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OPERATION GIBRALTAR PART 3
As highlighted beforehand that the military victory at Kutch as well as the successful British Mediation provided Pakistan with the confidence that the plan of action, even if not 100%, contained a high degree of success rate that could bear fruits for Pakistan in regards to Kashmir and was a gamble that Pakistan should take and should take immediately as the plan stated that there was little risk and a lot of gain. The Plan also highlighted that the objective was not just military along with internal and external pressure to India but was also to de-freeze the Kashmir issue and for this was Operation Grand slam. General Akhtar had taken great care and planning towards this operation and the soundness of the planning on paper was recognized by the Indian Army as well, and he envisaged that Gibraltar alone was not enough and would never succeed in driving India to the negotiating table and Grand Slam was the necessary and natural second part of the operation to create real pressure on India and push them back.
During the briefing, Grand Slam was presented as a plan for an armoured thrust by the 12th Division across CFL to Akhnur which was a critical supply position from India to Srinagar. The first draft of the plan was presented to Ayub as a limited push across the Chamb-Jurian line towards the town of Uri however the town would not be taken and akhnur would be threatened creating great pressure over India absent any occupation of of major towns or strategic locations which would corner India to either suffer great humiliation or retaliate. An International crisis would be created and India would be under great pressure at the table and would forever feel the knife at it’s most strategic location thus forcing India to make concessions. It was at this moment that Ayub pointed to Akhnur and asked, “But why don’t you go for the jugular?” and this has been confirmed by all sources cited that it was Ayub who wanted Grand slam to include the occupation of Akhnur. Military speaking occupation of Akhnur was a fine strategic move as the Akhnur sector was essential for Indian supply line in Srinagar and if Pakistan could hold Akhnur till the coming of winter then it could seriously build pressure on the Indian forces as any counterattack would be difficult if not impossible and supply to Indian forces within Kashmir would be constrained, allowing Pakistan to expand on the tactical objectives by crossing CFL against an isolated and demoralized enemy that was struggling with resupply. General Akhtar answered Ayub that his plan was the most realistic with the recourses sanctioned for the operation and Ayub answered that he will have all the resources he wants for the operation, both men and money.[1] The Operation was now much larger in a single stroke but the problem was that the occupation and threatening of the Major Indian Supply line to the Kashmir Valley was not properly discussed afterwards and while the 12th Division did issue multiple enemy reaction studies, as can be observed within the military section of this study, neither the Committee discussed the impact of a thrust to capture Akhnur nor how this would be seen within the International community nor on whether India would retaliate and how it would retaliate to expand the conflict and stem the advancing Pakistan Army? This would be seen with the after-effects of the operation and the diplomatic backlash that Pakistan suffered as well as the graveness of Indian retaliation. There was a clear need to reconsider the operation and reevaluate the situation especially in terms of defensive operations to Indian incursions both on the CFL and along the IB. It was clear that with Akhnur in the equation, it would be less about a battle of attrition and more of a contest between two militaries.
Altaf Gauhar highlights that on 24th July, he met Ayub Khan and by then Ayub was convinced that Kashmir would only be solved with a Military solution and believed in said solution as when he met the President in the Cabinet office, he was told that a “Great deal will depend on the propaganda front” and then left the meeting before Gauhar could ask for more details and Bhutto then took the chair and dramatically and in fashion of Bhutto, gave an emotional speech wherein he stated that the people of Kashmir were locked in a struggle for Life and Death and Pakistan would not be forgiven in this world or the next if it remained an idle spectator. Gauhar was then asked by the Director Military Intelligence to provide him two Kashmiri speaking broadcasters for radio broadcasts and was told that he would be given 24 hours notice before the curtain would be raised and the act to begin. The stage was now set. The 12th Division was in full preparation with the limited time and resourced within their disposal. The home front now needed to be prepared for the International Community to take action. On 17th May, Ayub officially gave the green light for the commencement and preparation of the operations and General Akhtar Malik sent a notifications to all sector commanders which has been reproduced within the military section of the study as well as the preparations and planning of Gibraltar and how infiltration teams were to infiltrate and act within IHK. On 13th July the final plans were presented before Ayub and General Musa and were approved and 7th August was fixed for the date of the Operation.[2]
Now the issue regarding whether any political and intelligence groundwork was done to prepare the local population remains a controversial issue yet the facts on ground as well as the facts in front of us tell us that there were serious political failures and intelligence deficiencies and the general perception was that no ground work was needed as the population was ready to burst into revolt and take up arms against the Indian Army and whatever match stick that needed to burn Kashmir, was going to be provided with the Operation. It is clear that the Pakistani leadership and political and intelligence apparatus did not even inform elements within Kashmir that Pakistan was to take action. Both sides blame each other for this failure however it is clear that the lack of proper information network and ground work preparation especially considering the grand and expansive operation that was expected to be executed by the men of Operation Gibraltar is evidence of the naïve approach of the Kashmir committee and it would be one that would cost Operation Gibraltar dearly. Nobody has been able to provide a proper answer as to why no groundwork was done before Operation Gibraltar apart from two reasons. First that the operation was to be secret and informing local elements would have leaked the details of the Operation causing India to counter when the Operation itself relied on element of surprise and largely ignorance of the Indian Intelligence. Second is the fact that groundwork required months if not years of preparation and considering the fact that the driving force behind such haste of the Operation was the perception that Pakistan only had a window until 1967, time nor resources could be wasted on creating proper intelligence network, local resistance groups, charismatic leaders and communication networks to pave the way for an infiltration force. General Akhtar Amlik took responsibility of this failure in his letter to his brother wherein he stated,
“Not informing Pro-Pak elements before launching Gibraltar was a command decision and it was mine. The aim of the operation was to defreeze the Kashmir issue, raise it from its moribound state and bring it to the notice of the world. To achieve this aim the first phase of the operation was vital i.e to effect undetected infiltration of thousands across the CFL. I was not willing to compromise this in any event. And the whole operation could be made stillborn by just one double agent.”[3]
Valid reasons and clear military thinking but the objectives expected from the Operation were in contradiction to this as the Force was surely neither expected nor equipped to deal with the Indian Army whilst galvanizing a confused population absent any resource support. It was clear that the operation in place favoured small time infiltration raids and pockets of resistance till Grand Slam after which the infiltrators would have to return. The objective regarding International intervention demanded longtime operational capability and proper guerrilla networks for which neither the Operation was suited for nor there was any groundwork for such. It was clear that the Operational objectives and strategic objectives did not align as the forces would have to move many miles through mountainous terrain to reach their allotted areas which was an unknown region for them and they were unknown to the populace.
