Military Doctrine Strategy -Danish artillery – status and development

Saithan

Experienced member
Denmark Correspondent
Messages
8,764
Reactions
37 20,035
Nation of residence
Denmark
Nation of origin
Turkey

#

Regardless of the level and scenario, the fire is in the right place, in the right amount, at the right time and of the right kind delivered by direct and indirect fire weapons that, coordinated with the unit, enable the maneuver.
The head of the Fire Support Department at the Army's Combat and Fire Support Center, Lieutenant Colonel Søren Høst, seeks with this article to spread understanding of the weapon type of fire support (formerly the service branch Artillery) as a contribution to an expectedly increasing debate ahead of the upcoming Defense Settlement.

What is fire support?
The fire support is the collective term for the coordinated deployment of the total land, sea and air-based fire support assets, which in a given operation are available for the ground force's deployment with the aim of achieving a given effect on the opponent. 1
The artillery includes traditional tube and rocket artillery and is thus one of several available means of fire support. The fire support must really be considered a system consisting of observers who have insight into the target, either directly or supported by various sensors, a fire support control link, where combating identified targets is prioritized and where fire support is selected, as well as one or more firing systems that deliver the fire .
The field artillery effect system also consists of three basic elements; Aiming, Fire control and Shooting control. The goal is about the ability to identify and establish goals. Fire management is about the tactical management of the fire and the ability to be able to prioritize targets and fight them with the most optimal fire support system, including achieving precisely the desired effect against a given target. Fire control is about the technical control of the fire and is thus the ability to bring the fire to effect on the target.

Recent history
The artillery (later the fire support weapon) has undergone a slightly turbulent but unambiguous existence, which has gradually and surely led to reductions and the abolition of regiments and capacities. In recent times, mention can be made of the disbanding of the King's Artillery Regiment, Nørrejyske Artillery Regiment, the Queen's Artillery Regiment and finally the Danish Artillery Regiment, which simultaneously marked the disbanding of the artillery as an independent branch of service in the spring of 2014, with the establishment of the Army's Combat and Fire Support Center in Oksbøl. Capacities have correspondingly been discontinued, including the Norwegian Air Force (end of 2009), Rocket Launchers (Multiple Launch Rocket Systems) (end of 2005) and Artillery Pejleradare (end of 2010). 2 Capacities that helped to complement the artillery – and which are again in demand today.

For various reasons, purely Danish artillery units, containing large-scale firing systems, were not deployed in Iraq or Afghanistan, and the fire support weapon did not manage to acquire a place in the history books, let alone add the special dimension to its identity, which, for example, has been the case with the tank weapon. But precisely the long-term deployment in Afghanistan led to the fire support weapon beginning a significant development that has not yet been completed. A development that has added several dimensions, shaken the common perceptions of available fire support assets at the various levels and in a way shifted the focus from nationally having the weapons platform itself (e.g. artillery systems) as our raison d'etre, to now a greater focus on the ability to coordinate the deployment of fire support in a Joint and Combined environment - at all levels.

Deployment in counterinsurgency within the framework of a coalition has driven the development of the fire support weapon at home and at our allies within doctrine, organization, technology and training. Absence of an air threat and a guaranteed own dominance in the airspace meant an unprecedented and unhindered use of airborne effectors and sensors, which in turn ensured an almost real-time situational awareness and ability to fight the adversary anywhere on the battlefield. An almost zero tolerance towards civilian casualties and accidental damage and the resulting demands for precision, speed and the elimination of human error, led to demands for digitization of the capabilities and integration in networks, as well as a demand for the use of precision weapons. Demands for protection of own soldiers led to heavier vehicles protected against e.g. roadside bombs. An extensive (Joint and Combined) palette of available fire support means and sensors gave rise to a requirement for doctrinal and technical interoperability with relevant partners. However, it must be emphasized that despite massive air support, classic tube artillery proved its clear merit in counterinsurgency with fast, accurate, coordinated and weather-independent support to the operations.

