TR Navy Navy|News & Discussions

[Saithan]

Gözünüzü seveyim ya, bir de bizim Sahil Güvenlik güclerine el atalim amk...

I miss news and progress for TCG.

 

[Khagan1923]

Gözünüzü seveyim ya, bir de bizim Sahil Güvenlik güclerine el atalim amk...

I miss news and progress for TCG.

Coast Guard was supposed to get new ships, no idea what happened wit that.

 

[Gessler]

I think South Korea is looking to pursue a similar reactor for their planned SSN, or at least it seems to be among the primary options being studied.

That's true - only France & China use LEU. But this list could increase as more countries acquire SSNs, namely Brazil and (possibly) S Korea.

Thought I should follow this up now that there have been some updates.

My previous guesstimate was right - South Korea is indeed going for LEU (usually meaning 5-7% enriched, but can be upto 20%) for their SSN program.

South Korea's Nuclear Submarine Plan Needs U.S. Fuel Talks

South Koreas Nuclear Submarine Plan Needs U.S. Fuel Talks U.S. consultations delayed as South Korea pushes domestic construction amid political speculation over local elections

www.chosun.com

"The government revealed on the same day that it plans to use low-enriched uranium (LEU) as fuel for the nuclear-powered submarines. However, face-to-face working-level consultations with the U.S., essential for securing the fuel, have not been held even once over the past six months."

"The government stated it would cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to establish a monitoring system and fulfill non-proliferation obligations during the LEU procurement process. However, securing LEU is impossible without U.S. cooperation."

"Under the current South Korea–U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement, even if South Korea seeks to enrich uranium to less than 20%, it must obtain U.S. consent through high-level consultations. Importing LEU from the U.S. also requires congressional support under U.S. atomic energy laws. Some reports suggest the government is considering partnering with France, which operates LEU-based Suffren-class nuclear-powered submarines. However, a diplomatic source stated, “This is an option that can only be attempted if one is prepared for a complete breakdown in South Korea–U.S. relations.”

====

My comments:

It appears to me that ROKN's SSN plan rests on obtaining LEU from the US. While enriching smaller quantities within SK should be possible, they'd have to scale it up eventually (especially as LEU reactors typically require refueling much more frequently than HEU ones) and that might not be possible without violating the terms of their agreement with the US from what I gather.

But I think, for SK, it shouldn't be a problem to obtain all necessary approvals and just buy the LEU from US. But it's possible they might be subject to periodic inspection or some other form of US oversight to ensure these SSNs (or the fuel itself) are never used against American interests in any way. Also possible US might leverage their control of the fuel to force SK to build their SSNs within the US, as Trump seems to want.

I'm not aware of where they are with regard to development of a 'Marinized' PWR. SK has been building land-based PWRs for a long time (initially of US-derived designs but eventually their own from what I gather, also sold to UAE) so I've no reason to doubt their capabilities in this department. Only thing I might question is the timeline: launching the first SSN by the mid-2030s (so ~10 years from now) might not be possible unless they've already built & tested a shore-based prototype of that marine PWR in secret. It's also possible they might be planning to do some of this research in parallel with the build program, but that carries a fair amount of risk if major changes become necessary down the line (happens all the time when certifying a new reactor design).

The Australians have it easy on that part: they're just gonna import fully built, sealed, life-of-type reactors with +97% HEU directly from the US/UK. Never have to worry about refueling them either. But it appears the US may not be comfortable approving this for the Koreans, hence LEU seems to be their only option.

Yes, most of this post has got nothing to do with the Turkish Navy directly, but I'm sure a lot of this is relevant for the NUKDEN program as well, especially following up my previous posts and conversation with @Yasar_TR.

 

[Pokemonte13]

 

[Pokemonte13]

Turkish Navy Confirms 2032 Delivery Date for MUGEM Aircraft Carrier - Naval News

Rear Admiral Hakan Uçar, Commander of the Turkish Navy’s Naval Technical Command (formerly head of the Design Project Office), gave a detailed presentation on Türkiye’s indigenous aircraft carrier MUGEM at the Combined Naval Event (CNE) 2026, held in Farnborough, UK, from 19 to 21 May.

www.navalnews.com

 

[Pokemonte13]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2063582257093185992

Looks like our FAC will be launched at the beginning of next year

 

[Strong AI]

EXCLUSIVE NEWS | Two More Tank Landing Ships (LST) to Be Built for the Turkish Navy!