The 12th Division started to station the forces near the border on 24th July and the infiltration was a complete success which speaks volumes of the failure of Indian intelligence. The political apparatus within India was also clueless that on 3rd August a press conference was held at Srinagar by Indian Defense Minister Chavan, after a three day inspection of the Indian Positions at Kargil and Uri Sector of the CFL. Chavan was completely unaware despite the fact that large number of Gibraltar forces had infiltrated by now and he declared that he was returning to Delhi with a sense of happiness and confidence in the Indian security forces in defending CFL. He stated that he was completely satisfied with the Indian security measures and that the number of Pakistani violations had greatly decreased since the Kutch Ceasefire Agreement has been signed.[4] Whether this was boasting to justify the Kutch Agreement since Shastri was facing severe pressure within the Indian parliament regarding Kutch as it was seen as an Indian defeat and surrender of territory to an aggressor or whether he actually believed his statement. Either way, the Indian Army and government were clueless at this stage. Whilst movements had begun since 24th July as stated within the Military portion of the study, on paper the official date was 7th August which was amended to 5th August.
Now on the General Harbaksh as well as Dr. Manekar both state that Indian army had received reports of training of infiltrators but action was taken as these reports were declared unreliable and there was a general perception within the Indian Army that Pakistan will not take any action that will risk an all out war especially due to the Indian Military doctrine centered around Operation Riddle which would come to play later on. Indian reports state that on the night of 5th August an Indian patrol was attacked by a group of approximately 70 men at a point 8000 yeards from the CFL in the Galuti sector of Jammu. On the same night on the northern slopes of the Pir Panjal range near Gulmarg, a hill station eight mountainous miles from the CFL and 23 miles west of Srinagar, there was a second clash. The Home Minister of IHK, D.P.Dhar visited Gulmerg area and concluded that the men who had clashed with the Indian patrol had crossed CFL from Azad Kashmir and immediately passed this information to Delhi and the news died down right there since the Central Government felt that the Kashmiri government was exaggerating common small time clashes and simply sensationalizing as on 9th August protests were to take place anyhow. The Kashmiri government was a lot more worried as the government tried to impress upon the Central government on the seriousness of the situation as Sadiq, the Chief Minister of IHK, flew back to Srinagar on 8th August with Indira Gandhi and the central government was till not impressed and only an exchange of fire within five miles of Srinagar forced the Central government to airlift armed Police into the region. By 5th August the Indian army was also getting repeated reports of infiltrators and armed strangers being witnessed moving around and trying to incite the population. On 8th August, an emergency meetings of the Indian Central Cabinet was held and the Indian spokesman informed the public of India that since 5th August there had been extensive infiltration of armed men from Azad Kashmir and this infiltration was not just from CFL but also from the International Border which India regarded between West Pakistan and Indian Kashmir and the purpose of these individuals was to carry out acts of sabotage and disturbances in Indian Kashmir.[5]
The Pakistani government was ready for this as the pre-planned propaganda was immediately launched as Bhutto declared that the people of Kashmir had faced great atrocities at the hands of the Indian Army and under such suffering and cruelty, had been driven to the only thing that could be expected of the victim to do and that was to rebel against the Indian repression and tyranny and their action is to be understood by the world and history to be their legitimate struggle and fight for freedom which was taking place all over Asia and Africa. This was wholly indigenous and Pakistan had nothing to do with this uprising.[6]
Unfortunately the local political and intelligence aspects weren’t the only sector where Pakistan was found wanting as the diplomatic legwork was also non-existent and it is fair to say that the Indian account was more widely believed despite the considerable diplomatic difference between Pakistan and India and the situation was not helped when the UN Observers on the ground quickly informed the UN Secretary General, U Thant, that the Indian version was more or less accurate. Lt. General Nimmo, the Chief Military Observer UNMOGIP reported to U Thant that a large scale infiltration of armed men from Azad Kashmir was underway and the Indian complaints which started after 6th August, were credible and accurate to the ground realities. U Thant conveyed to the Pakistan Ambassador to the United Nations, Syed Amjad Ali, on 9th August regarding these reports and his “very serious concerns regarding the situation that was developing in Kashmir……involving the crossing of the CFL from the Pakistani side by the numbers of armed men and their attacks on Indian Military positions on the Indian side of the line…..”[7]
IHK government expected the coming days to be filled with protestas on 8th August, situation was expected to be tense at Srinagar since processions were to be carried out throughout the city in honour of the Kashmiri Saint, Syed Abdul Qadir Gilani also known as Pir Dastagir Sahib and the following day was the 12th anniversary of the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah from premiership of the state. It is possible that these dates played a significant role in the planning of the operation but it is highly unlikely that they had anything to do with the operational implementation of Gibraltar since infiltrations had begun well in advance however the local Anti-India front composed of the HRAC, the plebiscite front and the Awami Action Committee all called for a general shutter down strike and many kashmiris within Srinagar had carried out protest in defiance of the ban on public meetings. By 9th August, the HRAC had expanded these protests to urban areas of the valley however there is little evidence to suggest that Pakistan or the Pakistani intelligence had anything to do with these disturbances and considering the fact that General Akhtar Malik and the committee valued secrecy for the Operation, it is even more unlikely that this expansion of protest had any involvement of Pakistan. It seems that this was local based. Now among the forces sent in Operation Gibraltar, the most crucial element was given to Salahuddin Force and whilst I have highlighted the military difficulties that were faced by the Force and how they struggled and eventually failed in their objectives, I will highlight the political objectives of the Force. Apart from military sabotage, Salahuddin Force was given the task of preparing Srinagar for a revolt and through the flames of the city, declare the sector as separate. They had planned to infiltrate Srinagar with a large number of villagers coming into the city and they would pockets of squads that would launch multiple prong attacks to seize the radio station and the government secretariat during the protests. They would then expand and secure Srinagar under the guise of charged and violent protests and thus Srinagar would be isolated to prevent or hinder Indian movement. Two targets were recognized as top priority with the Airport and the Srinagar-Jammu road as the forces to the north-east and south-west would cut this road and the force would take control of the Airport thus the Indian movement and response would be greatly crippled. With the completion of these objectives, the Salahuddin Force would immediately establish a revolutionary council similar to how it was done in 1947 with the Azad Government, and the council was to create an emergency national government which would be composed of members of the Anti-Indian parties. The revolutionary council would determine immediate steps to undertake the revolt within the Kashmir valley and create an Azad Force composed of local elements which would then help the Gibraltar forces in expanding and securing their hold within the valley. The national government would declare itself as the legitimate government of the people and formally appeal for recognition and assistance from all countries including and especially Pakistan and similar to 1947, Pakistan would recognize said government and provide resources for the national government and the revolutionary council which would keep the Gibraltar forces supplied and fuel the insurgency as well as land both a political and military blow to India and with Operation Grand Slam, the rope around Kashmir could only tightened. It is quite interesting to note the similarities between Operation Gibraltar and the 1947 Kashmir war which also witnessed similar political implementation by Pakistan and the Azad Forces and infiltration by Pakistan to fuel the fire that was to be led by the Azad Forces except here the Azad Forces did not exist as there was neither any leader like Sardar Ibrahim within Kashmir nor was there any ongoing insurgency like in 1947 which had been a brutal and continuous affair between the Maharaja of Kashmir and the Muslim Conference nor was the Indian Army so inept and suffering from losses as the Maharaja’s forces were doing. The only difference that could be considered as favourable in contrast to 1947 was that the infiltrators were professional soldiers rather than unruly raiders. How much was that to be a difference against another professional army with vast resources and hold in the region was to be seen by both sides.