Where the outlined development has led to a significant increase in understanding, skills and doctrinal innovation, it also led to an inevitable focus on warfare at the lower tactical levels (platoon, company and battalion) against a non-equal opponent. Consequences have, among other things, been that the Army has had to accept the absence of capabilities that either did not prove decisive in the current scenario, or were made available by coalition partners. Correspondingly, the Army underwent an organizational and capacity adjustment with a clear focus on the battalion battle group.

Recent developments, exemplified by the conflict in Ukraine and Russia's taste tests of effective conventional maneuver warfare, have now drawn the focus of Western armies back towards classical maneuver-based warfare against an equal adversary. The focus is no longer limited to the company and battalion level, but once again includes the troop unit.

The collective challenge thus consists in deriving and applying the right experiences from recent years' counterinsurgency deployments and transferring them to a new (reborn) context. The challenge also consists not least in dealing with the capability shortfalls that most of the western armies face – including the Danish one, and including Danish fire support.

Status
Today, Fire Support constitutes a type of weapon in the Army's combat troops, together with Reconnaissance, Tanks and Infantry. The Army's operational fire support capabilities are gathered in the 1st Danish Artillery Division, which forms part of the Army's Combat and Fire Support Center in Oksbøl. The staff at the Army's Combat and Fire Support Center also includes a school department (Fire Support Department) with responsibility for e.g. doctrine development, study and development activities, training and inspection activities and a school department (Security and ballistics) with responsibility for, among other things, the more technical side of fire support, including ammunition and ballistics.

Fire support capabilities for the battalion level and companies
1. The Danish Artillery Department's task set is currently concentrated on setting up fire support capabilities to the Army's battalion level. These fire support capacities are inserted into the framework of so-called fire support elements, which make up the "package", which is typically - but depending on the task - put together with a fire support guidance installation as the coordinating element. The fire support element typically contains a guidance installation, observers and firing systems.
The fire support leadership capacity at the battalion level is called the Joint Fires Cell. Here, the overall planning, deployment and management of the supporting, accessed and organizational fire support and target reconnaissance capacities is handled. The Joint Fires Cell is closely integrated into the battalion command post and forward command post. The Joint Fires Cell can also provide advice, planning and deployment of air support for the battalion. The Joint Fires Cell is described in the fire support doctrine, but the final implementation and utilization of the capacity is still dependent on a technological boost within means of communication and the approach of modern autonomous firing systems.

Invoking and directing fire support is carried out by artillery observers and Joint Terminal Attack Controllers 3 . Observers are normally assigned to the combat sub-departments, and are also responsible for planning fire support and advising the sub-department commander. An artillery observer is trained in calling for fire support from cruise weapons (light mortar, heavy mortar, artillery and rocket launchers). Correspondingly, there are dedicated observers associated with the mortar capacities. It must be emphasized that in principle anyone can call for fire support (e.g. a platoon leader) through the so-called type-2 call. 4 A Joint Terminal Attack Controller is trained and certified to call for fire support from aircraft and helicopters. They are all called observers, but differ in the training they undergo. Observers have a wide range of observation tools at their disposal, from maps, compasses and map targets, to day and night observation binoculars, laser rangefinders, position determination equipment and laser target designation equipment (Laser Target Designator).

The fire support element at the battalion level does not currently have its own heavy firing systems and, until the final implementation of both 155 mm tube artillery at the brigade level and 120 mm heavy mortars at the battalion level, must base the target engagement on the systems that any coalition partners may make available for a Danish force contribution . 1. The Danish Artillery Department currently maintains quite a few obsolete artillery systems of the type M109A3 5 and a single firing center, which is primarily used in the department's training of observers and secondarily used to maintain a certain expertise in the operation of artillery systems. The consequence of the very limited number and non-timed firing systems is, among other things, that the ability to plan and carry out department-led firings cannot be maintained. Until the introduction of new launch systems, expertise is sought to be maintained through cooperation with alliance partners and participation in training and exercise activities.

At company level (with the armored infantry companies), 60 mm light mortar sections are now organizationally advised as this level's own means of indirect fire support. These are set up and trained by the 1st Danish Artillery Division as a temporary task until the implementation of new 120 mm heavy mortars / new 155 mm artillery systems. After this, it is intended to return deployment responsibility to the combat troops' infantry subdivisions organized with light mortar sections.

