and the Indian twitter posted comparisons of a destroyed Ghor and a thriving Somnath, Gujrat. Yeah it was cringey and weird as hell but the underline was right that thousand year glories are thousand year ago glories. Today is all we have and tomorrow is all that matters.



Well forgive any mistakes or typos.

Some images for better understanding

@Nilgiri @Saithan @Agha Sher @GoatsMilk @TR_123456

 

[Nilgiri]

Hmmmm Quite frankly my views are different regarding this conflict and they may not be desirable for some but they are not absent reality. First of all the Iran-Taliban clash of 2023 stemmed from the historical issue regarding the distribution of the waters of the Helmand River. The Helmand river is the largest river within Afghanistan, cutting through the half the state and the main watershed of the Sistan Basin. The historical importance of this river cannot be understated as it supplied water to some of the most historic cities and the river along with its main tributary Arghandab were the main water supply to Qandahar. I would say the old Mughal and Persian province of Qandahar was bordered around the river as its boundary. Anyhow the Helmand is the main source of irrigation and energy supply to Afghanistan.

For iran, the river enters through the Sistan-Baluchistan border with Afghanistan and feeds the Hamouns. What are the Hamouns? The Hamouns are transboundary wetlands on the Iran-Afghan border made up of three lakes: Hamoun-e Helmand, which is entirely in Iran, Hamoun-e Sabari on the border, and Hamoun-e Puzak, almost entirely inside Afghanistan. The three lakes are linked and fed by water from the Helmand River. These great lakes have been present there for thousands of years, feeding the local civilization These lakes and wetlands once supported great plant and animal diversity in the Sistan Basin.

Afghanistan has looked to utilize the waters of Helmand River, since the large river, located 95% within Afghanistan and roughly constituting 40% of Afghanistan’s surface water, through building of dams, irrigation canal networks and barrages. Germany and Japan build some very old canals within Afghanistan in the late 1930s but the projects ended when they were defeated in WWII and post this disaster, Afghan government sought aid from US and the US firm Morrison-Knudsen was hired to build canals and roads along the southern Helmand-Arghandab valleys through the use of said aid and this was done in 1946. Half-way through rehabilitating old canals, Morrison-Knudsen suggested that to make the best use of the renovated water, a storage dam and reservoir should be built. In an effort to keep costs down, the work was done without first conducting surveys, which turned out to be a “fatal weakness” of the project according to a subsequent study by the US Agency for International Development. [1]

The Arghandab Dam was completed in 1952 and had a storage capacity of 388,000 acre-feet of water and after a few months, in april of 1953, the Kajaki Dam, seventy two miles upstream from Lashkar Gah was also completed, creating the most important water reservoir within Afghanistan. As with the Arghandab Dam, appropriate soil and topography studies were not conducted, even though a 1950 United Nations report had cast doubt on the economic soundness of the project and predicted negative environmental effects in the lower valley, including waterlogging and salinization downstream from the dam.[2]

Afghanistan’s water supply is derived from rain and melting glaciers. Three out of five of the country’s major rivers flow into neighboring countries. The Helmand is one of two that flow into Iran; the other is the Hari River. Two-thirds of Afghanistan’s water capacity of seventy-five billion cubic meters is surface water and the country has the capability to use only 25 to 30 percent of its river water flow. The dams and canals for irrigation schemes in the provinces of helmand, nimrooz and Kandahar have resulted in lower lake water levels and as a result the, Hamoun Lakes have nearly disappeared along with the birds and fishes upon which the local population once depended on for a living.

However, the combination of drought and water diversion for irrigation, including dykes on the Iran-Afghan border and four reservoirs Iran built in the province of Sistan-Baluchistan, have diverted water away from the Hamouns as well causing serious issue to the Lakes. Iran’s mismanagement has played a critical role as well since in 1983, Iran introduced an alien species of fish into the lake by the Iranian Fisheries Company causing devastation the eco system as the fish devoured all the reeds in the wetlands.[3]