It was effectively planned that individual infiltrators of the force would enter Srinagar and politically activate the people and would secure increased participation by the local people in their activities. On 10th August, the main Force reached western outskirts of the city however the force was unable to take any action since the Force had been discovered by the Indian Army and they were ready to secure the city. It is also important to note that the infiltrators failed in gathering massive support even from Anti-Indian elements who simply did not want to create a military situation that would result in chaos and suffering. Salahuddin found the populace to be hostile to them and the aforementioned parties not cooperative. India was not sleeping during this time as by 5th August they had discovered evidence of infiltration although to the scale that was the event, they were still ignorant, however General Harbakhsh stated in his work,
“……. Towards the evening (8th August) reports trickled in of a large number of infiltrators in the suburbs of Srinagar. A sizeable batch was reported in village Qasha Biru NM 6404, and it was indicated that they were moving towards the Srinagar Airfield- our most sensitive target in the valley. A company of 8 J and K militia, two tank troops and one rifle troop of Central India Horse were, therefore, immediately deployed for the protection of the airfield…………The City was quite when I arrived. There at about 1300 hours on 9th August 1965 after a third attempt to cross the clouded ZOJILA. The streets were deserted and there were visible signs of anxiety and tension on the faces of the residents peering through their windows. By the time however, the whole 2/9 GORKHA RIFLES had arrived in the Valley and were suitably deployed in the city……..”[8]
Despite the failure of the Salahuddin Force, Azad Kashmir radio, operating from Muzaffarabad reported that on the evening of 8th August it had monitored transmissions from a radio station located within IHK which called itself Sada-i-Kashmir (Voice of Kashmir) and the said transmission had declared that the people had risen up against the oppression and had formed a Revolutionary Council. The channel proclaimed the beginning of the war of liberation and announced that the National Government has been formed as well however it did neither mentioned under whom this government was formed and where its members. The radio station also did not mention the members of the Revolutionary Council. The radio station announced the declaration of the council which held that armed struggle will continue until all occupants are expelled from our land, our leaders are freed and that the will of the people is allowed to determine the future of this land. Now interesting to note here is that while the station had identified the Council as Muslims and the plans only expected the Muslim community to revolt, the larger tone was non-religious so as to present to the International Community that the movement was nationalistic and in line with the anti-colonial movements rather than religiously oriented or fundamentalist movement. The broadcast also stated that Kashmir was sold to India in 1947 and that events of sacrilege had happened by the Indian government and forces and individuals were living under the shadow of bayonets and guns and in contrast to Indian sources claim at that time, no proclamation of Jihad was made within the announcement as it would have given it a religious spin which Pakistan wanted to avoid for presenting the Kashmir case to the International community. For further legitimacy the call also emphasized that the armed struggle was not against the people of India but against the illegal occupation of the Indian government and Indian army as well as their local supporters. The Revolutionary Council also appealed to South Indians, Sikhs and Rajputs to assist the legitimate Kashmiri struggle. This was largely to create an image of a hindi speaking center that wants to oppress the rest of India and this center was inherently intolerant of others within India however it was clear that this concept of Hindu State oppressive to not only one region but to several was an official image that Pakistan would portray of India and Pakistan had hoped that this would be received sympathetically amongst other Indian Groups especially since on 2nd August of 1965, the Sikh leader Master Tara Singh demanded for the creation of a Punjabi speaking province within India and Pakistan had hoped that the Sikh movement would be rejuvenated with all the trouble within Kashmir, placing even more pressure on India. However it is important to note that the roles of Sikhs and South Indians never came up during the making and executing of the Operation and it was clear that Pakistan only expected Kashmiri Muslims to rise in revolt. It is heavily likely that the inclusion of the Sikhs was merely for International ammunition since South India was also mentioned despite the fact that South India was peaceful yet during this period the language divisions and the north and south divide was apparent within India and to display to the world that India is a divided and weakened nation. The inclusion of Rajputs could be similar to this so as to demoralize the large section of Rajputs within the Indian Army. It is also important to note that another language group could have been highlighted but weren’t and those were Bengalis but that could be a conscious omission since Pakistan’s own Bengali province was in a state of a mess and under ethnic tensions and any declaration of Bengali movement within India to the International community would have brought serious limelight to the troubles of East Pakistan. Finally the proclamation slammed the people of Pakistan for not having done enough to assist the Kashmiris and were invited to rectify this historical wrong by taking up arms and supporting the armed resistance. Azad Kashmir nor Gilgit Baltistan were not mentioned espite the fact that there was dissatisfaction within those regions as well and further declared that all agreements between India and the IHK were null and void so as the Instrument of Accession was also not a factor anymore and declared itself as the sole and legal government within IHK.
It was clear that the speech looked to have been written in large rooms upon shiny tables by suited men rather than determined guerrillas within the darkness of a conflict zone citing leaders and support base so it is safe to say that Mr. Bhutto was involved in the drafting of this speech and how it looked to cover all the diplomatic bases rather than a call to arms for the people of Kashmir on both sides of the border and this is another interesting omission. Any localized insurgency looking to fight such an oppressor would call upon their Kashmiri brethren from across the border to join and support the struggle and pick up arms especially when those brethren had already done so before yet the call for support was absolutely silent on Azad Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan. It is clear that Pakistan did not want to ruffle any feathers regarding their own held Kashmir especially considering the fact that not a decade ago they had suppress a serious revolt by the hero of Azad Kashmir, Sardar Ibrahim.
