Historical Pacific War series

[Domobran7]

This will be a series of posts about World War II in the Pacific, based in part on Boris Prikril's series Pakao Pacifica though obviously using other sources as well.

Pacific War 1 – Preliminary Moves

Road to the Pacific War Beginning of the war in the Pacific came unexpectedly, at least for some people. Attention was on Europe, where war had been raging for two years. Poland had been invaded by…

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Road to the Pacific War​

Beginning of the war in the Pacific came unexpectedly, at least for some people. Attention was on Europe, where war had been raging for two years. Poland had been invaded by Germany and USSR in September 1939., and USSR invaded Finland in November of the same year. After that, Germany conquered country after country – with Denmark, Norway, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium, France, Albania, Yugoslavia and Greece all falling in short order. In Asia, the war between Japan and China was already old news.

The war continued on. Air campaign over Britain captured and kept attention of the public. Even more so did the war in the North Atlantic, employing significant resources on both sides, as both knew the naval campaign was a key to either maintaining or neutralizing Britain. Stakes were increased even further when Axis powers invaded the Soviet Union. Massive expansion of war saw millions more troops thrown into combat, and millions of people were displaced or saw their homes destroyed. Soon, Leningrad was surrounded and Moscow was expecting an attack.

It is thus not surprising that nobody had cared what was happening in Asia. Eastern Asia and Pacific Ocean seemed calm: Japan had taken some areas of China, but they soon stopped with no plans for new advances evident. All of this, however, was soon to change.

 

[Domobran7]

Pacific War 1.5 – Opposing Sides

Imperial Japanese Navy Imperial Japanese Navy was, in 1941., third strongest navy in the world. Its core were 10 battleships. While over 20 years of age – as was the case in all other major navies …

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[Gary]

on paper the IJN is the 3rd largest navy on earth (by hull count and tonnage), with the RN and USN in #1 and #2 respectively. But I'll argue until at least mid 1942 the Japanese are the worlds most powerful navy, with it's Kido Butai, the world's first combined carrier strike group, the RN and USN are left behind in this area. Imperial Japan is the first country to use transports (carriers) as the main mean to deliver a blow to an enemy opposing fleet instead of artillery.

The air wing of Mitsubishi A6M Zero and Nakajima B5N Kate bombers outclasses any warplanes the western navies deployed on board their carriers.

 

[Domobran7]

on paper the IJN is the 3rd largest navy on earth (by hull count and tonnage), with the RN and USN in #1 and #2 respectively. But I'll argue until at least mid 1942 the Japanese are the worlds most powerful navy, with it's Kido Butai, the world's first combined carrier strike group, the RN and USN are left behind in this area. Imperial Japan is the first country to use transports (carriers) as the main mean to deliver a blow to an enemy opposing fleet instead of artillery.

The air wing of Mitsubishi A6M Zero and Nakajima B5N Kate bombers outclasses any warplanes the western navies deployed on board their carriers.

Agreed, although it does depend on where the battle will be fought. Firstly, carriers in 1939 were nowhere as powerful as they became in 1941 - 1942. Secondly, conditions in the North Sea and the Mediterranean imposed significant limits on carrier operations.

Of course, Japanese didn't have any interests outside the Pacific, really, so any battle actually fought would be to their advantage. But point is, any sweeping title such as "most powerful" has to have serious caveats included.

 

[Gary]

Firstly, carriers in 1939 were nowhere as powerful as they became in 1941 - 1942. Secondly, conditions in the North Sea and the Mediterranean imposed significant limits on carrier operations.

it was :

1. The air wing, not the carriers itself that the IJN has the advantage over its two competitors, simply put the air wing onboard the Japanese carriers outmatched anything the RN and USN employed onboard their own
2. Man behind the gun, the IJN pilots had a head start in experience with their deployment in China in the 30s. Until the destruction of the Kido Butai in Midway, Japanese aviators are simply worlds best.
3. Effective employment methods. Before Pearl, navies simply uses these carriers as scouts for the main battleship line, not offensive weapons itself. The successful attack on Pearl by the Japanese changes the whole paradigm of the uses and potential of an aircraft carrier.

Of course, Japanese didn't have any interests outside the Pacific,

Actually they do have. After the collapse of the European colonies in SE Asia, it's only natural for the Japanese to turn on the sanctuary which is the RN in the Indian ocean.

Indian Ocean raid - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

IJN fleet steaming towards the Indian ocean

 

[Domobran7]

it was :

1. The air wing, not the carriers itself that the IJN has the advantage over its two competitors, simply put the air wing onboard the Japanese carriers outmatched anything the RN and USN employed onboard their own
2. Man behind the gun, the IJN pilots had a head start in experience with their deployment in China in the 30s. Until the destruction of the Kido Butai in Midway, Japanese aviators are simply worlds best.
3. Effective employment methods. Before Pearl, navies simply uses these carriers as scouts for the main battleship line, not offensive weapons itself. The successful attack on Pearl by the Japanese changes the whole paradigm of the uses and potential of an aircraft carrier.

I am aware of all that. But these advantages also hide significant flaws:

1. Japan did not have a good program of pilot training. Or rather, their training was so intensive that they could not
2. Agreed. But as I pointed out above, they will not have remained the world's best for long.
3. That is not entirely correct. British had been using carriers as either main (Taranto) or auxilliary (hunt for Bismarck) offensive weapon since 1939. And this in spite of their carrier aviation being significantly underdeveloped. Still, as I have said, there is a massive difference between carriers and carrier wings in 1939, those in 1941 and those in 1945, and in any case it is true that until 1942 Japanese do have advantage in that area.

