Korea KF-X/ IF-X (KF-21) program

Chocopie

Contributor
South Korea Correspondent
Messages
528
Reactions
33 1,924
Nation of residence
Germany
Nation of origin
South Korea
Speaking of the Indonesian, is it someone hired by KAI, or transferred from PT. DI or any partner company from Indonesia?
Don't know the exact details. There were Korean conditions like age, seniority and experience level for the members of the Indonesian dispatch at KAI. Afaik those aren't directly hired by KAI as well.

During different development phases there were researchers from Indonesian science institutes, technicians from state-owned aerospace company PT DI and test-pilots from Indonesian Air Force.
Due to concerns from Lockheed and US gov their access was strictly controlled. No access to core domestic (AESA, IRST, EW jammers, EOTGP) development and US/European technology.


If you're interested, this opinion piece (hardcore conservative Segye Ilbo) with usefull security infos at KAI:

“Wait a minute, what is this USB?” Aftereffects of KF-21 data leak, where will it go?​

The domestically produced KF-21 fighter jet has once again become embroiled in controversy.

After controversy last year over the business feasibility study surrounding the initial mass production, an attempt to leak data arose when the related budget barely passed the National Assembly's deliberation.

According to the Defense Acquisition Program Administration on the 2nd, an Indonesian engineer working at Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) was caught trying to leak a portable storage device (USB) containing internal data related to the KF-21 on the 17th of last month.

1706964503989.jpeg

The KF-21 prototype is taking off for a test flight. Segye Ilbo file photo

This fact has been notified to the National Intelligence Service, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration, and the Defense Counterintelligence Command, and an investigation is underway.

KAI's stance is, “We understand that there is a lot of general data,” and “We have not discovered any military secrets to date,” but questions about the level of stored data and how it was leaked appear to be growing.

Given that this is a data leak incident that occurred at KF-21, which is a combination of many domestic and foreign companies, technologies, and systems, the ramifications are bound to be quite large.

This may act as an invisible obstacle not only in the development and performance improvement of the KF-21, but also in the export process.

◆Data leak attempt, why is it serious?

Regarding this incident, the defense industry at home and abroad is responding that it is difficult to understand.

Immediately after the 'Changwon Espionage Group' incident, which emerged shortly after the inauguration of the current government, security measures were greatly strengthened at defense companies in the Gyeongnam region.

KAI is no exception. Personnel entering and exiting KAI's headquarters and production plant located in Sacheon, Gyeongsangnam-do must undergo a search for all electronic devices capable of storing data and receive approval for use.

1706964527351.jpeg

The KF-21 prototype is being assembled at the Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) plant in Sacheon, Gyeongnam. Segye Ilbo file photo

Storage media control and access control systems are implemented in major systems to prevent external leaks and intrusions. By using the Mobile Terminal Management System (MDM), the import and export of personal portable devices is strictly controlled.

Even if you are a KAI employee, you may not have access to all facilities. KAI executives and employees have different permissions to access the headquarters in Sacheon.

These settings are divided into five or more security levels. It is known that only a few high-ranking executives have access to all facilities.

Indonesian technicians, with about 10 people, have access to far fewer places than KAI executives and employees. This means that access is very limited.

However, a significant amount of data was released from the USB. This raises the possibility that there may be a helper within KAI.

A government source said, “How could (the Indonesian engineer) have brought in the USB and stored the data?” and added, “Intelligence authorities have no choice but to keep in mind the possibility of the existence of an assistant.”


The type of data contained in the USB is also a problem. It is reported that the USB contained data such as KF-21 test flight results, avionics technology, and overseas source technology.

At the time of KF-21 development, Indonesia decided to receive one prototype and various technical data in exchange for paying about 1.6 trillion won, or 20% of the development cost.

According to this agreement, KAI distinguished between technologies that could be transferred to Indonesia and technologies that could not be transferred from the KF-21 design stage.

From the perspective of the technician who was caught trying to export the USB, there is little benefit to be gained from collecting the technical data to be transferred to Indonesia. There is a problem with non-payment of the contribution, but it can be taken over if paid. Technology that cannot be obtained in Korea is bound to become a target.

Technologies excluded from transfer to Indonesia include those imported from overseas and those that have export approval (E/L) issues in overseas original copyright countries. It is known that many of these technologies could be viewed even by Indonesian technical staff under controlled supervision.

