Air-Force [OpEd] How the Turkish Air Force Should Rebuild Its Airlift Fleet (2026-2040)

[dBSPL]

Military logistics is measured not by a single aircraft but by a pyramid. Strategic heavy lift sits at the top, courier and liaison work at the base, and every layer is built to take weight off the one above it. An air force's real reach is set as much by the balance between these layers as by the range of its largest aircraft. Türkiye's deepening overseas basing needs, our rising operational tempo, and our next-generation readiness doctrine all force a simultaneous transformation across all five layers of this pyramid. Below I work through that transformation not from the top down, but layer by layer in order of urgency.​

Photo: Turkish Air Force A400M at Shah Amanat International Airport, Chittagong to donate relief materials for the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh (Wikimedia Coomons)

Item 1: Utility / Liaison Class (8+)​

At the base of the pyramid sits the courier and liaison role, the backbone of operational tempo. Today that job falls to four ageing airframes nearing the end of their economic life within the 212th Special Squadron: two Cessna Citation IIs and two Cessna Citation VIIs. Türkiye's expanding multipolar sphere of influence, its overseas base management, and the rising operational tempo are growing the workload on these four aircraft geometrically rather than linearly. Once the periodic maintenance margin is factored in, it is clear the current capacity will fall short within the next five to ten years (2030-2035).

What this segment needs is a light or mid-size, ideally twin-engine business-jet-based military liaison platform. The critical threshold is range: the aircraft should be able to reach overseas bases or NATO headquarters in Europe non-stop from Ankara without refuelling, meaning an operational radius of 3,500 km or more at full load. On top of a one-for-one replacement of the four ageing airframes, raising the total to eight platforms is a rational target, intended to feed the logistics liaison pool of the joint overseas bases.

The candidate platforms should be split by range threshold. The Embraer Phenom 300E and Cessna Citation Latitude are attractive in terms of low flight-hour cost and parts continuity, but they only meet the 3,500 km non-stop overseas range at light load; this class is adequate for intra-continental and near-overseas tasks. For genuine non-stop strategic liaison, a longer-legged tier such as the Bombardier Challenger 650 or the Global series is a more consistent answer. Building the fleet around these two thresholds rather than a single type balances both cost and mission flexibility.

Item 2: Medium Tactical Transport / Battlefield Logistics (16-20)​

Over the next fifteen years (2026-2040), the transformation that will replace the CN-235 fleet in the light tactical transport class will be one of the most strategic calls to make. The path here is not a one-for-one replacement of the current aircraft but a vertical step up a class. The evolving overseas basing vision makes it necessary to jump directly into the medium tactical transport segment rather than settling for a platform that only carries personnel and light cargo.

The logic of that step lives in the hard numbers. In place of the 6-ton CN-235, what is needed is a platform that can carry 11 tons of payload and, thanks to its wide-body architecture, put tactical wheeled armoured vehicles and light artillery systems directly into the contact zone. At least 2,000 km of range at full load, over 4,000 km at light load, and a cruise speed above 550 km/h bring this class close to C-130 level. Part of the pure personnel-transport work the CN-235 fleet currently shoulders should be handed off to the liaison jets in Item 1, while the operational tactical load is met by a medium transport fleet of at least 16, ideally 20 aircraft. Given that the type's home operator Italy runs 12 and Greece 8, the figure may look high at first glance; but the tactical transport demand of Türkiye's large land army and its widening distributed basing network put this class on a different scale from the European examples. The ideal 20 is not just an opportunity buy, it is the product of a role expansion: the tasks inherited from the CN-235, the simultaneity demand that distributed basing brings, and a mid-tier contribution to airborne operations all pull this fleet upward in number.

The airborne dimension is an overlooked but critical function of this layer. With a capacity of roughly 46 paratroopers, the C-27J can feed the insertion of special forces and small units, but dropping an airborne force at brigade scale in a single wave is a load this class cannot carry on its own. For that reason the C-27J should be positioned not as the backbone of mass parachute operations but as the element that complements them and adds flexibility; the actual mass-drop capacity should be sought one layer up, in the expanded C-130J fleet.