Actually they do have. After the collapse of the European colonies in SE Asia, it's only natural for the Japanese to turn on the sanctuary which is the RN in the Indian ocean.

I was talking about situation before the war - that is, when design choices were being made.

 

[Domobran7]

Pacific War 2 – Attack on Pearl Harbor – History and War (wordpress.com)

While this was understood only by a few people, by 1941. Japan and the United States had been on a collision course for a whole decade. Slide towards the conflict started arguably in 1902., with the signing of the Anglo-Japanese alliance between the Great Britain and Japan. But that the two countries were on a collision course only became clear in 1931., when Japan conquered Manchuria. In 1937., Japan also invaded northern China, and two years later its attention turned southwards with the conquest of island of Hainan. After it, Japan turned its attention onto Malaya, Phillipines and the Dutch East Indies. United States, by contrast, were supporting the Japan-hostile government of Chang Kai Shek, and also European colonial efforts in Asia. This was happening right at the time when Japan was repeating the parole of “Asia to Asians”. Japanese kept talking about the great eastern sphere of common progress, while they were in fact searching for the natural resources their islands did not have.

Fall of France in June 1940. gave Japan a good excuse to send troops to French Indochina, and on 27th September it signed a Tripartite Pact with the Axis powers. As US sympathies were clearly with the Allies, President Roosevelt introduced an embargo on all key materials except for oil. Japanese called this confrontation of two powers Taihei-yono-go: “Cancer of the Pacific”. Attempting to find a diplomatic solution, Japanese government recalled a retired admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, assigning him as a Japanese ambassador to United States in January 1941. But plans were already being made for war, and the US sanctions only increased Japanese determination to fight. US ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, correctly predicted that Japan will “rather carry out a national harakiri than bow under foreign pressure”.

 

[Domobran7]

Pacific War 3 – Preparations Before the Invasion of Malaya – History and War (wordpress.com)

Introduction – the Strategic Realities
​

Malaya had for long time been safe, but this had rapidly changed in the last decade. Japanese imperial ambitions had led them to sieze and annex Manchuria in 1931 – 1932. In 1934, Japane renounced the Washington agreements, and in 1937 invaded China. Meanwhile, tensions had been rising in Europe, with British being well aware that the policy of appeasement will only delay war, not prevent it – yet that was the time they desperately needed.

Singapore Naval Base was officially opened in February 1938., but it became clear that deploying a large fleet to it would be impossible. After the fall of France and Italian entrance to war, British had to suspend their plan to send a large fleet to Far East. Even so, decision was made to defend Singapore, which would be a British centre of gravity in the Far East. Japanese Army had been tied down in China, which meant that there would be time enough to deploy reinforcements. But the plans did not foresee direction of war in 1940. and 1941., with British suffering a defeat after defeat. As a result, no reinforcements were available when Japan attacked.

Japanese themselves exploited situation in Europe to full. After the fall of France, Japan was able to secure permission from the Vichy French government to occupy French Indochina. This greatly increased threat to Singapore, as now Japanese ground troops and air bases were in range of Singapore. At the same time, strong American reaction to Japanese expansionism meant that war was Japan’s only choice, as it could not give in to American demands.

When Germany attacked USSR in June 1941., Japan had a choice to attack either Russia or Great Britain. But several factors pushed towards the latter, most importantly the fact that Russian Far East did not have all the resources that Japan needed to support its economy. Thus, a decision was made to occupy Malaya and Dutch East Indies. Occupation of the French Indochina fulfilled a major strategic prerequisite, allowing Japan to directly threaten both Malaya and Singapore. But it also meant that Japan was locked on a war path: occupation of Indochina meant that United States, Britain and Netherlands all slapped embargo on Japan, and with no access to oil, Japan had to turn to conquest in order to secure oil supply.

 

[Gary]

interesting part is the Japanese effort of HUMINT in Malaya in the years preceding the war, disguised as trekkers they laid up the route of the eventual Japanese invasion of Malaya years later.

 

[Domobran7]

Pacific War 4 – Sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse

Introduction According to the Japanese war plan, attack on Pearl Harbor was merely a side note – an attack whose main purpose was to enable the conquest of southeastern Asia. While the attack on Pe…

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Introduction​

According to the Japanese war plan, attack on Pearl Harbor was merely a side note – an attack whose main purpose was to enable the conquest of southeastern Asia. While the attack on Pearl Harbor was prepared in strict secrecy, preparations for the conquest of southeastern Asia were made out in the plain sight – both to help divert attention from preparations for attack on Pearl Harbor, but also because any possibility of serious resistence in the area was unlikely to the point of fantasy.

Yet these areas were extremely important due to raw resources they would provide to Japanese industry and war potential. Attack was to be executed in multiple areas and by multiple groups simultaneously, to deny enemy the time necessary for organizing resistence. Forces were thus split accordingly, and protection was provided by the Southern Fleet under command of vice admiral Nobutake Kondo. This fleet was divided into main group, group for Philippines, and group for Malaya. Independent of the fleet were small naval detachments meant for conquest of isolated US bases in the Western Pacific.

