TR UAV/UCAV Programs | Anka - series | Kızılelma | TB - series

[Zafer]

Dönmezoğlu made a rotary wing aircraft, so funny.

They should add some wings for longer airtime.

 

[UkroTurk]

Standart 60mm mortar mount ? Interesting.

 

[Heartbang]

Here's the vid:

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1723398769285189725

 

[Maximilien Robespierre]

This could be a nightmare for armored columns

 

[Kitra]

Here's the vid:

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1723398769285189725

Honestly, not very impressive or useful. Too short duration with 10min and that warhead feels like fireworks.

 

[Maximilien Robespierre]

Honestly, not very impressive or useful. Too short duration with 10min and that warhead feels like fireworks.

those fpv drones in ukraine says the otherwise

 

[Oublious]

When i see drones like this, how many Korkut SPAAG do we have? Can the main radar of Korkut find this small drones? Ther will be drone wars in the battlefield ,Skynet is awakening....

 

[DBdev]

those fpv drones in ukraine says the otherwise

We have 100 companies making drones not 1 has eyes and brains apparently. Copy what works. Mass produce cheap FPV drones carrying antitank grenades or RPGs like Russians and Ukrainians. They can be as effective as top attack ATGMs costing 100.000 USD but for 200 USD.

 

[Era_shield]

Here's the vid:

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1723398769285189725

The Forbidden Kebab

 

[Sanchez]

Honestly, not very impressive or useful. Too short duration with 10min and that warhead feels like fireworks.

Point of the video was clearly to show the proximity fuze, not warhead.

We have 100 companies making drones not 1 has eyes and brains apparently. Copy what works. Mass produce cheap FPV drones carrying antitank grenades or RPGs like Russians and Ukrainians. They can be as effective as top attack ATGMs costing 100.000 USD but for 200 USD.

Issue with this is that they are pure war systems. They are nothing special, you just put an RPG round on a drone and call it a day. That’s no way to run a business and make a profit if there is no war around.

 

[Peter66]

Point of the video was clearly to show the proximity fuze, not warhead.



Issue with this is that they are pure war systems. They are nothing special, you just put an RPG round on a drone and call it a day. That’s no way to run a business and make a profit if there is no war around.

There is always some form of war around

 

[DBdev]

Point of the video was clearly to show the proximity fuze, not warhead.



Issue with this is that they are pure war systems. They are nothing special, you just put an RPG round on a drone and call it a day. That’s no way to run a business and make a profit if there is no war around.

It is simple yet not one company got it right out of 100s. You need bigger propellers and battery, higher voltage, but tiniest possible drone that can carry 5kg RPG-7 warhead to 10km and direct its jet properly. These jokers made one with 1kg payload and they are the closest ones.

https://dronexl.co/2023/02/01/ukraine-fpv-drones-rpg-7/

Russia alone is planning to employ 1 million people just in drone making. In addition to 3+ million of their other defense sector workers. Our silly defense sector is bragging about 6 billion usd export when world factories are making 0.6 trillion each year. Less than 1% of world's defense market.

No profit he says...

 

[boredaf]

This fascination with FPV drones with munition is really childish. Ukraine war is between two countries without proper EW countermeasures against them. If they were used against a country with one those cheap drones would drop like flies. Like when Azerbaijan reportedly used a Turkish one against Armenia and did just that. There is a reason every other drone and missile is being built to withstand EW countermeasures.

These drones work in Ukraine which became trench warfare and against Russian armour which for some reason operating its tanks without proper support around them. That meant death for tanks even in WWII ffs. Lesson from Ukraine shouldn't be to make cheapest drone possible and slap on the cheapest round we can find on it.

 

[Nutuk]

This fascination with FPV drones with munition is really childish. Ukraine war is between two countries without proper EW countermeasures against them. If they were used against a country with one those cheap drones would drop like flies. Like when Azerbaijan reportedly used a Turkish one against Armenia and did just that. There is a reason every other drone and missile is being built to withstand EW countermeasures.

These drones work in Ukraine which became trench warfare and against Russian armour which for some reason operating its tanks without proper support around them. That meant death for tanks even in WWII ffs. Lesson from Ukraine shouldn't be to make cheapest drone possible and slap on the cheapest round we can find on it.

Not at all!

How many EW installations does Turkiye have for instance? Will it be enough for a long frontline, like in the case of Ukraine - Russia? Nope! No any country has that amount of EW systems available in sufficient numbers.

Current FPV's are radio controlled and vulnerable against EW (if sufficiently available everywhere) but they are quickly evoluting towards autonomous AI. Even EW will not stop them soon in a few years

 

[Merzifonlu]

Even EW will not stop them soon in a few years

+1

There will be 3 ways to thwart drones in the near future. 1) 35 mm Atom-style programmable ammunition, 2) Directed energy weapons and 3) Anti-kamikaze drones.

 

[Era_shield]

Not at all!