It is possible that the person in question recognized the value of the technology that we control and transfer, given that the technician with the data on the USB has more knowledge and experience than other technicians as a senior among the personnel who stayed at KAI.


Some speculate that domestic active electronic scanning (AESA) radar technology may be included. However, the AESA radar has key data in the Agency for Defense Development (ADD), which is developing it. The core technology of the KF-21 avionics equipment has been protected.

1706964560575.jpeg

Domestic Active Electronically Scanning (AESA) radar to be mounted on the KF-21. Segye Ilbo file photo

However, there is a possibility that the USB contains a classification chart of the AESA radar and related avionics systems. This level of data may be useful for Indonesia, which lags behind in fighter jet development technology and has difficulty importing technology from the United States as an Islamic country.

The big problem is that this may not be the first attempt. Since development of the KF-21 system began in 2016, Indonesian engineers have stayed at KAI's headquarters and factory in Sacheon. We cannot rule out the possibility that there may have been data leaks in the past that KAI, the government, and military authorities were not aware of.

◆Risk of trust turning into distrust

This attempt to leak data may result in planting seeds of distrust in relationships between countries and companies surrounding KF-21.

In particular, problems may become more serious regarding the movements of foreign companies and government authorities related to the KF-21.

If their technology is included in the leak, there is a possibility that it will move in some form. Methods vary, from formal inquiries to direct investigations.

The ones receiving the most attention are Lockheed Martin and the U.S. government. Lockheed Martin, in charge of technical support for the KF-21, is said to have invested dozens of technologies in the KF-21 design stage.

1706964615463.jpeg

A pilot is preparing to disembark after completing a flight in the KF-21 prototype. Segye Ilbo file photo

A defense industry official said, “I understand that the U.S. government, including the Joint U.S. Military Affairs Group in Korea (JUSMAG-K), which is affiliated with the U.S. Embassy in Korea, is already making moves.”

In 2011, the United States sent an investigation team to conduct an intensive investigation after suspicions arose that South Korea had illegally removed the Tiger Eye sensor, a sensor for the F-15K fighter jet. During this process, Korean and U.S. officials engaged in an argument.

In this case, if American technology was contained in the USB in any form, there is a risk that it could develop into a diplomatic issue. If the United States raises questions about the investigation and follow-up of the incident, distrust may increase.

There is concern that this may lead to the risk that the US government's export approval will become more difficult than before or that approval will not be granted in the process of integrating additional US-made aviation weapons such as anti-radiation missiles into the KF-21.

This problem may also occur in the future KF-21 export process. When a third country's technology and shares are included in the fighter jet production process, the approval of the third country's government becomes a major variable in exports.

Saudi Arabia announced its intention to introduce 48 Typhoon fighter jets in 2018, but no progress was made due to Germany, one of the countries participating in the development, opposing Saudi exports. A representative example is that Germany recently changed its position and was able to pursue the introduction project only after five years. This is a case.

1706964629758.jpeg

American GE's F414 engine used in the KF-21. Provided by GE

The KF-21 includes equipment that requires US government export approval, such as engines and Link-16. This is not a situation where we can just say “there is no problem” regarding this incident.

The same goes for Europe. European companies are participating in the KF-21, including medium-range air-to-air missiles (MBDA, UK), short-range air-to-air missiles (Diehl Defence, Germany), and ejection seats (Martin Baker, UK).

Although they do not have the authority to force an investigation, the mere possibility that the technology for a product developed over a long period of time and a large sum of money may have been leaked without permission is bound to cause anxiety and distrust in these companies.

The gap of distrust in relations with Indonesia is expected to deepen further.

Indonesia is in arrears of about 1 trillion won as it has not properly paid its share of the project due to budget shortages. On the other hand, as France is taking steps such as introducing Rafale fighter jets and purchasing used Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets used by Qatar, there is considerable distrust in Korea regarding its willingness to participate in the KF-21 project.

1706964642460.jpeg

The fourth KF-21 prototype is undergoing test flights. Segye Ilbo file photo

Attempts to leak data in this situation run the risk of leading to fundamental skepticism about joint development with Indonesia. This is the part where it is pointed out that “Aren’t they just trying to acquire technology while maintaining the status of a joint development country while only paying the minimum contribution?”