Fire support capabilities for the troop unit level
At the troop unit level, the 1st Danish Artillery Division sets up a fire support guidance installation called the Joint Fires Coordination Center to support one of the Army's two brigade headquarters, while the Fire Support Department at the Army's Combat and Fire Support Center sets up parts of a fire support guidance installation for the Danish Division's headquarters.

The Joint Fires Coordination Center handles the planning, deployment and management of the supporting, access and organizational fire support and target reconnaissance capabilities 6 and also acts as a command station for the brigade's artillery section. The Joint Fires Coordination Center is closely integrated into the brigade's forward command station and operations and planning center. The Joint Fires Coordination Center can be reinforced with liaison elements from accessed and supporting units, e.g. Naval Gun Support, target reconnaissance etc. as well as elements from the Air Force to provide advice, planning and deployment of air support for the brigade as well as airspace coordination.

With the planned approach of new firing systems, the vision is that the 1st Danish Artillery Division should be able to contribute with an artillery division to a brigade containing a guidance capacity (Joint Fires Coordination Center) and firing systems. The artillery department will also be able to act as a framework for any multinational protection contribution and target reconnaissance capabilities.

At the divisional level, the fire support leadership capacity is called the Fire Support Coordination Center. The functionalities of the Fire Support Coordination Center cover the ability to plan for and deploy land-based fire support, army air defense (Army Organic Air Defence), aircraft and helicopter support and possibly maritime fire support. The Fire Support Coordination Center is responsible for planning and deploying any available divisional troops in the form of divisional artillery (tube artillery and rocket launchers), target reconnaissance and anti-aircraft. The Fire Support Coordination Center is not fully staffed in day-to-day life, and is therefore based on structural design, use of personnel from the reserve as well as access to multinational staff personnel and staff elements for e.g. planning and deployment of combat helicopters.

In an operational context, the Fire Support Coordination Center is responsible for planning and executing the division's Deep Battle. In a Combat scenario, the majority of the division's prerequisite-creating operations (Shaping Operations) will be carried out as part of the division's depth combat. Therefore, the Fire Support Coordination Center also contributes significantly to the implementation of the division's Targeting process.

Doctrine
Doctrinal fire support for army units should consist of firing systems that achieve the effect that suits the individual level. Traditionally, doctrinal fire support was divided into light mortar at the platoon level, medium mortar at the subdivision level, heavy mortar at the battalion level, tube artillery at the brigade level, and tube and rocket artillery at the division level. Primarily technological development, however, has led to a shift in that perception. The development has also meant that the ability to coordinate the so-called 3rd dimension; airspace, can take place at ever lower levels. Those conditions, together with the begun digitization of the Army, have, among other things, meant that the traditional firing center functionality, where fire and fire control was carried out, is now combined with the ability to coordinate airspace in a Joint Fires Cell. The same adjustment has been made at the brigade level. Common to all levels is the need for the planning and conduct of the fire support assets to take place very closely coordinated (and integrated) with the planning and conduct of the battle.

The regulation "Fire support for land military operations" forms the national doctrinal framework for Danish fire support capabilities. The doctrine was launched in 2014 and is rooted in NATO doctrines, but incorporates relevant experience from deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan - just as it is in line with our strategic partners. This ensures interoperability, future-proofing and a common reference basis with other defense forces and other nations.

The doctrine is based on a scalable, modular organization where fire support is used in accordance with the deployment environment. In practice, this means that the fire support capacity must be put together for the task. Eg. a fire support element for a combat battalion may be composed with a Joint Fires Cell as the unifying body. The fire support element may contain the required number of artillery observers, Joint Terminal Attack Controllers and firing systems in the form of heavy mortars and in some cases artillery systems decentralized to this level. Finally, the doctrine describes the integration of indirect fire weapons, air support, target detection means and anti-aircraft defenses.

The doctrine can be summarized in nine basic principles of fire support; formation of weight in the battle, situational and discriminated use of the fire support, close cooperation with supported unit, coordination of all available means, effective target clarification and processing of results, flexibility and modular composition of the fire support means, centralized as well as decentralized deployment of the means, surprising use of the fire support and the consideration of security and protection.
In addition, the doctrine describes the basic tasks that the fire support at a given level can be deployed in. The basic fire support tasks are close support, combating targets in depth, artillery and mortar combat, fire preparation, countering anti-aircraft defenses, countering threats on the flank or in the rear, and final execution of fire concentration areas.

