Pakistan Historical Military History of Pakistan

[Fatman17]

Sadly we haven't learned anything from our past mistakes

 

[Joe Shearer]

In a sense, that is the harsh truth, Sir. GHQ did absolutely nothing in the interim for Eastern Command, and it does seem quite apparent that they did nothing because they were in hourly expectation of help and support from the Chinese, or the Americans, or even world opinion at large.

While all this was going on, Bhutto, one of the prime architects of the situation, was fanning the flames, putting it out that whatever was going on was perfectly the right thing to do. I understand - I would be happy to be corrected - that it was only after 16/17th December that he discovered that the Army was led by incompetents, and that it would be better for it if he were to take a direct interest. As it happened, a fatal interest.

 

[Joe Shearer]

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It is worth considering that while all that was going on, in Delhi and in Calcutta, matters were far better coordinated.

First, within the Army, the Eastern Command Chief of Staff, while he had no deep-rooted respect or affection for his Army Commander, had been given a wide rope, and had been planning from around June onwards. At that time, there was a temporary moving around, and one of our best generals, Lt. Gen. Inderjit Singh Gill, was temporarily the DGMO (I think they were DMO those days), and was extremely easy to get along with. While General Jacob makes a couple of fanciful points in HIS book, these are known to be exaggerations; most units, most commands cooperated with him. What happened in action is that only one of the three and half prongs of the Indian attack was a runaway success, but it did make up for slow progress on the other fronts. You probably already know that the Indian Army did not expect to capture Dhaka, and was reconciled to making enough headway to be able to allow the Bangladeshis to display a piece of land from East Pakistan and form a state-let there. It was Sagat Singh's drive and persistence that got Dhaka.

 

[Joe Shearer]

It is worth considering that while all that was going on, in Delhi and in Calcutta, matters were far better coordinated.

First, within the Army, the Eastern Command Chief of Staff, while he had no deep-rooted respect or affection for his Army Commander, had been given a wide rope, and had been planning from around June onwards. At that time, there was a temporary moving around, and one of our best generals, Lt. Gen. Inderjit Singh Gill, was temporarily the DGMO (I think they were DMO those days), and was extremely easy to get along with. While General Jacob makes a couple of fanciful points in HIS book, these are known to be exaggerations; most units, most commands cooperated with him. What happened in action is that only one of the three and half prongs of the Indian attack was a runaway success, but it did make up for slow progress on the other fronts. You probably already know that the Indian Army did not expect to capture Dhaka, and was reconciled to making enough headway to be able to allow the Bangladeshis to display a piece of land from East Pakistan and form a state-let there. It was Sagat Singh's drive and persistence that got Dhaka.

Second, there was perfect coordination between the Army and the Air Force, a coordination rarely seen earlier. Both P. C. Lal and Manekshaw were straightforward, practical men, Lal a taciturn stickler for rules, Manekshaw very much the flamboyant life and soul of the party. Lal did not make the mistake that Arjan Singh had made in 1965, and most of the IAF inventory was protected; very few aircraft died on the ground.

 

[Saiyan0321]

Sadly we haven't learned anything from our past mistakes

One has to consider something to be a mistake to learn from it. The Army has never seen bangladesh as their mistake. Not from an institutional point of view. Often the blame was diverted to politicians, nationalities, bureaucracy and retired individuals. Never the institution

 

[Joe Shearer]

Second, there was perfect coordination between the Army and the Air Force, a coordination rarely seen earlier. Both P. C. Lal and Manekshaw were straightforward, practical men, Lal a taciturn stickler for rules, Manekshaw very much the flamboyant life and soul of the party. Lal did not make the mistake that Arjan Singh had made in 1965, and most of the IAF inventory was protected; very few aircraft died on the ground.

Third, the Navy outdid itself. Not only were defensive missile boats towed behind ocean-going vessels, but they raided East Pakistan with carrier-borne aircraft. Another separate team trained Bangladeshis to be frogmen. That team and their Bangladeshis sank more tonnage than the rest of the Navy.

