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OPERATION GIBRALTAR PART 3


As highlighted beforehand that the military victory at Kutch as well as the successful British Mediation provided Pakistan with the confidence that the plan of action, even if not 100%, contained a high degree of success rate that could bear fruits for Pakistan in regards to Kashmir and was a gamble that Pakistan should take and should take immediately as the plan stated that there was little risk and a lot of gain. The Plan also highlighted that the objective was not just military along with internal and external pressure to India but was also to de-freeze the Kashmir issue and for this was Operation Grand slam. General Akhtar had taken great care and planning towards this operation and the soundness of the planning on paper was recognized by the Indian Army as well, and he envisaged that Gibraltar alone was not enough and would never succeed in driving India to the negotiating table and Grand Slam was the necessary and natural second part of the operation to create real pressure on India and push them back.

During the briefing, Grand Slam was presented as a plan for an armoured thrust by the 12th Division across CFL to Akhnur which was a critical supply position from India to Srinagar. The first draft of the plan was presented to Ayub as a limited push across the Chamb-Jurian line towards the town of Uri however the town would not be taken and akhnur would be threatened creating great pressure over India absent any occupation of of major towns or strategic locations which would corner India to either suffer great humiliation or retaliate. An International crisis would be created and India would be under great pressure at the table and would forever feel the knife at it’s most strategic location thus forcing India to make concessions. It was at this moment that Ayub pointed to Akhnur and asked, “But why don’t you go for the jugular?” and this has been confirmed by all sources cited that it was Ayub who wanted Grand slam to include the occupation of Akhnur. Military speaking occupation of Akhnur was a fine strategic move as the Akhnur sector was essential for Indian supply line in Srinagar and if Pakistan could hold Akhnur till the coming of winter then it could seriously build pressure on the Indian forces as any counterattack would be difficult if not impossible and supply to Indian forces within Kashmir would be constrained, allowing Pakistan to expand on the tactical objectives by crossing CFL against an isolated and demoralized enemy that was struggling with resupply. General Akhtar answered Ayub that his plan was the most realistic with the recourses sanctioned for the operation and Ayub answered that he will have all the resources he wants for the operation, both men and money.[1] The Operation was now much larger in a single stroke but the problem was that the occupation and threatening of the Major Indian Supply line to the Kashmir Valley was not properly discussed afterwards and while the 12th Division did issue multiple enemy reaction studies, as can be observed within the military section of this study, neither the Committee discussed the impact of a thrust to capture Akhnur nor how this would be seen within the International community nor on whether India would retaliate and how it would retaliate to expand the conflict and stem the advancing Pakistan Army? This would be seen with the after-effects of the operation and the diplomatic backlash that Pakistan suffered as well as the graveness of Indian retaliation. There was a clear need to reconsider the operation and reevaluate the situation especially in terms of defensive operations to Indian incursions both on the CFL and along the IB. It was clear that with Akhnur in the equation, it would be less about a battle of attrition and more of a contest between two militaries.

Altaf Gauhar highlights that on 24th July, he met Ayub Khan and by then Ayub was convinced that Kashmir would only be solved with a Military solution and believed in said solution as when he met the President in the Cabinet office, he was told that a “Great deal will depend on the propaganda front” and then left the meeting before Gauhar could ask for more details and Bhutto then took the chair and dramatically and in fashion of Bhutto, gave an emotional speech wherein he stated that the people of Kashmir were locked in a struggle for Life and Death and Pakistan would not be forgiven in this world or the next if it remained an idle spectator. Gauhar was then asked by the Director Military Intelligence to provide him two Kashmiri speaking broadcasters for radio broadcasts and was told that he would be given 24 hours notice before the curtain would be raised and the act to begin. The stage was now set. The 12th Division was in full preparation with the limited time and resourced within their disposal. The home front now needed to be prepared for the International Community to take action. On 17th May, Ayub officially gave the green light for the commencement and preparation of the operations and General Akhtar Malik sent a notifications to all sector commanders which has been reproduced within the military section of the study as well as the preparations and planning of Gibraltar and how infiltration teams were to infiltrate and act within IHK. On 13th July the final plans were presented before Ayub and General Musa and were approved and 7th August was fixed for the date of the Operation.[2]

Now the issue regarding whether any political and intelligence groundwork was done to prepare the local population remains a controversial issue yet the facts on ground as well as the facts in front of us tell us that there were serious political failures and intelligence deficiencies and the general perception was that no ground work was needed as the population was ready to burst into revolt and take up arms against the Indian Army and whatever match stick that needed to burn Kashmir, was going to be provided with the Operation. It is clear that the Pakistani leadership and political and intelligence apparatus did not even inform elements within Kashmir that Pakistan was to take action. Both sides blame each other for this failure however it is clear that the lack of proper information network and ground work preparation especially considering the grand and expansive operation that was expected to be executed by the men of Operation Gibraltar is evidence of the naïve approach of the Kashmir committee and it would be one that would cost Operation Gibraltar dearly. Nobody has been able to provide a proper answer as to why no groundwork was done before Operation Gibraltar apart from two reasons. First that the operation was to be secret and informing local elements would have leaked the details of the Operation causing India to counter when the Operation itself relied on element of surprise and largely ignorance of the Indian Intelligence. Second is the fact that groundwork required months if not years of preparation and considering the fact that the driving force behind such haste of the Operation was the perception that Pakistan only had a window until 1967, time nor resources could be wasted on creating proper intelligence network, local resistance groups, charismatic leaders and communication networks to pave the way for an infiltration force. General Akhtar Amlik took responsibility of this failure in his letter to his brother wherein he stated,

“Not informing Pro-Pak elements before launching Gibraltar was a command decision and it was mine. The aim of the operation was to defreeze the Kashmir issue, raise it from its moribound state and bring it to the notice of the world. To achieve this aim the first phase of the operation was vital i.e to effect undetected infiltration of thousands across the CFL. I was not willing to compromise this in any event. And the whole operation could be made stillborn by just one double agent.”[3]

Valid reasons and clear military thinking but the objectives expected from the Operation were in contradiction to this as the Force was surely neither expected nor equipped to deal with the Indian Army whilst galvanizing a confused population absent any resource support. It was clear that the operation in place favoured small time infiltration raids and pockets of resistance till Grand Slam after which the infiltrators would have to return. The objective regarding International intervention demanded longtime operational capability and proper guerrilla networks for which neither the Operation was suited for nor there was any groundwork for such. It was clear that the Operational objectives and strategic objectives did not align as the forces would have to move many miles through mountainous terrain to reach their allotted areas which was an unknown region for them and they were unknown to the populace.

The 12th Division started to station the forces near the border on 24th July and the infiltration was a complete success which speaks volumes of the failure of Indian intelligence. The political apparatus within India was also clueless that on 3rd August a press conference was held at Srinagar by Indian Defense Minister Chavan, after a three day inspection of the Indian Positions at Kargil and Uri Sector of the CFL. Chavan was completely unaware despite the fact that large number of Gibraltar forces had infiltrated by now and he declared that he was returning to Delhi with a sense of happiness and confidence in the Indian security forces in defending CFL. He stated that he was completely satisfied with the Indian security measures and that the number of Pakistani violations had greatly decreased since the Kutch Ceasefire Agreement has been signed.[4] Whether this was boasting to justify the Kutch Agreement since Shastri was facing severe pressure within the Indian parliament regarding Kutch as it was seen as an Indian defeat and surrender of territory to an aggressor or whether he actually believed his statement. Either way, the Indian Army and government were clueless at this stage. Whilst movements had begun since 24th July as stated within the Military portion of the study, on paper the official date was 7th August which was amended to 5th August.