Technology
In the same way that the Army is in doctrinal harmony with our strategic cooperation partners, so too is the field of possible coalition partners as part of the study and development business. A number of general development trends can be seen within fire support. There remains a requirement to be able to continuously achieve a given effect in the target. It deals with the ability for both precision, near-precision and area effect, and can generally be attributed to the ability to deliver a precise weapon on a precisely designated target. Next follows a demand for increased interoperability and digitization to ensure greater speed and security in the executions. Finally, there is an ever-increasing demand for survival in the form of protection, agility, autonomy (shoot'n'scoot) and great range. These trends largely shape the Army's focus on materiel procurement.

Looking first at the ability to support the desired effect, this requires precision and range from the firing system, which requires modern autonomous artillery and heavy mortar systems. The acquisition of both types of launch platforms has been initiated and will give the Army a more integrated and modern fire support capacity within the coming years. The artillery systems are again deployed at the brigade level in a battery and divisional framework, while the heavy mortars will be deployed at the battalion level, which will thus again have their own organizational fire support means.

In order to exploit the potential of these new launch platforms, the acquisition of modern ammunition is also required. Finances have been set aside for testing and testing prior to the possible acquisition of new ammunition, which will, among other things, ensure that precision and near-precision ammunition can be fired in the new launch platforms. Another area to be developed is the ability to engage surface targets with few fire support systems, including armored targets. This is especially a challenge after we can no longer use the so-called Improved Conventional Munition after the ratification of the Oslo Convention. 7

In order to support the precise delivery of the weapon's effect, the acquisition of map measurement software is currently underway, which will ensure the Armed Forces' special forces and fire support units the ability to generate accurate target point coordinates, thus enabling an optimal use of precision weapons. The acquisition has been a long time coming, but the rollout of the first systems with certified instructors will take place this year. In order to also maintain a similarly precise weapon delivery from air-delivered ammunition, a new modern Laser Target Designator is currently being procured for use by the special forces and fire support units. The armed forces are also in the process of acquiring a mobile sensor system for, among other things, fire support observers. 8 This system will greatly increase the range with which precise target point coordinates can be generated.

The demand for increased interoperability and digitization is met, among other things. through digitization of fire control and shooting control as well as calls for air support. The last part has already been implemented in the form of the Digital Aided Close Air Support system for the Norwegian Armed Forces' Joint Terminal Attack Controllers. Development of a Digital Aided Fire Support System is underway in collaboration with the supplier of the Army's Battle Management System and the Army's Command, Control and Information System. The system effectively becomes an application that can integrate and support a number of functions within fire support planning as well as fire planning and digitally connect observers (sensors), guidance links with launch systems – across nations. Implementation of the system will enable the total fire support capability (including the future launch system) to operate within the framework of network-based operations.

Education
1. The Danish Artillery Division's soldiers and fire support capabilities are trained like all other army capabilities through individual training, functional training, unit training, cooperative training and driver training. 1. The capacities of the Danish Artillery Division participate in company exercises, battalion exercises and brigade exercises. In recent years, the emphasis has been on the battalion level. The training activities focus on planning, leading and combat exercises, but also contain elements of high complexity. The absence of certain capabilities within the fire support weapon obviously means that the exercise framework cannot be completed. It is therefore only in the training of drivers, under the auspices of courses and staff exercises, that you can work with a complete fire support weapon with all relevant capacities.

Simulation is an essential part of fire support education and training. Simulation facilities in Oksbøl garrison are used extensively for basic training and familiarization in e.g. observation service and for course activities. Fire support is also an essential element in more staff- and unit-related simulation systems. There is good experience with field-based simulation systems, where units have used detectors that could recognize / simulate the enemy's fire support (e.g. artillery fire). Implementation of this type of training aid will strengthen the understanding of fire support for all units, including not least the necessity of passive security in the form of concealment and obfuscation, dispersion and movement. In addition, it will increase understanding and respect for fire control measures and the importance of avoiding shelling of one's own forces.

