Frankly, I don't believe the concept design of MUGEM was done with the Eastern Mediterranean in mind. For me, even MILDEN and the Tepe class. TR is establishing a strong presence in Somalia, with some strategic investments projected for 50-80 years. TR wants to set up its naval presence in a triangle stretching from the Horn of Africa to the Umman Sea and the Gulf, and from there to the South Asia up to Java Sea.
Behind this projection are actually highly explainable economic goals. While uncertainties in the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Aden have the potential to seriously affect world freight trade for many years, Turkiye and Syria aim to open an economic corridor extending to the Arabian Gulf and descending southwards in two main branches (the Hejaz Route and the Basra Development Route). Both projects involve a series of railway transit highways, port/customs integrations, organized industrial zones, oil/gas, electricity, and water transmission lines. Land transport cannot completely replace sea freight, but it is vital, especially during times of crisis. Another issue here is China's alternative southern trade routes. If such a projection exists, the only force capable of maintaining these routes in the connected seas is the Turkish navy. Not SA, or Pakistan.
One of the consequences of an Iran-Israel-US war is the inevitable rapprochement with some Arab countries in both trade and defense. I won't give a long speech on the effects of the Iran-Israel war, as we all see the situation Europe is in and how this has turned into a long-term erosion.
While striving for Somalia's territorial integrity and its liberation from terrorism, interdependence is deepening. Turkiyeaims to achieve space access with its own capabilities, with Somalia at the center. We are investing billions of dollars in hydrocarbons, infrastructure, and especially in the development of security institutions. Unfortunately, Somalia was abandoned to its fate for a period internationally, which is why our activities are attracting attention, but the target sphere of influence of Turkish foreign policy is not limited to Somalia, nor even just East Africa. There are very critical nodes within the triangle I mentioned, and in short, my final conclusion is that the Turkish navy is preparing for the Indian Ocean for the 2030s. While I respect the idea that Türkiye should limit its sphere of influence to the Eastern Mediterranean and that the Greek issue must be dealt with first, I am fundamentally opposed to the notion that all of this is for the Mediterranean if we are currently discussing what is being built rather than our own ideas. Political will always promises something, even tending towards populist behavior, but it is the navy that instrumentalizes this and places it within a suitable projection.
Normalization with Egypt, military-industrial integration with Italy and Spain, maintaining position in Libya, and the revolution in Syria have already preserved the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean to a certain extent. Cyprus and now Lebanon remain serious minefields. Greece, with its traditional foreign policy approach, does not hesitate to side with whichever country creates tension with Turkiye; in other words, nothing has changed there.