Now on the General Harbaksh as well as Dr. Manekar both state that Indian army had received reports of training of infiltrators but action was taken as these reports were declared unreliable and there was a general perception within the Indian Army that Pakistan will not take any action that will risk an all out war especially due to the Indian Military doctrine centered around Operation Riddle which would come to play later on. Indian reports state that on the night of 5th August an Indian patrol was attacked by a group of approximately 70 men at a point 8000 yeards from the CFL in the Galuti sector of Jammu. On the same night on the northern slopes of the Pir Panjal range near Gulmarg, a hill station eight mountainous miles from the CFL and 23 miles west of Srinagar, there was a second clash. The Home Minister of IHK, D.P.Dhar visited Gulmerg area and concluded that the men who had clashed with the Indian patrol had crossed CFL from Azad Kashmir and immediately passed this information to Delhi and the news died down right there since the Central Government felt that the Kashmiri government was exaggerating common small time clashes and simply sensationalizing as on 9th August protests were to take place anyhow. The Kashmiri government was a lot more worried as the government tried to impress upon the Central government on the seriousness of the situation as Sadiq, the Chief Minister of IHK, flew back to Srinagar on 8th August with Indira Gandhi and the central government was till not impressed and only an exchange of fire within five miles of Srinagar forced the Central government to airlift armed Police into the region. By 5th August the Indian army was also getting repeated reports of infiltrators and armed strangers being witnessed moving around and trying to incite the population. On 8th August, an emergency meetings of the Indian Central Cabinet was held and the Indian spokesman informed the public of India that since 5th August there had been extensive infiltration of armed men from Azad Kashmir and this infiltration was not just from CFL but also from the International Border which India regarded between West Pakistan and Indian Kashmir and the purpose of these individuals was to carry out acts of sabotage and disturbances in Indian Kashmir.[5]

The Pakistani government was ready for this as the pre-planned propaganda was immediately launched as Bhutto declared that the people of Kashmir had faced great atrocities at the hands of the Indian Army and under such suffering and cruelty, had been driven to the only thing that could be expected of the victim to do and that was to rebel against the Indian repression and tyranny and their action is to be understood by the world and history to be their legitimate struggle and fight for freedom which was taking place all over Asia and Africa. This was wholly indigenous and Pakistan had nothing to do with this uprising.[6]

Unfortunately the local political and intelligence aspects weren’t the only sector where Pakistan was found wanting as the diplomatic legwork was also non-existent and it is fair to say that the Indian account was more widely believed despite the considerable diplomatic difference between Pakistan and India and the situation was not helped when the UN Observers on the ground quickly informed the UN Secretary General, U Thant, that the Indian version was more or less accurate. Lt. General Nimmo, the Chief Military Observer UNMOGIP reported to U Thant that a large scale infiltration of armed men from Azad Kashmir was underway and the Indian complaints which started after 6th August, were credible and accurate to the ground realities. U Thant conveyed to the Pakistan Ambassador to the United Nations, Syed Amjad Ali, on 9th August regarding these reports and his “very serious concerns regarding the situation that was developing in Kashmir……involving the crossing of the CFL from the Pakistani side by the numbers of armed men and their attacks on Indian Military positions on the Indian side of the line…..”[7]

IHK government expected the coming days to be filled with protestas on 8th August, situation was expected to be tense at Srinagar since processions were to be carried out throughout the city in honour of the Kashmiri Saint, Syed Abdul Qadir Gilani also known as Pir Dastagir Sahib and the following day was the 12th anniversary of the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah from premiership of the state. It is possible that these dates played a significant role in the planning of the operation but it is highly unlikely that they had anything to do with the operational implementation of Gibraltar since infiltrations had begun well in advance however the local Anti-India front composed of the HRAC, the plebiscite front and the Awami Action Committee all called for a general shutter down strike and many kashmiris within Srinagar had carried out protest in defiance of the ban on public meetings. By 9th August, the HRAC had expanded these protests to urban areas of the valley however there is little evidence to suggest that Pakistan or the Pakistani intelligence had anything to do with these disturbances and considering the fact that General Akhtar Malik and the committee valued secrecy for the Operation, it is even more unlikely that this expansion of protest had any involvement of Pakistan. It seems that this was local based. Now among the forces sent in Operation Gibraltar, the most crucial element was given to Salahuddin Force and whilst I have highlighted the military difficulties that were faced by the Force and how they struggled and eventually failed in their objectives, I will highlight the political objectives of the Force. Apart from military sabotage, Salahuddin Force was given the task of preparing Srinagar for a revolt and through the flames of the city, declare the sector as separate. They had planned to infiltrate Srinagar with a large number of villagers coming into the city and they would pockets of squads that would launch multiple prong attacks to seize the radio station and the government secretariat during the protests. They would then expand and secure Srinagar under the guise of charged and violent protests and thus Srinagar would be isolated to prevent or hinder Indian movement. Two targets were recognized as top priority with the Airport and the Srinagar-Jammu road as the forces to the north-east and south-west would cut this road and the force would take control of the Airport thus the Indian movement and response would be greatly crippled. With the completion of these objectives, the Salahuddin Force would immediately establish a revolutionary council similar to how it was done in 1947 with the Azad Government, and the council was to create an emergency national government which would be composed of members of the Anti-Indian parties. The revolutionary council would determine immediate steps to undertake the revolt within the Kashmir valley and create an Azad Force composed of local elements which would then help the Gibraltar forces in expanding and securing their hold within the valley. The national government would declare itself as the legitimate government of the people and formally appeal for recognition and assistance from all countries including and especially Pakistan and similar to 1947, Pakistan would recognize said government and provide resources for the national government and the revolutionary council which would keep the Gibraltar forces supplied and fuel the insurgency as well as land both a political and military blow to India and with Operation Grand Slam, the rope around Kashmir could only tightened. It is quite interesting to note the similarities between Operation Gibraltar and the 1947 Kashmir war which also witnessed similar political implementation by Pakistan and the Azad Forces and infiltration by Pakistan to fuel the fire that was to be led by the Azad Forces except here the Azad Forces did not exist as there was neither any leader like Sardar Ibrahim within Kashmir nor was there any ongoing insurgency like in 1947 which had been a brutal and continuous affair between the Maharaja of Kashmir and the Muslim Conference nor was the Indian Army so inept and suffering from losses as the Maharaja’s forces were doing. The only difference that could be considered as favourable in contrast to 1947 was that the infiltrators were professional soldiers rather than unruly raiders. How much was that to be a difference against another professional army with vast resources and hold in the region was to be seen by both sides.

It was effectively planned that individual infiltrators of the force would enter Srinagar and politically activate the people and would secure increased participation by the local people in their activities. On 10th August, the main Force reached western outskirts of the city however the force was unable to take any action since the Force had been discovered by the Indian Army and they were ready to secure the city. It is also important to note that the infiltrators failed in gathering massive support even from Anti-Indian elements who simply did not want to create a military situation that would result in chaos and suffering. Salahuddin found the populace to be hostile to them and the aforementioned parties not cooperative. India was not sleeping during this time as by 5th August they had discovered evidence of infiltration although to the scale that was the event, they were still ignorant, however General Harbakhsh stated in his work,

“……. Towards the evening (8th August) reports trickled in of a large number of infiltrators in the suburbs of Srinagar. A sizeable batch was reported in village Qasha Biru NM 6404, and it was indicated that they were moving towards the Srinagar Airfield- our most sensitive target in the valley. A company of 8 J and K militia, two tank troops and one rifle troop of Central India Horse were, therefore, immediately deployed for the protection of the airfield…………The City was quite when I arrived. There at about 1300 hours on 9th August 1965 after a third attempt to cross the clouded ZOJILA. The streets were deserted and there were visible signs of anxiety and tension on the faces of the residents peering through their windows. By the time however, the whole 2/9 GORKHA RIFLES had arrived in the Valley and were suitably deployed in the city……..”[8]

Despite the failure of the Salahuddin Force, Azad Kashmir radio, operating from Muzaffarabad reported that on the evening of 8th August it had monitored transmissions from a radio station located within IHK which called itself Sada-i-Kashmir (Voice of Kashmir) and the said transmission had declared that the people had risen up against the oppression and had formed a Revolutionary Council. The channel proclaimed the beginning of the war of liberation and announced that the National Government has been formed as well however it did neither mentioned under whom this government was formed and where its members. The radio station also did not mention the members of the Revolutionary Council. The radio station announced the declaration of the council which held that armed struggle will continue until all occupants are expelled from our land, our leaders are freed and that the will of the people is allowed to determine the future of this land. Now interesting to note here is that while the station had identified the Council as Muslims and the plans only expected the Muslim community to revolt, the larger tone was non-religious so as to present to the International Community that the movement was nationalistic and in line with the anti-colonial movements rather than religiously oriented or fundamentalist movement. The broadcast also stated that Kashmir was sold to India in 1947 and that events of sacrilege had happened by the Indian government and forces and individuals were living under the shadow of bayonets and guns and in contrast to Indian sources claim at that time, no proclamation of Jihad was made within the announcement as it would have given it a religious spin which Pakistan wanted to avoid for presenting the Kashmir case to the International community. For further legitimacy the call also emphasized that the armed struggle was not against the people of India but against the illegal occupation of the Indian government and Indian army as well as their local supporters. The Revolutionary Council also appealed to South Indians, Sikhs and Rajputs to assist the legitimate Kashmiri struggle. This was largely to create an image of a hindi speaking center that wants to oppress the rest of India and this center was inherently intolerant of others within India however it was clear that this concept of Hindu State oppressive to not only one region but to several was an official image that Pakistan would portray of India and Pakistan had hoped that this would be received sympathetically amongst other Indian Groups especially since on 2nd August of 1965, the Sikh leader Master Tara Singh demanded for the creation of a Punjabi speaking province within India and Pakistan had hoped that the Sikh movement would be rejuvenated with all the trouble within Kashmir, placing even more pressure on India. However it is important to note that the roles of Sikhs and South Indians never came up during the making and executing of the Operation and it was clear that Pakistan only expected Kashmiri Muslims to rise in revolt. It is heavily likely that the inclusion of the Sikhs was merely for International ammunition since South India was also mentioned despite the fact that South India was peaceful yet during this period the language divisions and the north and south divide was apparent within India and to display to the world that India is a divided and weakened nation. The inclusion of Rajputs could be similar to this so as to demoralize the large section of Rajputs within the Indian Army. It is also important to note that another language group could have been highlighted but weren’t and those were Bengalis but that could be a conscious omission since Pakistan’s own Bengali province was in a state of a mess and under ethnic tensions and any declaration of Bengali movement within India to the International community would have brought serious limelight to the troubles of East Pakistan. Finally the proclamation slammed the people of Pakistan for not having done enough to assist the Kashmiris and were invited to rectify this historical wrong by taking up arms and supporting the armed resistance. Azad Kashmir nor Gilgit Baltistan were not mentioned espite the fact that there was dissatisfaction within those regions as well and further declared that all agreements between India and the IHK were null and void so as the Instrument of Accession was also not a factor anymore and declared itself as the sole and legal government within IHK.