Now the mismanagement of Iran and Afghanistan regarding the Helmand River is a long topic that deserves its own write-up but for better understanding the short summary would be that the dispute is very old. Disputes over water between Iran and Afghanistan date to the 1870 when Afghanistan was under British control. A British officer drew the Iran-Afghan border along the main branch of the Helmand River. In 1939, the Iranian government of Reza Shah Pahlavi and Mohammad Zahir Shah’s Afghanistan government signed a treaty on sharing the river’s waters, but the Afghans failed to ratify it. In 1948, another attempt to resolve the dispute began in Washington. Based on an American suggestion, a three-person commission was selected by Iran and Afghanistan to investigate the issue and recommend a settlement. On February 28, 1951, the Helmand River Delta Commission presented its report, recommending that Iran’s share of the Helmand waters amount to twenty-two cubic meters per second. Iran, however, rejected the report, asking for a larger share.[4] A long period of renegotiation ensued. Asadollah Alam, the Shah’s minister of court, wrote in his diaries in 1969 that Afghanistan had offered to provide more water, if Iran would give Afghanistan improved access to the Iranian ports at Chabahar and Bandar Abbas, as well as development assistance.[5] Four years later, in 1973, Iranian Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveida and Afghan Prime Minister Mohammad Musa Shafiq signed an accord that accepted the flow of water into Iran at twenty-two cubic meters per second with an option for Iran to purchase an additional four cubic meters per second in “normal” water years. In return, Iran agreed to allow the ports of Bandar Abbas and Chabahar to be available to Afghanistan without preconditions. However, this agreement was neither ratified nor fully implemented due to the political developments in both countries including a 1973 coup in Afghanistan, the 1979 Iranian revolution, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan that same year, and finally the rise of the Taliban in 1995 and then with the rise of the Afghan government and then the rise of the Taliban again. Absence of ratification creates many legal questions regarding enforceability yet both sides give the treaty a defacto recognition as despite sharing waters with each other, Iran and Afghanistan do not have any other significant water treaty and in absence of such a treaty, constant conflict is not in the interest of any party.

Now Iran has repeatedly accused Afghanistan of using the river as a political tool and as a means of punishing Iran for any mistreatment of Refugees whereas Afghanistan has accused Iran of using the Afghan Refugees as the sword of Damocles through mistreatment and forced repatriation to put undue pressure on Afghanistan and both sides through this back and forth have repeatedly diverted from the main issue which is the growing drought in the region and the immediate need for diplomatic discussions regarding water conservation and preservation to preserve the integrity of the Sistan Basin. While the Hamouns have suffered for decades due to the mismanagement of two states, most are quite unaware of their existence much less of their significance. As the drying of the Hamoun Lake created an economic crisis in the vicinity, thousands of villagers, left the area and moved to cities and the drying did not just impact the Iranian side but the Afghan Side as well and this downturn of the economic situation and loss of income from agriculture has resulted in the creation of smuggling rackets, drug trafficking and human trafficking which bodes ill for both sides and the neighboring countries of Iran and Afghanistan.[6]

This mistrust has grown rapidly. According to Mohsen Milani, executive director of the Center for Strategic and Diplomatic Studies at the University of South Florida, “there could be a popular backlash against Afghans in Iran if there is a perception that Kabul is blackmailing Tehran.”[7] In October 2015, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif was asked in a parliamentary session to press the Afghans for more water and

“to devote more time and attention to the issue of Hamouns.”

Zarif in turn promised that his ministry

“will do everything to ensure that the Hamouns’ water rights are upheld.”

He went on to say that

“the issue is not at all political, adding “restoring the Hamouns can
benefit everybody.”

Zarif added that “all cooperation and agreements with Afghanistan currently depend on this issue.”[8]

On the contrary Mr. Najeed Fahim, director of International Treaties and Conventions at the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and an expert on the legal aspects of Afghanistan’s transboundary waters, rejected Iranian media claims that Afghanistan does not respect Iran’s water rights.