The KF-21 is a state-of-the-art weapon with a complex mix of advanced technologies. The interests are that complicated. To maintain this, maintaining a high level of trust is essential. This is why I am very concerned about the ramifications of this leak attempt. Only a thorough investigation and measures to prevent recurrence can reduce this impact.

 
Last edited:

Chocopie

Contributor
South Korea Correspondent
Messages
528
Reactions
33 1,924
Nation of residence
Germany
Nation of origin
South Korea
Actually, we did.

Seriously, putting some ass-old machines and items in mostly empty halls isn't investing.

The cost of hight-tech machinery, CNC and composite matrix machines, aerospace tooling and equipment, industrial robots, IT data center, edge cloud computing and power distribution facilities for production lines goes into hundred of millions $ if you don't want to simply screwdrive imported parts together ...
 
Last edited:

Anmdt

Experienced member
Naval Specialist
Professional
Messages
5,157
Solutions
2
Reactions
97 22,991
Nation of residence
Turkey
Nation of origin
Turkey
Don't know the exact details. There were Korean conditions like age, seniority and experience level for the members of the Indonesian dispatch at KAI. Afaik those aren't directly hired by KAI as well.

During different development phases there were researchers from Indonesian science institutes, technicians from state-owned aerospace company PT DI and test-pilots from Indonesian Air Force.
Due to concerns from Lockheed and US gov their access was strictly controlled. No access to core domestic (AESA, IRST, EW jammers, EOTGP) development and US/European technology.


If you're interested, this opinion piece (hardcore conservative Segye Ilbo) with usefull security infos at KAI:

“Wait a minute, what is this USB?” Aftereffects of KF-21 data leak, where will it go?​

The domestically produced KF-21 fighter jet has once again become embroiled in controversy.

After controversy last year over the business feasibility study surrounding the initial mass production, an attempt to leak data arose when the related budget barely passed the National Assembly's deliberation.

According to the Defense Acquisition Program Administration on the 2nd, an Indonesian engineer working at Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) was caught trying to leak a portable storage device (USB) containing internal data related to the KF-21 on the 17th of last month.

View attachment 65277
The KF-21 prototype is taking off for a test flight. Segye Ilbo file photo

This fact has been notified to the National Intelligence Service, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration, and the Defense Counterintelligence Command, and an investigation is underway.

KAI's stance is, “We understand that there is a lot of general data,” and “We have not discovered any military secrets to date,” but questions about the level of stored data and how it was leaked appear to be growing.

Given that this is a data leak incident that occurred at KF-21, which is a combination of many domestic and foreign companies, technologies, and systems, the ramifications are bound to be quite large.

This may act as an invisible obstacle not only in the development and performance improvement of the KF-21, but also in the export process.

◆Data leak attempt, why is it serious?

Regarding this incident, the defense industry at home and abroad is responding that it is difficult to understand.

Immediately after the 'Changwon Espionage Group' incident, which emerged shortly after the inauguration of the current government, security measures were greatly strengthened at defense companies in the Gyeongnam region.

KAI is no exception. Personnel entering and exiting KAI's headquarters and production plant located in Sacheon, Gyeongsangnam-do must undergo a search for all electronic devices capable of storing data and receive approval for use.

View attachment 65278

The KF-21 prototype is being assembled at the Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) plant in Sacheon, Gyeongnam. Segye Ilbo file photo

Storage media control and access control systems are implemented in major systems to prevent external leaks and intrusions. By using the Mobile Terminal Management System (MDM), the import and export of personal portable devices is strictly controlled.

Even if you are a KAI employee, you may not have access to all facilities. KAI executives and employees have different permissions to access the headquarters in Sacheon.

These settings are divided into five or more security levels. It is known that only a few high-ranking executives have access to all facilities.

Indonesian technicians, with about 10 people, have access to far fewer places than KAI executives and employees. This means that access is very limited.

However, a significant amount of data was released from the USB. This raises the possibility that there may be a helper within KAI.

A government source said, “How could (the Indonesian engineer) have brought in the USB and stored the data?” and added, “Intelligence authorities have no choice but to keep in mind the possibility of the existence of an assistant.”


The type of data contained in the USB is also a problem. It is reported that the USB contained data such as KF-21 test flight results, avionics technology, and overseas source technology.