It was clear that the speech looked to have been written in large rooms upon shiny tables by suited men rather than determined guerrillas within the darkness of a conflict zone citing leaders and support base so it is safe to say that Mr. Bhutto was involved in the drafting of this speech and how it looked to cover all the diplomatic bases rather than a call to arms for the people of Kashmir on both sides of the border and this is another interesting omission. Any localized insurgency looking to fight such an oppressor would call upon their Kashmiri brethren from across the border to join and support the struggle and pick up arms especially when those brethren had already done so before yet the call for support was absolutely silent on Azad Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan. It is clear that Pakistan did not want to ruffle any feathers regarding their own held Kashmir especially considering the fact that not a decade ago they had suppress a serious revolt by the hero of Azad Kashmir, Sardar Ibrahim.

Post the announcement, India immediately replied stating that the Radio Station was based within Pakistan and that the frequencies were registered in Pakistan’s name with the International Frequency Registration board.[9] Unfortunately the work of Altaf Gauhar confirms that this was indeed the case as he states that on the morning of 8th August, he was approached by the Military Intelligence Director, Brigadier Irshad, apologizing that they had not given him the 24 hour notice that he was promised and they urgently needed a Transmitter. Gauhar told him that none were available and thus the Voice of Kashmir had to be broadcasted using the same frequency as the Azad Kashmir Radio which was the Pakistani government run radio within Azad Kashmir. India discovered this connection quite soon and they wasted no time to publically highlight this blunder highlighting to their own populace how Pakistan had invaded India and broke the Ceasefire agreement, displaying to the International Community that Pakistan was the aggressor thus weakening any stance, moral or legal, for Pakistan to take and gave the impression within the circles of Pakistan that the ground situation was not going well and Operation Gibraltar was in serious danger as plan after plan was falling apart. Everything that could go wrong, was going wrong and it was clear that if Gibraltar was to mimic Kutch then it looked more like the battle of Sardar Post rather than the Battle of Bets only this time, india was not as absent. For Brigadier Irshad the day would not get any better as All India Radio Broadcasted interviews of Four prisoners captured by Indian Forces and they spoke in great detail regarding the operation. Gauhar states that Irshad, when presented with the summary of the broadcast, stated,

“Oh my God, the bastards have spilt the beans..”[10]

What wasn’t broadcasted was that the among the prisoners were two officers who gave detailed account of Gibraltar on the radio but also possessed a number of documents that revealed the entire plot of the massive infiltration and when it was hatched leading to shock and horror within the Indian Forces. The Voice of Kashmir on 13th August claimed that the infiltrators had sealed off Sringar from the surrounding country side by cutting off twelve roads invluding three major arteries being the ones leading to Jammu, Baramula and Leh. As we will observed within the Military section of the study that this was clearly not the case at all and while the Salahuddin Force was a major headache for the Indian Army and involved in many incidents second only to the Ghaznavi Force within Rajauri under Major Malik[11], it was also clear that by 13th August they were feeling the pressure and as their base in Khag Forest was raided and the burning of Baramula, it was clear that by 13th August the Salahuddin Force had lost control and by 18th, they started to retreat back to Azad Kashmir. While the force did not achieve their main objectives, they also didn’t suffer major losses as highlighted within the Military Section. India reported ambush incidents such as the ambush 40 mile to the west of Srinagar which resulted in death of 10 police men and Nimmo confirms reports of attacks on the bridges of Baramula on the night of 7th august, and at Kargil on 10th August as well as on the Srinagar-Leh road where an Indian convoy was attached as late as on 1st September.[12]

However it is clear that the Majority of Kashmiri Muslims and the Anti-Indian leadership ignored the call and did not rise up to help the infiltrators contrary to the expectations of the Kashmir Committee and while it could be argued that they had received neither any request nor any intelligence of this infiltration and were expected to cooperate with stranger invaders masquerading as locals, it is clear that the Gibraltar Force was abandoned by the locals and minute incidents of support to the forces is were clearly the exception rather than the norm and the only sector that truly stood out was Rajauri. The British Military Review noted.

“…the inhabitants of the Valley, noted more for the beauty of their women rather than the martial prowess of their men, did not revolt…”[13]

Clearly the above quotation is blinded by the old British concept of Martial Races, Same race a few miles across and within the state itself took up arms in 1947 to separate Southern Azad Kashmir and regions of IHK with many serving in WWII. Altaf Gauhar has a more realistic outlook regarding this matter as he states that Pakistan lacked local intelligence and relied heavily preconception and stereotypes and this limitation was demonstrated when it was realized in contrast to a prepared and ready to revolt population, the Forces found a frightened and hostile population who distrusted the strangers in local garb and felt that they were bringing forth war upon their land. As Ayub had said to the Kashmir Committee in February as to under whose authority was the committee bringing war upon this country, perhaps the people of IHK also felt it needed to ask as to under whose authority was a foreign power like Pakistan bringing death, destruction, war, conflict and insurgency to the Valley. It is also important to understand that only 18 years had passed since the 1947 conflict and many individuals were well aware of the brutal nature of infiltrators as had been the case with the Raiders of Kashmir. Distrust was rampant and the fact that they did not know whether these Gibraltar Force was professional soldiers or trained raiders looking to plunder, was a serious intelligence overlook that Pakistan was to pay for dearly. It is important to highlight these factors when looking into the reasons as to why the locals did not rise up or trust Pakistan. On top of it all, the individuals werent even organic and for the movements within Kashmir for independence, it was clear that this half-hearted effort would only result in an Indian crackdown which would be largely felt by the locals and the Anti-Indian parties operating within IHK. Pakistan’s diplomatic ammunition depended greatly on a localized movement and uprising and the element of legitimacy to Gibraltar demanded that the people rise up in revolt since Pakistan had repeatedly continued the stance that the people of Kashmir were rising against Indian tyranny. Absent the revolt, Pakistan now found itself in a difficult situation as nobody within the International community believed the story of local revolt and Pakistan having no hand in the matter. The Diplomatic denial was met with skepticism and annoyance and gave Pakistan an image of an aggressor that had willfully destroyed the peace of South Asia for their own gain and brought more conflict to the International Stage. Infact it had the opposite effect and India found itself as the more sympathetic party as it repeatedly shouted within the International stage that Pakistan was bringing conflict to Kashmir. Pakistan had enjoyed more diplomatic support regarding Kashmir since 1947 and had escaped harsher measures and UN condemnation of the 1947 raiders but it seemed that Pakistan was now losing that Moral high ground that it had once enjoyed. By 30th August, Nimmo had presented his report on the events within IHK and the CFL and the report contained that of the 23 violations within 5th August and 30th august, 19 were committed by Pakistan and 4 were committed by India and noted that Indian violations had only started in retaliation to Pakistani violations as their incidents covered the period between 14th August and 24th August. U Thant’s Report to the Security Council, which contained all these reports, was presented on 3rd September but Pakistani Government objected to its public release and thus the report was not publicized till 6th September 1965.[14]