“In the last 40 years Iran has taken several times more water than stipulated by the water treaty between the two countries,”[9]




And there you have it. Two countries are on the brink of a water conflict stemmed from decades of hostile behavior and absence of diplomatic acumen on both sides and while Afghanistan can claim that it has been embroiled in conflict for nearly a Century, Tehran cannot claim such an excuse nor can it ignore its own role in the destruction of the Hamoun Lakes however the instability within Afghanistan has also not made life easier for Iran which is why a democratic and stable Afghanistan was necessary for the region. Even the mishmash under Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani was more acceptable. Now the Taliban have a history of conflict with Iran and they have prioritized internal water needs for local legitimacy as opposed to international obligations as could be witnessed by the blockage of Kajaki Dam water in 1998-2001 during which Iran suffered a seriously damaging drought in the region. The history of the Salma Dam is fraught with deteriorating circumstances within Afghanistan and Iran. During the building of the Dam in 2011, the insurgents repeatedly targeted the dam causing massive delays and casualties. AdbulQudos Qayam, the governor of ChishtiSharif was assassinated along with his guards in 2010. He was a fierce advocate for the dam. The US forces deployed, along with the ANA helped with the construction of the dam however the larger perception within the ANA was that the Taliban, at the behest of Iran and being supplied by Iran to target the dam which is another evidence of interests and clandestine trade subverting all religious and regional notions. Dozens of engineers were targeted and many ANA and security officials died to build the dam. Ashraf Ghani was adamant that the dam should be built at all cost as it could hold 640 million cubic meters of water and generate 42 megawatts of energy but more importantly, irrigate 80,000 hectares of land. When it became functional, its importance was so great to the nearby region that Taliban, after capturing it in 2021, did not target the dam despite artillery shells falling here and there. An Afghan commander protecting the dam referred to Iran’s “interference” with the process, accusing “some circles in Iran” of desiring to blow up the dam, which will significantly reduce their share of the river’s water.[10] Shah Hussain Murtazawi, a deputy spokesman for the Afghan president, commented,

“the Salma Dam was constructed despite the efforts made by the enemy to disrupt it.”[11]

There is a lot of lack of trust here that needs to be covered and this has been a thorn in the relations between Afghanistan and Iran and thus we witnessed the incident.

On May 27th clashes broke out between both sides and there is little to no knowledge on how these clashes initiated as both sides blame each other. Iran has accused the Taliban of not having the understanding for International Borders and International Obligations whereas the Taliban was accused Iran of being bellicose and stated that they wish for de-escalation of the situation.

"The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan considers dialogue to be a reasonable way for any problem," Taliban Defense Ministry spokesman Enayatullah Khawarazmi said in a statement on May 28, referring to the official name of the Taliban's unrecognized government. "Making excuses for war and negative actions is not in the interest of any of the parties."[12]

Whereas Iran’s national police commander Brigadier-General Ahmadreza Radan stated the same day that "the border forces of the Islamic republic of Iran will decisively respond to any border trespassing and aggression, and the current authorities of Afghanistan must be held accountable for their unmeasured and contrary actions to international principles." However the officials have expressed the need for a diplomatic solution, with high-ranking security official Mohammad Ismail Kothari describing the dispute as "fighting between children of the same house" while rejecting that Tehran would resort to the "military option."[13]



The Taliban have struggled with international legitimacy and have looked to build ties with Tehran however Tehran has neither recognized the Taliban and the view the same with great skepticism.



Now the clashes happened and resulted in the Iranian Check Post being destroyed. First of all it is important to understand how these things function. Check Posts are targeted and could be destroyed in clashes. The Pak-Afghan Clashes have been happening since the 1950s and often times check posts are targeted even destroyed or occupied. Happens along the LOC in the Pak-India border however no side then declares the check post as their territory. Often the check posts are targeted resulting in and injury and loss of security forces and in the event it is destroyed, the security forces simply abandon it. In modern times, they may take an image here and there because of the simple reason that occupation of posts is neither of strategic consequence or tactical consequence and will be retaken the moment the host country counter attacks resulting in unnecessary losses defending an area that is just not worth defending. Terrorist operate to capture posts so that they can smuggle in a large number of items that will help their operations. Often posts are engaged by forces or terrorists to allow for smuggling of all kinds. For example the Iran posts around the Pak-Iran border are engaged sometimes and this is often by terrorists who are actually either bringing in a large shipment of smuggled which ranges from humans to weapons to fuels.[14] This is often done when they need to get the supplies across but feel that normal small time smuggling operations will be too costly and time consuming. Human Smuggling was heavily researched by my mother who wanted to bring in a strong law during Musharraf Era and in her research, she found out that large scale human smuggling operations, who can afford such, place two or three individuals with automatic weapons and tell them to engage the post on either Pakistan side or Iranian side and then post is engaged. The 10-15 individuals, if the post is big, are immediately engaged and enter into a defensive position and start counter attacking which continues for a few hours before the assailants vanish into darkness. The soldiers engaged stay within the post since the SOPs demand that you stay in defensive cover and counter-engage and not take any drastic steps like telling guys to move for pincer since you don’t have all the information nor how many are about to engage further nor how many are waiting for you to leave cover which is advantageous for the smugglers. They smugglers smuggle the humans and whisk away. A lot of times they just pay the guards and stuff. A lot of times, they become target practice. Remember, not all “Terrorists” killed across the border are “Terrorists”.