At the time of KF-21 development, Indonesia decided to receive one prototype and various technical data in exchange for paying about 1.6 trillion won, or 20% of the development cost.

According to this agreement, KAI distinguished between technologies that could be transferred to Indonesia and technologies that could not be transferred from the KF-21 design stage.

From the perspective of the technician who was caught trying to export the USB, there is little benefit to be gained from collecting the technical data to be transferred to Indonesia. There is a problem with non-payment of the contribution, but it can be taken over if paid. Technology that cannot be obtained in Korea is bound to become a target.

Technologies excluded from transfer to Indonesia include those imported from overseas and those that have export approval (E/L) issues in overseas original copyright countries. It is known that many of these technologies could be viewed even by Indonesian technical staff under controlled supervision.

It is possible that the person in question recognized the value of the technology that we control and transfer, given that the technician with the data on the USB has more knowledge and experience than other technicians as a senior among the personnel who stayed at KAI.


Some speculate that domestic active electronic scanning (AESA) radar technology may be included. However, the AESA radar has key data in the Agency for Defense Development (ADD), which is developing it. The core technology of the KF-21 avionics equipment has been protected.

View attachment 65279
Domestic Active Electronically Scanning (AESA) radar to be mounted on the KF-21. Segye Ilbo file photo

However, there is a possibility that the USB contains a classification chart of the AESA radar and related avionics systems. This level of data may be useful for Indonesia, which lags behind in fighter jet development technology and has difficulty importing technology from the United States as an Islamic country.

The big problem is that this may not be the first attempt. Since development of the KF-21 system began in 2016, Indonesian engineers have stayed at KAI's headquarters and factory in Sacheon. We cannot rule out the possibility that there may have been data leaks in the past that KAI, the government, and military authorities were not aware of.

◆Risk of trust turning into distrust

This attempt to leak data may result in planting seeds of distrust in relationships between countries and companies surrounding KF-21.

In particular, problems may become more serious regarding the movements of foreign companies and government authorities related to the KF-21.

If their technology is included in the leak, there is a possibility that it will move in some form. Methods vary, from formal inquiries to direct investigations.

The ones receiving the most attention are Lockheed Martin and the U.S. government. Lockheed Martin, in charge of technical support for the KF-21, is said to have invested dozens of technologies in the KF-21 design stage.

View attachment 65280
A pilot is preparing to disembark after completing a flight in the KF-21 prototype. Segye Ilbo file photo

A defense industry official said, “I understand that the U.S. government, including the Joint U.S. Military Affairs Group in Korea (JUSMAG-K), which is affiliated with the U.S. Embassy in Korea, is already making moves.”

In 2011, the United States sent an investigation team to conduct an intensive investigation after suspicions arose that South Korea had illegally removed the Tiger Eye sensor, a sensor for the F-15K fighter jet. During this process, Korean and U.S. officials engaged in an argument.

In this case, if American technology was contained in the USB in any form, there is a risk that it could develop into a diplomatic issue. If the United States raises questions about the investigation and follow-up of the incident, distrust may increase.

There is concern that this may lead to the risk that the US government's export approval will become more difficult than before or that approval will not be granted in the process of integrating additional US-made aviation weapons such as anti-radiation missiles into the KF-21.

This problem may also occur in the future KF-21 export process. When a third country's technology and shares are included in the fighter jet production process, the approval of the third country's government becomes a major variable in exports.

Saudi Arabia announced its intention to introduce 48 Typhoon fighter jets in 2018, but no progress was made due to Germany, one of the countries participating in the development, opposing Saudi exports. A representative example is that Germany recently changed its position and was able to pursue the introduction project only after five years. This is a case.

View attachment 65281
American GE's F414 engine used in the KF-21. Provided by GE

The KF-21 includes equipment that requires US government export approval, such as engines and Link-16. This is not a situation where we can just say “there is no problem” regarding this incident.

The same goes for Europe. European companies are participating in the KF-21, including medium-range air-to-air missiles (MBDA, UK), short-range air-to-air missiles (Diehl Defence, Germany), and ejection seats (Martin Baker, UK).

Although they do not have the authority to force an investigation, the mere possibility that the technology for a product developed over a long period of time and a large sum of money may have been leaked without permission is bound to cause anxiety and distrust in these companies.