Driver training plays a significant role in fire support as a type of weapon. This is due, among other things, to the fact that the fire support weapon is distinctly technical. It is also because fire support capabilities are part of a framework and are deeply dependent on support and coordination with external assets in a complex context.
Fire support officers undergo two structural fire support courses (weapons courses). Weapons course-1 is carried out as an extension of the officer training for first lieutenant, and trains the newly appointed first lieutenant as an observation officer. He is then ready to join the 1st Danish Artillery Division, where he will optimally complete unit training, first as part of an artillery observer team, then as part of a fire support element for a combat battalion. Training in other specialties (e.g. half-battery driver and fire control officer) is carried out as separate ad hoc courses at the Army's Combat and Fire Support Center's Fire Support Department.

Like others, the first lieutenant completes a further training course to be appointed captain. In that context, review of the so-called Brigade module is absolutely crucial for the fire support officer's understanding of the framework and thus for the contesting of a number of positions in the fire support guidance installations. After the further training course, the fire support officer goes through a fire support-specific Weapons Course-2. This course targets fire support planning and execution at the battalion level and brigade level. Since at these levels there are requirements for joint fire support (Joint Fires) in the battalion level's Joint Fires Cell and the brigade level's Joint Fires Coordination Center, Weapons Course-2 also emphasizes the ability to integrate aircraft and helicopter support into the overall fire support plan (Air Land Integration).

In an educational context, the Danish Division and the division's Fire Support Coordination Center form the framework for the fire support training of the brigades' Joint Fires Coordination Centers. The division carries out branch-specific training for the brigade staffs, followed by a planning exercise where the brigades draw up their own operational plans. As the end of the annual training cycle of the brigades in a division framework, the division carries out exercise SABER KNIGHT, which has been held in the Baltic in recent years, as part of NATO Assurance Measures. The exercise forms a demanding and complex framework with both symmetric and asymmetric threats. During the exercise, the Fire Support Coordination Center is part of the division's exercise management, and is responsible for all fire support initiatives, while also setting up Trainer Teams that contribute to the division commander's final evaluation of the brigade staffs.

Although the Army's Combat and Fire Support Center is responsible for fire support study development, it is, among other things, participation in the Danish Division's activities that facilitate this. In addition to a large educational benefit from participation in the division's activities, it is under the auspices of the division that a number of doctrinal fire support topics are tested and validated - also because here we are often supported by multinational experts and staff elements within competencies that we do not master nationally (e.g. e.g. air defense or deployment of combat helicopters). Examples of this are joint fire support in the form of Air Land Integration, which allows us to use the designation Joint Fires, and the staff function Targeting.

Overall, the weapons courses, cooperation exercises (company and battalion) and staff exercises (brigade) provide relevant, robust and logical training for the fire support officer, which is however challenged by, among other things, personnel changes.

Use of the Home Guard and the Reserve
The Army's fire support capabilities are supplemented through the use of the Army's reserve force. The fire support guidance installations at troop unit level are supplemented to a substantial extent with individuals from the reserve. Competence development is carried out via participation in courses and practice activities. There still remains a challenge associated with developing an appropriate type of contract that can satisfy both the principle of the reserve and the desire for (fire support) capacities on high readiness with a high professional level. Utilization of the Home Guard as a supplement in a fire support context has not yet materialized.

Cooperation with the other defences
Fire support is, as previously mentioned, the collective term for the coordinated deployment of all land-, sea- and air-based fire support assets, which in a given operation are available for the ground force's deployment with the aim of achieving a given effect on the adversary. Fire support is therefore Joint (and Combined) in nature, and therefore close cooperation with the other defenses is not only natural, but absolutely essential. For a number of years, the army has benefited primarily from air-based fire support in deployments in conflict areas. A Joint approach to fire support is thus essential for the Army to ensure the continued development, interoperability and integration of the Armed Forces' total resources.

