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Anu Anwar
January 16, 2023 6:00 AM
In September 2022, in these pages, I argued that national security is a taboo subject in Bangladesh. National security is taboo precisely because the discourse on national threats is the real taboo.
In Bangladesh, whether scholars or bureaucrats, military or civilian, nobody is comfortable discussing the country's emerging and existential threats.
The discourse of national security takes place rarely, and even in such rare discourses, there is a deliberate effort to demilitarize it. It is often portrayed to the public and indoctrinated in academic settings that Bangladesh has no security threats. Therefore, all it needs to do is focus on economic development.
This argument misses the fact that a country must create a set of basic prerequisite conditions if it is to reach middle-income status and sustain the developmental momentum. Securing territorial integrity, establishing absolute sovereignty, and possessing the capability to maintain, and if necessary, enforce stability -- is the key to creating a required condition overcoming the middle-income trap.
All the countries that are developed today, they achieved the threshold of national security first --either via internal or external balancing. Singapore, Israel, Japan, South Korea -- any nation-state that is comparable with Bangladesh's geo-strategic realities, followed this pathway to achieve the status of a developed country.
Bangladesh shares these countries' vision of development and pursuing policies to become a middle-income country by 2031 and a developed country by 2041 -- but has yet to realize that the fundamentals lie in ensuring national security first.
The chronic politicization of institutions and dysfunctional nature of politics make national security a taboo subject. Disregarding threat perceptions causes unpreparedness and undermines the nation-building process, which ultimately leads to weakening the nation -- let alone its development.
Disregarding national threats is certainly not unanimously accepted as a good idea by all segments of society. If that were the case, then Bangladesh, despite being an overpopulated developing nation, would not spend billions of dollars each year and enlist over two hundred thousand of service members in active service. Not to mention, the paramilitaries on reserve.
So, what is the missing part here?
The missing part is dysfunctional domestic politics and the interest of vested quarters. These interest groups, prioritizing personal gain, view national threats through the lens of their own party, business, or personal interest. That also explains why there is no such consensus either on threat perceptions or national security policy, or even the national interest.
In this article, I thus intend to speak the unspeakable.
First, for Bangladesh, a sovereign country with the world's eighth largest population, sitting at the Indo-Pacific geopolitical crossroads -- what is the number one threat for the nation?
It is the southeastern frontier, a tumultuous border with the rough state of Burma, where more than a million of Myanmar's population are sheltered inside Bangladesh's territory.
Chittagong division and its rich coastline along the Bay of Bengal is the key contributor to Bangladesh's recent economic miracle. This is precisely what makes Bangladesh different from neighbouring Nepal or Bhutan.
Not to think too far down the road, even a little turmoil in this region, will immediately halt the nation's only seaport Chittagong and pause economic activities within a matter of days. A minor conflict could cripple the economy.
This is why Bangladesh should pursue a strategy of “deterrence for peace,” aiming to prevent war -- as opposed to provoking it -- by showing our strengths. As Dr APJ Abdul Kalam, the missile man of India, once replied, “strength respects strength,” to a question whether he ever felt guilty about developing nuclear weapons.
What we need is to strengthen the capacity of armed forces on such a scale that makes Burmese forces' objectives untenable, therefore, compel Tatmadaw to self-restraint.
This also explains how it all started. The largest influx of Rohingya crossed the Bangladesh border in 2017 -- just a year prior to a national election, perhaps not coincidentally.
Major countries pressured Bangladesh to shelter an unreasonable number, over a half million of refugees, when these countries themselves have done little to nothing for Rohingyas themselves.
Bangladesh's role in sheltering the Rohingya has stood the government in good stead on the world stage and perhaps helped to quiet questions with respect to the legitimacy of elections held the following year.
The temptation to play the same card in the upcoming election remains and may hinder the government from initiating what it takes to resolve Bangladesh's number one national security threat.
To be clear, there never had been, and never will be, a diplomatic solution to this problem -- unless Bangladesh can create sustained leverage over Myanmar, which remains unlikely.
The only option therefore is for Bangladesh's armed forces to rebuild itself and strengthen its warfighting capacity to punish the Tatmadaw for their genocidal acts, thus coercing Myanmar to compel repatriation.
Indeed, if Bangladesh could pose a credible threat to the Tatmadaw, Myanmar wouldn't have dared to launch the exodus in the first place.