The gap of distrust in relations with Indonesia is expected to deepen further.

Indonesia is in arrears of about 1 trillion won as it has not properly paid its share of the project due to budget shortages. On the other hand, as France is taking steps such as introducing Rafale fighter jets and purchasing used Mirage 2000-5 fighter jets used by Qatar, there is considerable distrust in Korea regarding its willingness to participate in the KF-21 project.

View attachment 65282
The fourth KF-21 prototype is undergoing test flights. Segye Ilbo file photo

Attempts to leak data in this situation run the risk of leading to fundamental skepticism about joint development with Indonesia. This is the part where it is pointed out that “Aren’t they just trying to acquire technology while maintaining the status of a joint development country while only paying the minimum contribution?”

The KF-21 is a state-of-the-art weapon with a complex mix of advanced technologies. The interests are that complicated. To maintain this, maintaining a high level of trust is essential. This is why I am very concerned about the ramifications of this leak attempt. Only a thorough investigation and measures to prevent recurrence can reduce this impact.

I have been involved in a few sensitive projects in the past (and not most of them were related to TR) and what I remember is that the USB or peripheral based transfers were rarely used, with encrypted drivers and under the supervision of a superior from management and another from IT, with some papers signed and only certain devices with matching ID - S/N would be recognised by the clients (and not all of them, only certain clients were capable of file transfer and used under supervision).

In common usage, all computers were configured to be clients with minimal amount of files are kept in temp and accessed from the servers, and the servers have a timestamped file system that shows the history of who accessed those files and when. This is mediocre enterprise data security measures imho.

If it was a highly sensitive part of the project, then there was no way to leak any data through peripherals, let alone be able to transfer anything out of the computers placed in the 'dark rooms', no internet, all connection ports are disabled from the hardware side, only mouse/keyboard with good old PS/2 works and a monitor, again I recall VGA, when DVI - HDMI was available it was left out.

So a USB does indeed sound like a clichéd way of smuggling data today, and doesn't seem quite realistic.

Few months ago an intern at Baykar was caught with several HDDs in the bag, in an attempt to leave facilities with them, later it has turned out to be a guy with some theft-related criminal history and with a motive to sell used-disposed-cleaned HDDs in the flea market. Yeah, nobody has quite bought the conclusion.
 

Chocopie

Contributor
South Korea Correspondent
Messages
528
Reactions
33 1,924
Nation of residence
Germany
Nation of origin
South Korea
I have been involved in a few sensitive projects in the past (and not most of them were related to TR) and what I remember is that the USB or peripheral based transfers were rarely used, with encrypted drivers and under the supervision of a superior from management and another from IT, with some papers signed and only certain devices with matching ID - S/N would be recognised by the clients (and not all of them, only certain clients were capable of file transfer and used under supervision).

In common usage, all computers were configured to be clients with minimal amount of files are kept in temp and accessed from the servers, and the servers have a timestamped file system that shows the history of who accessed those files and when. This is mediocre enterprise data security measures imho.

If it was a highly sensitive part of the project, then there was no way to leak any data through peripherals, let alone be able to transfer anything out of the computers placed in the 'dark rooms', no internet, all connection ports are disabled from the hardware side, only mouse/keyboard with good old PS/2 works and a monitor, again I recall VGA, when DVI - HDMI was available it was left out.

So a USB does indeed sound like a clichéd way of smuggling data today, and doesn't seem quite realistic.

Few months ago an intern at Baykar was caught with several HDDs in the bag, in an attempt to leave facilities with them, later it has turned out to be a guy with some theft-related criminal history and with a motive to sell used-disposed-cleaned HDDs in the flea market. Yeah, nobody has quite bought the conclusion.
Out of my head: Strict security measures at KAI for physical items and non-physical data regarding KFX were checked and certified by LockMart and US officials. They made a damn fuss about locking Indonesians out before agreed ToT if I remember correctly (after the first F-35 deal)

Therefore many observers suspect insider assistance from Koreans at KAI with higher security clearance. That would be a major breach and leak …
 

dBSPL

Experienced member
Think Tank Analyst
DefenceHub Ambassador
Messages
2,066
Reactions
78 10,702
Nation of residence
Turkey
Nation of origin
Turkey
Our Korean friends provide a lot of detailed information here, but I just realized from reading in a local agency that 40 aircraft will be produced per year in the early stage of mass production. This is a very significant production capacity. For Korean aviation industry to reach these capacities that can affect global markets is also very valuable for breaking the monopoly in combatant aviation in the world.
 