[1] Ibid the cited works of Altaf Gauhar, General Musa and Gulzar Ahmed, all are unanimous on this.
[2] Ibid Gulzar Ahmed
[3] General Akhtar Malik, Letter to his brother.
[4] News Report in The Hindu 5th August 1965
[5] Times of India 9th August 1965
[6] Dawn News Report 13th August 1965
[7] S/6651, Part 1 para 9 quoted by Wright
[8] Lt. Gen Harbakhsh Singh, War dispatched- the Indo Pak Conflict 1965
[9] Kashmir Answers Pakistan, Government of India
[10] Ibid Ref Gauhar
[11] Major Malik started his military career within the British India Army and was captured by the Japanese Army during the occupation of Singapore in WWII and became part of the Japanese Army as he received special training wherein he would later on he became part of the Azad Hind Revolutionary Force under Subas Chandre Bose and commanded the 2nd INA Guerilla Battalion during the battle of Imphal and was taken prisoner and brought to trial for treason. (Smith, James INA Operations in SouthEast Asia World War II He was freed post partition of British India and was invited to join the Pakistan Army and he became part of Azad Kashmir Regular Force which would then be reconstituted into the Azad Kashmir Regiment. He led the force at Rajouri Sector and controlled and was able to operate easily in a wide area of over 500 Square Miles and was able to formulate quite a resistance. While Indian sources contest his control, he was largely in power in the region and welcomes the UN Observers who landed at Rajouri to monitor the Ceasefire yet after Tashkent Declaration, he was ordered to retreat and return much to the chagrin of the said major and the disappointment of the locals. He was awarded Tamgha-e-Basalat Sitar-e-Jurat by Ayub Khan and declared as King of Rajouri but was unable to escape the distrust that all INA soldiers faced on both sides of the border.

[12] S/6651, Part II quoted by wright)
[13] British Military Review of the Indo-Pakistan conflict May 1966
[14] Second Report of the UN Security General dated 03-09-1965 cited within the Indian Official History
 

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OPERATION GIBRALTAR PART 4


The Indian government had hoped that the infiltration was small time and could be dealt with point to point reactionary operations and there was no need for large scale deployment or operations as Indian forces were already stationed in a large number and the disparity of the troop difference between the Indian forces and the stationed 12th Division gave Indian government the confidence that it could handle anything absent any reinforcement or resource diversion. The IHK information minister. Ali Muhammad Tariq claimed on 10th August that many of the raiders were either killed or captured and others had fled back to Azad Kashmir whereas the Indian Army had encircled the rest [1] and this was largely for domestic consumption as by 10th August the Salahuddin Force was very active and India had only begun to tackle the situation and the Ghaznavi force was wreaking havoc in rajouri. It could also be evidence of the fact that the IHK government wanted to calm the people down and deter any movement or protest or revolt or joining of groups to the Force by stating that the infiltrators had failed and it seems this was the state strategy as on the same day Indira Gandhi had described the situation as serious but under control.[2] By 11th August the government was felt that the initiative had been regained by the Indian Forces and larger military operations could be conducted which included the Khag Forest and the burning of buildings within Baramula and while the Indian government claimed that it had sealed off all the infiltration points at the CFL, it is clear from the Military section of the study that most of the Forces had made it back and while they faced difficulty, they were able to return thus this was another crucial failure on the part of the Indian Forces and their inability to control, secure and dominate the CFL. The government claimed that with the help of the locals and assistance of the armed police, they were confident that they could locate all the infiltrators within the week.[3] On the same day the Indian cabinet decided that for the time being the Indian Army would not cross the CFL in pursuit of the infiltrators or to block the main infiltration attempts which seemed largely a Military decision as it would have been foolish of the Indian Forces to pursuit into Azad Kashmir without first securing IHK and would have handed the initiative to Pakistan which was looking for evidence of Indian Aggression and it would have been the perfect justification to launch Grand Slam. The view point of General Harbakhsh has already been written and he was absolutely against doing anything that could ‘play into the hands of the enemy’ even going as far as to discourage the declaration of Martial Law within IHK despite large scale infiltrations since he did not want to give any advantage to the enemy. In a radio broadcast to the nation, Shastri stated that cleanup operations were in progress whilst the public of India was told to be vigilant, his tone was filled with confidence.[4]

On the other hand, the days for Pakistan were getting harder as the US State Department was repeatedly requesting clarificationof the situation in Kashmir. This resulted in a telegram from Karachi to the State Department on 11th August in which it was revealed that the UNMIGOP Station Commander, Colonel Graham, had informed the American diplomats that it was clear that a sizeable number of non-local, well-armed personal were operating inside IHK and he thought that the number might be as high as one thousand and their objectives were military ones such as bridges and trucks and further stated that the groups of armed men were too well-organized, well-disciplined and well-drilled to have been recent recruits. Pakistan denied all these assertions flatly.[5] However it was clear that the diplomatic limitations were mounting and the promises by the Foreign Ministry of diplomatic support and International ignorance to Pakistan’s blatant infiltration was only hot air. The world was looking at Pakistan in a cold manner and whereas Pakistan had expected that these questions and reports and explanations would have to be provided and answered by India, slowly it was finding itself in the exact spot, Pakistan had hoped to find India in. it was clear that on the diplomatic front, little to no work had been done and while the intelligence matter is understandable considering the limitation of the army and the secrecy of the Operation, the diplomatic failure could not be so easily excused.

During period of 7th August and 22nd August, India revised their estimate of infiltrators as it went from several hundreds to 1200, to approx. 3200 to between 3000 and 4000 and finally to between 4000-5000 still at large whilst 1100 killed or captured.[6] The number of losses is largely exaggerated for domestic consumption as seen in the military section, the number of troops is closer to the real number.

Now the interesting element to notice are the diplomatic exchanges between both sides during this period. During and before the Kutch battles began, great number of diplomatic exchanges had happened however here the number was not so high. It could be due to the fact that the situation was escalating rapidly within a very short period of time whereas Kutch had built up slowly and more naturally. The Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan was Kewal Singh and he was instructed by the Indian Government to call on Ayub regarding the first reports of infiltration and during the call inform Ayub that if Pakistan did not immediately withdraw the infiltrators, it would suffer grave consequences. An appointment was made to meet Ayub however Pakistan needed to buy as much time as possible and wanted to avoid a diplomatic row and answer to tough questions thus the meeting with Ayub, appointed to happen on 10th August, could not happen and was instead met by Bhutto who stated that Pakistan knew nothing of this so called aggression and it was an internal revolt of the people and Pakistan was closely watching the situation and their legitimate struggle against oppression.[7]

Two days later as the diplomatic situation began to look grim, Pakistan launched a declaration as Bhutto stated that India had chosen to close all doors to a peaceful settlement and the integration of the occupied territory, and therefore had only itself to blame.[8] Ayub made a similar speech and stated that it was time for India to recognize that the gravity of the situation and try to bring about an honourable settlement.[9]

Shastri claimed that Pakistan had made a thinly disguised armed attach on India which would be met forcibly, and stated firmly that under the circumstances there was absolutely no scope for talks and he would not even contemplate them.[10] On 14th August Chester Bowles, the US ambassador to India, reported to the state department on the Indian perspective regarding Pakistan’s actions in sending guerrilla fighters into Kashmir and the setting up of a bogus radio station, which had created a very serious situation that may get worse before it gets better. Bowles also said that if Pakistan had hoped that its infiltration and propaganda would lead to an uprising then its intelligence was ‘….woefully inept and planning and operation of this gambit equally so.’ The US defense attaché based in Delhi had recently returned from IHK and was reported to have said that the Kashmiris were in no mood to welcome the Pakistanis as they ‘….never had an appetite for violence and have traditionally feared the Indians.’ Bowles went on to say that the danger now was that either the Indians would be tempted to retaliate and teach Pakistan ‘..a lesson’ especially after Kutch wherein they fought at a disadvantage and lost the battles, or, ‘…Pakistan frustrated by the blatant failure of their ambitious effort will embark on direct military action.’ One thing was assured that US knew how Pakistani Military thought as they predicted the action of Pakistan to the point as Grand Slam was in works and they knew that rather than calling it a loss, Pakistani Military, especially Ayub, would double down rather than face the prospect and humiliation of a military failure, not to mention the International blowback. Bowles further stated that he was doing his best to calm India down and prevent an escalation and recommended that it would be helpful if the US government did not ‘….equate their (India’s) position in this particular affair to that of Pakistan…’ which in plain words was Bowles requesting clear-cut on the table condemnation from the US government of Pakistan’s actions and support or at the very least some understanding if India reacted with military force.[11]

