Microelectronics and Rare Earth Elements Sectors

Cabatli_TR

Experienced member
Staff member
Administrator
Messages
5,369
Reactions
80 45,485
Nation of residence
Turkey
Nation of origin
Turkey
Produced in Taiwan, so will we have some domestic production as well ?

The first facility will be located in Gebze where 65nm production will be carried out in the 2000m2 clean room facility created by transfering lithography devices owned by Qatar to Turkiye.

The second production area which will be a giant investment, is looking for "babayiğits" to invest in the land allocated in Ankara. Turkiye's largest chip investment area will be there and assuming that Çakıl's new version to be produced for industrial needs will be 22nm, we can predict that this is the target for production of chip factory to be established in Ankara.

images-251.jpeg
 

Zafer

Experienced member
Messages
4,463
Reactions
6 7,141
Nation of residence
Turkey
Nation of origin
Turkey
Photo-lithography processes first introduction timeline, 2nm process coming in 2024. We have limited production capability in 250nm as of now AFAIK. We want to jump to 2005 from 1996 and hopefully to 2012 in a next level move.

1705931623241.png
 

Bogeyman 

Experienced member
Professional
Messages
8,332
Reactions
60 29,246
Website
twitter.com
Nation of residence
Turkey
Nation of origin
Turkey

Intel Shares Dip on Report That It’s Delaying Ohio Chip Plant​


Intel Corp. shares slipped in extended trading after the Wall Street Journal reported that the company was delaying a closely watched $20 billion chip facility planned for Ohio.

Intel had previously hoped to begin production at the plant in 2025, though now the site is unlikely to be ready until late 2026, the newspaper reported. A slow rollout of money from the Chips and Science Act — legislation passed in 2022 to revitalize the US chipmaker industry — has contributed to the delays.

Intel declined to comment on the project’s exact timeline but said it remains committed to the effort. It’s still moving forward and the company has made significant progress, Intel said.

The US has been aiming to announce major chip grants by the end of March, Bloomberg reported earlier, paving the way to send billions of dollars to semiconductor makers. Intel has previously said that the grants — and business conditions — will determine how quickly it progresses with expansion projects, including the Ohio facility, which it has said may become the world’s largest.

The shares fell as much as 3.1% to $42.01 in late trading Thursday. Even before the dip, they were down 14% this year.

 

Bogeyman 

Experienced member
Professional
Messages
8,332
Reactions
60 29,246
Website
twitter.com
Nation of residence
Turkey
Nation of origin
Turkey

Chips companies will be lucky to get half of subsidies sought, US Commerce Secretary says​


U.S. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo said Monday chips companies seeking government subsidies from a $52.7 billion program are expected get significantly less than they sought.
Raimondo said she is pushing chips companies "to do more for less" in order to fund more projects. She said her conversations with chips company CEOs typically include them asking for billions in government assistance, which she says is reasonable.

"I tell them you will be lucky to get half of that." When they come in to finalize a deal, "where they get less than half of what they wanted and they tell me they are not feeling lucky. That's the reality."
Raimondo said the department is prioritizing projects that will be operational by 2030. "We are saying no for now" for projects that will not be complete before then.
The Chips and Science program approved by Congress in August 2022 includes a $39 billion program to subsidize chip production and related supply chain investments, and the awards will help build factories and increase production.

Raimondo said the department plans to invest $28 billion in leading edge manufacturing - but those companies have requested more than $70 billion. She said the department is engaged in very tough negotiations in individual companies.
"These are highly complex, first-of-their-kind facilities. The kind of facilities that TSMC (2330.TW), opens new tab, Samsung (005930.KS), opens new tab, Intel (INTC.O), opens new tab are proposing to do in the United States - these are new-generation investments - size, scale complexity that's never been done before in this country," Raimondo told Reuters earlier this month.

The awards can be a mix of grants, government loans and loan guarantees up to about 35% of project capital costs.