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2063625151992709465

 

[Pokemonte13]

Free real estate for the navy basically

 

[Oublious]

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https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2063588495566725314

 

[dBSPL]

EXCLUSIVE NEWS | Two More Tank Landing Ships (LST) to Be Built for the Turkish Navy!

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/2063625151992709465

The news that the Turkish Naval Forces will proceed with hulls three and four of the Bayraktar class is genuinely good, What I want to raise is a design question that becomes more relevant with each new hull: why are these new hulls still going to sea without a hangar?

The existing pair, TCG Bayraktar and TCG Sancaktar, have a quite large flight deck that could accommodate even a heavy-lift helicopter, but the ships lack a hangar. That is a meaningful operational gap, and it is worth being precise about why.

An LST without a hangar can land a helicopter. What it cannot do is sustain one. The flight deck is exposed to weather, corrosive salt spray, and operational tempo. A helicopter sitting on an open stern through a transit or a multi-day operation is burning maintenance hours and accumulating airframe wear with no return.

The crew cannot turn it around for a follow-on sortie efficiently, cannot arm or refuel it under cover, and cannot protect it during high sea states. The result is that the embarked rotary asset, when one is carried, functions as a passenger rather than an organic capability. It does one job and then becomes a liability on deck.

This is not a theoretical problem. It is one the Royal Australian Navy ran into directly. When the RAN acquired two former US Navy Newport-class tank landing ships in the mid-1990s, the first thing they did before putting either vessel into operational service was add a hangar. A hangar for three Sea King or four Blackhawk helicopters was added, while the aft helicopter deck was reinforced. The conversion took years and was expensive, but the RAN's judgment was clear: an LST without organic rotary sustainment is a fundamentally less capable platform according to their doctrine. HMAS Kanimbla and HMAS Manoora subsequently served in East Timor, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami response, and multiple coalition operations in that configuration. The hangar was not a luxury addition; it was the thing that made the ships operationally flexible.

The design logic is also visible at the lower end of the displacement range. The Makassar-class LPDs operated by the Indonesian Navy displace in the same general bracket as the Bayraktar class and were designed from the outset with integrated hangar facilities. The LPDs feature helicopter landing spots and hangar facilities to support the operations of light and medium-sized helicopters. The first two ships can carry three helicopters while the third and fourth ships can accommodate five helicopters each. This is not a comparison between different tiers of platform; it is a comparison between two approaches to the same rough displacement category, and the Makassar design chose to invest in sustained air capability while the Bayraktar design did not.

The operational implication for the Bayraktar class is specific. These ships are not replacements for TCG Anadolu; they operate in contexts where the LHD is either unavailable or inappropriate. Island contingencies, lower-intensity coastal operations, humanitarian response with a military component, or distributed operations where the amphibious force is not concentrated under a single task group commander.

In exactly those scenarios, the ability to sustain an organic helicopter around the clock without dependence on a shore facility or another ship is the difference between a platform that can act independently and one that needs to wait for support.

A hangar integrated into the superstructure of hulls three and four, sized for two to three medium helicopters, would not require discarding the current vehicle and troop capacity. It would require a deliberate design decision at the outset, which is precisely the moment the program is at now. Retrofitting it later, as the RAN discovered, is technically feasible but operationally disruptive and expensive.

The Bayraktar class is already a capable platform. The question is whether the Turkish Naval Forces want hulls three and four to be capable platforms or more capable platforms. The hangar is the most straightforward answer to that question.

The alternative path, procuring one or two dedicated LPDs to fill the same gap, would deliver comparable or greater rotary capability but at substantially higher unit cost and with a longer construction timeline. Integrating a hangar into hulls three and four achieves the core capability gain within a program that is already contracted, at a fraction of that cost.

 

[dBSPL]

Gözünüzü seveyim ya, bir de bizim Sahil Güvenlik güclerine el atalim amk...

I miss news and progress for TCG.

The contract for 2+6 National Coast Guard vessels was signed in July 2025, with the first vessel planned for delivery in 26 months. This means delivery in 2027, commissioning in 2028, and delivery of the second vessel in 2028. The construction of the 6 vessels under option is expected to be quite rapid.