Within India, things were not looking up for the Shastri government. Already perceived and slandered as a weak government and forgiving of Pakistan’s aggression in Kutch, Shastri faced a hostile Lok Sabha, especially when the extent of the Operation was coming to light and the situation looked less like infiltrating batches of guerrillas and more like an invasion force. On 16th August the Lok Sabha was called for an emergency meeting with the opposition vigorously berating Shastri and calling for an end to the Kutch Ceasefire as well as the meeting scheduled between 20th August between the Pakistani and the Indian delegations. Atal Behari Vajpayee, who would one day face the exact issue that Shastri was facing, suggested that India should take an aggressive posture and take out the bases of the infiltrators.[12] Meanwhile 8 no-confidence motions were tabled by the oppositions in which the Indian government was accused of failing in the defence of India which is very interesting and a testament to the Indian democratic system that despite such a serious emergency ongoing and clear threat of a military escalation on the horizon, the Indian constitutional setup was neither disrupted nor the opposition chastised under the excuse of ‘Creating Divisions’. It is also important to highlight that during this meeting, while incumbent government enjoyed a vast majority, no representative of the incumbent government came forward to defend the government as a means to show ‘Unity’ of government. Shastri stood up and announced that while the delegation talks will be cancelled, India will not violate her agreements and step back from the Kutch Agreement. The house voted 269 to 28 for approval of the Kutch Agreement. It was quite a moment for both the Indian people and Indian Army to witness as Shastri had been considered as a weak leader by both internal and external observers who was given the very large task of filling up Nehru’s shoes whilst reviving a Nation. The emergency meeting showed that India was neither leaderless nor rudderless in these hard times.[13] The cancellation was a smart move as there were serious protests ongoing against the actions of Pakistan and any untoward incident by a charged nation in light of a visit by Bhutto would have only made things more difficult for the incumbent government.

As mentioned before, by 14th August, India was gaining ground and felt that they should be more aggressive, not just within IHK but also across the CFL. By 15th August, serious operations were being conducted to cut off the supply lines for the Salahuddin Force as the burning of the house in Batmalu wherein 100 infiltrators had been seen. Weak communication and failure to satisfy military and political objectives and in face of a closing in Indian Army, it was clear to the force that they will only be surrounded, if they remained. India had a much larger forces in the area under the XV Corps commanded by Lt. Gen Kashmir Singh Katoch. By 18th August, Major Mansha, realized that his team can do no more good. He smartly and quite cleverly divided his men into small pockets and squads under appointed leaders who slowly exfiltrated across the CFL some near Kel and others near Rajauri. On 16th August, the Indian 121 Brigade took control of three Pakistani Posts north of Kargil however this was within the limits expected by the Pakistani Army and in context of all the havoc the Gibraltar forces had caused, Indian response was quite conservative.

On 19th August, the US embassy in Pakistan informed the State Department that it was very hard to give any context or measurement or even character of the infiltration but the number was to be revised into several thousand. The US embassy stated that despite Indian claims of minimal support, the infiltrators must have found some level of support to establish arms, drops and operations however it is important to highlight that the US were not aware of what was going on during and after the Operation and how the infiltrators were armed and meant to operation or even when the infiltrators had crossed the CFL. It was clear that India was looking at it from the view of Vietnam at this moment and as it has been confirmed that minimal local support played a crucial role in the failure of Gibraltar.[14]

Putting aside the diplomatic cabal, it was clear that the situation was getting very serious for Pakistan and whilst General Akhtar saw little concern in the Indian Advance, he would highlight that the fall of Akhnur would have forced India to reestablish itself thus allowing Pakistan to regain all the losses[15], the Pakistani government was starting to panic as the prospect of botched operation and loss of territory was too much to bear for a government that had hoped to justify its validity and legality through the Kashmir operations. On 21st August, India expanded their military operations across CFL and attacked three other Posts in the Tithwal area where the Uri-Poonch Bulge is and while India justified this action as a defensive push to threaten the Gibraltar supply lines, the operations focused more on a track that ran along the Neelum valley and linked Muzaffarabad to other towns in Azad Kashmir. The Muzaffarabad-Kel tract was now dominated by the Indian Forces and it was clear that the declaration did not hold all operational planning or the truth as the Indian Forces came dangerously close to threatening the Neelam Valley. Any Grand Slam type operation by India could see Pakistan losing the valley and having to fight to save both Gilgit Baltistan as well as Muzaffarabad. The Indian Army did not stop there as the main infiltrator route was the Haji Pir Pass in the Uri/Poonch bulge and by this time, Operation Gibraltar was nearly wrapped with Rajouri being the only headache for India and whilst it divided the Indian planning and forces, it was not enough to divert Indian focus entirely. The Indian Army was growing in confidence as they crossed the line south of the Uri on the night of 25th/26th August and in a flanking movement, attacked the pass and after some resistance, took the all-important pass on the 28th of August and the fall of this strategic pass shook the subcontinent as Indian Army morale rose and they were able to create an atmosphere that the retaliation would lead to Indian Dominance within the Kashmir issue once and for all. While propaganda would say that, it is clear that on the ground, the Indian capture revealed more weaknesses than strengths for largely the all-important pass was poorly defended and if Pakistan had gotten reinforcements to the pass quickly, courtesy of the lack of manpower due to Operation Gibraltar, then the pass would not have fallen and on top of it all, the Indian Army had allocated much larger resources than needed and they still struggled to quickly take control of the pass. The British Military Review of the war was also not kind to the Indian pace in Haji Pir Pass.

“….the Capture of the pass took four days despite a somewhat half-hearted defense.”[16]

The Indians were also unable to maximize their capture and continued a conservative policy. This fall of the pass also did not worry General Akhtar as he not only felt that it was within their predicted response but also felt that the more resources India spent on the pass, the less they would have for the defense of Grand Slam whose success would make the capture irrelevant and may even force the Indian to abandon the pass. A danger recognized by General Harbakhsh as well in his work about the war. General Akhtar was facing the pressure of a panicked command and a worried low staff as he had to assure Colonel Rafique of Company 2, who repeatedly expressed his fears of defeat and wanted maximum effort to retake the Bedouri Bulge, that everything was according to plan and it was not in his plans to focus all resources for the capture of bedouri bulge and he was willing to sacrifice the bulge for Grand Slam, which would make indian advancement irrelevant. General Akhtar was the only one that was acting like a wartime General, a feat that could not be said of General Musa, who, despite the fact that Gibraltar were exfiltrating back, save for the Ghaznavi force, heard about the fall of the pass, rushed to Bhutto’s residence with a map and demonstrated how the forces were isolated and the operation lost. He screamed as Bhutto,

“..My boys have nothing but stones to fight with.”[17] Which was not true at all. The situation was serious but required a serious and focused command who believed in the military strength of the army as well as the soundness of the plans. The only at that time that had any faith in both was General Akhtar and at this time, it feels that as if he was the only one that was thinking from a Military mind rather than political, interest-driven or a defeatist mindset. Ayub was driven by all three and as the Indian forces looked to dominate the CFL and reestablish its existence as the sole dominant force at the CFL, pressure was mounting for the launch of Grand Slam. The losses at CFL and the failure of the operation had dented the confidence of Ayub who was panicking as he felt that he had only two choices which were to either accept the failure of Gibraltar and call for a Ceasefire with the acceptance of the losses or press ahead to regain ground. At this moment, Ayub Khan also started to feel that his advisors, Bhutto and Akhtar Malik were not sincere and would pin the blame of these failures on him to depose him completely. This lack of trust with Akhtar would make sure that Operation Grand Slam would fail to meet complete objectives. Once again the only person that was focused on the war was General Akhtar Malik and the only one that proved himself to be above many officers on both sides of the border especially on this side of the border.



[1] The Times 13th August 1965
[2] The Times of India 11th August 1965
[3] Times of India 13th August 1965
[4] Lal Bahadur Shastri. When Freedom is menaced
[5] 11th august 1965 POL 32-1 India-Pak, NA Karachi to State Department
[6] Times of India 22nd August 1965
[7] Security Council Official Records, United Nations Department of Public Information, 20th Year 1237th Meeting, 04-09-1965
[8] Dawn 13th August 1965
[9] Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements, Lahore: Muhammad
[10] Ibid Ref Shastri
[11] 14th August 1965, New Delhi to State, India Cables, Vil LBJ
[12] 16th August 1965 Times New India
[13] LSD Debates, Third Series XVLV:1
[14] 19th August 1965, Karachi to State Department, POL 32-1 India-Pak, NA
[15] Ibid Ref Akhtar Malik letter to his brother
[16] Ibid Ref British Military Review
[17] Ibid Ref Gauhar
 

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OPERATION GIBRALTAR PART 5


Operations of Gibraltar



GIBRALTAR Forces were organized into six groups TARIQ, QASIM, KHALID, SALAHUDDIN, GHAZNAVI and BABUR (Map 3). The breakdown of the force employees if the following.

