schuimpjes
Experienced member
Asia Tenggara dan Indo–Pacific lebih luas bukan pake model NATO Eropa, tapi model latticework, lebih longgar atau loose hubungannya. Aku gak kaget kalo nanti bakal ada yang serupa kayak gini tapi sama Jepang. Isinya DCA Indonesia–Australia ini sama RAA Jepang–Filipina hampir sama, apalagi yang bagian kunjungan pasukan ke negara satu sama lain.RI-Australia teken DCA, Menhan tegaskan itu bukan pakta pertahanan
Menhan Prabowo selepas upacara penandatanganan itu menegaskan DCA RI-Australia bukanlah pakta pertahanan atau aliansi pertahanan, melainkan perjanjian kerja sama untuk kemitraan di sektor pertahanan yang lebih erat antara dua negara.
“Ini sekali lagi, bukan suatu pakta militer, bukan suatu military alliance, tetapi suatu defense cooperation. Ini menandakan bahwa kami ingin meneruskan dan meningkatkan hubungan erat, hubungan persahabatan yang sangat baik,” kata Menhan Prabowo saat memberikan pernyataan selepas acara di Akmil, Magelang, Kamis, sebagaimana disiarkan kanal YouTube resmi Kemenhan RI.
Sementara itu, Menhan Australia Richard Marles menyebut Australia memahami kebijakan politik bebas aktif Indonesia, sehingga posisinya akan selalu menjadi negara non-blok.
“Kami menghormati itu, kami memahami itu, dan yang terpenting, kami sangat berkepentingan bertetangga dengan negara non-blok seperti Indonesia. Jadi, perjanjian ini bukan aliansi militer, tetapi sebagaimana namanya, ini adalah perjanjian yang akan mempererat kerja sama kami di bidang pertahanan,” kata Marles.
RI-Australia teken DCA, Menhan tegaskan itu bukan pakta pertahanan
Menteri Pertahanan (Menhan) RI Prabowo Subianto dan Menhan Australia Richard Marles menandatangani perjanjian kerja sama pertahanan (DCA) di Akademi Militer ...www.antaranews.com
Latticework Strategy
Building Partnerships Against Chinese Revisionism: A “Latticework Strategy” for the Indo-Pacific | National Institute for Public PolicyFurthermore, some countries, such as India, also carry the political and psychological baggage of decades of anti colonial activism and national self-identification against the former imperial powers of the developed West, which makes the idea of a military alliance with countries such as the United States and Great Britain more problematic. Thankfully, India's traditional anti-Western political culture does not rule out closer ties—or even a "strategic partnership" with the United States—but barring a significant escalation in Chinese threats, formal alliances still seem problematic. For all these reasons, we should not expect much by way of a full-blown NATO-style alliance network to be possible anytime soon.
Yet precisely because effective cooperation against shared security threats is more a question of vision, values, and collective commitment than of formal legalities, it may be that a NATO-style mechanism in the Indo-Pacific isn't actually necessary, provided that the United States builds collaborative and mutually-supportive security relationships by other means. In theory, a “latticework" of relationships—on a bilateral basis or involving subsets of countries in the region, not merely between United States and regional states but also between such regional states themselves—could do the work of such community building nearly as well as a formal multilateral structure. Building such a latticework should clearly be the near-term objective of U.S. regional security policy.