How many EW installations does Turkiye have for instance? Will it be enough for a long frontline, like in the case of Ukraine - Russia? Nope! No any country has that amount of EW systems available in sufficient numbers.

Current FPV's are radio controlled and vulnerable against EW (if sufficiently available everywhere) but they are quickly evoluting towards autonomous AI. Even EW will not stop them soon in a few years

That's the benefit of being able to develop and innovate such systems yourself - when the enemy does something you can come up with a countermeasure against it. Put jammers on drones. Harden the comms of your own drones. Make your drones work without remote control using AI, and who knows what else. War has always been measure, counter-measure.

 

[Quasar]

Frankly spaeking, unfortunatly there is no silver bullet against them... Atom-style programmable ammunition is problematic in Urban areas or in the protection of fixed high value soft targets. Directed energy weapons have its limitation in multiple target engagement compared to Atom-style programmable ammunition. Not only for EW systems but the Availability of all the above mentioned systems in sufficient numbers is the common problem.

What we have witnessed so far is just a trailer. No one has a sufficent answer against a hypothetical well organized swarm attack

 

[B_A]

Baykar exported to 33 countries ther drones. Aselsan latest FLIR system is delivered to BAykar and will be used in no time, Aselsan Flir is delivered to tens of countries, Aselsan succes will be Wescam fail, they are in financial problems.

Wescam is still a company with a lot of customers. And they are a subsidiary of L3Harris. I don’t think they will be in a bad financial situation anytime soon.

Canadian defence company bankrupted due to arms embargo against Turkey

Ottawa's decision to cancel weapons sales to Turkey forced Telemus Systems to go bust, it has been revealed

www.middleeasteye.net

The company which had problems was not Wescam but another Canadian company.

 

[Bogeyman]

Not at all!

How many EW installations does Turkiye have for instance? Will it be enough for a long frontline, like in the case of Ukraine - Russia? Nope! No any country has that amount of EW systems available in sufficient numbers.

Current FPV's are radio controlled and vulnerable against EW (if sufficiently available everywhere) but they are quickly evoluting towards autonomous AI. Even EW will not stop them soon in a few years

Electronic CounterMeasures (ECM)​

ECM is the active part of EW and is intended to disrupt the surveillance systems of the enemy, whether by radar or radio communications, and also to counter any of his weapons which use electromagnetic, infrared or laser systems for guidance or aiming. There are two main methods of achieving this: by jamming, or by the use of decoys, both of which are effective when used properly. Many modern ECM equipment, particularly in the naval scenario, employ both methods in an integrated system.

Noise jamming is the use of transmissions to disrupt the enemy’s communications channels or to saturate his radar to obscure its target. Although this denies the enemy his information channels it also means that the jamming source cannot read the signals for intelligence purposes. Apart from this, modern frequency-agile communication systems are no longer easy to jam effectively.

Simple noise jamming is still in widespread use in the land warfare scenario, one important application being in remotely operated expendable jammers. These can be hand-emplaced, artillery-delivered, dropped from aircraft or used in unmanned aerial vehicles, and serve as short term jammers for a particular operation.

Electronic CounterMeasures - Radartutorial

www.radartutorial.eu

Electronic Counter-CounterMeasures (ECCM)​

Electronic Counter-CounterMeasures (ECCM) is the method by which you endeavor to combat the ECM systems of the enemy by either making your equipment ECM-resistant or by using techniques to nullify his jamming and/or decoy systems. It is an extremely sensitive area in that any disclosure of ECCM measures designed into a system is likely to inform the enemy of its vulnerability to ECM.

Against jamming systems, the most commonly used method is frequency agility, whereby the transmissions are made to “hop” over a large frequency band in a random fashion. This means that either the jammer has to spread its power over the entire band with the inevitable loss of strength on any particular frequency, or it must attempt to follow the signal as it hops randomly.

The latest technique is the use of “stealth” techniques to combat the radar system. This is beginning to be employed in aircraft and consists of several methods to reduce the radar cross section of the aim. The main techniques employed are

• to design the airframe itself to avoid sharp corners and flat surfaces which act as radar reflectors, and
• the use of radar-absorbent material which minimizes the amount of energy reflected back to the radar.

At the aircraft, the most important parts of the fuselage can be covered in radar-absorbent material to make it extremely difficult to detect.

Many anti-radiation missiles have been developed. The missile is passive in operation so that it cannot be picked up by ESM systems, and normally locks on to the sidelobes of the radar transmission. The main countermeasures against this type of missile are low sidelobes, frequency agility, and the use of decoy transmitters which must be positioned close enough to the surveillance radar to “seduce” the missile but not so close as to endanger the main system.

Radartutorial

www.radartutorial.eu

This is entirely a race between ECM and ECCM techniques. Kamikaze UAVs will one day have to be redesigned in accordance with invisibility technology and will target low observability. To ensure low RCS (radar cross section) values, we will see many changes such as material engineering (the widespread use of materials that absorb radar waves), designing the form of kamikaze UAVs accordingly, electrification of propulsion systems or the use of hybrid systems, etc. The future of anti-radiation kamikaze drones with a range of 50-60 km, also operating in passive mode, looks bright.