All except the BABUR Force comprised three or more companies. BABUR Force was only a platoon of thirty-four men. Each company of the five main GIBRALTAR groups consisted of three platoons of thirty-four men each and a company headquarters of seven personnel, correspondingly there were five to six officers in each force to command its companies. The force headquarters consisted of fourteen members. The hard core of each of the five main GIBRALTAR Forces twenty men including an officer from the special Group (SSG). Except for some of the company commanders and the SSG personnel, no Pakistani troops were to participate in the operation. Approximately one-third strength of each force taken from battalions of Azad Kashmir Forces and Northern Scouts and the balance as made up from Mujahids activated for this operation. The sector commanders were instructed to give preference to selection of those personnel who had knowledge of IHK. The participants in Operation GIBRALTAR were to operate in civilian attire. All force headquarters were equipped with a long-range wireless set (GRC-9) with which the force commanders were to communicate on the GIBRALTAR command net. The Planning Staff also established a number of relay stations for this purpose. The company commanders were given a wireless set to communicate with the force headquarters. Below the company level, communication was only through messengers. On 4th June 1965, Headquarters 12 Division issued instructions on administrative and logistic planning for GIBRALTAR. The infiltrating troops were given rations for seven days after which they were to live off the enemy. Each rifle was allotted 200 rounds, sten gun rounds, light machine gun 900 rounds, launcher thirty rockets and each man eight grenades. Half of this ammunition was carried on every person while the remainder was to be carried by porters. The forward concentration area of each force was stocked with additional ammunition and rations for subsequent replenishment. Each platoon was given medicines, spare parts of weapons and personnel trained in nursing and weapon repair skills. To ensure the secrecy of Operation GIBRALTAR, ‘watertight' security was maintained. Even those concerned with its preparation were given only essential information. Towards the end of the second week of July Headquarters 12th Division issued six sets of operation instructions, perhaps separately to each commander of the GIBRALTAR Forces. Four out of the six GIBRALTAR Forces were tasked to operate in the Kashmir Valley proper while the objectives Of GHAZNAVI and BABUR lay south of the Pir panjal Range (Map 3). In the words of Lieutenant Colonel waqi uz zaman (GSO-I GIBRALTAR Planning Staff),

"Most of the infiltration routes which were to be taken..... passed above 12000 feet (and) were under snow October onwards till April and in some cases till May.”[1]

TARIQ Force was made up of three companies provided by Number 1 and 4 Sectors. It was to operate in the extreme north of the Kashmir Valley mainly astride Zoji La. Initially concentrated at Bunji, it was to be launched from Gultari through Kaobal Gali where the road from Kanzalwan to Dras crosses over the Great Himalaya Range. Its targets were saboteur such as the bridges at Kulan and Rezan (4 and 6.25 miles east of Gund respectively) which lay on the line of communication Gund—Sonamarg—Zoji La. Its tasks also included the creation of craters in the road through Zoji La, to hold the paass and then expand its control over the area up to Amarnath, Kolahoi (Map 3) and Gagangir (about seven miles from Gund).

Immediately west of TARIQ was the area of QASIM Force which was initially concentrated at Gilgit for training and launched from the general area of Sheikh Bela and Kel (Map 3). It was organized into four companies provided by Number I and 4 Sectors and given the tasks of demolishing bridges at Sonarwain (about two miles north of Bandipura). Woyil. Kangan, Dudarhom (south of Gandarbal) and two culverts on road Bandipura—Gandarbal. After accomplishing its primary task, QASIM Force was to continue operations against suitable targets north of the line Zinyimar—Hazratbal—Nishatbagh (all these places lie on the outskirts of Srinagar) in close liaison with SALAHUDDIN Force.

The operating area of KHALID Force lay west of the Wular Lake. Comprising four companies, contributed by Number l, 3 and 4 Sectors, it was assembled and trained at Batrasi (north of Abbottabad, see Map 1). This force Was launched from the area of Shardi-Dhudnial with the task of destroying bridges at Handwara, Sopur and some culverts on the road Handwara-Kopwara-Batargam (two miles west of Kopwara)-Trahagam. It also to execute a raid on the enemy’s battalion headquarters at Trahagam and brigade headquarters (presumably 268 Brigade) at Darugmul (about 3.5 miles south of Kopwara); destroy the police stations, telegraph and telephone exchanges at Handwara and Sopur, and the power station at Kopwara. After completing the primary tasks. Khalid Force was to expand its operation south of the River Jhelum.

The strongest of the GIBRALTAR Forces was named SALAHUDDIN Force consisting of six companies which were assembled and trained at Mang Bajri (Map 3). Its manpower was drawn from Number 2 and 4 Sectors, and the AKRF elements of 102 Brigade. It was to operate in the main valley in the areas of Baramula, Srinagar, Islamabad, Shupiyan, Pulwama and Gulmarg. Its main task was to isolate Srinagar by demolishing the Banihal Pass Tunnels (in co-operation with GHAZNAVI Force), the bridges at Bijbiara and those over the spill channels on the road Srinagar—pattan. All telephone and telegraph lines radiating from the State capital to the important towns were to be cut and the Srinagar radio station and Pampur transmitting station were to be destroyed. The airfield was to be rendered unserviceable and all aircraft on it destroyed. SALAHUDDIN Force was also to raid several military installations including Headquarters of 19 Division at Baramula and 'render ineffective' Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad, DP Dhar, Maharaja Kiran Singh, (Hari Singh's son), Mir Qasim and GM Sadiq.

The fifth group of GIBRALTAR was GHAZNAVI Force which consisted of five companies raised entirely by Number 3 Sector at Dungi in the Khuiratta valley (Map 3). GHAZNAVI Force was tasked to destroy the bridges at Ramban, Naushahra, Rajauri, and Dhanwa Kot (located on the Cease Fire Line nine miles south-west of Rajauri), raid the Headquarters of 25 Division and 80 Brigade, and destroy several military installations, It was to base itself at Sundartop (the height immediately west of the Banihal Pass referred to as Point 12725) and deny the road Ramban—lslamabad. It was also to assist SALAHUDDIN Force in demolishing the tunnels at Banihal Pass.

The sixth group called BABUR Force consisted of only thirty-four men provided by Number 4 Sector. its mission was to raid Headquarters XV Corps at Udhampur after which it was to inflict maximum damage on the telephone communication radiating om Udhampur (Map 3).

In addition to their primary tasks, all the five major forces of GIBRALTAR were assigned some common tasks such as raiding ammunition and supply dumps, police stations, destruction of telecommunication facilities and power stations, and ambushing military convoys in their respective areas. Having created a shock wave by attacks on the initial targets, the GIBRALTAR Forces were to establish areas of influence inside IHK and expand the operational activity by recruiting, training and fostering local uprisings.



To facilitate GIBRALTAR Forces in penetrating and striking deep into the IHK, another group of infiltrators was organized by General Akhtar which he named NUSRAT Forces. Their task was to contain the enemy forces deployed along the Cease Fire Line. NUSRAT Forces comprised fourteen groups each approximately 350 strong (Map 4). Three groups each were provided by Number l. 2 and 3 Sectors and two each by Number 4 Sector and the Northern Scouts. 102 Brigade provided the fourteenth group. Each group was given a letter of the alphabet as a code name. The task of NUSRAT groups was to infiltrate into IHK a few days before the D Day set for Operation GIBRALTAR, and then harass the enemy holding the Cease Fire Line and prevent employment of the Indian forces in the depth against GIBRALTAR Forces, NUSRAT operations were to commence on 7th August, simultaneously with Operation GIBRALTAR and last about a fortnight. Depending upon the situation they were either to join the GIBRALTAR Forces or return to Azad Kashmir and infiltrate again later. The men selected for GIBRALTAR were divided into three categories according to their aptitude and qualifications and put through six weeks training which began on 1st June 1965.