 

Rooxbar

Contributor
Think Tank Analyst
Messages
463
Reactions
41 1,487
Nation of residence
Nethelands
Nation of origin
Turkey
Mandatory Reading:

Where the Chips Fell​

By Julius Krein

Before student loan forgiveness, the raid on Mar-a-Lago, and the Inflation Reduction Act, something called the CHIPS Act was a major news story for a few days in late July. CHIPS was essentially a bill to support semiconductor manufacturing in the United States, and the final version that passed into law, which added basic research funding and related programs, was christened the CHIPS and Science Act.
By some accounts, CHIPS is a critical tool in the intensifying economic and technological competition against China, a solution to address America’s eroding technological leadership and the decline of a key manufacturing sector. Others still argue that it represents America’s abandonment of free market capitalism. In reality, however, it is neither. More semiconductor fabs will be built in the United States as a result of CHIPS (some commitments have already been announced), but its legislative trajectory also reveals the shortcomings of the current U.S. approach to industrial policy and the lack of any serious resolve when it comes to competing against China.
By way of background, although the United States still leads in key elements of semiconductor design, its share of global manufacturing has fallen from nearly 40 percent in the 1990s to around 10 percent today. Moreover, the chips that are produced in the United States are not at the technological frontier. Taiwan, Korea, and China are the top global producers, with Taiwan’s TSMC the technological leader. China has invested heavily in building its own semiconductor industry since the early 2000s, when it essentially started from zero. While it remains far from technological leadership, it has established a strong presence at the lower end of the value chain. Moving up the technological ladder remains a major priority for the Chinese government; Beijing’s spending on the sector dwarfs that of the United States, even after CHIPS.
The path of CHIPS itself was a long and winding one. It began as two bills in 2020, both led by Republicans with bipartisan support, that were folded into one: the CHIPS for America Act. CHIPS for America was passed into law via the National Defense Authorization Act in December 2020, but Congress still needed to appropriate funding before it could be implemented. Hence CHIPS funding became a key component of two larger bills, the United States Innovation and Competition Act, or usica (in the Senate), and the America competes Act (in the House). These bills combined CHIPS funding with various research spending and industrial policy programs (mostly drawn from yet another proposal, the Endless Frontiers Act). As with any major piece of legislation nowadays, both also contained their share of pork and extraneous provisions; usica—perhaps ironically for a bill touted as essential to competing with China—additionally included significant tariff relief on Chinese imports. Both bills passed their respective chambers and headed to conference committee, where they languished for months, with no compromise bill that could pass both houses emerging. This is where the story becomes interesting.
There are basically two industry lobbies in the United States interested in CHIPS, in particular, and industrial policy more generally: the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA), naturally, and a gaggle of groups that lobby on behalf of American universities to promote research funding. Other industries that might presumably have an interest in industrial strategy—such as aerospace, defense, and pharma—are entrenched within their own silos and, if anything, tend to oppose any “innovation” policy that might disrupt the status quo in their verticals. CHIPS was the pet project, and in many ways the brainchild, of SIA from the beginning.
SIA’s attitude toward the broader industrial policy proposals of the larger usica and competes bills was always somewhere between indifference and hostility—which is understandable in the near term but, as we shall see, may prove unfortunate in the longer term. Thus, as the usica–competes conference negotiations dragged on, SIA lobbied aggressively to remove these additional proposals—some dubious, and some, like “Manufacturing Investment Companies,” much more interesting—and pass a “skinny bill” focused on semiconductor funding alone.
After CHIPS had been isolated from the rest of usica–competes, and essentially reduced to subsidies for incumbent firms, SIA then launched a scorched-earth campaign aimed at removing any restrictions on these subsidies. First, progressives like Bernie Sanders sought to limit firms receiving subsidies from engaging in share buybacks and cash distributions to shareholders. This effort never stood much of a chance in today’s America and was defeated easily. A somewhat more serious challenge came from senators, primarily Republicans, seeking to restrict beneficiary firms’ ability to continue investing in China.