The clearest proven example of this segment worldwide is the Leonardo C-27J Spartan. The point here is less an opportunity window than a lesson to be drawn. Under its 2026 National Defence Strategy, Australia decided to retire its 10 C-27Js early, before they had even completed a decade of service. But what sits behind that decision is not a capability shortfall of the aircraft; it is the chronic spare-parts and sustainment problems created by the FMS procurement route run through the United States. That carries a two-way message for Türkiye. On one hand it confirms the segment is the right one; on the other it is a reminder that if this class is entered, procurement must be structured through direct manufacturer support and a secured sustainment chain. The right aircraft can still cause trouble when bought through the wrong procurement model. Another thing that pushes the C-27J forward is the broad logistics commonality it shares with the C-130J; the same Rolls-Royce AE2100 engine family, a similar avionics architecture, and an overlapping sustainment chain make it a natural tactical complement to an expanded C-130J fleet. As of today, as a declared programme with an active production line and a proven track record, the strongest battlefield airlifter choice on the table is the C-27J.

That said, this choice should not be treated as the only option. The proposed 20-aircraft fleet would make Türkiye one of the largest operators of this class in the world; that is a deliberate choice grounded in tactical reasoning, but it also points to a rare economic condition. Domestic demand this large and this sustained can, on its own, provide the critical mass needed to keep an indigenous development programme alive, because it largely removes from the outset the biggest risk facing any domestic platform, which is an insufficient production run. On that footing, if no firm decision is taken in favour of the C-27J, an alternative path can be considered starting today: an indigenous tactical transport platform that would phase in gradually from the mid-2030s as the CN-235s leave service. Sitting above the CN-235 but below the full capacity of the C-27J, in the 7-9 ton payload band, wide-bodied and with a rear ramp, such an aircraft would be no fantasy but the natural extension of an existing industrial base. TUSAŞ has serially produced the CN-235 with a high domestic content ratio, put the C-130 fleet through a comprehensive avionics modernisation built around a national mission computer and indigenous mission software, and in the A400M programme moved from build-to-print parts manufacturing to design responsibility, becoming an industry player that holds the design rights to critical structural components. That accumulated base shows that the airframe, avionics, and systems-integration dimensions of an indigenous light transport could largely be resolved at home.

The two paths need not be mutually exclusive. If the indigenous platform is positioned to cover the upper end of the fleet, that is, the additional demand above 16, C-27J imports would be limited to a core fleet and the remaining requirement shifted to domestic production; this both pushes supply independence down to the base layer and secures the continuity of the local line. It must be said plainly, though, that there is no declared, budgeted indigenous programme today; this is a projection. On the ground of present reality, with an active production line, a proven logistics partnership with the C-130J, and standing as the standard of the segment, the C-27J is the primary and priority choice of this item. The indigenous alternative should be treated as an extension that could gradually take over this fleet once it matures.

Item 3: Medium-Heavy Tactical / Regional Transport Class (12 + 8)​

In the medium-heavy tactical transport class the decision has largely been made and is in the execution phase. Despite the ERCİYES modernisation, the veteran C-130B/E/H fleet faces the risk of permanently falling out of operation due to airframe ages in the 55-to-68-year band. To close this gap, the 12 stretched C-130J-30 Super Hercules procured from the United Kingdom are going through centre wing box renewal and heavy maintenance at Marshall Aerospace. The work involves a comprehensive programme spread over four years, and when the deliveries will complete is not yet settled; the depth of the airframe refurbishment suggests the schedule will not be rushed.

The 12 C-130J-30s, with the advantage of a stretched fuselage, close the tonnage gap left by the 19 ageing airframes to be retired (13 C-130Es and 6 C-130Bs), but they create a contraction in numerical flexibility. Türkiye's large land army places a far heavier operational load on its tactical transport fleets than the European examples; the fact that the existing A400M and C-130 fleets are already run at high tempo is the proof of that. For this reason the 12-aircraft fleet should ideally be brought up to 20 airframes with an additional buy of 8. That figure is not arbitrary but a doctrinal threshold: because readiness rates mean only a portion of the fleet will be flyable at any moment, the fleet needs to sit in the 20 band to sustain mass parachute operations across a meaningful number of waves, to keep regional transport flowing without interruption, and to feed a simultaneous airlift bridge. Whether this added capacity is met by hunting clean second-hand C-130J airframes on the used market or by the battlefield airlifter class in Item 2 taking over the tactical load; once the C-27J shoulders the tactical workload, the C-130J fleet can focus on pure regional transport, mass airborne drops, and the airlift bridge.