Post the announcement, India immediately replied stating that the Radio Station was based within Pakistan and that the frequencies were registered in Pakistan’s name with the International Frequency Registration board.[9] Unfortunately the work of Altaf Gauhar confirms that this was indeed the case as he states that on the morning of 8th August, he was approached by the Military Intelligence Director, Brigadier Irshad, apologizing that they had not given him the 24 hour notice that he was promised and they urgently needed a Transmitter. Gauhar told him that none were available and thus the Voice of Kashmir had to be broadcasted using the same frequency as the Azad Kashmir Radio which was the Pakistani government run radio within Azad Kashmir. India discovered this connection quite soon and they wasted no time to publically highlight this blunder highlighting to their own populace how Pakistan had invaded India and broke the Ceasefire agreement, displaying to the International Community that Pakistan was the aggressor thus weakening any stance, moral or legal, for Pakistan to take and gave the impression within the circles of Pakistan that the ground situation was not going well and Operation Gibraltar was in serious danger as plan after plan was falling apart. Everything that could go wrong, was going wrong and it was clear that if Gibraltar was to mimic Kutch then it looked more like the battle of Sardar Post rather than the Battle of Bets only this time, india was not as absent. For Brigadier Irshad the day would not get any better as All India Radio Broadcasted interviews of Four prisoners captured by Indian Forces and they spoke in great detail regarding the operation. Gauhar states that Irshad, when presented with the summary of the broadcast, stated,
“Oh my God, the bastards have spilt the beans..”[10]
What wasn’t broadcasted was that the among the prisoners were two officers who gave detailed account of Gibraltar on the radio but also possessed a number of documents that revealed the entire plot of the massive infiltration and when it was hatched leading to shock and horror within the Indian Forces. The Voice of Kashmir on 13th August claimed that the infiltrators had sealed off Sringar from the surrounding country side by cutting off twelve roads invluding three major arteries being the ones leading to Jammu, Baramula and Leh. As we will observed within the Military section of the study that this was clearly not the case at all and while the Salahuddin Force was a major headache for the Indian Army and involved in many incidents second only to the Ghaznavi Force within Rajauri under Major Malik[11], it was also clear that by 13th August they were feeling the pressure and as their base in Khag Forest was raided and the burning of Baramula, it was clear that by 13th August the Salahuddin Force had lost control and by 18th, they started to retreat back to Azad Kashmir. While the force did not achieve their main objectives, they also didn’t suffer major losses as highlighted within the Military Section. India reported ambush incidents such as the ambush 40 mile to the west of Srinagar which resulted in death of 10 police men and Nimmo confirms reports of attacks on the bridges of Baramula on the night of 7th august, and at Kargil on 10th August as well as on the Srinagar-Leh road where an Indian convoy was attached as late as on 1st September.[12]
However it is clear that the Majority of Kashmiri Muslims and the Anti-Indian leadership ignored the call and did not rise up to help the infiltrators contrary to the expectations of the Kashmir Committee and while it could be argued that they had received neither any request nor any intelligence of this infiltration and were expected to cooperate with stranger invaders masquerading as locals, it is clear that the Gibraltar Force was abandoned by the locals and minute incidents of support to the forces is were clearly the exception rather than the norm and the only sector that truly stood out was Rajauri. The British Military Review noted.
“…the inhabitants of the Valley, noted more for the beauty of their women rather than the martial prowess of their men, did not revolt…”[13]
Clearly the above quotation is blinded by the old British concept of Martial Races, Same race a few miles across and within the state itself took up arms in 1947 to separate Southern Azad Kashmir and regions of IHK with many serving in WWII. Altaf Gauhar has a more realistic outlook regarding this matter as he states that Pakistan lacked local intelligence and relied heavily preconception and stereotypes and this limitation was demonstrated when it was realized in contrast to a prepared and ready to revolt population, the Forces found a frightened and hostile population who distrusted the strangers in local garb and felt that they were bringing forth war upon their land. As Ayub had said to the Kashmir Committee in February as to under whose authority was the committee bringing war upon this country, perhaps the people of IHK also felt it needed to ask as to under whose authority was a foreign power like Pakistan bringing death, destruction, war, conflict and insurgency to the Valley. It is also important to understand that only 18 years had passed since the 1947 conflict and many individuals were well aware of the brutal nature of infiltrators as had been the case with the Raiders of Kashmir. Distrust was rampant and the fact that they did not know whether these Gibraltar Force was professional soldiers or trained raiders looking to plunder, was a serious intelligence overlook that Pakistan was to pay for dearly. It is important to highlight these factors when looking into the reasons as to why the locals did not rise up or trust Pakistan. On top of it all, the individuals werent even organic and for the movements within Kashmir for independence, it was clear that this half-hearted effort would only result in an Indian crackdown which would be largely felt by the locals and the Anti-Indian parties operating within IHK. Pakistan’s diplomatic ammunition depended greatly on a localized movement and uprising and the element of legitimacy to Gibraltar demanded that the people rise up in revolt since Pakistan had repeatedly continued the stance that the people of Kashmir were rising against Indian tyranny. Absent the revolt, Pakistan now found itself in a difficult situation as nobody within the International community believed the story of local revolt and Pakistan having no hand in the matter. The Diplomatic denial was met with skepticism and annoyance and gave Pakistan an image of an aggressor that had willfully destroyed the peace of South Asia for their own gain and brought more conflict to the International Stage. Infact it had the opposite effect and India found itself as the more sympathetic party as it repeatedly shouted within the International stage that Pakistan was bringing conflict to Kashmir. Pakistan had enjoyed more diplomatic support regarding Kashmir since 1947 and had escaped harsher measures and UN condemnation of the 1947 raiders but it seemed that Pakistan was now losing that Moral high ground that it had once enjoyed. By 30th August, Nimmo had presented his report on the events within IHK and the CFL and the report contained that of the 23 violations within 5th August and 30th august, 19 were committed by Pakistan and 4 were committed by India and noted that Indian violations had only started in retaliation to Pakistani violations as their incidents covered the period between 14th August and 24th August. U Thant’s Report to the Security Council, which contained all these reports, was presented on 3rd September but Pakistani Government objected to its public release and thus the report was not publicized till 6th September 1965.[14]
[1] Ibid the cited works of Altaf Gauhar, General Musa and Gulzar Ahmed, all are unanimous on this.
[2] Ibid Gulzar Ahmed
[3] General Akhtar Malik, Letter to his brother.
[4] News Report in The Hindu 5th August 1965
[5] Times of India 9th August 1965
[6] Dawn News Report 13th August 1965
[7] S/6651, Part 1 para 9 quoted by Wright
[8] Lt. Gen Harbakhsh Singh, War dispatched- the Indo Pak Conflict 1965
[9] Kashmir Answers Pakistan, Government of India
[10] Ibid Ref Gauhar
[11] Major Malik started his military career within the British India Army and was captured by the Japanese Army during the occupation of Singapore in WWII and became part of the Japanese Army as he received special training wherein he would later on he became part of the Azad Hind Revolutionary Force under Subas Chandre Bose and commanded the 2nd INA Guerilla Battalion during the battle of Imphal and was taken prisoner and brought to trial for treason. (Smith, James INA Operations in SouthEast Asia World War II He was freed post partition of British India and was invited to join the Pakistan Army and he became part of Azad Kashmir Regular Force which would then be reconstituted into the Azad Kashmir Regiment. He led the force at Rajouri Sector and controlled and was able to operate easily in a wide area of over 500 Square Miles and was able to formulate quite a resistance. While Indian sources contest his control, he was largely in power in the region and welcomes the UN Observers who landed at Rajouri to monitor the Ceasefire yet after Tashkent Declaration, he was ordered to retreat and return much to the chagrin of the said major and the disappointment of the locals. He was awarded Tamgha-e-Basalat Sitar-e-Jurat by Ayub Khan and declared as King of Rajouri but was unable to escape the distrust that all INA soldiers faced on both sides of the border.