So this question of Afghanistan occupying Iranian territory are not believable. I have studied these conflicts on all sides of the borders. There is no occupation because there can’t be any occupation. It’s a flat arid terrain and rebuilding defensive positions against a counter attacking enemy is a nightmare in a small time frame is a nightmare especially when there are no natural defenses and the opponent has all the cards to play and rapidly quick deployment options. Flat terrain check posts are largely meant for patrolling and securing areas that are sensitive or for keeping movements in check. They are often connected to a central HQ from where all patrols take place. Larger number of troops are stationed on strategic posts like we see in the LOC or the Durand Line or on mountain hills where reinforcement against any engagement will not be able to respond quickly. These can number anywhere between 30 to 60 security personnel. So lets put to rest the Ghaurid fantasies.



So lets talk about responses. What is the Taliban response and whether their response is appropriate?

First it is important to understand that before the Taliban, the Afghan National Army was responsible for the defense of the country and this army was divided into about 7 corps in addition to force commands like the capital division and special commandos or the air force. Now first of all the ANA (Composed of all troops and border police) was 317000 on paper however many of them were Ghost Soldiers, [15] individuals that were either falsely mentioned on papers or were dead but their salaries were being collected by officers. Infact one study stated that a third of the army did not exist and the recruitment and yearly loss ratio was decreasing the number of actual troops as the recruitment was around 500-600 whereas the losses were 5000 average a year.[16] These were reported losses. You can’t have ghost soldiers with reported losses so clearly the loss was higher. Much higher than reported.

These Corps did not function as other army corps but were largely composed of brigades, formations of 600 or so individuals within the Afghan Army, who were under the control of local war lords. The ANA had a ridiculously high number of Generals which would often be hereditary as the local chieftains would bully the central government into awarding them to their candidate. This was rampant under Hamid Karzai but full credit to Ashraf Ghani, he tried to stop this but by the time, he put his foot down and wanted to reform the ANA, it was too late. The US was no longer interested, the ANA was corrupted and incapable beyond repair and the Taliban had made many inroads including those within the ANA as well as with tribal leaders. Around 2009ish, the US had this brilliant idea that stemmed from their dealing with Iraq, I think it was General Petraeus proposal that local militia groups be empowered to help secure Afghanistan and alleviate the burden on the nascent ANA and US did do that but what it created was a well-equipped militia men whose loyalty was more to their handler rather than to the central government. This weakened the writ of the Kabul government and enhanced the control of non-state elements over security and if these handlers were to change side then large tracts of strategic areas could immediately fall out of the hand of Afghanistan. The reason why I am telling this is to understand the state of the ANA and how the Taliban came to take over this army. As the influence of warlords grew, the central writ became weak and with US wrapping things up the Taliban started talking with these elders. They made inroads after inroads and formed a very powerful front that resulted in 60% of Afghanistan contested, 17% under the control of Taliban and the rest under the control of the government. This was the weakness that was exploited. The Quetta Shura played a serious role in utilizing this weakness supported and prompted by the ISI. So in August, even if we go by a generous estimate of 260K ANA, they surrendered, were massacred but surrendered as city after city just gave up. Where did these Corps go? Within the Taliban as they renamed them with Islamic names although the numbers and their nature remain the same like 203rd corp is still employed for the protection of Paktia, Ghazni, Gardez and other area. Let me highlight further. A 2016 report by the US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (Sigar) claimed that "neither the United States nor its Afghan allies know how many Afghan soldiers and police actually exist, how many are in fact available for duty, or, by extension, the true nature of their operational capabilities".

In a more recent report, Sigar expressed "serious concerns about the corrosive effects of corruption... and the questionable accuracy of data on the actual strength of the force".