Main group of the southern fleet consisted of battleships Haruna and Kongo, aircraft carriers Ryujo and Sunyo (sic!; perhaps Junyo), heavy cruisers Atago and Chokai, as well as a destroyer flotilla. Philippines group consisted of seaplane carriers Noturo and Kumikawa Muru, heavy cruisers Ashigara, Haguro and Myoko, old cruisers Nagara and Kuma, and three destroyer flotillas. Malaya group consisted of four new heavy cruisers of Mogami class: Mogami, Mikuma, Suzuya, Kumano, a destroyer flotilla and three submarine flotillas. These forces were tasked with protecting extensive landing forces and auxilliaries. Groups also received extensive ground-based air support, with the Philippines group receiving 175 aircraft and Malaya group 550 aircraft. Navy also provided 300 aircraft for the Philippines group and 150 for the Malaya group. Navy also left 275 aircraft as a reserve in Japanese bases.

These large forces penetrated into Southeast Asia according to a very detailed plan, based around a series of simultaneous or quickly successive landings – just at Philippines, landings were made at nine different places. Normal pattern of Japanese amphibious landings was to choose a place within strike range of land-based air bases, so that carrier air wings could always be held in reserve for a potential naval battle. Invasion would open with massive air strikes against air bases, followed by naval and air bombardment of the landing area. Finally, landing would be undertaken, again with support of aircraft and ships. Ships used for shore bombardment were destroyers and light cruisers, with heavy cruisers being utilized only on occasion, and battleships never, so that the fleet was always ready for a potential naval battle. Each landing group had its own screening forces of cruisers and destroyers. In the rear was the majority of the southern fleet of admiral Kondo, consisting of fast carriers and fast battleships, in order to intercept any potential enemy fleet attacks against the landing area.

 

[Domobran7]

Pacific War 5 – Conquest of Malaya and Singapore

The Action off Endau The loss of Prince of Wales and Repulse brought an effective end to the naval portion of the campaign. Only British naval presence were light RN units, but these were focused o…

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The Action off Endau​

The loss of Prince of Wales and Repulse brought an effective end to the naval portion of the campaign. Only British naval presence were light RN units, but these were focused on escorting convoys into the fortress and in any case could not contest control of the South China Sea with the Imperial Japanese Navy.

One exception to this reluctance came in the later part of the campaign as the British forces were retreating towards Singapore. Japanese conducted a logistics operation on the south-east coast of Malaya, which had been scaled down from the original plans for a full landing operations due to concerns for British air and naval intervention. And this intervention did happen. Percival believed assault on Endau to be capable of cutting off the British force retreating into the fortress, and thus the Royal Navy decided to attack the assault force with whatever was available.

The Japanese landing was carried out by two IJA transports carrying construction stores, ordnance and personnel to set up an airfield. These were escorted by 3rd Destroyer Squadron, consisting of a light cruiser, six Fubuki-class destroyers, and five large minesweepers. RAFs repeated attacks achieved nothing despite the loss of 15 aircraft, and the only naval units available were the 23 year old S-class destroyer Thanet and the 25 year old Australian V-class destroyer Vampire. Two destroyers carried 4-inch guns and a total of seven torpedoes.

HMAS Vampire
The small force departed Singapore on the afternoon of 26th of January, with the intention of carrying out a night attack. Destroyers sailed close to shore, sneaking past the Japanese destroyer patrols, but were spotted within anchorage by a minesweeper W-4. Vampire launched two torpedoes at the minesweeper at 2:42 but both missed. Failing to find the transports, two destroyers launched all their remaining torpedoes at a Japanese destroyer, and retreated at high speed to south-east. But their luck ran out, and within minutes Thanet was hit in the engine room by a 5 inch shell. Shell severed both main and auxiliary steam lines, leaving Thanet dead in the water. Of its crew, 65 were able to evade capture and return to Singapore, 12 were killed in action, and 32 were captured by the Japanese and later executed. Vampire escaped with the help of its smokescreen, and suffered no damage or casualties.

 

[Domobran7]

Pacific War 6 – Battle of Hong Kong

Preparations for the attack on Hong Kong started on Saturday 6th December 1941., when a large number of Japanese civilians left the colony following instructions from Tokyo. Japanese were already o…

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Preparations for the attack on Hong Kong started on Saturday 6th December 1941., when a large number of Japanese civilians left the colony following instructions from Tokyo. Japanese were already on the move against the Pearl Harbor and the Philippines – latter of which they regarded as a “pistol aimed at Japan’s heart”. On 27th November the US Navy Department sent out a despatch, stating that “This despatch is to be considered a war warning … an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days … the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedi#tion against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo.”.

US Ambassador in Tokyo, J C Grew, believed that the Japanese negotiations with the Americans in Washington were intended to conceal war preparations, and that the attack might come suddenly. His warning was confirmed by intercepted secret messages from Tokyo to Washington; they stressed the urgency of bringing the negotiations to a favourable conclusion by 29th November since “after that [date] things are automatically going to happen”. Roosevelt concluded that America was likely to be attacked within a week.

 

[Domobran7]

https://historyandwarfare.wordpress.com/2022/01/23/pacific-war-7-invasion-of-philippines/

Background and Forces​

US forces​

Philippines, rich islands which United States owned ever since the US-Spanish war, were important to Japanese for many reasons. They were a rich source of raw materials, but more important was their strategic location. Located between Japan and Southeast Asia, Philippines would allow the US Navy to interdict any traffic in the area. Even just military presence in the Philippines could be used to deter Japanese aggression – and military presence there was significant. Conquest of Philippines would also make conquest of Indonesia much easier, as land-based aircraft could be based close to their targets. Nevertheless, some in Washington believed that the Philippines did not represent an object of great strategic value.