Cooperation across the defenses does not only take place on the battlefield and in operations, but also at home in educational and operational contexts. The collaboration with and support from the Air Staff is the most developed and matured. The cooperation with the Naval Staff regarding, among other things, development of Navel Gunfire Support, including joint firing and training of personnel from the Navy's ships is under development. Cooperation across the defenses therefore takes several forms and spans informal mutual support for coordination forums, where representatives from the defense staffs, independent commands, the Defense Academy and relevant operational units meet with the aim of dealing with all aspects within the inner circle of warfare.

International cooperation
International cooperation is natural and necessary. The fire support doctrine has been developed in line with international trends, and the Army's Combat and Fire Support Center regularly participates in a number of international forums and meetings to constantly ensure consistency between partners and Danish doctrine. Interoperability is not only a matter of being able to communicate, but is equally a matter of standards and procedures so that units can interact during deployment.
An example of this is the Army's participation in Exercise BOLD QUEST. It is a series of equipment demonstrations and technology exercises where soldiers, analysts, technicians and programmers test technology and procedures with a focus on digital interoperability. Exercise BOLD QUEST is therefore also about participation in a collaborative forum on the application of doctrinal and technological standards, including digital standards. 9

FUTURE DEVELOPMENT
As mentioned, the development of the army, including the development of Danish fire support, relies on the corresponding development of our relevant strategic partners. The tendencies of our international partners are relatively consistent. Most armies we like to compare ourselves to have all gone through the same evolution and have focused primarily on a long-term deployment to counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, replacing the Cold War focus on conventional warfare. The pendulum has now swung back to maneuver warfare. Keywords that recur when summarizing the trends of our partners are precision, range, sensors, protection, agility, digitization and "armament" as well as an overall challenge regarding relearning the ability to fight a classic maneuver war.

The basis for developing the Army's capabilities is the assumption that if the Army's units can fight and win in a high-tech environment against an equal opponent, they can also solve other tasks such as stabilization tasks. The Army's ability to solve tasks in the entire conflict spectrum makes the Army a trustworthy and preferred partner for strategic allies.

As a natural consequence of a renewed focus on conventional warfare, the development of the Army will primarily take place within the framework of a brigade structure and aim to be able to establish a force contribution of such a size and composition that it will be able to fight independently in cooperation with allies in high-intensity operations in the full conflict spectrum under the auspices of NATO. The units should have their own organizational fire support, but must be able to be complemented by other defense forces and partners. The units in the brigade must possess the ability for effective leadership and high tactical mobility and be able to be put together for the task (modular). Finally, they must be able to form part of networks and be interoperable with strategic partners in accordance with NATO's standards.
 

Saithan

Experienced member
Denmark Correspondent
Messages
8,764
Reactions
37 20,035
Nation of residence
Denmark
Nation of origin
Turkey
Experiences from Ukraine
The events in Ukraine, and Russia's examples of maneuver warfare, in fact emphasized the already initiated development and beginning shift in focus towards conventional challenges. Although Russia was not fighting an equal opponent,

the conflict provided a number of examples 10 of Russia's effectiveness on the battlefield. The Russian forces demonstrated several examples of organizational agility and flexibility as well as a very short sensor-to-shooter loop, where the massive use of drones was coupled to the launch systems through a very efficient and fast decision cycle. In fact, most of the Ukrainian losses were caused by indirect fire weapons. The Russians achieved great success with rocket launchers and the use of Improved Conventional Munitions. The use of rocket launchers with precisely this type of ammunition can achieve great effect against flat targets and armored targets.

The experiences of the conflict have given rise to worried mines in the Western armies and several learning points that were actually recognized before the conflict, which were part of the initiated refocusing on conventional warfare, but which were demonstrated with almost frightening actuality. Paradoxically, there are several conditions that the armies of the West have so far mastered, but have unlearned through many years of deployment in counter-insurgency. Efficient and fast lead business is necessary. It is the ability to maneuver quickly on the battlefield as well. Firing systems must be able to move into position, deliver fire and move out of position again very quickly, and before the adversary's sensors and radars recognize the firing position and initiate combat with tube artillery or rocket launchers.