Mr Payenda said that troops who did exist were often not paid on time, while there were leaders of government-backed militias who were "double-dipping" - taking their government wage, and then also accepting payments from the Taliban to give up without a fight.

"The whole feeling was, we cannot change this. This is how the parliament works, this is how the governors work. Everybody would say the stream is murky from the very top, meaning the very top is involved in this," he said.

He said he did not think former President Ashraf Ghani was "financially corrupt". Responding to accusations of corruption within the finance ministry, Mr Payenda said: "I agree with that to a certain extent but in these issues, absolutely not."

He added that the West was "part of" some of the failures in Afghanistan, and described the US and Nato's involvement in the country as "a great opportunity lost".[17]

By the time, the offensive was launched the Taliban largely controlled the handlers of the militia and generals of the ANA and Taliban was now suddenly in an alliance control of a trained, (even the weakest soldier programs produce decent soldiers and many in the ANA were trained in good soldier programs) army that had a lot of equipment. In 2022 the Taliban announced that they would reform and remake the army into a Grand Afghan Army.[18] The reformation is largely continuation of the ANA structure as the CORPS are still there and still as regional or warlord central and as time goes by, they brought in more and more individuals as the ANA soldiers also need to eat and feed their families. So do they have 300K army. No they don’t. Not even close but they do have an army and considering the supplies they have, it is strong enough to hold out for a small period of time thus we come to the response.

The Taliban response was quite frankly adequate considering the situation they find themselves in. No nation is giving the Taliban arms which means that their military supplies are largely dependent on smuggling, which they cant pay since they don’t have the funds for it and drugs is a way to get funds but not at the amount where you can arm a massive army and conflicts are a great way to burn through stored ammunition which would be heading slowly but surely towards their expiration and not to mention since regime change does not mean societal or system change, the corruption still exists which is why the, already precious, military stores are being found in different conflicts because arm dealers and corrupt individuals are selling military equipment. 7 billion dollars worth of gold mine and the Taliban are struggling to keep it under check. The reformation of a complex entity like the ANA is simply not possible especially for a government that is formed through conflict based alliances and lets not forget that Pakistan intelligence is heavily involved in Afghanistan especially after the loss of the Afghan government and the rise of the emirate and while the Pakistan military has no need for that equipment, it could easily use that and sell it to supply insurgent and terror groups.[19]

So in such a situation where you suddenly have a hostile neighbor engage you in a firefight and the ground soldiers, adhering to how Afghanistan has acted repeatedly in the past[20], what will you do? You cant stay quite as you need to prove to the people as well as the international community that you have legitimacy and capability to defend the nation. You show a display of power like sending mass troops by upping the ante and showing the opposition that you will engage in a larger conflict and on the other hand hold an olive branch. You throw the ball at the opposition court and Afghanistan has done this repeatedly especially with Pakistan giving Pakistan two options on whether they can engage and get embroiled in an objectiveless war or they stabilize their position and come to the table. For Pakistan most Pak-Afghan conflicts were based on fencing and Durand line issues and whenever such were engaged, Pakistan found a third form of response which was to act answer build up with buildup, respond with artillery and look to accomplish the objective at hand aka the fencing or the check post building. This actually worked well even with a recalcitrant and bellicose individual like Raziq but Iran does not have this option. There is no objective for Iran to take.

Lets get something clear. The Taliban cannot win a military engagement. They neither have the cohesiveness of command nor the military supplies necessary to fight a war. They may hold out and may create costs but they will be beaten back simply because they don’t have the supplies. Iran has a military industrial complex behind its military and International trade with economy and natural resources. It can engage another country for quite a long time. The Taliban can fight a small time engagement but they cannot and do not have the military equipment to fight any military engagement and will most likely give ground after ground before dispersing for guerilla tactics which is why we see the Taliban immediately extending and opening for talks as they are well aware of their own limitations. Taliban tactics is fine. Most likely this was soldier to soldier incident and my money is on smuggling cover which went bad. People are giving it a water spin but there is no evidence to suggest that water issue was the catalyst. Border post conflicts are hardly like that and probing conflicts to check the readiness of the enemy is not like this at all and very continuous.