US command knew that Philippines could not be defended. Philippines were close to Japan and far from the US mainland, which meant that the Japanese would have advantage in logistics. Moreover, proximity of Japan and its naval bases meant that the Japanese Navy could interdict any attempts to supply or reinforce the islands. Archipelago itself consisted of over 7 000 islands, and the main naval base located in Subic Bay was difficult to defend. Nevertheless, Douglas MacArthur had strong force of 80 000 soldiers, of which 19 000 Americans. Most of the USAFFE consisted of infantrymen, but there was also a large contingent of coastal artillery units used to guard fortifications that protected Manilla and Subic bays. Ground forces in general were predominantly infantry, with some artillery and armored cars, but no tanks. MacArthur also had 277 aircraft, of which 107 modern fighters and 35 flying fortresses – a total of 142 aircraft capable of serious combat. Majority of commanders were American, and they had taken over command and training of most Philippino Army throughout the fight.

While Philippine Army troops were numerous, they lacked modern weapons, training, equipment and experienced commissioned and non-commissioned officers. While MacArthur had envisioned Philippine Army as being based on the Swiss model of a small professional army filled out with disciplined reservists, threat of Japan had forced him to start mobilizing the troops. Lack of time he had to carry out his plans meant that Filipino units had to be mobilized despite lacking training, equipment, uniforms, rations and other necessities. Estimated total strength of PA was 120 000 troops, but soldiers and officers alike lacked training. Diversity of dialects also caused communications issues, and many soldiers lacked basic educations. Lack of trained officers meant that American officers had to assume command of battalion and higher level units as the war progressed.

MacArthur thus, in addition to hastily training the troops, placed much faith in airplane as an equalizer. He hoped that advanced B-17 bombers and fighter aircraft could compensate for his lack of trained and equipped ground forces. Far Eastern Air Force was a small but growing component of the USAFFE. MacArthur had hoped to use the air power to stem the Japanese, and by December 8 the FEAF had a sizable force. Fighters consisted of modern Curtiss P-40 and obsolete Seversky P-35A fighters. In total, there were 277 aircraft, of which 107 P-40B/E, 52 P-35A and 35 B-17C/D. MacArthur also wanted PA to have its own air force. AAF officers and enlisted personnel thus had to train Filipino Air Corps personnel in required tasks, but this was a slow process. By August 1941., PAAC had 500 personnel organized in six squadrons. As new B-17s and P-40s arrived, obsolete aircraft such as B-10 and P-26A were transferred from USAAF to PAAC.

US Navy’s Asiatic Fleet also maintained forward presence in the region. Commanded by Admiral Hart, it had numerous submarines. Available surface units were limited: heavy cruiser USS Houston, light cruiser USS Marblehead, as well as a number of World War I era destroyers gunboats and support ships. Also present was Motor Torpedo Squadron 3 consisting of six patrol torpedo (PT) boats. The Asiatic Fleet also had Patrol Wing 10, consisting of 24 PBY Catalina aircraft and four seaplane tenders. On December 8, most of the destroyers and the USS Marblehead had deployed to Borneo. However, the lack of Navy transportation and escorts limited the ability to reinforce the islands even before the war. Majority of the effort had to be directed to an undeclared, but hot, war in the Atlantic. Main base was at Manilla, but there was also a major base in Olongapo in the Subic bay.

As the war started looking inevitable, United States looked to defense of their positions in the Philippines, Hawaii and elsewhere. On 16th of August, MacArthur received word that Washington would start shipping reinforcements no later than 5th September. These included several tank battalions, 200th Coastal Artillery Regiment for AA support, an ordnance battalion, and more self-propelled, 75mm M1897A4 gun Motor Carriage M3 halftracks capable of providing direct fire support and armor-piercing capability.

75 mm M3 GMC
The 192nd and 194th Tank Battalions came from Army National Guard units and formed the Provisional Tank Group. Group was armed with M3 Stuart light tanks, whose 37 mm guns were highly effective against lightly armored Japanese tanks. MacArthur could count on getting 108 M-3 Stuarts and some M3 75mm M3 halftracks.

MacArthur had also received SCR-270, 272, and 371 air radar-warning units, but only one set was operational at Iba. While 60th and 200th Coastal Artillery Regiments were present, they did not have enough weapons to protect the airfields, the fortified islands at Manila Bay’s mouth, Subic Bay, Manila, and other bases. Anti-aircraft defenses were limited to 24 machine guns at Clark Field and Manilla. FEAF aircraft would have to be protected by a combination of combat air patrols and dispersal of aircraft to secondary airfields.

Japanese forces​

Japanese forces in the area were also significant. The Japanese Southern Expeditionary Army, with headquarters in Saigon in French Indochina, consisted of four numbered armies of which 14th was designated for the Philippines operation. Japanese forces had been mobilized and many were already bloodied in China, giving them much needed experience. However, both IJA and IJN had to spread their forces across multiple concurrent operations.

14th Army, which was a designated spearhead of the attack, consisted of 16th and 48th Divisions as well as a garrison unit, the 65th Independent Mixed Brigade. Two divisions and brigade were infantry units, with each division numbering 20 000 troops. Homma also had two tank regiments, two regiments and a battalion of medium artillery, three engineer regiments, five AAA battalions and other support units. The 16th Division had served in Manchuria and fought in Northern China from 1937 to 1939, but had a mixed combat record. It consisted of 9th, 20th and 33rd Infantry Regiments. The 48th Division had a Formosan mixed brigade consisting of 1st and 2nd Formosa Infantry Regiments and the veteral 47th Infantry Regiment which had combat experience from China. Each division also had organic cavalry for reconnaissance, transport, artillery and engineer regiments.