A late addition to the bill allowed the secretary of commerce to grant exemptions from the law’s prohibitions on recipient firms investing in manufacturing facilities in China. This may seem like a minor technical detail to those unfamiliar with multinational firms’ strategies to circumvent trade laws, but allowing the Department of Commerce to grant exemptions has become a common industry tactic to vitiate statutory restrictions. Indeed, the Wall Street Journal recently reported that a “Commerce Department–led process that reviews U.S. tech exports to China approves almost all requests and has overseen an increase in sales of some particularly important technologies.” Of course, selling the chips themselves to China is defensible insofar as it keeps Chinese industry dependent on U.S. exports. But investing in production facilities in China is another matter entirely, and this “loophole” arguably undermines a major premise of the whole bill. Several Republican sponsors of the original CHIPS legislation in 2020, including Senators Cotton, Rubio, and Hawley, ended up voting against the 2022 bill as a result.
But by this point, it didn’t matter. The industry’s brazen and in many ways dishonest lobbying tactics foreclosed any opportunity to correct this loophole. The usual chorus of “national security experts” was trotted out to insist that the bill was essential to compete against China—though on the question of beneficiary firms continuing to invest in China, these experts apparently had nothing to say. Intel threatened to cancel a previously announced investment in an Ohio fab, and the SIA threatened that investment would flow elsewhere if the bill suffered even the slightest delay. In reality, these blackmail attempts were risible—firms would still accept subsidies to invest in the United States even with tighter restrictions on Chinese facilities, and they will continue to invest elsewhere if the subsidies in those countries are sufficient, especially since the bill’s restrictions are so weak—but most congressional offices showed little willingness or capacity to seriously investigate these issues.
The bill’s provisions for research funding went through a similar process. After the university lobbies succeeded in getting various research programs reattached to CHIPS, Senator Rob Portman offered an amendment intended to protect research and intellectual property from Chinese theft and espionage. Despite assurances from Senate leadership, the amendment was unexpectedly killed, demonstrating once again the lack of any real interest in competing with China.
What, then, is one to make of CHIPS? No single, overarching narrative can be constructed out of its messy evolution, but a few conclusions can be drawn.
First, the recent intellectual ferment around industrial policy in the United States, on both right and left, had minimal impact on this legislation. Provisions with strong corporate lobby support—from either semiconductors or universities—passed; everything else died.
Going forward, more ambitious—and arguably more serious—industrial policies will likely be more difficult to enact, given that the major lobbies have already gotten what they wanted, and because of the bad feeling CHIPS has created among many in Congress. The SIA and university lobbies’ slash-and-burn tactics made clear that they have no interest in any serious industrial strategy or concerted effort to compete with China. Any future initiatives along these lines, however genuine, will now have to overcome the negative presumptions these lobbies have created.
Yet without more robust support for domestic manufacturing outside of semiconductors, any cutting-edge intellectual property resulting from the new research funding can be expected to make its way to Asian factories for production, as has been the norm for decades now. Other initiatives, like “regional innovation hubs,” deprived of the healthy manufacturing ecosystems that might have been supported by Manufacturing Investment Companies and similar programs, will probably generate more bureaucratic make-work than anything else.
More broadly, although economic and technological competition with China may offer effective political cover in today’s environment, it is clearly not a serious goal of U.S. policy. In light of Congress’s refusal to maintain strict limits on investment in Chinese semiconductor manufacturing facilities or protections on research funding, the recent symbolic controversies over Taiwan (like Nancy Pelosi’s visit) appear all the more bizarre. Likewise, conservative talk of “dismantling the administrative state” and returning power to Congress has once again proved totally fatuous. When presented with an easy opportunity to defend its prerogatives in setting conditions on industrial subsidies, Congress fell over itself to cede authority to the Department of Commerce.
On the other hand, multiple new semiconductor fabs will be built in the United States as a result of CHIPS. This is a real benefit, both for the domestic supply chains they strengthen and the jobs they create. Nevertheless, these projects—still a generation or two behind the most advanced facilities—cannot be expected to catapult America back into the technological lead in semiconductor manufacturing. In fact, within days of CHIPS’s passage, Intel actually cut capital spending plans.