Anmdt

Experienced member
Naval Specialist
Professional
Messages
5,157
Solutions
2
Reactions
97 22,991
Nation of residence
Turkey
Nation of origin
Turkey
Therefore many observers suspect insider assistance from Koreans at KAI with higher security clearance. That would be a major breach and leak
But why? With promising future orders and interest in global market, not a strategic reliance on supply chain or personnel to Indonesia, not sufficient funding by Indonesia; why would these guys cooperate in smuggling of sensitive data to lure Indonesia in, that will put them at stake with no actual benefit to KAI or 3rd parties in Korea?

Or using those engineers as scapegoats of another bigger scheme (let's say by Chinese, N.K.) ? Or an alternative scheme to deepen the troubles between two countries and de-facto cease the contract? Like who benefits most out of these?
 

Spitfire9

Committed member
Messages
286
Reactions
6 372
Nation of residence
United Kingdom
Nation of origin
United Kingdom
I don't have any interest in conspiracy theory. If I did, I might say that ROK set up an Indonesian engineer to smuggle some data out of the plant. Why? So they could catch an Indonesian committing a security breach, giving ROK an excuse to end the partnership. It has already been asked how this engineer could have obtained the data without inside help. Elsewhere it has been alleged that there were flight test data on the USB.
 

dBSPL

Experienced member
Think Tank Analyst
DefenceHub Ambassador
Messages
2,066
Reactions
78 10,702
Nation of residence
Turkey
Nation of origin
Turkey
I don't have any interest in conspiracy theory. If I did, I might say that ROK set up an Indonesian engineer to smuggle some data out of the plant. Why? So they could catch an Indonesian committing a security breach, giving ROK an excuse to end the partnership. It has already been asked how this engineer could have obtained the data without inside help. Elsewhere it has been alleged that there were flight test data on the USB.
++ If I were a technology espionage agent, the last thing I would do is put these information on a USB stick and go to the airport gate.
 

Chocopie

Contributor
South Korea Correspondent
Messages
528
Reactions
33 1,924
Nation of residence
Germany
Nation of origin
South Korea
But why? With promising future orders and interest in global market, not a strategic reliance on supply chain or personnel to Indonesia, not sufficient funding by Indonesia; why would these guys cooperate in smuggling of sensitive data to lure Indonesia in, that will put them at stake with no actual benefit to KAI or 3rd parties in Korea?

Or using those engineers as scapegoats of another bigger scheme (let's say by Chinese, N.K.) ? Or an alternative scheme to deepen the troubles between two countries and de-facto cease the contract? Like who benefits most out of these?
The usual motivations for treason, whistleblowing and leaking confidential data: money, greed, women, debts, ideological or egoistic reasons …

It‘s human nature. There were several security breaches, hacking and espionage cases in Korean MIC in the past, will happen in the future as well.

Main staple of counterintelligence services
to detect them.
 
Last edited:

Chocopie

Contributor
South Korea Correspondent
Messages
528
Reactions
33 1,924
Nation of residence
Germany
Nation of origin
South Korea
Our Korean friends provide a lot of detailed information here, but I just realized from reading in a local agency that 40 aircraft will be produced per year in the early stage of mass production. This is a very significant production capacity. For Korean aviation industry to reach these capacities that can affect global markets is also very valuable for breaking the monopoly in combatant aviation in the world.
Serial production capacity are estimated
2-3 KF-21per month and 24+ units a year.
 
Last edited:

Chocopie

Contributor
South Korea Correspondent
Messages
528
Reactions
33 1,924
Nation of residence
Germany
Nation of origin
South Korea
I don't have any interest in conspiracy theory. If I did, I might say that ROK set up an Indonesian engineer to smuggle some data out of the plant. Why? So they could catch an Indonesian committing a security breach, giving ROK an excuse to end the partnership. It has already been asked how this engineer could have obtained the data without inside help. Elsewhere it has been alleged that there were flight test data on the USB.
There are IMO easier and more diplomatically face-saving ways to silently end the Indo-Korean partnership or let it fizzle out like right now.
 