The massive use of drones emphasizes the necessity of humble movement on the battlefield, taking into account concealment and obfuscation. In a conflict like this, we must be able to operate without being able to enjoy the benefits of dominating the airspace. The conflict also exposed capability shortfalls in certain Western armies, including not least short-range air defenses and the ability to fight drones of various sizes. The adversary's many firing systems (artillery and rocket launchers) emphasize the need to be able to carry out artillery combat, which in turn requires target detection means in the form of e.g. artillery aiming radars. Finally, the conflict exposed the West's almost unequivocal focus on further developing precision weapons against the ability of the Russian forces to effectively fight surface targets (mass fires). Several of the recognized learning points have already been incorporated into the training of the Army's units and leaders as well as incorporated into exercise scenarios, just as the conflict forms part of the basis for the future development of the Army's capabilities and Danish fire support.

The army's initiated acquisitions
The future development of fire support must generally aim to restore balance in the cycle of warfare and, more precisely, provide a much-needed technological boost. Introduction of e.g. new firing systems and continued digitization will make the total fire support capacity more integral. In short, the goal is to be able to build a fire support unit (departmental value) that, with modern firing systems, guidance installations, sensors and target detection means 11 integrated in a digitally supported network, can form part of a coalition.

As mentioned earlier, new firing systems are implemented in the form of 120 mm heavy mortars as the battalion level's primary fire support weapon and 155 mm tube artillery as the brigade level's primary fire support weapon. The launch systems must add increased range, flexibility, protection and autonomy and, together with digitization, enable a better utilization of the fire support doctrine and organization. The development is supported by the introduction of modern ammunition. Not necessarily as obvious as national stockpiles, but as a minimum the ability to use modern and guided ammunition etc. is built up. to support the ability, with indirect fire weapons, to engage point targets with high precision, engage hard (armoured) targets and engage moving targets.

Further development of the fire support
The fire support doctrine is also going forward Joint and Combined in nature at all levels, and must embrace a flexible organization of the fire support capabilities. In line with an expected increased focus on the troop unit and fulfillment of the Army's level of ambition, the fire support will accordingly support this development, but at the same time preserve the organizational agility to be able to flexibly centralize and decentralize e.g. firing systems. Thus, the fire support capabilities must be able to be included both in support of the troop unit level and included in fire support elements in support of the battalion level. The absolutely central capacity will continue to be the fire support guidance installation, where the available means are coordinated.

Although the conduct of warfare in the future will not necessarily be reserved for counter-insurgency, but can equally take place against an equal opponent, the discriminated use of fire support and the ability to avoid civilian casualties and unintended consequential damage are also assessed to be a requirement in the future in order to maintain legitimacy.

Doctrinal and technical interoperability (including within digitalisation) is ensured through close cooperation with the primary strategic partners. Technical interoperability and the ability to exchange data digitally will be a crucial entry ticket to be able to join coalitions on the future battlefield.

The army's air defense has been closed down. However, since air superiority is an aspirational prerequisite for the freedom of maneuver and survival of one's own forces, especially against an equal or superior opponent, the ambition is to (re)build competences and capacities within the area of air defense. The first steps will be in the form of knowledge and familiarity with doctrine and technological development, but also by building a minimal leadership capacity at the brigade level, which ensures that the brigade structure can plan for and use air defense units from cooperation partners. At the same time, it must ensure the necessary integration into the overall air and missile defence. In the medium term, the aim is to acquire a capacity to combat air targets, including smaller drones, although this may be difficult from a resource perspective.

The technological development will lead to obvious dilemmas and considerations. An increased number of sensors and an increased integration of sensors through the digitization of fire support allows for automation. However, there still seems to be a need for trained and certified observers to call for, prioritize and lead fire support and, not least, take care of the final control, including ensuring identification of the target as well as correct and proportionate use of weapons. 12

TERMINATION
The fire support weapon is under pressure in several areas, but there is reason for optimism. Despite a period of hardship and a gradual but steady reduction of the fire support weapon and its capabilities, there are positive perspectives.