Masaharu Homma
The Imperial Japanese Army Air Force contributed the 5th Army Air Force Division to the Philippines campaign, commanded by Lieutenant General Hideyoshi Obata. This division had 4th Army Air Force Division at its disposal, composed of four sentais (groups). The brigade had various types of bombers, as well as Nakajima Ki-27 Nate fighters which had fixed landing gear and were overall not very good. In fact, they struggled to defeat even the obsolete Allied aircraft they faced early in the war, and limited range meant they could not reach central Luzon from Formosa. Obata could also use the 10th Independent Hikotai. This unit contained Mitsubishi Ki-15 reconnaissance, Mitsubishi Ki-36 air cooperation, and transport aircraft. But much like Ki-27, all IJAAF aircraft had limited range.

The IJN dedicated the 3rd fleet under vice-admiral Ibo Takahashi to support the IJA’s invasion of the Philippines. The fleet was to take the Philippines and later Borneo and the Celebes. Takahashi’s force was to destroy the US naval forces, cover and support the IJA landings, and after the conquest, protect IJA supply lines and reinforcements. Takahashi had light carrier Ryujo available to conduct operations beyond the range of Japanese land-based aircraft. Majority of the fleet consisted of surface combatants: 5 heavy cruisers, 5 light cruisers, 29 destroyers, two seaplane tenders and some torpedo boats and minesweepers. Most cruisers, destroyers and minesweepers were assigned to Surprise Attack Forces consisting of transports. Five attack forces were aimed, respectively, at Aparri, Vigan, Batan Island and Legaspi.

Japanese aircraft carrier Ryujo
IJNAF proved itself very valuable early in the campaign. IGHQ planners assigned the 11th Air Fleet to the campaign consisting of the 21st and 23rd Air Flotillas based in Formosa. The 21st Air Flotilla provided Mitsubishi G4M1 (Betty) and G3M2 (Nell) twin-engine long-range bombers, but more valuable was the 23rd Air Flotilla. This flotilla consisted of fighter forces, whose naval fighters had longer range than the IJAAF ones. IJNAF pilots did fly Mitsubishi A5M4 fixed landing gear fighters, but its most important contribution was the longer range, Mitsubishi A6M2 Zero fighter, which outclassed any FEAF fighter in the Philippines. Out of 304-aircraft strong IJNAF force, 108 were Zero fighters. These could reach targets in central Luzon, including the main FEAF base at Clark Field and Manila.

 

[Domobran7]

Pacific War 8 – Fall of Guam and Wake

Fall of Guam Introduction On 11th June of 1931., the Secretary of the Navy ordered Guam’s Governor to demilitarize the island. This move was in reaction to Japanese military activity in Manch…

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Fall of Guam​

Introduction​

On 11th June of 1931., the Secretary of the Navy ordered Guam’s Governor to demilitarize the island. This move was in reaction to Japanese military activity in Manchuria, seized later that year, hoping perhaps that demilitarization of Guam would confine any Japanese military moves to Manchuria and not provoke any incidents on Pacific islands. All guns and mounts, including the mobile artillery of the Marines, were dissasembled and returned to the United States on all transports that could take same. Only two 8-inch howitzer guns with mounts, eight 7-inch rifles and two 7-inch tractor-mounted guns were left on Guam, simply because transports could not load guns heavier than 6 inches. Ammunition was also left in the magazines.

Soon after Guam was demilitarized, US and Japan exchanged visits, with Captain Root visiting Saipan and Baron Matsuda visiting Guam. These visits were a show of friendship but also mutual assurance of military weakness. Japanese schooner Kibara Maru, based on Saipan, also made frequent visits to Guam. This was likely used to allow Japanese resident on Guam to inform the Japanese government on Guam affairs.

With big guns gone, Guam was left with two 6-pound guns for saluting, 12 Browning automatic rifles, four Browning machine guns, 688 Springfield rifles for Guam militia and 260 Springfield rifles for the Marine Corps and Insular Force.

Japanese goals​

Guam’s capture by Japan was a minor operation within the campaign that stretched over 6 000 miles. Over a thousand aircraft were involved in operation which ended up reversing Pacific balance of power with very few losses. Air strikes were followed by landings and occupation of certain locations. This was enabled by the fact that by 1941., Japan possessed Mitsubishi A6M Zero-Sen, first carrier-borne fighter aircraft that could outperform land-based models. Zero had range of 1940 miles when using drop tanks, and typical combat radius exceeded 500 miles.

Guam was important because it could serve as an air base for Zeroes as well as land-based twin-engined bombers. Guam would also serve as a stop where aircraft en route between other islands could refuel. It would also serve as an alternative to Saipan, Tinian or Rota when they were closed due to weather or enemy action. Taking Guam would also deny to United States a waypoint en route to the Philippines, themselves an important source of raw resources as well as a key route between Japan itself and the Japanese-held French Indochina. Oil and other raw resources Japan required lay in Southeast Asia, especially Netherlands East Indies and British Malaya.