 

[Afif]

There have been numerous Dark Moments in our country's short history but nothing compares with what happened on 16th/17th December 1971.
Many books have been written on this subject with each author coming up with his/her reasons for the Debacle.
One such author was Gen. Niazi himself who finally authored a book to clear his name. Whether he did or not only time will tell because todate the ordinary Pakistani remains confused.
After reading Gen.Niazi book it because quite clear to me that the GHQ which was located in the West of the country basically "abandoned " the Eastern Command. The rest is history as we know.
Gen. Niazi visited my father in the early 2000s. They were in the same regiment (5 Punjab) in the mid 50s. Niazi was CO and my father was his 2iC.
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Well....I read the book quite a long ago. At the same time read the 'Surrender at Dacca: Birth of a Nation'

Anyway, I don't think it would have mattered in end if GHQ hadn't abandoned Eastern command. Supported by massive homogeneous population in their land allied force were bound to win anyway. It may have taken little longer, but nevertheless I don't see any different outcome. Except if US and it's Western allies decided to intervene, which they did not and even then there were Soviets. Only in this scenario outcome was uncertain.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Meanwhile, apart from the grossly outnumbered soldiers in the east, the rest of the Pakistani military did what it could.

On the western front, Pakistan Army's 18th Div failed to capture Jaisalmer, due to the confusion occasioned by a misleading dividing wire that was wrongly thought to demarcate a mined area, and due to the terrible conditions; unlike the stony surface of the Western Desert where 8th Army fought the Afrika Korps and the Italians, surface conditions in the Thar are far more difficult, with deep sand-dunes consisting of very fine-grained sand, that would make it impossible even for tracked vehicles to make rapid progress. Our mutual friend Panzerkiel made this point very early during discussions on PDF.

I don't want to discuss Longewala in depth, because there is a public story and there is the real narrative, and it will take time to present the true picture, and not everybody may be interested to read it. The wikipedia article is a piece of garbage, but fortunately Z. A. Khan, who was personally involved, has written about it, and there are anecdotes relating to Atma 'Atom' Singh, the AOP who did all the spotting.

Perhaps one of the Pakistan Army's finest hours was up in the north, where, incredibly, there was yet another attack on Chhamb-Jaurian, and even more incredibly, in spite of the lessons of the past, the Indian Army was out-fought and out generalled, and it was probably only the battlefield death of Iftekhan Janjua that averted calamity.

 

[Saiyan0321]

Perhaps one of the Pakistan Army's finest hours was up in the north, where, incredibly, there was yet another attack on Chhamb-Jaurian, and even more incredibly, in spite of the lessons of the past, the Indian Army was out-fought and out generalled, and it was probably only the battlefield death of Iftekhan Janjua that averted calamity.

Ehhh yeah i have read and have a very detailed book about the account. It points out to the faults in the attack at the sector and how pakistan failed to take advantage of times where indian positions were weakened. I also found this exchange and the akhnur dagger exchange which wasnt across the LOC and the central punjab and kutch exchanges as well as the indian plans towards the indus green belt and if you look at the central punjab sector, both sides stopped short of crossing sutlej despite the fact that pakistan was quite close to hussainwala as compared to India was to the Khudia road and the same was seen in ravi where india went dera baba nanak but didnt cross the river and near maqbulpura whereas pakistan went into dharan enclave kassowal but didnt cross the river, to be very interesting.. shakargarh, kargil and the dagger were nightmares for pakistan western command.

Iftikharabad is iftikharabad but lets not ignore there were serious weaknesses

 

[Joe Shearer]

i have read and have a very detailed book about the account.