On the other hand, Iran could respond with a buildup and could military respond with artillery and shelling at posts but pre-2021 you were dealing with a government, no matter how weak the government but a government with US in the country as a major stakeholder. So there were many channels you could use to de-escalate even a built up conflict but here you are dealing with a volatile organization that you don’t know much control could it exert if you escalate or on how much diplomacy can you employ which is especially true in case of Iran because despite the limited options available to Pakistan, Pakistan still has clandestine channels. Iran does not have that luxury and on top of this Iran would be aware that neither Pakistan nor the Gulf will look kindly on an aggressive Iran against Afghanistan especially Pakistan which would not look towards growing Iranian influence into Afghanistan very kindly. So escalation is a dangerous option that can backfire especially in absence of any objective that could be the center for argument. So de-escalation from Iran is a smart step.[21] Look Iran can fight and can “win” battles with Afghanistan but what will be the cost? Fact is that they just cant afford it and by afford I don’t mean they cant pay. They can pay just like I can buy an item but after purchase of said item, I will struggle financially thus just like that they can pay but it’s the afterwards that matter. Look there is a reason you have individuals going through tough examinations and competitive environment to reach top positions because you cannot be a fanboy or let emotions control you. You need to be calm and you need to keep a cool head. Both sides are deescalating which is good.[22]



Umm so question of airforce came up. The ANA did have an airforce, ANAF and it was quite active and effective and had a success rate of 88% when it came to targets which is pretty good but the US policy of shutting everything down and the fall of the ANA. The ANAF, which is now the Airforce of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, did not have fighter jets. It has attack helicopters as the ANA was largely meant to be counter-terror offensive driven rather than airstrikes across the border and jets would have raised many many eyebrows everywhere including in Washington. At the height of their operational capabilities they had 8000+ airforce personnel including all the engineers and about 145+ plans which largely included helicopters and fixed wing planes. Now, unlike the ANA, the Airforce was quite different and could actually be called a proper national force as they owed their allegiance to state rather than to local warlords or local generals which is why you rarely witnessed any improper or arbitrary action from the Afghan Air Force despite the fact that fencing caused a lot of conflicts within the border region. Why? Because they were the only force that were within state writ in contrast to many sectors of the ANA and the militia and they were effective as mentioned. When the Taliban did their offensive, they made it their mission to attack the airmen since they inflicted massive casualties to the Taliban. Whenever the Taliban would take a major city or cut off any supply, the ANA would either be cutoff or would be struggling and the airforce would bail them out. Taliban attacked Kunduz multiple times and multiple times, they would be driven out after impressive ingress. The point is that Taliban members did not like them and the airmen knew it but the Taliban wanted to make sure that they would have some form of serviceable airforce for the purpose of legitimacy as a proper armed force rather than rag tag group of terrorists and there is quite some thinking on this within the Taliban. So when base after base fell, the airmen had to run away as well since the doors to bases were being opened by their fellow army men and you cant stay in the air without a base to resupply in. They damaged many planes and then fled across the borders and many who couldn’t were killed however the Taliban wanted engineers to stay and issued orders against their killing but ground level soldiers do not listen. After they took control, they announced special amnesty scheme to airmen to rebuild the airforce and while they claim to have 70 operational helicopters, there is a lot of question on that number. By the time the US left there were about 131 planes which were operational and 25% of them were flown out in the 2021 conflict and many were damaged. Now it is possible that Taliban may have repaired them but airplanes require massive resources and equipment especially if said airforce is an entirely foreign construct. You don’t just need engineers. You need to have military trade. Without supplies, a modern army cannot function much less exist.

Amin Tarzi, an Afghan analyst does not have a rosy view at all on the situation of Afghan Air Force.

"I don't see the Taliban air force as something to worry about," said Amin Tarzi, director of Middle East Studies at the U.S. Marine Corps University. "If anything, it can become more symbolic….Despite the Taliban propaganda, this air force won't become a major threat to anyone in the region."

Tarzi says that even before the United States indicated it wanted to withdraw from Afghanistan by signing a peace agreement with the Taliban in February 2020, the Afghan Air Force was an anemic institution. He pointed out as critical deficiencies its overreliance on Western support, a lack of discipline, and an incapability to operate independently.