In order to protect and keep open the 3 000 miles long sea route for tankers, enemy bases in the Philippines, Hong Kong and Singapore were to be captured first. Outer ring of protection would be formed by American Wake and Guam, British Gilberts and Burma and Australian Solomons. Elimination of US fleet at Pearl Harbor was also meant to keep this route safe.

Finally, Guam represented the largest and potentially richest island within the 900 mile radius. Nearby Saipan and Tinian were a significant source of raw resources for the Japanese, but Guam could be made to produce more.

Invasion of Guam​

In December 1940., Japanese Imperial High Command ordered Army commands in China to begin studies for the capture of targets in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Detailed plans for the amphibious invasion of Guam were completed in October 1941. Meanwhile, three Army divisions in China trained for tropical warfare and received tropical clothing and gear. From one of these divisions – the 144th Infantry Division – came a regimental combat team named South Seas Detachment. This team was further reinforced with naval militia and other units, and then assigned the tasks of taking first Guam, and then Rabaul on New Britain island in the Solomons.

Starting with October 1941., the 18th Air Unit of Imperial Japanese Navy flew high altitude photo reconnaissance flights over Guam from its base on Saipan. Secret maritime night patrols were also carried out from October on. Japan’s South Seas Detachment of 5 000 soldiers staged in the Bonin Islands and proceeded on 4th December 1941. towards Guam. En route near Rota it picked up ships which held 500 men of a special naval landing force drawn from the 5th Defense Force stationed off Saipan.

Guam invasion fleet, consisting of three cruisers, three destroyers and eight merchant ships serving as troop transports, organized off Rota on 8th December (7th in Hawaii). At the same time, planes of the 18th Air Unit at Saipan bombed and strafed Guam. On Guam, Japanese nationals were arrested and jailed as soon as the state of war with Japan became known.

Unopposed air raids on 8th and 9th December destroyed several houses and stores in Agana. Near Piti, barracks of a Navy contractor were hit. On Orote peninsula, air attacks destroyed oil tanks, hit the Marine barracks and golf course, damaged the cable station, Pan American hotel and flying boat buildings. Small boat handling facilities at Piti Naval Yard were extensively damaged. Several villages were strafed. Old minesweeper USS Penguin was sunk at Apra harbor.

Japanese plans anticipated the invasion of Guam to be a joint Army-Navy affair, but in practice only the small naval militia unit had to fight. The first target was Orote peninsula, which controlled the Apra harbor and was also the site selected for initial airport construction.

Naval militia unit was between 400 and 700 men strong. The unit crossed a half-mile of reef and landed just before 3 AM on 10th December on Dungca’s beach. During two-mile overland westward advance towards downtown Agana, the militia eliminated a machine gun emplacement at a road intersection, killed an unknown number of civilians fleeing Agana, and were temporarily halted by machine gun and rifle fire by the Insular Force Guard in defensive positions around the Plaza de Espana in downtown Agana. At 5:45 AM all firing ceased. Guam’s governor signed the surrender documents shortly thereafter, after having been humiliated by being forced to remove his trousers and a coat. Word of surrender was passed to Sumay on Orote peninsula, where most of the US Marines had been deployed.

Japanese had lost several dead and wounded soldiers. US troops had lost 13 dead and 37 wounded US troops, 4 dead and 8 wounded members of the Insular Force Guard, and 30 – 40 Guaman civilians dead with unknown number wounded. Japanese Army’s South Seas Detachment soon after landed unopposed at Agat and occupied by then empty US Marine barracks. Units from Agat also proceeded to Agana. Guamians living in the Oroto peninsula were forced to evacuate.

Capture of Wake​

Japanese submarine on Wake
United States started fortifying the Wake island as the war began to look more likely. On 19th August 1941., 517 Marines and Sailor of the 1st Defense Landing Battalion arrived to start fortifying the island. Under the command of Major James Devereux and Navy Commander Winfield S. Cunningham, the Marines worked 10 to 12 hours a day clearing fields of fire, emplacing sandbags, conducting reactionary drills and completing other defensive measures.

Major Devereux, who hailed from a line of military scholars, was one of the only men with enough foresight to sense the impending danger. Prior to attack on Pearl Harbor, most Marines believed that the Japanese would never dare incite a war with the United States. Wake, thus, was considered an unimportant strip of land. It was never fully equipped for a defense against a full-scale invasion, and thus it had to be hastily prepared after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Island’s arsenal included 12 M3 anti-air cannons, several Browning .50 cal machine guns, and a few lightweight artillery pieces. Riflemen were armed with the M1903 Springfield bolt-action rifle, while the fighter squadron had only 12 functional F4F-3 fighters. But Marines lacked fundamental components such as radar, mines and illumination rounds.

Admiral Husband Kimmel, commander in chief of the US Pacific Fleet, had wanted to reinforce Wake prior to Pearl Harbor disaster. Believing that any act of aggression from Japan would initially target Wake, he dispatched a battle group led by the carrier USS Saratoga with additional troops, radar and civilian evacuation plans. But ten days after the attack on Pearl Harbor, admiral Kimmel was relieved of command, losing the foremost naval leader commited to defense of the Wake island.

Preparing for the attack and lacking radar, Marines took Wildcats on air patrols to intercept Japanese air attacks. But this was not enough as on 9th of December Japanese bombers descended on the island, destroying eight of twelve grounded Wildcats. The aviaton Marines also lost 23 personnel. But the Imperial Navy soon found itself spread thin attempting to take the islands of Guam, Midway, Marshall, Malaya and Wake in one rapid motion. Because of these commitments as well as the intelligence that island defenses had been reduced to entrenched small arms, Admiral Sadamichi Kajioka ordered nine ships, cruisers and destroyers, to take the island.