After the progress of countermeasure systems on the basis of both soft kill and hard kill systems, systems produced for simple but daily needs will be doomed to failure.
Therefore, it is unsustainable that today the costs for FPV kamikaze drones are in the range of a few hundred dollars. Because as the specificity of the applied technology increases, the unit cost will also increase. Therefore, projections that aim solely at quantitative density cannot have a future. Systems that can work effectively can only be projects that look for pinpoint vulnerabilities in target platforms and successfully close their own vulnerabilities against enemy countermeasure systems. This is only possible through specialization.

 

[Bogeyman]

Electronic CounterMeasures (ECM)​

ECM is the active part of EW and is intended to disrupt the surveillance systems of the enemy, whether by radar or radio communications, and also to counter any of his weapons which use electromagnetic, infrared or laser systems for guidance or aiming. There are two main methods of achieving this: by jamming, or by the use of decoys, both of which are effective when used properly. Many modern ECM equipment, particularly in the naval scenario, employ both methods in an integrated system.

Noise jamming is the use of transmissions to disrupt the enemy’s communications channels or to saturate his radar to obscure its target. Although this denies the enemy his information channels it also means that the jamming source cannot read the signals for intelligence purposes. Apart from this, modern frequency-agile communication systems are no longer easy to jam effectively.

Simple noise jamming is still in widespread use in the land warfare scenario, one important application being in remotely operated expendable jammers. These can be hand-emplaced, artillery-delivered, dropped from aircraft or used in unmanned aerial vehicles, and serve as short term jammers for a particular operation.

Electronic CounterMeasures - Radartutorial

www.radartutorial.eu

Electronic Counter-CounterMeasures (ECCM)​

Electronic Counter-CounterMeasures (ECCM) is the method by which you endeavor to combat the ECM systems of the enemy by either making your equipment ECM-resistant or by using techniques to nullify his jamming and/or decoy systems. It is an extremely sensitive area in that any disclosure of ECCM measures designed into a system is likely to inform the enemy of its vulnerability to ECM.

Against jamming systems, the most commonly used method is frequency agility, whereby the transmissions are made to “hop” over a large frequency band in a random fashion. This means that either the jammer has to spread its power over the entire band with the inevitable loss of strength on any particular frequency, or it must attempt to follow the signal as it hops randomly.

The latest technique is the use of “stealth” techniques to combat the radar system. This is beginning to be employed in aircraft and consists of several methods to reduce the radar cross section of the aim. The main techniques employed are

• to design the airframe itself to avoid sharp corners and flat surfaces which act as radar reflectors, and
• the use of radar-absorbent material which minimizes the amount of energy reflected back to the radar.

At the aircraft, the most important parts of the fuselage can be covered in radar-absorbent material to make it extremely difficult to detect.

Many anti-radiation missiles have been developed. The missile is passive in operation so that it cannot be picked up by ESM systems, and normally locks on to the sidelobes of the radar transmission. The main countermeasures against this type of missile are low sidelobes, frequency agility, and the use of decoy transmitters which must be positioned close enough to the surveillance radar to “seduce” the missile but not so close as to endanger the main system.

Radartutorial

www.radartutorial.eu

This is entirely a race between ECM and ECCM techniques. Kamikaze UAVs will one day have to be redesigned in accordance with invisibility technology and will target low observability. To ensure low RCS (radar cross section) values, we will see many changes such as material engineering (the widespread use of materials that absorb radar waves), designing the form of kamikaze UAVs accordingly, electrification of propulsion systems or the use of hybrid systems, etc. The future of anti-radiation kamikaze drones with a range of 50-60 km, also operating in passive mode, looks bright.

After the progress of countermeasure systems on the basis of both soft kill and hard kill systems, systems produced for simple but daily needs will be doomed to failure.
Therefore, it is unsustainable that today the costs for FPV kamikaze drones are in the range of a few hundred dollars. Because as the specificity of the applied technology increases, the unit cost will also increase. Therefore, projections that aim solely at quantitative density cannot have a future. Systems that can work effectively can only be projects that look for pinpoint vulnerabilities in target platforms and successfully close their own vulnerabilities against enemy countermeasure systems. This is only possible through specialization.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1697294474542731747

Let's create a hypothetical reality in the opposite direction from the reality I wrote (actually, by learning from what I wrote there).
We are already seeing what can happen if ultra-fast FPV kamikaze drones with high electronic countermeasure systems carry enough explosive material to take a platform out of combat. This will be a new level of efforts to shape the quantity-oriented front we are experiencing now.

However, the advantages of being so light and fast come across as problems in miniaturizing countermeasure systems or the problem of carrying a warhead.

The more miniaturization technologies develop, the faster revolutionary changes will be realized.

You cannot hit this type of UAV with laser weapons. Maybe microwave weapons would work.