Airborne operations and the airlift bridge are the real strategic rationale for this layer. Dropping an airborne force at brigade scale, with a meaningful combat mass, in a single wave is possible only when a C-130J fleet in the 20 band works together with the A400Ms; the A400M carries the heavy end with its 116-paratrooper capacity, the C-130J the numerical mass. In the same way, when a 1974-type airlift bridge has to be set up in the near abroad, the backbone of that task is the fixed-wing transport fleet, not helicopters; helicopters only take on last-stage distribution once the corridor is established. This is exactly the logic of the pyramid: the tightness of one layer is offset by the correct sizing of the layers below and above it.

Item 4: Strategic / Heavy Transport Class (10 + 7)​

In the heavy transport class Türkiye starts from a strong position. Delivery of the 10-aircraft A400M Atlas fleet is complete, and the world's only external retrofit and FASBAT centre, set up within the 2nd Air Maintenance Factory in Kayseri, has earned serious infrastructure independence on this aircraft. The problem is not capability but scale. The multipolar basing strategy calls for this class of fleet to be grown.

The most rational way to grow is not a fresh order but seizing a ready opportunity. Spain plans to keep the first 20 aircraft of its original 27-aircraft A400M quota in its own air force; the remaining last 7 airframes, still to be built, are in surplus status. Acquiring these aircraft through a government-to-government deal would cut procurement time sharply compared with joining a zero-position order queue. On top of that, since these airframes are still to come off the production line, our domestic maintenance infrastructure already established in Kayseri reaches maximum efficiency with the larger fleet. This kind of overlap between the production and sustainment ecosystems is an industrial gain beyond a purely numerical fleet increase. And a fleet of 17 is hardly excessive next to the scale of NATO partners such as France and Germany, which run the A400M with 50 and 53 aircraft, and the United Kingdom with 22; it should be read as a minimum requirement for the multipolar basing vision.

In the pure strategic heavy class, though, one has to be realistic. With the C-17 production line closed long ago, no second-hand market to speak of, and the aircraft's extreme sustainment costs, this option becomes a theoretical fantasy as an owned-asset goal. Yet this capacity gap can be placed on a rational footing through allied pooling. By expanding the existing military transport and deployment agreements with Qatar, which holds 8 C-17s in its inventory, a joint strategic logistics line can be set up between the two countries. For Türkiye, the real owned-asset goal should be to consolidate its heavy logistics weight within the A400M ecosystem. This fleet also carries the heavy end of airborne operations; with its 116-paratrooper capacity and its ability to put heavy vehicles down on short strips, the A400M, together with the C-130J in Item 3, forms the strategic backbone of mass parachute and airlift-bridge tasks.

Item 5: Strategic Tanker-Cargo Class (10-12+)​

This layer produces not weight but range. The 7 veteran KC-135Rs, the multiplier of the Turkish Air Force's deep-operations capability, will need to be retired within the next decade (2035) on account of airframe ages exceeding sixty years and high operating costs, even with avionics modernisation.

The platform chosen to replace them should be not just a refuelling aircraft but a multi-role carrier. A tanker that can carry up to 45 tons of cargo on its lower deck or 250 to 300 fully equipped personnel in its cabin relieves the whole system by sharing the palletised cargo and personnel load of the overseas-bound logistics pyramid with the A400Ms. There is a qualitative distinction here: the A330 MRTT cannot ramp-load heavy and outsize vehicles the way the A400M can, but it adds serious capacity in palletised freight and personnel movement. So this layer does its own job while also taking off part of the load of the layers beneath it.

A one-for-one replacement is not enough numerically. On the assumption that the number of manned fighters and unmanned platforms will trend upward over the coming decades with the manned-unmanned teaming concept, at least 10, ideally 12 or more next-generation strategic tankers would meet both readiness rates and deployment flexibility. The jump from 7 KC-135Rs to that figure may look large, but the comparative frame makes it reasonable: the United Kingdom runs 14 strategic tankers and France 11, with the UK keeping 9 of that fleet in continuous military service and holding the rest in a surge pool. A 12-aircraft fleet built on a similar core-plus-support logic would put Türkiye at the tanker-power level of those two countries. On platform choice, the Airbus A330 MRTT stands out. While the Boeing KC-46A is both a lower-capacity alternative and carries political and supply constraints, the A330 MRTT's conversion from a civil airframe is industrially established and cost-effective. This choice also overlaps with the A400M ecosystem in Item 4 and lets Türkiye build a consistent supply line in European-origin strategic air platforms.