The NUSRAT Forces got only four weeks for training. During the period of training and before the start of infiltration, General Akhtar Malik visited each camp and addressed the men embarking on a mission whose outcome was momentous for Kashmir. By July, 12 Division was ready to launch GIBRALTAR. On 10th July, a co-ordination conference was held in Headquarters 12 Division in which details regarding tasks, movement, infiltration routes and administration were finalized. Three days later, on 13 July, General Akhtar presented the final plan to President Ayub and General Musa, 7th August was fixed as the D Day. On this day, all the GIBRALTAR Forces were to be in position to strike their targets. In precisely ten weeks General Akhtar had assembled, equipped and trained men, and stocked material for the guerrilla operations. Within this short span of two and a half months, his Planning Staff had issued meticulously prepared instructions which are written proof of remarkable staff work. These instructions included every detail from enemy hypotheses down to the contents of the haversack. But neither General Akhtar's energy nor boldness, nor GIBRALTAR Planning Staff's diligence could transcend the barrier of time as seventeen years of lack of preparation could not be made up suddenly by barely two and a half months of brilliant effort nor could the compounded low morale of the AKRF be boosted through positive but largely small reforms to the Force nor could it force men to fight in extreme hostile ground whilst carrying 17 years of disappointment

In 1965, the Indian XV Corps commanded by Lieutenant General KS Katoch was responsible for the whole of INK (Map 3). It comprised three infantry divisions, one armoured regiment (20 Lancers) and three independent infantry brigades, 6S Infantry Brigade (initially at Jindrah, about seven miles south of Udhampur), 121 Infantry Brigade (Kargil) and 191 Infantry Brigade (Akhnur). XV Corps also had several battalions of second line forces such as Jammu Kashmir (J&K) Militia, Ladakh Scouts and local police. With its headquarters at Leh, 3 Infantry Division was essentially deployed along the border with China. It comprised three brigades; 163 Infantry Brigade was located at Leh with three battalions; 114 and 70 Infantry Brigades were deployed at Dabruk and Gaik respectively. facing the Chinese in Aksai Chin. 114 Infantry Brigade had six battalions while 70 Infantry Brigade consisted of four units. Headquarters 19 Infantry Division was located at Baramula, with 104 Brigade (three battalions) deployed in Tithwal-Tangdhar area: 161 Brigade (three battalions) looking after Uri-Punch and Uri-Rampur approaches and 268 Brigade with its headquarters at Pattan (about five miles from Baramula on the road to Srinagar) and a battalion each at Kopwara, Baramula and Gulmarg. Headquarters 19 Division had two additional battalions. 4 Kumaon located at Bangas (about ten miles south of Panzgam) and 3 Rifles at Kunvalwan (north of Bandjpura and about eightmiles west of Gurais (see Map 3). The area south of the Pir Punjal Range from Punch to Munawwar Gap was entirely 25 Iniantry Division responsibility. It had 93 Brigade at Punch with 120 Brigade located at Galuthi (approximately eleven miles north-east of Rajauri slightly east of the road to Mendhar) with four battalions, and 80 Brigade at Naushahra with four battalions and 80 brigade at Naushahra with four battalions. The area of Munawwar Gap (Chhamb-Akhnur) was held by 191 Infantry Brigade until the advent of Headquarters 10 Division (on 1 September) was directly under Headquarters XV Corps (Map 3).

It would seem that while the planning and preparations for launching Operation GIBRALTAR were under way, 12 Division's troops deployed along the Cease Fire Line kept increasing the pressure on the Indian forces opposite them to condition the foe. According to Lieutenant General Harbakhsh Singh, GOC-in-C Western Command during 1965:

“Incidents of firing and shelling across the Cease Fire Line, large scale intrusions and similar provocative activities rose to the enormous figure of 1800 during the period January to July 1965 as compared to only 522 throughout the previous year. During the months of June and July 1965, the daily firing incidents averaged from six to seven in both, 19 and 25 Infantry Division Sectors. On -301 July, there were as many as six hostile acts in TITHWAL Area alone. A day later, the Pakistanis subjected our post in the NAUSHAHRA Area to intense mortar and medium machine gun fire on three occasions within a period of two hours! The firing incidents were interspersed with a series of intrusions, the scale and frequency of which increased in a geometrical progression day by day, week by week, as the end of July approached. Acts of sabotage and subversion, familiar feature of PAK intrigues in the Valley. touched a new high during July and reached its peak in the first week of August, Specially trained agents and saboteurs were projected into J&K for mass scale subversive activities, in order to generate amongst the populace an atmosphere of despair and despondency with a view to eroding the authority of the civil administration. The resulting situation of lawlessness and disorder, it was hoped. would push the government to the brink of an abyss, ready to topple over with the next stage of large-scale infiltration. There were acts of arson in the towns of PUNCH and SRINAGAR on 3011' June and July respectively, and a large number of houses and shops were razed to the ground. Time bombs were detected 111 public buses. A few were found planted with the obvious intent of assassinating political leaders. An opportunist dissident section the local population, sensing the way the wind would soon blow, contributed their mite in the service of PAK by freely tossing about the word Jehad from public platforms. The ground was being prepared with elaborate care ofr the phase of PAK aggression.[2]



The GIBRALTAR Forces had to walk many miles Of rugged mountainous terrain to reach their points Of infiltration. Therefore, movement to their forward concentration areas started as early as 24th July. During the next three days they infiltrated across the Cease Fire Line making their way to the respective operational bases inside IHK. 12th Division was well equipped with information about terrain and Indian deployments along the Cease Fire Line. The intelligence had been quite successful in this field however it was clear that this would be the limit of the intelligence provided since when the forces crossed the CFL, they found a completely different situation. Thus the GIBRALTAR Forces crossed at every point without detection or suffering any at the hands of the enemy, a remarkable achievement when seen in the light of the fact that the Indian troops occupying the forward areas had been alerted and they were not completely unaware of the preparation going in Azad Kashmir as highlighted by DR Manekar and is reproduced again,

“Srinagar had known about the training centers set up in Pakistan for saboteurs and guerrillas early enough In July the representatives of the Union Home Ministry and of the state Government met at a high-level conference at which the problem was discussed and the conference of the view that Pakistan was not prepared for a large-scale war with India, though sabotage activity by armed guerrillas was anticipated.”

In fact, on I August 1965, the Indian COAS held a preliminary meeting at Srinagar with the commanders of the Indian western Command, and XV corps to discuss the subject of sabotage and guerrilla activity preparatory to a joint civil and military conference scheduled for the next day, 2nd August 1965. Lieutenant General Harbakhsh Singh writes:



“It was our unanimous opinion that the Army was over-extended along the Cease Fire Line and that the police battalions positioned along the border were of an indifferent standard. The Home Guard Organization was intended to give villages in the vicinity of the border the capability to defend themselves. But we felt that this measure was ineffective…..The next day, 2nd August 1965, the Chief of the Army Staff projected the above views to the Civil and Military meeting at SRINAGAR……While we were wrangling leisurely across the table to revitalize our defence arrangements, momentous events were already in the offing across the Cease Fire Line. As is apparent from the tone of the deliberations during the conference on 2nd August 1965 the mounting incidents in J&K appeared to have excited no sense of urgency or apprehension with regard to PAK’s next move. During the last few weeks, vague intelligence reports had been coming in regarding the training of infiltrators by PAK and the possibility of their being inducted into KASIIMIR, But each report gave a different and often contradictory version, That something serious was brewing up across the border, I had no doubt whatsoever. But for want of accurate information, I could not definitely put my finger on its nature, scope or timing. Nevertheless, I thought it prudent to alert my forces in J&K against the possibility of an unexpected action by PAK. That this came about within 48 hours of the 2nd August conference is a tribute to the high standard of PAK's security measures. It is also a poor reflection on our Intelligence organization.”[3]

Ironically, the stumbling block in the execution of Operation GIBRALTAR was also lack of reliable intelligence or technical information about their targets. The intelligence directorates were unable to provide any worthwhile intelligence to 12 Division for the guerrilla operations. Each commander of the GIBRALTAR Forces was given (by Headquarters 12 Division) a few names of collaborators whom they were to contact after infiltration inside Indian Held Kashmir but their reliability was uncertain. In fact none came forth to help the guerrilla forces. Therefore, despite undetected infiltration across the cease Fire Line, all the GIBRALTAR Forces, with the exception of GHAZNAVI, ran into trouble at the very outset of their operations. The Indian authorities received the first news about the presence of infiltrators in IHK on 5th August 1965 when the local Kashmiris of different areas reported the presence of strangers near their villages. The first to be discovered were perhaps men from SALAHUDDIN Force's company near Dara Kassi (about 3-4 miles south-east of Tangmarg), and some elements of NUSRAT Forces in the Mendhar area. An infiltrator of SALAHUDDIN Force caught near Buna Danwas (about four miles south of Gulmarg)