[12] S/6651, Part II quoted by wright)
[13] British Military Review of the Indo-Pakistan conflict May 1966
[14] Second Report of the UN Security General dated 03-09-1965 cited within the Indian Official History
As highlighted beforehand that the military victory at Kutch as well as the successful British Mediation provided Pakistan with the confidence that the plan of action, even if not 100%, contained a high degree of success rate that could bear fruits for Pakistan in regards to Kashmir and was a gamble that Pakistan should take and should take immediately as the plan stated that there was little risk and a lot of gain. The Plan also highlighted that the objective was not just military along with internal and external pressure to India but was also to de-freeze the Kashmir issue and for this was Operation Grand slam. General Akhtar had taken great care and planning towards this operation and the soundness of the planning on paper was recognized by the Indian Army as well, and he envisaged that Gibraltar alone was not enough and would never succeed in driving India to the negotiating table and Grand Slam was the necessary and natural second part of the operation to create real pressure on India and push them back.
During the briefing, Grand Slam was presented as a plan for an armoured thrust by the 12th Division across CFL to Akhnur which was a critical supply position from India to Srinagar. The first draft of the plan was presented to Ayub as a limited push across the Chamb-Jurian line towards the town of Uri however the town would not be taken and akhnur would be threatened creating great pressure over India absent any occupation of of major towns or strategic locations which would corner India to either suffer great humiliation or retaliate. An International crisis would be created and India would be under great pressure at the table and would forever feel the knife at it’s most strategic location thus forcing India to make concessions. It was at this moment that Ayub pointed to Akhnur and asked, “But why don’t you go for the jugular?” and this has been confirmed by all sources cited that it was Ayub who wanted Grand slam to include the occupation of Akhnur. Military speaking occupation of Akhnur was a fine strategic move as the Akhnur sector was essential for Indian supply line in Srinagar and if Pakistan could hold Akhnur till the coming of winter then it could seriously build pressure on the Indian forces as any counterattack would be difficult if not impossible and supply to Indian forces within Kashmir would be constrained, allowing Pakistan to expand on the tactical objectives by crossing CFL against an isolated and demoralized enemy that was struggling with resupply. General Akhtar answered Ayub that his plan was the most realistic with the recourses sanctioned for the operation and Ayub answered that he will have all the resources he wants for the operation, both men and money.[1] The Operation was now much larger in a single stroke but the problem was that the occupation and threatening of the Major Indian Supply line to the Kashmir Valley was not properly discussed afterwards and while the 12th Division did issue multiple enemy reaction studies, as can be observed within the military section of this study, neither the Committee discussed the impact of a thrust to capture Akhnur nor how this would be seen within the International community nor on whether India would retaliate and how it would retaliate to expand the conflict and stem the advancing Pakistan Army? This would be seen with the after-effects of the operation and the diplomatic backlash that Pakistan suffered as well as the graveness of Indian retaliation. There was a clear need to reconsider the operation and reevaluate the situation especially in terms of defensive operations to Indian incursions both on the CFL and along the IB. It was clear that with Akhnur in the equation, it would be less about a battle of attrition and more of a contest between two militaries.
Altaf Gauhar highlights that on 24th July, he met Ayub Khan and by then Ayub was convinced that Kashmir would only be solved with a Military solution and believed in said solution as when he met the President in the Cabinet office, he was told that a “Great deal will depend on the propaganda front” and then left the meeting before Gauhar could ask for more details and Bhutto then took the chair and dramatically and in fashion of Bhutto, gave an emotional speech wherein he stated that the people of Kashmir were locked in a struggle for Life and Death and Pakistan would not be forgiven in this world or the next if it remained an idle spectator. Gauhar was then asked by the Director Military Intelligence to provide him two Kashmiri speaking broadcasters for radio broadcasts and was told that he would be given 24 hours notice before the curtain would be raised and the act to begin. The stage was now set. The 12th Division was in full preparation with the limited time and resourced within their disposal. The home front now needed to be prepared for the International Community to take action. On 17th May, Ayub officially gave the green light for the commencement and preparation of the operations and General Akhtar Malik sent a notifications to all sector commanders which has been reproduced within the military section of the study as well as the preparations and planning of Gibraltar and how infiltration teams were to infiltrate and act within IHK. On 13th July the final plans were presented before Ayub and General Musa and were approved and 7th August was fixed for the date of the Operation.[2]
Now the issue regarding whether any political and intelligence groundwork was done to prepare the local population remains a controversial issue yet the facts on ground as well as the facts in front of us tell us that there were serious political failures and intelligence deficiencies and the general perception was that no ground work was needed as the population was ready to burst into revolt and take up arms against the Indian Army and whatever match stick that needed to burn Kashmir, was going to be provided with the Operation. It is clear that the Pakistani leadership and political and intelligence apparatus did not even inform elements within Kashmir that Pakistan was to take action. Both sides blame each other for this failure however it is clear that the lack of proper information network and ground work preparation especially considering the grand and expansive operation that was expected to be executed by the men of Operation Gibraltar is evidence of the naïve approach of the Kashmir committee and it would be one that would cost Operation Gibraltar dearly. Nobody has been able to provide a proper answer as to why no groundwork was done before Operation Gibraltar apart from two reasons. First that the operation was to be secret and informing local elements would have leaked the details of the Operation causing India to counter when the Operation itself relied on element of surprise and largely ignorance of the Indian Intelligence. Second is the fact that groundwork required months if not years of preparation and considering the fact that the driving force behind such haste of the Operation was the perception that Pakistan only had a window until 1967, time nor resources could be wasted on creating proper intelligence network, local resistance groups, charismatic leaders and communication networks to pave the way for an infiltration force. General Akhtar Amlik took responsibility of this failure in his letter to his brother wherein he stated,
“Not informing Pro-Pak elements before launching Gibraltar was a command decision and it was mine. The aim of the operation was to defreeze the Kashmir issue, raise it from its moribound state and bring it to the notice of the world. To achieve this aim the first phase of the operation was vital i.e to effect undetected infiltration of thousands across the CFL. I was not willing to compromise this in any event. And the whole operation could be made stillborn by just one double agent.”[3]
Valid reasons and clear military thinking but the objectives expected from the Operation were in contradiction to this as the Force was surely neither expected nor equipped to deal with the Indian Army whilst galvanizing a confused population absent any resource support. It was clear that the operation in place favoured small time infiltration raids and pockets of resistance till Grand Slam after which the infiltrators would have to return. The objective regarding International intervention demanded longtime operational capability and proper guerrilla networks for which neither the Operation was suited for nor there was any groundwork for such. It was clear that the Operational objectives and strategic objectives did not align as the forces would have to move many miles through mountainous terrain to reach their allotted areas which was an unknown region for them and they were unknown to the populace.