Over the long term, because semiconductor manufacturing is inherently cyclical, and new fabs in America and doubtless subsidized investments elsewhere will produce occasional gluts, American manufacturing may be especially vulnerable. CHIPS adds to semiconductor supply, but the standalone final version of the bill does nothing to support the reshoring of downstream electronics manufacturers that would provide a domestic source of demand for these chips. Everything does not have to happen in the same bill, of course, but it is very much an open question whether anything along these lines will happen at all. At bottom, the fact that China has built such a massive electronics manufacturing industry underlies the competitive dynamics surrounding chips (and CHIPS) in the first place. Western chipmakers need to sell to Chinese electronics manufacturers, while China seeks greater self-sufficiency in semiconductors in order to protect these other manufacturing industries.
The next key policy question involves the funding guidance that will be issued by the Department of Commerce—i.e., the application process to receive funds. This will provide a good indication of whether Commerce intends to deter investment in China with any rigor. As some observers have argued, the most important effect of CHIPS may be to limit Korean firms’ investments in China, as these firms seek to preserve eligibility for U.S. subsidies. But this will depend on how rigorously Commerce enforces any restrictions against Chinese investment. Commerce’s prior history, and the fact that industry pushed so hard to allow the department to waive restrictions, are certainly causes for concern.
Taking the long view, CHIPS might have been a great policy solution twenty-five years ago, but amid the current American postindustrial landscape, it is probably too little, too late, on its own. Fallen national champions like Intel, Boeing, GE, IBM, and the like have been hollowed out by decades of financialization, offshoring, and underinvestment; CHIPS or similar subsidies will not fix that. In this sense, criticisms that CHIPS, especially as it ended up, is merely corporate welfare for Intel are probably not inaccurate.
Even so, the libertarian preference for doing nothing remains the least defensible approach, if not downright idiotic. The only thing worse than having second-tier domestic semiconductor manufacturing is having none at all. And since the competitors to American firms are not exactly exemplars of state nonintervention, becoming even more dependent on foreign manufacturing would hardly represent a triumph of the “market.”
Rather than a choice between “corporate welfare” or nothing, what is required are policies—in the areas of finance, intellectual property, trade, and beyond—that would mobilize both state and private capital (especially private equity) behind investment in new domestic production technologies and ecosystems. The Manufacturing Investment Companies, lost in the CHIPS legislation, were a step in this direction, as were, for example, various proposals included in the failed Small Business Administration reauthorization bill in the previous Congress. But America lacks the political will—or, more realistically, an effective corporate lobby—to support such initiatives.
Ironically, when it comes to semiconductor manufacturing, the United States and China find themselves in somewhat similar positions. Both lag industry leaders Taiwan and South Korea, and both are reliant on sclerotic, mostly underperforming national champions. America has not been able to leverage its leadership in certain design technologies to strengthen its hollowed out manufacturing sector, while China’s massive spending has failed to overcome technological barriers—especially compared to its extraordinary successes in sectors such as electric vehicles, batteries, and their supply chains, other manufacturing verticals, and advanced technologies such as AI. Yet China recently initiated “disciplinary reviews” of the heads of its major chip companies and investment funds, suggesting that the Chinese Communist Party, unlike the U.S. government, is capable of employing both carrots and sticks in its peculiar fashion. Moreover, China, whatever its other problems, has shown an impressive ability to experiment with new funding models for strategic sectors. In the United States, by contrast, industry has merely shifted from demanding trade support as it pursued offshoring and share buybacks to demanding largely unconditional subsidization.
Former Treasury secretary Lawrence Summers, remarking on the eleventh-hour legislative maneuvering that surrounded the Inflation Reduction Act, passed shortly after CHIPS, said, “I am appalled by the end stages of the Senate’s bill passage. There is no legitimate public policy argument for the maintenance of carried interested or . . . private equity carve out from the bill. It makes me despair of the general interest above the special interest.” This sentiment may seem a bit rich coming from Summers, who was a leading architect of the financialized political economy that led us to this point, but it is accurate, and it is perhaps an even more appropriate criticism of the end stages of CHIPS. (And the Inflation Reduction Act went quite far in supporting domestic production.) The weakening of investment protections in CHIPS and the defeat of the Portman amendment’s intellectual property protections not only had no public policy justification, but undermined a cardinal purpose of the underlying bill. Real benefits will still result from the CHIPS Act, but on the whole, it looks less like an economic policy success and more like a political disappointment.