Anmdt

Experienced member
Naval Specialist
Professional
Messages
5,157
Solutions
2
Reactions
97 22,991
Nation of residence
Turkey
Nation of origin
Turkey
++ If I were a technology espionage agent, the last thing I would do is put these information on a USB stick and go to the airport gate.
If the articles are correct, it is mentioned that it is a USB that is used within the company*, again it is more of a rogue way of transferring data around. Also he was caughty in company's security gates, rather than airport. (As it has happened at Baykar facilities.)

*That's my opinion, but in some cases, non-sensitive (still sensitive, but not top secret, or the part of highly sensitive data that relates to the contractor) data is shared with contractors via secure storage that is designated to a secure (controlled, inspected, provided by the company's IT) computer that would not recognise any device other than the approved one. It is also illegal for him to confiscate such a USB that does not belong to him or should belong to him. Even if he did, he would need a key to decrypt it. This alone is enough to put him or others of his nationality under investigation. This is likely to happen, in my opinion, as it is almost impossible for him to have a security clearance high enough to plug in a USB, access sensitive files and copy them.
 

Anmdt

Experienced member
Naval Specialist
Professional
Messages
5,157
Solutions
2
Reactions
97 22,991
Nation of residence
Turkey
Nation of origin
Turkey

It seems like USB sticks have not contained any 'critical' information, regardless of the situation sensitive documents are sensitive, secrecy levels exist for a reason and meant to be obeyed. Once again, i am wondering how he got ahold of those sticks that likely not destines to him, and the key to decrypt them.
 

Baryshx

Contributor
Messages
951
Reactions
8 2,037
Website
www.twitter.com
Nation of residence
Turkey
Nation of origin
Turkey
I wonder how much longer ROK will be prepared to 'partner' with Indonesia on this project.

Indonesia does not pay its share of development costs and fails to honour all undertakings to rectify the situation. There is suspicion of industrial espionage by one or more Indonesian engineers.
I wonder where you place Indonesia in your mind? Indonesia with its population and future economic power will be even more advanced than Korea and the UK. It is necessary to maintain strong strategic, military and economic relations with Indonesia.
 

Nilgiri

Experienced member
Moderator
Aviation Specialist
Messages
9,323
Reactions
96 18,905
Nation of residence
Canada
Nation of origin
India
I have been involved in a few sensitive projects in the past (and not most of them were related to TR) and what I remember is that the USB or peripheral based transfers were rarely used, with encrypted drivers and under the supervision of a superior from management and another from IT, with some papers signed and only certain devices with matching ID - S/N would be recognised by the clients (and not all of them, only certain clients were capable of file transfer and used under supervision).

In common usage, all computers were configured to be clients with minimal amount of files are kept in temp and accessed from the servers, and the servers have a timestamped file system that shows the history of who accessed those files and when. This is mediocre enterprise data security measures imho.

If it was a highly sensitive part of the project, then there was no way to leak any data through peripherals, let alone be able to transfer anything out of the computers placed in the 'dark rooms', no internet, all connection ports are disabled from the hardware side, only mouse/keyboard with good old PS/2 works and a monitor, again I recall VGA, when DVI - HDMI was available it was left out.

So a USB does indeed sound like a clichéd way of smuggling data today, and doesn't seem quite realistic.

Few months ago an intern at Baykar was caught with several HDDs in the bag, in an attempt to leave facilities with them, later it has turned out to be a guy with some theft-related criminal history and with a motive to sell used-disposed-cleaned HDDs in the flea market. Yeah, nobody has quite bought the conclusion.

Yup just air-gap everything as much as possible.
 

Spitfire9

Committed member
Messages
286
Reactions
6 372
Nation of residence
United Kingdom
Nation of origin
United Kingdom
I wonder where you place Indonesia in your mind? Indonesia with its population and future economic power will be even more advanced than Korea and the UK. It is necessary to maintain strong strategic, military and economic relations with Indonesia.
My interest is in Indonesian aviation in respect of its involvement in the KF-X/I--FX programme.. In common with several other countries I am confident that Indonesia will strengthen economically vis a vis the more established economies and those more established economies will undoubtedly try to establish closer links. Given China's expansionist outlook in the region I think that military co-operation will increase, too.

Sadly I find Indonesia's performance in the KF-X/I--FX programme lamentable. How do you see it?
 