The fire support weapon's strongest point is probably an up-to-date doctrinal foundation and a wealth of decisive experience that has developed the ability to deploy and coordinate all available fire support means in a Joint and Combined environment. We are currently "unarmed", but interoperable and innovative, and are thus strongly equipped to be able to integrate new firing systems quickly, as well as to be able to operate within the framework of multinational units.
The fire support weapon has – like the rest of the Army – developed enormously during recent years' counter-insurgency deployments, but it is currently difficult to reap the benefits of the good experiences due to a significant Danish imbalance between doctrine, organization and technology. Only with the introduction of new firing systems, modern ammunition, new armored personnel carriers and digitization of the capacities in networks is it possible to unfold the fire support doctrine. The imbalance is balanced over time and patience is necessary.

It is essential to use the time to get ready for the arrival of new firing systems and rollout of the Army's tactical communication system. The precondition-creating activities in that context include, as mentioned, development of digitization, but also continued doctrinal development, continued transition to a focus on maneuver warfare and preservation of professionalism. The latter is difficult with capacities that are maintained at a level below the minimum and further challenged by a not so favorable personnel situation.

In addition, the fire support weapon has reached a critical minimum now. It is, among other things, it is difficult to fill the structure with employees with the right fire support skills around the Defense authorities (e.g. the Army Staff, the Brigade Staff, the Defense Materiel and Procurement Agency and the Defense Academy) and the fire support weapon is vulnerable to departure. Strategic and long-term thinking is absolutely essential, including prioritizing competence development (e.g. students on advanced officer training) and, of course, employee retention.

History clearly shows that it is risky to cut capacities, as they are extremely difficult to regain or rebuild. The article therefore highlights the importance of acquiring and digitizing the fire support weapon's capabilities - and here we are well ahead. It will be decisive for participation and survival in future conflicts and, in reality, decisive for being able to mitigate the capability shortfalls the fire support weapon will expect to continue to face. We need to be able to be complemented.
Despite the identified challenges, this does not change the fact that the fire support weapon and the concept of fire and movement are modern again in a new - or perhaps rather reborn - context.

Footnotes
1 The Army's regulations for Fire Support for Land Military Operations (HRN 043-003 – FIRE LANDOPS).
2 For the sake of perspective, Danish artillery in 1978 had 21 artillery divisions, three so-called heavy gun batteries,
four light gun batteries and two air defense missile divisions.
3 Formerly referred to as Forward Air Controllers.
4 Fire calls of that type may be relevant if the observer does not have insight into the target. The fire call is carried out via a
certified observer or one of the fire support guidance installations.
5 Resources have only been set aside to maintain three pamphlets and a shooting centre. In addition, a supplementary number
of pamphlets is available, which only serves to keep the three active in operation.
6 The Joint Fires Coordination Center replaces the former elements called the Division's Fire Control Center and the Artillery Element
and also constitutes the artillery division's command station. This ensures close integration with the combat unit's
(brigade) command station and operations center.
7 The Oslo Convention prohibits the use of so-called cluster bombs, including the vast majority of current forms of
Improved Conventional Munition (ICM).
8 The project concerns optical sensors that are mounted on existing vehicles on an elevating mast.
9 For example the ability to send and receive digital requests for fire support multinationally. This is done via a protocol
called Artillery Systems Corporation Activities (ASCA). This forum includes our strategic partners.
10 As e.g. analyzed in "Lessons Learned from the Russo-Ukrainian War", The Potomac Foundation, 6 July 2015.
11 Including the capacity to recognize the adversary's firing systems as a prerequisite for rapid combat against e.g.
enemy artillery and mortars.
12 As part of the discriminated use of fire support, which involves a coordinated use of fire support that minimizes
the risk of self-fire, civilian casualties and unintended collateral damage and at the same time achieves the desired effects that
contribute to achieving the end-state of the operation.

 

Bogeyman 

Experienced member
Professional
Messages
9,192
Reactions
67 31,256
Website
twitter.com
Nation of residence
Turkey
Nation of origin
Turkey

Denmark must give Ukraine all its air defense systems, Prime Minister Frederiksen says. “We decided many months ago to give all our artillery to Ukraine. Why? Because in Ukraine it will be used better than in Denmark. And now we have to do the same with air defense.”


@Saithan , I understand your good intentions. However, the Danish Prime Minister transferred all of Denmark's artillery inventory to Ukraine months ago. Therefore, this title has no operational meaning (for now).
 

Follow us on social media

Top Bottom