"The idea that the Afghan Air Force was intact and operational was erroneous," he said.[23]



So the Taliban Airforce is something that we cannot factor nor rely on when speaking of military engagement and the Taliban know this. Secondly as Taliban grow in power, they need to carve some form of central control especially when dealing with their neighbors. The 1973 water agreement, along with afghan treaties with its neighbors cannot be whisked away and if the Taliban want to display their legitimacy then they need to create a formal legal ministry that deals with the foreign ministry to work with, not just with Taliban’s own legitimacy but also with their treaty agreements but I am literally talking about an extremist group that believed in violence to adhere and understand International Law but they need it and they need it fast especially in their constant case for recognition. Sending in some mullah as an ambassador is not gonna work nor is ignoring these issues. They need an educated and well-read class to form and that in itself looks like a herculean task.

---

[1] A.I.D. Evaluation Special Study No. 18, The Helmand Valley Proj- ect in Afghanistan, US Agency for International Development, December 1983, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnaal028.pdf.
[2] John W. Whitney, “Geology, Water, and Wind in the Lower Helmand Basin, Southern Afghanistan,” Scientific Investigations Report 2006–5182, US Geological Survey, US Department of the Interior, 2006, http://pubs.usgs.gov/sir/2006/5182/pdf/SIR06-5182_508.pdf.
[3] United Nations Development Programme I. R. Iran, “Restoration and Sustainable Use of the Shared Sistan Basin: A Baseline Situation Analysis,” February 2005, http://www.undp.org/content/dam/iran/docs/News/2014/March%202014/Towards%20a%20solution%20for%20Iran’s%20dying%20wetlands/Hamoun%20Wetland/Hamoun%20Wetland%20Base-line%20Situation%20Analysis%202005.pdf.
[4] Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, “Foreign Re- lations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, Africa,” Vol. V, Department of State, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v05/d824.
[5] Alinaghi Alikhani, ed., The Shah and I (London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1991).
[6] Iran’s Presidential Center for Innovation and Technology Cooperation, “United States’ Support for Building Two Dams on the Helmand’s Main Branches,” http://www.citc.ir/?fkeyid=&siteid=1&pageid=134&newsview=1054
[7] Mohsen Milani, executive director of the Center for Strategic and Diplomatic Studies at the University of South Florida, interview with the Fatemeh Aman, July 2016
[8] “Zarif Left Majlis Fully Achieved,” Donya-e Eqtesad Daily, 2016, (Reporting on the parliament’s session attended also by Foreign Minister, Javad Zarif,) http://donya-e-eqtesad.com/SiteKhan/951717.
[9] Najeeb Fahim, director of International Treaties and Conventions at the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interview with Fatemeh Aman, July 2016.
[10] RFE/RL, Afghanistan Service, “Rashidi: Some Circles in Iran Want to Explode Salma Dam,” 2015, http://da.azadiradio.com/a/27406575.html.
[11] Hussein Sirat, “How Will Afghanistan provide Security for Large Economic Projects?” Deutsche Welle, http://goo.gl/vq3MxM.
[12] https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-taliban-water-dispute-/32435442.html
[13] Ibid, 12
[14] https://ifpnews.com/iran-foils-terrorist-attack-on-post-near-pakistan-border/
[15] https://www.dw.com/en/why-the-afghan-army-folded-to-the-taliban/a-58889507
[16] https://www.voanews.com/a/extremism...oops-killed-us-taliban-agreement/6193660.html
[17] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-59230564
[18] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/22/taliban-create-grand-army-afghanistan-old-regime-troops
[19] https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/us-weapons-afghanistan-taliban-kashmir-rcna67134
[20] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023...-afghan-iran-border-clashes-what-happens-next
[21] https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/...tan-border-calm-after-clash-interior-minister
[22] https://en.irna.ir/news/85127985/Taliban-will-never-violate-Iran-s-rights-Envoy
[23] https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-taliban-air-force-aircraft-helicopters-training/32427528.html

Its exactly the longer context to "Water war" that @Merzifonlu was looking for earlier.

He doubtless enjoyed reading your detailed take here as did my Persian friend who called it an "E-book" heh....along with earlier telling me why Iran is unlikely to escalate this conflict given number of Afghan refugees (~ 3 million at least) in Iran that the IRI regime does not want to antagonize.

It is much appreciated my friend. Thank you.

We shall stay tuned and watch for any further developments.

 

[Barry]

That's great stuff, mate.