The 12th Division started to station the forces near the border on 24th July and the infiltration was a complete success which speaks volumes of the failure of Indian intelligence. The political apparatus within India was also clueless that on 3rd August a press conference was held at Srinagar by Indian Defense Minister Chavan, after a three day inspection of the Indian Positions at Kargil and Uri Sector of the CFL. Chavan was completely unaware despite the fact that large number of Gibraltar forces had infiltrated by now and he declared that he was returning to Delhi with a sense of happiness and confidence in the Indian security forces in defending CFL. He stated that he was completely satisfied with the Indian security measures and that the number of Pakistani violations had greatly decreased since the Kutch Ceasefire Agreement has been signed.[4] Whether this was boasting to justify the Kutch Agreement since Shastri was facing severe pressure within the Indian parliament regarding Kutch as it was seen as an Indian defeat and surrender of territory to an aggressor or whether he actually believed his statement. Either way, the Indian Army and government were clueless at this stage. Whilst movements had begun since 24th July as stated within the Military portion of the study, on paper the official date was 7th August which was amended to 5th August.
Now on the General Harbaksh as well as Dr. Manekar both state that Indian army had received reports of training of infiltrators but action was taken as these reports were declared unreliable and there was a general perception within the Indian Army that Pakistan will not take any action that will risk an all out war especially due to the Indian Military doctrine centered around Operation Riddle which would come to play later on. Indian reports state that on the night of 5th August an Indian patrol was attacked by a group of approximately 70 men at a point 8000 yeards from the CFL in the Galuti sector of Jammu. On the same night on the northern slopes of the Pir Panjal range near Gulmarg, a hill station eight mountainous miles from the CFL and 23 miles west of Srinagar, there was a second clash. The Home Minister of IHK, D.P.Dhar visited Gulmerg area and concluded that the men who had clashed with the Indian patrol had crossed CFL from Azad Kashmir and immediately passed this information to Delhi and the news died down right there since the Central Government felt that the Kashmiri government was exaggerating common small time clashes and simply sensationalizing as on 9th August protests were to take place anyhow. The Kashmiri government was a lot more worried as the government tried to impress upon the Central government on the seriousness of the situation as Sadiq, the Chief Minister of IHK, flew back to Srinagar on 8th August with Indira Gandhi and the central government was till not impressed and only an exchange of fire within five miles of Srinagar forced the Central government to airlift armed Police into the region. By 5th August the Indian army was also getting repeated reports of infiltrators and armed strangers being witnessed moving around and trying to incite the population. On 8th August, an emergency meetings of the Indian Central Cabinet was held and the Indian spokesman informed the public of India that since 5th August there had been extensive infiltration of armed men from Azad Kashmir and this infiltration was not just from CFL but also from the International Border which India regarded between West Pakistan and Indian Kashmir and the purpose of these individuals was to carry out acts of sabotage and disturbances in Indian Kashmir.[5]
The Pakistani government was ready for this as the pre-planned propaganda was immediately launched as Bhutto declared that the people of Kashmir had faced great atrocities at the hands of the Indian Army and under such suffering and cruelty, had been driven to the only thing that could be expected of the victim to do and that was to rebel against the Indian repression and tyranny and their action is to be understood by the world and history to be their legitimate struggle and fight for freedom which was taking place all over Asia and Africa. This was wholly indigenous and Pakistan had nothing to do with this uprising.[6]
Unfortunately the local political and intelligence aspects weren’t the only sector where Pakistan was found wanting as the diplomatic legwork was also non-existent and it is fair to say that the Indian account was more widely believed despite the considerable diplomatic difference between Pakistan and India and the situation was not helped when the UN Observers on the ground quickly informed the UN Secretary General, U Thant, that the Indian version was more or less accurate. Lt. General Nimmo, the Chief Military Observer UNMOGIP reported to U Thant that a large scale infiltration of armed men from Azad Kashmir was underway and the Indian complaints which started after 6th August, were credible and accurate to the ground realities. U Thant conveyed to the Pakistan Ambassador to the United Nations, Syed Amjad Ali, on 9th August regarding these reports and his “very serious concerns regarding the situation that was developing in Kashmir……involving the crossing of the CFL from the Pakistani side by the numbers of armed men and their attacks on Indian Military positions on the Indian side of the line…..”[7]
IHK government expected the coming days to be filled with protestas on 8th August, situation was expected to be tense at Srinagar since processions were to be carried out throughout the city in honour of the Kashmiri Saint, Syed Abdul Qadir Gilani also known as Pir Dastagir Sahib and the following day was the 12th anniversary of the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah from premiership of the state. It is possible that these dates played a significant role in the planning of the operation but it is highly unlikely that they had anything to do with the operational implementation of Gibraltar since infiltrations had begun well in advance however the local Anti-India front composed of the HRAC, the plebiscite front and the Awami Action Committee all called for a general shutter down strike and many kashmiris within Srinagar had carried out protest in defiance of the ban on public meetings. By 9th August, the HRAC had expanded these protests to urban areas of the valley however there is little evidence to suggest that Pakistan or the Pakistani intelligence had anything to do with these disturbances and considering the fact that General Akhtar Malik and the committee valued secrecy for the Operation, it is even more unlikely that this expansion of protest had any involvement of Pakistan. It seems that this was local based. Now among the forces sent in Operation Gibraltar, the most crucial element was given to Salahuddin Force and whilst I have highlighted the military difficulties that were faced by the Force and how they struggled and eventually failed in their objectives, I will highlight the political objectives of the Force. Apart from military sabotage, Salahuddin Force was given the task of preparing Srinagar for a revolt and through the flames of the city, declare the sector as separate. They had planned to infiltrate Srinagar with a large number of villagers coming into the city and they would pockets of squads that would launch multiple prong attacks to seize the radio station and the government secretariat during the protests. They would then expand and secure Srinagar under the guise of charged and violent protests and thus Srinagar would be isolated to prevent or hinder Indian movement. Two targets were recognized as top priority with the Airport and the Srinagar-Jammu road as the forces to the north-east and south-west would cut this road and the force would take control of the Airport thus the Indian movement and response would be greatly crippled. With the completion of these objectives, the Salahuddin Force would immediately establish a revolutionary council similar to how it was done in 1947 with the Azad Government, and the council was to create an emergency national government which would be composed of members of the Anti-Indian parties. The revolutionary council would determine immediate steps to undertake the revolt within the Kashmir valley and create an Azad Force composed of local elements which would then help the Gibraltar forces in expanding and securing their hold within the valley. The national government would declare itself as the legitimate government of the people and formally appeal for recognition and assistance from all countries including and especially Pakistan and similar to 1947, Pakistan would recognize said government and provide resources for the national government and the revolutionary council which would keep the Gibraltar forces supplied and fuel the insurgency as well as land both a political and military blow to India and with Operation Grand Slam, the rope around Kashmir could only tightened. It is quite interesting to note the similarities between Operation Gibraltar and the 1947 Kashmir war which also witnessed similar political implementation by Pakistan and the Azad Forces and infiltration by Pakistan to fuel the fire that was to be led by the Azad Forces except here the Azad Forces did not exist as there was neither any leader like Sardar Ibrahim within Kashmir nor was there any ongoing insurgency like in 1947 which had been a brutal and continuous affair between the Maharaja of Kashmir and the Muslim Conference nor was the Indian Army so inept and suffering from losses as the Maharaja’s forces were doing. The only difference that could be considered as favourable in contrast to 1947 was that the infiltrators were professional soldiers rather than unruly raiders. How much was that to be a difference against another professional army with vast resources and hold in the region was to be seen by both sides.