These successes made the Japanese incautious, which the garrison exploited to full. Maj Devereux planned to repel the initial attack by erecting fake gun positions in the open, leaving the real batteries concealed for an ambush. This was especially important as many anti-aircraft gun crews had never fired on ships before. Defenders allowed the imperial fleet to come close before opening fire. Catching the fleet by surprise, they sunk a destroyer and damaged eight other ships. Japanese warships ran away, leaving the transports to be sunk by artillery and air attacks. Captain Henry Elrod managed to sink second destroyer as the Japanese fleet retreated.

Admiral Kajioka rapidly responded to the Empire’s first loss. Japanese bombers pounded the island day after day until, on 23rd December, an armada appeared on the horizon. Enemy ships were outside the range of island’s artillery and backed by two fleet carriers. The Japanese attempted to begin the second invasion with a low-light beach landing. This did not go well as Marines used industrial-strength spotlights from the airfield to illuminate the landing zone. While spotlights were immediately destroyed, this allowed the defenders to immediately inflict heavy casualties with cannon and machine gun fire. Despite this, the Japanese slowly gained footholds through the island. By morning, land battle was raging all across the island. Remaining fighters had also been shot down by far superior enemy.

Into the second day, Commander Cunningham reported to his superiors “enemy on island—issue in doubt.”. Upon hearing this message, Vice Admiral William S. Pyke ordered the Saratoga battlegroup to return to Pearl Harbor, citing unnecessary loss as his chief motivation for no longer reinforcing the ill-fated troops.

The Wake defenders continued resisting the ever-increasing enemy force. Casualties, ammo depletion and fatigue began to compound, forcing the Marines to desperate efforts. Marine units began to utilize aggressive counter-offenses to keep the Japanese off-balance and seize ammunition. Even early in the third day of fighting, victory was still seen as feasible if relief arrived soon.

Inside the command center, Major Devereux lost communications with his Marines. Simultaneously, Commander Cunningham was informed by Pearl Harbor that the relief force would not be coming. Seeing Japanese battle standards surrounding his position, he decided to surrender the island. Only later did he find out that island was not yet actually lost: out of original 517 servicemen, 476 were still alive, and battle standards were actually yosegaki flags: standards flown from a bayonet or rifle carried by unit leaders for command and signal procedures. These were likely result of dead Japanese troops surrounding Marine emplacements. Still, the decision did save lives of Marines who were stuck in an indefensible position.

 

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Pacific War 9 – Japanese Conquest of Indonesia – History and War (wordpress.com)

After all the previous successes, it was clear that the Japanese will not stop and that Indonesia was next in line. It was also very clear that a piecemeal defense had absolutely no chance of success. This led to formation of ABDA Command: a unified force of US, British, Dutch and Australian ships. In doing so, the Allies had managed to put together a force of 2 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers and 9 destroyers. These forces were weak, and many ships were already obsolete. Cruisers’ spotter planes had also been shipped to land bases. Neither could a force hastily assembled from four different navies function well as one unit. Few aboard Dutch ships understood any English at all, and their Anglophone allies were even worse in reverse. In a last minute attempt to rectify the problem, a dozen English-speaking Dutch officers were divided amongst the fleet as interpreters. In order to ensure unity of command, the entire force was subordinated to Dutch admiral Doorman.

Karel Doorman as a Lieutenant Commander
The only chance for success the Allies had was an all-out attack while Japanese forces were in transit, before the Japanese themselves could conentrate and attack. Thus the Allied command sent out four old American destroyers with task of attacking transport ships. Destroyers sailed towards northeast, specifically the Makassar Strait, because it was expected that Japanese forces detailed for attack on Indonesia will move through this area between Borneo and Celebes.

As Japanese transport ships would be under heavy escort, any daylight attack would be doomed to failure. Destroyers thus timed their approach so that they arrived to straits during night. Sailing close to Borneo shore, American destroyers approached the important harbor of Balikpapan during the night of 23rd onto 24th January 1942. Sailing without lights, they noticed shadows of at least 12 Japanese transport ships anchored within the bay. These were screened by a squadron of admiral Nishimura, which consisted of a light cruiser and 9 destroyers, located nearby in open sea.

Japanese in the bay thus did not expect any danger. Seeing the situation, commander Talbot ordered an immediate attack. US destroyers charged into the bay, but nervousness caused several premature launches. Torpedoes randomly dropped from all sides, and Japanese only noticed the attack when a torpedo hit and sank a patrol ship. Exploiting the confusion, destroyers continued onwards, launching the remaining torpedoes. Crews were now calmer and targeting much more accurate; four transport ships were sunk in short order. Destroyers then opened up with their guns, damaging numerous ships but failing to sink any more.

Japanese did not take long to compose themselves, and soon the ships in the bay started to reply from their small deck guns. Fearing that the fighting will alert Japanese warships which had to be nearby, Talbot continued onwards, leading his destroyers out of the bay and into the safety of darkness beyond. Keeping close to shore, destroyers managed to return home unimpeded.

 

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https://historyandwarfare.wordpress.com/2022/02/13/pacific-war-10-marshalls-gilberts-raid/

When attacking the Pearl Harbor, Japanese focused all their attention on the battleships. It is unknown why the Japanese command, which had spearheaded the usage of carriers as a main tool of attack, had essentially ignored the US carriers. In fact, this ignorance could well have had devastating consequences for the Japanese, as two US carrier groups – Enterprise and Lexington – were nearby. Only American confusion saved the Japanese squadron from destruction.