This article is an American Affairs online exclusive, published August 30, 2022.

 

Bogeyman 

Experienced member
Professional
Messages
8,332
Reactions
60 29,246
Website
twitter.com
Nation of residence
Turkey
Nation of origin
Turkey
First functional semiconductor made from graphene


The first functional semiconductor made from graphene has been created at the Georgia Institute of Technology. This could enable smaller and faster electronic devices and may have applications for quantum computing.




Semiconductors, which are materials that conduct electricity under specific conditions, are foundational components of electronic devices like the chips in your computer, laptop, and smartphone. For many decades, their architecture has been getting smaller and more compact – a trend known as Moore's Law. This has enabled gigantic leaps in a vast range of technologies, from general computing speeds and video game graphics, to the resolution of medical scans and the sensitivity of astronomical observatories.

Silicon, the main material of microelectronics, is edging closer to its physical limit in terms of miniaturisation. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) is expected to release a 1.4 nanometre (nm) process node by 2028, for example. New materials and chip architectures will soon be needed to ensure that progress in faster and smaller computing can continue.

Graphene, discovered in 2004, is a type of nanotechnology made from a single layer of carbon. Often touted as a potential game-changer in the field of semiconductors, its remarkable properties include exceptional electrical conductivity, flexibility, and strength. By utilising its ultra-thin, one-atom-thick structure, researchers are exploring ways to develop even smaller, more efficient, and faster chips.

Scientists at the Georgia Institute of Technology have just achieved a significant milestone for the field, with a demonstration of the world's first fully functioning semiconductor made from graphene. Their work appears this month in Nature.

Walter de Heer, Regents' Professor of Physics at Georgia Tech, led a team that included a collaboration with colleagues at the Tianjin International Center for Nanoparticles and Nanosystems (TICNN) at Tianjin University, China.

"We now have an extremely robust graphene semiconductor with 10 times the mobility of silicon, and which also has unique properties not available in silicon," explained Professor de Heer. In other words, the electrons move with very low resistance, which, in electronics, translates to faster computing.

"It's like driving on a gravel road versus driving on a freeway," he added. "It's more efficient, it doesn't heat up as much, and it allows for higher speeds so that the electrons can move faster."

In silicon, the standard material for computer chips, the electron mobility is typically around 500 cm² V⁻¹ s⁻¹ at room temperature. Professor de Heer's team achieved a mobility of 5,000 cm² V⁻¹ s⁻¹.

This breakthrough is the culmination of 10 years' research, which began when he and his team figured out how to grow graphene on silicon carbide wafers using special furnaces. They produced epitaxial graphene, which is a single layer that grows on a crystal face of the silicon carbide. The team found that when it was made properly, the epitaxial graphene chemically bonded to the silicon carbide and started to show semiconducting properties.

Over the next decade, they persisted in perfecting the material at Georgia Tech and later in collaboration with colleagues in Tianjin, China. Their product is now the only two-dimensional semiconductor that has all the necessary properties to be used in nanoelectronics, and its electrical properties are far superior to any other 2D semiconductors currently in development.

"A long-standing problem in graphene electronics is that graphene didn't have the right band gap and couldn't switch on and off at the correct ratio," said researcher Lei Ma, from TICNN. "Over the years, many have tried to address this with a variety of methods. Our technology achieves the band gap, and is a crucial step in realising graphene-based electronics."

Epitaxial graphene could cause a paradigm shift in electronics, allowing completely new technologies that take advantage of its properties. The material allows the quantum mechanical wave properties of electrons to be utilised, for example, which is a requirement for quantum computing.

A new generation of electronics should be expected at some point, however, because silicon is just the latest of several steps in the history of electronics. Prior to its arrival, people used vacuum tubes, and before that, relays, and electromechanical devices. Another paradigm shift is inevitable in the future and looks increasingly likely to be graphene.

"To me, this is like a Wright brothers moment," de Heer said. "They built a plane that could fly 300 feet through the air. But sceptics asked why the world would need flight when it already had fast trains and boats. But they persisted, and it was the beginning of a technology that can take people across oceans."


 

Follow us on social media

Top Bottom