It was effectively planned that individual infiltrators of the force would enter Srinagar and politically activate the people and would secure increased participation by the local people in their activities. On 10th August, the main Force reached western outskirts of the city however the force was unable to take any action since the Force had been discovered by the Indian Army and they were ready to secure the city. It is also important to note that the infiltrators failed in gathering massive support even from Anti-Indian elements who simply did not want to create a military situation that would result in chaos and suffering. Salahuddin found the populace to be hostile to them and the aforementioned parties not cooperative. India was not sleeping during this time as by 5th August they had discovered evidence of infiltration although to the scale that was the event, they were still ignorant, however General Harbakhsh stated in his work,
“……. Towards the evening (8th August) reports trickled in of a large number of infiltrators in the suburbs of Srinagar. A sizeable batch was reported in village Qasha Biru NM 6404, and it was indicated that they were moving towards the Srinagar Airfield- our most sensitive target in the valley. A company of 8 J and K militia, two tank troops and one rifle troop of Central India Horse were, therefore, immediately deployed for the protection of the airfield…………The City was quite when I arrived. There at about 1300 hours on 9th August 1965 after a third attempt to cross the clouded ZOJILA. The streets were deserted and there were visible signs of anxiety and tension on the faces of the residents peering through their windows. By the time however, the whole 2/9 GORKHA RIFLES had arrived in the Valley and were suitably deployed in the city……..”[8]
Despite the failure of the Salahuddin Force, Azad Kashmir radio, operating from Muzaffarabad reported that on the evening of 8th August it had monitored transmissions from a radio station located within IHK which called itself Sada-i-Kashmir (Voice of Kashmir) and the said transmission had declared that the people had risen up against the oppression and had formed a Revolutionary Council. The channel proclaimed the beginning of the war of liberation and announced that the National Government has been formed as well however it did neither mentioned under whom this government was formed and where its members. The radio station also did not mention the members of the Revolutionary Council. The radio station announced the declaration of the council which held that armed struggle will continue until all occupants are expelled from our land, our leaders are freed and that the will of the people is allowed to determine the future of this land. Now interesting to note here is that while the station had identified the Council as Muslims and the plans only expected the Muslim community to revolt, the larger tone was non-religious so as to present to the International Community that the movement was nationalistic and in line with the anti-colonial movements rather than religiously oriented or fundamentalist movement. The broadcast also stated that Kashmir was sold to India in 1947 and that events of sacrilege had happened by the Indian government and forces and individuals were living under the shadow of bayonets and guns and in contrast to Indian sources claim at that time, no proclamation of Jihad was made within the announcement as it would have given it a religious spin which Pakistan wanted to avoid for presenting the Kashmir case to the International community. For further legitimacy the call also emphasized that the armed struggle was not against the people of India but against the illegal occupation of the Indian government and Indian army as well as their local supporters. The Revolutionary Council also appealed to South Indians, Sikhs and Rajputs to assist the legitimate Kashmiri struggle. This was largely to create an image of a hindi speaking center that wants to oppress the rest of India and this center was inherently intolerant of others within India however it was clear that this concept of Hindu State oppressive to not only one region but to several was an official image that Pakistan would portray of India and Pakistan had hoped that this would be received sympathetically amongst other Indian Groups especially since on 2nd August of 1965, the Sikh leader Master Tara Singh demanded for the creation of a Punjabi speaking province within India and Pakistan had hoped that the Sikh movement would be rejuvenated with all the trouble within Kashmir, placing even more pressure on India. However it is important to note that the roles of Sikhs and South Indians never came up during the making and executing of the Operation and it was clear that Pakistan only expected Kashmiri Muslims to rise in revolt. It is heavily likely that the inclusion of the Sikhs was merely for International ammunition since South India was also mentioned despite the fact that South India was peaceful yet during this period the language divisions and the north and south divide was apparent within India and to display to the world that India is a divided and weakened nation. The inclusion of Rajputs could be similar to this so as to demoralize the large section of Rajputs within the Indian Army. It is also important to note that another language group could have been highlighted but weren’t and those were Bengalis but that could be a conscious omission since Pakistan’s own Bengali province was in a state of a mess and under ethnic tensions and any declaration of Bengali movement within India to the International community would have brought serious limelight to the troubles of East Pakistan. Finally the proclamation slammed the people of Pakistan for not having done enough to assist the Kashmiris and were invited to rectify this historical wrong by taking up arms and supporting the armed resistance. Azad Kashmir nor Gilgit Baltistan were not mentioned espite the fact that there was dissatisfaction within those regions as well and further declared that all agreements between India and the IHK were null and void so as the Instrument of Accession was also not a factor anymore and declared itself as the sole and legal government within IHK.
It was clear that the speech looked to have been written in large rooms upon shiny tables by suited men rather than determined guerrillas within the darkness of a conflict zone citing leaders and support base so it is safe to say that Mr. Bhutto was involved in the drafting of this speech and how it looked to cover all the diplomatic bases rather than a call to arms for the people of Kashmir on both sides of the border and this is another interesting omission. Any localized insurgency looking to fight such an oppressor would call upon their Kashmiri brethren from across the border to join and support the struggle and pick up arms especially when those brethren had already done so before yet the call for support was absolutely silent on Azad Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan. It is clear that Pakistan did not want to ruffle any feathers regarding their own held Kashmir especially considering the fact that not a decade ago they had suppress a serious revolt by the hero of Azad Kashmir, Sardar Ibrahim.