Last edited:

Baryshx

Contributor
Messages
951
Reactions
8 2,037
Website
www.twitter.com
Nation of residence
Turkey
Nation of origin
Turkey
My interest is in Indonesian aviation in respect of its involvement in the KF-X/I--FX programme.. In common with several other countries I am confident that Indonesia will strengthen economically vis a vis the more established economies and those more established economies will undoubtedly try to establish closer links. Given China's expansionist outlook in the region I think that military co-operation will increase, too.

Sadly I find Indonesia's performance in the KF-X/I--FX programme lamentable. How do you see it?
I don't see Korea's view on this issue as a good one either. I think there was a time when Turkiye came to the table for a partnership for the KF-21, but the partnership did not materialize because Korea did not favor technology sharing. I wonder what the Indonesian government, which accepted the terms of this partnership, thinks about this. Did they get what they wanted, is there any technological infrastructure and gains? Because this is one of the purposes of partnerships. Anyway, the partnership is limited, in the end it will be something like a ready purchase.
 

Spitfire9

Committed member
Messages
286
Reactions
6 372
Nation of residence
United Kingdom
Nation of origin
United Kingdom
I don't see Korea's view on this issue as a good one either. I think there was a time when Turkiye came to the table for a partnership for the KF-21, but the partnership did not materialize because Korea did not favor technology sharing. I wonder what the Indonesian government, which accepted the terms of this partnership, thinks about this. Did they get what they wanted, is there any technological infrastructure and gains? Because this is one of the purposes of partnerships. Anyway, the partnership is limited, in the end it will be something like a ready purchase.
I don't know exactly what terms Turkiye wanted that ROK did not want to offer and vice versa. I don't know what terms Indonesia agreed with ROK but it was clear that Indonesia agreed to pay 20% of the development cost of the K-FX/I-FX project. It is also clear that Indonesia has not done that. That makes it an unreliable partner. Repeatedly promising to correct that failure but then failing to do so reinforces the fact that Indonesia is not a trustworthy partner. What is your government's explanation for not honouring its side of the contract? What is your government's explanation for promising to make up overdue contract payments but not doing so?

Sorry, not wanting to offend you but adhering to contracts is basic stuff. If you want to enter into a debate as to whether contracts should or should not be respected, you will have to excuse me if I decline.
 
Last edited:

Chocopie

Contributor
South Korea Correspondent
Messages
528
Reactions
33 1,924
Nation of residence
Germany
Nation of origin
South Korea
Follow-up report on Indonesian USB-gate:


Years worth of confidential KF-21 data on USB … how, when it can’t be used at KAI?

Yesterday (2nd) we reported that an Indonesian researcher working at Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) was caught trying to take out an USB storing data of Korean supersonic fighter KF-21. Since it is impossible to use USB in KAI itself, it is questioned how the data was put in there.

It was discovered that Indonesian researcher Mr. A attempted to extract confidential data on the Korean supersonic fighter KF-21 by putting it on a USB stick.

It is known that Mr. A's USB contained 4 to 5 years worth of detailed information related to the development of the KF-21.

Mr. A is said to be the person in charge of four research positions among the 16 employees dispatched from Indonesia, and is the Indonesian employee who participated for the longest in the development of KF-21, except the time during severe COVID-19 restrictions.

Investigative authorities suspect that Mr. A selected and collected the necessary data as he had access to development data for a long period of time.

However, since the use of USB is prohibited at Korea Aerospace Industry KAI, there are still questions about how the data was transferred to the USB.

A key KAI official told SBS reporters, "KAI's computers not only don‘t support USB, but they also cannot be plugged in."

Also, due to KAI's regulations and security system, personal laptops cannot be brought into the building.

For this reason, investigative authorities are looking into whether there were any internal conspirators in the external USB leaking process.

An official from the investigative authorities said, "We will be able to reveal the details of the case only if we find out when, where, and how the data was stored on the USB."

It is said that the investigators are also examining Mr. A's immigration records, as they believe there is a possibility that he might have already stolen related information.

 
Last edited:

Oublious

Experienced member
The Netherlands Correspondent
Messages
2,017
Reactions
7 4,328
Nation of residence
Nethelands
Nation of origin
Turkey
So how will this end for Indonesia, will they be kicked out?
 
Top Bottom