Readiness and Scale: Why the Numbers Sit Where They Do​

A fleet's on-paper strength and the number of aircraft it can put in the air at once are not the same thing. In modern transport fleets the readiness rate generally runs in the 50-to-65-percent band; on complex platforms like the A400M, periodic maintenance, modernisation, and spare-parts cycles can pull that rate even lower at times. This explains why the numbers proposed above are not generous but measured. Of 17 A400Ms only 9 to 11 at a given moment, of 20 C-130Js 11 to 13, of 12 tankers 7 to 8 should be counted as actually operational. A concrete design scenario makes this visible: moving a mechanised brigade with its personnel, light armour, and supplies to an overseas theatre a few thousand kilometres away within a few days locks up nearly the entire operational portion of the A400M and C-130J fleets on a single task. Once you account for the need to keep up domestic tactical transport, the airlift bridge, and a possible airborne operation at the same time, the proposed fleet depth stops being a luxury and becomes a minimum requirement. When planning at the scale of the Turkish Armed Forces, the metric to go by is not the total number of airframes but the number of operational aircraft that can be put in the air simultaneously in the worst case.

Feasibility and Timeline: How the Transformation Can Happen​

The most critical implicit assumption of this architecture is that aircraft can be pulled off the shelf the moment they are wanted; in reality the procurement situation of each layer differs, and these differences set the timeline of the transformation. On the A400M side the situation is favourable: the production line is secured until at least 2029 by the 2025 agreement, and Spain's surplus airframes offer a ready supply window. On the C-130J side, clean, low-hour second-hand airframe supply is extremely scarce, because these aircraft are relatively young and owners do not let them go; for that reason part of the additional buy may require joining the new-build queue. On the C-27J side, the airframes Australia retired early create a one-off opportunity window, but once that window closes the low-tempo production line offers no flexible alternative. On the tanker side the A330 MRTT line is solid but the order book is full; delivery of a fresh order could run into the mid-2030s, which raises the risk of a transition-period gap overlapping with the KC-135Rs' retirement schedule.

The shared lesson in all of this is that this transformation has to be run not as a simultaneous bulk buy but as a phased, opportunistic procurement strategy keyed to supply windows. And there is a resource dimension to it, not only a supply one. More than sixty new airframes across five layers means a programme worth billions of dollars, and no defence budget can carry that load in a single fiscal period; this is where the real necessity of a phased schedule comes from. The issue is not platform cost alone, either. A type new to the inventory like the C-27J in particular requires building a pilot and technician training pipeline, simulators, a spare-parts pool, and a sustainment infrastructure from scratch; doubling the tanker fleet likewise forces a comparable investment in people and infrastructure. So the real risk planning has to manage is, as much as the capability trough that forms when an old platform retires before its replacement has arrived, the coordination of the acquisition schedule with training and infrastructure readiness. Right timing is as decisive as the right platform choice.

Conclusion​

What these five layers share is that none of them should be assessed on its own. The liaison jets take over the CN-235's personnel load, the battlefield airlifter eases the C-130J's tactical load, the multi-role tanker shares the A400M's strategic cargo load. The pyramid works as a system in which each layer lets the one above it breathe. The real difficulty lies not in the technical side but in the timing. Renewing five classes at once across the 2026-2040 span means a serious burden in budget, training, and sustainment. For that reason the transformation should be handled not as a shopping list but as a phased roadmap; starting from the oldest and most critical airframes, each layer's replacement should be planned in an order that eases the load of the next. And while this roadmap is for now drawn largely with imported platforms, no less important is keeping the way open for an indigenous alternative that will mature at the base layer and building an architecture that pulls external dependency down over time. Built correctly, this architecture gives Türkiye not just more aircraft but real logistics depth in an age of multipolar operations.


*Disclaimer: This article reflects the author's own analysis and recommendations, not any official position or confirmed programme. The figures and proposals are offered as a basis for discussion, and counterarguments, particularly on the fleet numbers, are welcome.