Now you are being deliberately provocative.
Now you are being deliberately provocative.
Now you are being deliberately provocative.
₹ 2,949.49

 

[Saiyan0321]

Now you are being deliberately provocative.
Now you are being deliberately provocative.
Now you are being deliberately provocative.
₹ 2,949.49

Oh no its not that. That doesnt mention 1971 at all. Its different works from other writers. Steeds of war, battle of chhamb 1971 is a good start., I dont think that book is available outside pakistan

 

[Joe Shearer]

Ehhh yeah i have read and have a very detailed book about the account. It points out to the faults in the attack at the sector and how pakistan failed to take advantage of times where indian positions were weakened. I also found this exchange and the akhnur dagger exchange which wasnt across the LOC and the central punjab and kutch exchanges as well as the indian plans towards the indus green belt and if you look at the central punjab sector, both sides stopped short of crossing sutlej despite the fact that pakistan was quite close to hussainwala as compared to India was to the Khudia road and the same was seen in ravi where india went dera baba nanak but didnt cross the river and near maqbulpura whereas pakistan went into dharan enclave kassowal but didnt cross the river, to be very interesting.. shakargarh, kargil and the dagger were nightmares for pakistan western command.

Iftikharabad is iftikharabad but lets not ignore there were serious weaknesses

Western Command was then headed by General Gopal Bewoor, and the troops under him did an indifferent job. Perhaps Major General Khambatta, whom Agha Amin in his completely uninhibited way calls the worst Indian general, did especially badly, when he got news of Longewala happening.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Oh no its not that. That doesnt mention 1971 at all. Its different works from other writers. Steeds of war, battle of chhamb 1971 is a good start., I dont think that book is available outside pakistan

Most Pakistani books are available at amazingly high prices. Prohibitive.

 

[Saiyan0321]

For example

"2nd armoured brigade group was tasked to capture Chhamb on 7th December. Without any information of enemy defences surrounding the town of chhamb, the armoured brigade group, with 28 cavalry and two companies of the 23 baloch attacked and secured chhamb by 0900 hours on 7th december. Unknown to the 23rdm indians had abandoned the entire chhamb salient on the night of 6/7 december....111 brigade, which was in close contact with 5 sikh in area point 994 on moel-chhamb road, failed to detect its withdrawal which led to wasting of precious resources and an entire day in attacking chhamb instead of pursuing the withdrawing indians. 23 division indeed has lost an opportunity to capture a large swathe of enemy territory. A review of the battle is essential to conclude a few pertinent issues. Then it goes into highlighting some failures..

Agha Amin, review is even more scathing

 

[Saiyan0321]

Most Pakistani books are available at amazingly high prices. Prohibitive.

In india? In Pakistan this book is expensive as well. 8K. Thats alot of cash especially for a guy that doesnt really pay for books if you know what i mean.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Oh no its not that. That doesnt mention 1971 at all. Its different works from other writers. Steeds of war, battle of chhamb 1971 is a good start., I dont think that book is available outside pakistan

Now that you have jogged my memory, that was exclusively about 65, wasn't it?

 

[Joe Shearer]

111 brigade, which was in close contact with 5 sikh in area point 994 on moel-chhamb road, failed to detect its withdrawal which led to wasting of precious resources and an entire day in attacking chhamb instead of pursuing the withdrawing indians.

How can a unit simultaneously be in close contact, and fail to detect the opposing formation's withdrawal?

 

[Saiyan0321]

Now that you have jogged my memory, that was exclusively about 65, wasn't it?

yep. If there was ever a conflict that needed to be reviewed extensively then it was the 1971 war and kargil war and if anybody review it and wrote about it then they made sure it wouldnt leave the boundaries of NDU

 

[Saiyan0321]

How can a unit simultaneously be in close contact, and fail to detect the opposing formation's withdrawal?

the 111 brigade failures with the withdrawl issue are mentioned on multiple sources. Agha amin was convinced that they should have all been court martialed. I may write something on it later on. Much later on

 

[Joe Shearer]

yep. If there was ever a conflict that needed to be reviewed extensively then it was the 1971 war and kargil war and if anybody review it and wrote about it then they made sure it wouldnt leave the boundaries of NDU

1971, with regard to the western border; the events of the east have been covered again and again. I am aware of two of the incidents, the two I mentioned.

One, down where 18th Div made its abortive bid to reach Jaisalmer, as a spoiling attack to put Khambatta, who was planning a thrust towards the north-south corridor, off his stride. Some people have suggested that, after all, 18th Div did manage to put the fear of God into Khambatta, so its own retreat didn't matter.

Two, the Chhamb Jaurian engagement.