This explains why Myanmar doesn't dare to push Chins to India or Kachin and Shan to China. It is precisely because Myanmar's generals know very well that doing so would provoke a shock and awe military response from China or India in which they would lose decisively.
To be clear, protecting the territorial boundary is the number one national security priority. Those who try to undermine it must meet with a decisive and proportionate military response.
Dhaka did not do this in 2017, resulting in our carrying the burden of over one million refugees. Failing to fight for it now will cost us far more down the line.
The sole question remains: Why did we fail to stop the influx of 2017?
Nobody here is expecting our border security forces to kill Rohingyas to stop the influx, but there were many other ways to nip the exodus in the bud.
If Tatmadaw is the culprit, deterring them from what they were doing, even punishing them for the consequences, is the solution for resettling the Rohingyas in their motherland.
If the argument is that Bangladesh's armed forces are weaker compared to the Burmese, then one has to answer why a country with a six times larger economy, three times larger population, and spending more money on the military than the Burmese armed forces, would still be weaker in military power.
Suppose the argument is that Tatmadaw is more combat-ready as they have an experience of a prolonged battle with insurgencies. In that case, one has to answer why Bangladesh's armed forces, which played a key role in liberating the nation by waging a full-fledged war against much stronger forces and having succeeded in suppressing insurgency in CHT, would be less confident in its capability.
A comparison of both forces' history suggests Bangladesh's armed forces have a track record of wins in its battle, while Tatmadaw has been fighting for decades but with a track record of losses.
Looking at the long term, keeping the rise of nationalism in India in mind, Rohingyas are doing the groundwork for all players. If Rohingyas staying in Bangladesh becomes a norm, then the so-called religion-based residence argument will be validated.
Indian politicians are already asserting that millions of Muslims in India's northeast should also be pushed to Bangladesh.
The catastrophic consequences for Bangladesh of such an influx need not be elaborated. The clock is ticking. If Bangladesh acts now, it still has the opportunity to turn things around.
If China or India takes the Myanmar side, so be it. It would be a watershed moment for the nation to test who a friend is and who is a foe.
However, further delay will make Bangladesh only a passive victim of the great games in which we can only lose.
One way or another, things are moving in that direction.
The recent news suggests Japan and India are interested in building road connectivity linking Bangladesh's Bay of Bengal with India's impoverished northeastern seven sisters. This has been India's aspiration for years, but the entry of Japan into this is a new phenomenon.
Though it is touted as an economic project, there is no significant economic gain here for Bangladesh. What would Bangladesh gain from connecting with a part of India which is much poorer than Bangladesh itself? Bangladesh needs interstate connectivity, but that should be North-South bound, not East-West bound, and connecting third countries such as Nepal, not confined to India only.
Nor would Bangladesh get anything extra from Japan by implementing this project that it couldn't get without it.
The truth is crystal clear. The economic carrot is an eyewash here, the reality is security. Perceiving China as a threat, building this connectivity makes perfect sense.
Japan has its own calculations as to how investing in India's capacity building will help its own security concerns with respect to China.
But the question for Bangladesh is: Does it secure or weaken Bangladesh?
Japan has been a friendly country to Bangladesh, and will surely remain so. This proposed connectivity would certainly deepen Japan-India ties and help secure both nations. But what is in it for Bangladesh is not clear.
Another national election is due next year. While elections are a matter of celebration for some countries, for Bangladesh it is likely to be a time for violence, turmoil, and political horse-trading.
The options are shrinking. This time Democratic president Biden is in power, and Western countries are creating intense pressure, at least rhetorically, on the government to hold a free and fair election.
The ruling party holds two cards with respect to the big powers.
One is doing what they tell Bangladesh to do regarding Rohingyas. The second is the security corridor.
Acceding on both fronts might solve the short-term problem, but at what long-term cost?
Then again, even if the opposition were to come to power, is there any evidence to suggest that they would or could deal with these matters differently?
Do they have any clear-cut foreign and defense policy outlook based on solid action plans either to repatriate Rohingyas or to pursue a truly independent foreign policy? Their track record suggests no such thing.
Moreover, after 15 years out of power, the opposition is desperate to return to power, whatever it takes.
The bottom line is: On the question of national security and foreign policy, rhetoric aside, there appears to be little difference between the parties.
Bangladesh is sleepwalking towards danger at a time of geopolitical crisis. We must wake up before it is too late.
Anu Anwar is a fellow at the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Harvard University, and a PhD candidate at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
Let’s talk the talk: Confronting Bangladesh’s national security threats
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