During this difficult time, command of the US forces was taken over by Admiral Nimitz. His task was to hold the Hawaii islands as well as the open path from the US to Australia. While both of these tasks were fundamentally defensive, Nimitz decided to solve them with attack so as not to allow the Japanese to choose the time and place of battle. Nimitz clearly recognized that if he remained on the defense, there was no chance he could stave off the Japanese with the forces he had available.

Nimitz’s appointment immediately lifted sprits of the crews and officers. Yet his decision was risky. He had only three carriers – Enterprise and Lexington from the Pacific fleet, as well as a slightly smaller Yorktown that had been transferred from the Atlantic. He will have had Saratoga as well, but the large carrier had been torpedoed by a Japanese submarine on 11th February 1942., and so she had to limp back to a drydock where she was repaired and heavily modernized.

USS Enterprise (CV-6)
Available escort forces were also very limited, as surface ships were needed to protect convoys bringing reinforcements to various areas of Pacific. Most important of these convoys had to be escorted by aircraft carriers and their battlegroups, and so Nimitz had not a single ship he could send to an offensive action.

 

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Pacific War 11 – Indian Ocean Raid

Japanese advance continued on unrelenting. And while Nimitz’s carriers had shown that the further southward advance be connected with significant risks, there was absolutely no resistance in …

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Japanese advance continued on unrelenting. And while Nimitz’s carriers had shown that the further southward advance be connected with significant risks, there was absolutely no resistance in the west. Japanese ships and fleet formations raided deep into the Indian Ocean, not encountering any serious opposition. In order to avoid confusion with German submarines and auxilliary cruisers that were also operating there, 70° longitude was chosen as an operational border, placing almost entirety of India within the Japanese operational zone.

To their zone the Japanese sent a large number of submarines, and then decided to attack Ceylon. The fall of Ceylon would sever trade routes with Australia and New Zealand. Its capture would allow Japan to raid India and Middle-East. In Britain, such an event would certainly topple Churchill’s shaken coalition government. But the best that could be done was to send Admiral Sommerville to take command. He arrived to Colombo on 24th of March.

For this task, a strong squadron left port of Kendari on Celebes on 26th March in order to strike Ceylon at 4th of April. The strike had originally been planned for 1st of April, but departure had been postponed until intentions of the US carrier force spotted near Wake island on March 10th had become clear. Squadron was commanded by admiral Nagumo and consisted of 5 aircraft carriers, 3 fast battleships, 3 cruisers and 9 destroyers. Second squadron under admiral Kurita was also deployed independently into the Indian Ocean. This squadron consisted of an aircraft carrier, 6 cruisers and several destroyers. Far behind them was a supply group of 6 tankers and 3 destroyers.

 

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Pacific War 12 – Doolittle’s Tokyo Raid

During February 1942., a request for volunteers was passed through all of the USAAF’s bomber squadrons. From a large number of volunteers, around a hundred ended up being chosen and sent to a…

historyandwarfare.wordpress.com

During February 1942., a request for volunteers was passed through all of the USAAF’s bomber squadrons. From a large number of volunteers, around a hundred ended up being chosen and sent to an air base in Florida. There, they met their instructor, Lieutenant Henry L. Miller.

Volunteers went through a series of gruelling exercises. They were taught to land at as slow speeds and short distances as possible while flying twin-engined B-25 bombers. Conditions were made progressively worse and the landing area progressively smaller. Then they were sent to a second airfield, where they had to land and take off within two lines – one third of the space normally required.

In early April, volunteers and aircraft were sent to the aircraft carrier USS Hornet. Nobody was aware of what task awaited them, and 16 B-25 bombers had been loaded onto the carrier instead of the aircraft that were normally used there. Such large bombers had never been used on a carrier before: each weighted 11 tons, and their wing tips stretched past the deck. Next day the Hornet left San Francisco and was joined by two cruisers before sailing westwards.

 

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Pacific War 13 – Australia and the Battle of the Coral Sea

Original Japanese plan had been fulfilled, and Japan was now in a solid position. It had rich sources of raw materials and numerous important strategic positions, strewn all across the Western Paci…

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Original Japanese plan had been fulfilled, and Japan was now in a solid position. It had rich sources of raw materials and numerous important strategic positions, strewn all across the Western Pacific and the Southeastern Asia. This might have allowed it a prolonged, if not indefinite, defense of the achieved positions.

But the Japanese leaders were not satisfied with this. Successes had been too large and too easy to keep the already megalomaniacal Japanese leadership sober. Thus, it became impossible to stop with merely fulfilling the original plan. New conquests were needed.

Admiral Yamamoto preferred a campaign aimed against the Midway Islands. Predicting a decisive battle between the Japanese and US fleets, he hoped that it will happen in the are where the Japanese Navy will also have access to aircraft from land bases. These bases would be in the conquered Midway Islands. But the plan did not take into account logistical situation, despite warnings by some individuals in the Japanese HQ. Supply lines were already extremely long. New Guinea was 3 000 nautical miles from Tokyo, and destruction of refineries meant that crude oil had to be sent all the way to Japan for refinement, and then shipped back to the advanced bases. Doolittle’s Raid had been used to support further expansion, since US bases were still too close when their aircraft were endangering the capital.