Post the announcement, India immediately replied stating that the Radio Station was based within Pakistan and that the frequencies were registered in Pakistan’s name with the International Frequency Registration board.[9] Unfortunately the work of Altaf Gauhar confirms that this was indeed the case as he states that on the morning of 8th August, he was approached by the Military Intelligence Director, Brigadier Irshad, apologizing that they had not given him the 24 hour notice that he was promised and they urgently needed a Transmitter. Gauhar told him that none were available and thus the Voice of Kashmir had to be broadcasted using the same frequency as the Azad Kashmir Radio which was the Pakistani government run radio within Azad Kashmir. India discovered this connection quite soon and they wasted no time to publically highlight this blunder highlighting to their own populace how Pakistan had invaded India and broke the Ceasefire agreement, displaying to the International Community that Pakistan was the aggressor thus weakening any stance, moral or legal, for Pakistan to take and gave the impression within the circles of Pakistan that the ground situation was not going well and Operation Gibraltar was in serious danger as plan after plan was falling apart. Everything that could go wrong, was going wrong and it was clear that if Gibraltar was to mimic Kutch then it looked more like the battle of Sardar Post rather than the Battle of Bets only this time, india was not as absent. For Brigadier Irshad the day would not get any better as All India Radio Broadcasted interviews of Four prisoners captured by Indian Forces and they spoke in great detail regarding the operation. Gauhar states that Irshad, when presented with the summary of the broadcast, stated,
“Oh my God, the bastards have spilt the beans..”[10]
What wasn’t broadcasted was that the among the prisoners were two officers who gave detailed account of Gibraltar on the radio but also possessed a number of documents that revealed the entire plot of the massive infiltration and when it was hatched leading to shock and horror within the Indian Forces. The Voice of Kashmir on 13th August claimed that the infiltrators had sealed off Sringar from the surrounding country side by cutting off twelve roads invluding three major arteries being the ones leading to Jammu, Baramula and Leh. As we will observed within the Military section of the study that this was clearly not the case at all and while the Salahuddin Force was a major headache for the Indian Army and involved in many incidents second only to the Ghaznavi Force within Rajauri under Major Malik[11], it was also clear that by 13th August they were feeling the pressure and as their base in Khag Forest was raided and the burning of Baramula, it was clear that by 13th August the Salahuddin Force had lost control and by 18th, they started to retreat back to Azad Kashmir. While the force did not achieve their main objectives, they also didn’t suffer major losses as highlighted within the Military Section. India reported ambush incidents such as the ambush 40 mile to the west of Srinagar which resulted in death of 10 police men and Nimmo confirms reports of attacks on the bridges of Baramula on the night of 7th august, and at Kargil on 10th August as well as on the Srinagar-Leh road where an Indian convoy was attached as late as on 1st September.[12]
However it is clear that the Majority of Kashmiri Muslims and the Anti-Indian leadership ignored the call and did not rise up to help the infiltrators contrary to the expectations of the Kashmir Committee and while it could be argued that they had received neither any request nor any intelligence of this infiltration and were expected to cooperate with stranger invaders masquerading as locals, it is clear that the Gibraltar Force was abandoned by the locals and minute incidents of support to the forces is were clearly the exception rather than the norm and the only sector that truly stood out was Rajauri. The British Military Review noted.
“…the inhabitants of the Valley, noted more for the beauty of their women rather than the martial prowess of their men, did not revolt…”[13]
Clearly the above quotation is blinded by the old British concept of Martial Races, Same race a few miles across and within the state itself took up arms in 1947 to separate Southern Azad Kashmir and regions of IHK with many serving in WWII. Altaf Gauhar has a more realistic outlook regarding this matter as he states that Pakistan lacked local intelligence and relied heavily preconception and stereotypes and this limitation was demonstrated when it was realized in contrast to a prepared and ready to revolt population, the Forces found a frightened and hostile population who distrusted the strangers in local garb and felt that they were bringing forth war upon their land. As Ayub had said to the Kashmir Committee in February as to under whose authority was the committee bringing war upon this country, perhaps the people of IHK also felt it needed to ask as to under whose authority was a foreign power like Pakistan bringing death, destruction, war, conflict and insurgency to the Valley. It is also important to understand that only 18 years had passed since the 1947 conflict and many individuals were well aware of the brutal nature of infiltrators as had been the case with the Raiders of Kashmir. Distrust was rampant and the fact that they did not know whether these Gibraltar Force was professional soldiers or trained raiders looking to plunder, was a serious intelligence overlook that Pakistan was to pay for dearly. It is important to highlight these factors when looking into the reasons as to why the locals did not rise up or trust Pakistan. On top of it all, the individuals werent even organic and for the movements within Kashmir for independence, it was clear that this half-hearted effort would only result in an Indian crackdown which would be largely felt by the locals and the Anti-Indian parties operating within IHK. Pakistan’s diplomatic ammunition depended greatly on a localized movement and uprising and the element of legitimacy to Gibraltar demanded that the people rise up in revolt since Pakistan had repeatedly continued the stance that the people of Kashmir were rising against Indian tyranny. Absent the revolt, Pakistan now found itself in a difficult situation as nobody within the International community believed the story of local revolt and Pakistan having no hand in the matter. The Diplomatic denial was met with skepticism and annoyance and gave Pakistan an image of an aggressor that had willfully destroyed the peace of South Asia for their own gain and brought more conflict to the International Stage. Infact it had the opposite effect and India found itself as the more sympathetic party as it repeatedly shouted within the International stage that Pakistan was bringing conflict to Kashmir. Pakistan had enjoyed more diplomatic support regarding Kashmir since 1947 and had escaped harsher measures and UN condemnation of the 1947 raiders but it seemed that Pakistan was now losing that Moral high ground that it had once enjoyed. By 30th August, Nimmo had presented his report on the events within IHK and the CFL and the report contained that of the 23 violations within 5th August and 30th august, 19 were committed by Pakistan and 4 were committed by India and noted that Indian violations had only started in retaliation to Pakistani violations as their incidents covered the period between 14th August and 24th August. U Thant’s Report to the Security Council, which contained all these reports, was presented on 3rd September but Pakistani Government objected to its public release and thus the report was not publicized till 6th September 1965.[14]
[1] Ibid the cited works of Altaf Gauhar, General Musa and Gulzar Ahmed, all are unanimous on this.
[2] Ibid Gulzar Ahmed
[3] General Akhtar Malik, Letter to his brother.
[4] News Report in The Hindu 5th August 1965
[5] Times of India 9th August 1965
[6] Dawn News Report 13th August 1965
[7] S/6651, Part 1 para 9 quoted by Wright
[8] Lt. Gen Harbakhsh Singh, War dispatched- the Indo Pak Conflict 1965
[9] Kashmir Answers Pakistan, Government of India
[10] Ibid Ref Gauhar
[11] Major Malik started his military career within the British India Army and was captured by the Japanese Army during the occupation of Singapore in WWII and became part of the Japanese Army as he received special training wherein he would later on he became part of the Azad Hind Revolutionary Force under Subas Chandre Bose and commanded the 2nd INA Guerilla Battalion during the battle of Imphal and was taken prisoner and brought to trial for treason. (Smith, James INA Operations in SouthEast Asia World War II He was freed post partition of British India and was invited to join the Pakistan Army and he became part of Azad Kashmir Regular Force which would then be reconstituted into the Azad Kashmir Regiment. He led the force at Rajouri Sector and controlled and was able to operate easily in a wide area of over 500 Square Miles and was able to formulate quite a resistance. While Indian sources contest his control, he was largely in power in the region and welcomes the UN Observers who landed at Rajouri to monitor the Ceasefire yet after Tashkent Declaration, he was ordered to retreat and return much to the chagrin of the said major and the disappointment of the locals. He was awarded Tamgha-e-Basalat Sitar-e-Jurat by Ayub Khan and declared as King of Rajouri but was unable to escape the distrust that all INA soldiers faced on both sides of the border.
[12] S/6651, Part II quoted by wright)
[13] British Military Review of the Indo-Pakistan conflict May 1966
[14] Second Report of the UN Security General dated 03-09-1965 cited within the Indian Official History
. I already have saiyans previous book in my collection.