“...revealed the startling information on 5th August, that a large number of intruders had moved in from Bugina to Domari Gali in the Tithwal sector (possibly elements of Groups C, D, or E belonging to NUSRAT Forces). A large influx of infiltrators (possibly QASIM Force) through Atham Gali, a pass situated directly north of Kopwara, was also reported by a civilian.”[4]

The next day (6th August) reports also came from 25 Division of infiltrators sighted in Mendhar, Rajauri and Dewa areas. On 8th August, two officers belonging to AK battalions were captured near Naushahra area from whom the Indians obtained information sufficient to form a reasonable picture of the scale of infiltration and the guerrilla operations already under way. However, except Headquarters 68 Brigade and its 6 Dogra which were moved on 6 August 1965 from Jindrah to Tangmarg, XV Corps had no troops readily available to meet the growing threat posed by Operation GIBRALTAR (Map 4). Lieutenant General Harbakhsh Singh writes:



[1] Lt.Col Waqi Us Zaman Interview in 1978 at Command and staff College, Quetta.
[2] Ibid Ref Gen. Harbakhsh Singh Despatches
[3] Ibid Gen Harbakhsh Despatches
[4] Ibid Gen. Harbakhsh Despatches
 

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OPERATION GIBRALTAR PART 6


“The only troops available in the Valley at the time were four and K Militia Battalions. To reinforce the Valley, I ordered the following troop movements:



(a) 4 SIKH LIGHT INFANTRY from KASAULI AMBALA. The unit was placed at six hours notice for airlift to SRINAGAR.



(b) 2/9 GORKHA RIFLES to SRINAGAR from JAMMU (On account of breaches en route the leading company of the battalion could reach SRINAGAR only by the evening of 8th August 1965).”[1]



Inevitably it took some time before the Indian forces in IHK really became effective. Therefore, the GIBRALTAR Forces did get some headstart. TARIQ Force under Major Sikandar infiltrated from Gultari over the Great Himalaya Range and reached their operational base in Bat Kulan Ganj (Point 14766) which lies north-east of Zoji La and nearly midway between the Cease Fire Line and Zoji La (Map 1). Travelling over heights towering up to 17,000 feet, the force commander soon reported to Murree that many of his men had fallen victim to high altitude sickness. According to Lieutenant Colonel Waqi uz Zaman, on receiving the gloomy reports from Major Sikander about the condition of his men,

“…the GOC got fed up and towards the end of the first week he sent the message (that) if conditions were so bad, then come back! I think this message acted as a spur and he moved onward."[2]

Later, TARIQ Force reported that it had raided a bridge across the River Sind and successfully ambushed road columns in the vicinity of Gund, Sonamarg, Badoab and Badogam (the latter two lie on the Indian side in the Kishanganga valley). An Indian account verifies to some extent the activity Of TARIQ Force:

“The Force infiltrated through Gultari, Marpo La and Kaobal Gali. One of these groups headed for Zoji La and Sonamarg attempted to blow the Hamilton Bridge on the Srinagar-Sonamarg road but did only minor damage to it. They also tried to blow up a cement bridge near Zoji La.[3]

Clearly there was an exaggeration at play here from the TARIQ FORCE and it is clear that despite the botched nature of the bridge attack, Major Sikander wanted some progress to be recorded to escape inquiry on failure. Nevertheless TARIQ Force eventually exfiltrated 011 10 September having suffered ten casualties. QASIM Force commanded by Major Murtaza began infiltration on the night of 29-30 July. Describing Major Murtaza's infiltration, Lieutenant Colonel Waqi uz Zaman said:



“Even though we had given him three routes, he collected his entire force, put them in a single column of 550 men and just marched them across the Cease Fire Line through a ravine, went and established his base wherever he had to. (sic)"[4]



QASIM Force established their base north of Bandipura in a rugged, inaccessible piece of terrain (Map 4). They demolished the bridge at Gandarbal, and attacked others at Woyil, Kangan (on the road to Kargil), and the one near Sonarwain (north of Bandipura). But by the third week of August, the men were near starvation since survival off the land had become impossible. Major Murtaza was determined to stay on and therefore requested Headquarters 12 Division on the wireless for an airborne drop of supplies. In spite of adverse flying conditions over IHK, the PAF flew five sorties during the nights between 21-23rd August delivering sixteen packages; fourteen of these were recovered and QASIM Force managed to stay inside IHK until the third week of September. Then the supplies and ammunition were exhausted. Between the enemy and threat of starvation, QASIM Force roamed the inhospitable terrain without actually dominating the northern part of the Valley as required by the plan. In the fourth week of September when it was neither possible to re-supply them by air nor was there any further necessity for them to stay behind enemy lines due to the 1965 war expanding and their abilities to hurt the enemy was largely restrained, Major Murtaza and his men were ordered to withdraw. Once again Major Murtaza collected his men and exfiltrated in a single line over the same route he had adopted for infiltration. It could be argued that the inability of Major Murtaza to diversify his force and form a three pronged attack in the northern valley as opposed to his strategy of invasion army march and encampment then perhaps he could have been successful after all the entire Operation was meant to be guerrilla in nature hinging upon as many saboteur actions as possible to distract and scatter the enemy forces. It is clear that his insistence on keeping his entire force of 550 men with him not only limited his operational capability but also witnessed fast consumption of supplies which would not have been as bad an issue if he had divided his forces to fulfill the objectives he was allotted. It was another display on how ill-prepared the force was in conducting of guerrilla operations and needed more time not only to understand the dynamics of IHK but also to understand how saboteur war is waged. QASIM suffered sixteen casualties, including five killed.

Major Mehraj Din commanded KHALID Force comprising four companies. It was launched through Shardi and Dhudnial (Map 4). Immediately on crossing the Cease Fire Line, all four company somehow lost wireless contact with their force commander but they continued to move on and did what they could on their own. On 5-6th August, one these companies tasked to raid Trahagam brushed with 4 Kumaon Battalion which was camped pending its move to India. According to the Kumaon Regiment history:

“…..But enemy intentions and the extent of his threat were not yet known; and while these moves were taking place. a farewell party that had been arranged by 8 Kumaon for officers of 4 Kumaon continued. The JCOs of the 4th were also attending a similar function, Half an hour before midnight. the camp and the ammunition dump came under small-arms fire from the Trahagam ridge. Several bullets went over the officers' mess; farewell parties broke up and everyone hurried to his action station. The firing continued for about 30 minutes, though in the dark the enemy were hitting no one..... About 1 a.m. two sepoys of A Company came running to the battalion headquarters. They brought the news that the enemy had attacked the bridge (at Karalpur approximately four miles west of Trahagam) and heavy fighting was going on. C Company were then rushed off under Major Gurbux Singh to deal with the situation. The enemy tried to block the company's advance. Again, D Company were able to help; they kept the enemies' heads down with their light machine-guns. When C Company reached the bridge, they found 11 of the defenders dead, and three ncluding Jemadar Umrao Singh wounded. One of the wounded men, Sepoy Prem Prakash was still gallantly guarding the bridge. There was no sign of the enemy, except for a wounded sepoy from 19 A.K. Battalion. One 65 pound charge was lying unexploded, one small charge had exploded and damaged two planks of the bridge; a third charge was still fitted to the metal frame of the bridge.”[5]





After overcoming the initial shock and surprise, 4 Kumaon was launched to search and destroy the guerrillas. It seems that the Indians had a large measure of success against KHALID Force because its companies were not being controlled by their force headquarters, which had lost contact with them soon after infiltration. However, the total casualties suffered by KHALID Force were not very high; reportedly five were missing, seven wounded and perhaps as many killed, the exact number being unknown. It is another evidence of the fact that Pakistan Army had largely ignored the mistakes and blunders of the Battle of Sardar Post and retained only the positives of the Battle of Bets. Having lost contact with its companies, the force headquarters of KHALID Force had withdrawn to AK where it was reorganized under Major Yaqub of SSG and were sent again into IHK during the second week of September. To continue the Kumaon history:



“On 8 August there were stray encounters the enemy mopping-up operations and a few prisoners were taken. In the early hours of the morning, the base at Naugam (south of Panzgam in Uttar Machipura) had also received enemy's attention, and Lieutenant Colonel Gore (CO 8 Kamaon) moved his battalion there to be able to control the situation more effectively. On the following day, a pursuit force from 4 Kumaon (A Company and a platoon from D Company), under Major Y.S. Bisht, attacked an enemy harbour. It killed two of the enemy captured about six tons of arms, ammunition and stores. Seventy ponies later carried the stuff back to the base. Among the captured material were some secret documents. These proved quite useful revealing the enemy's plan and his cipher code.”[6]

Four days later the Kumaon Regiment were to mourn the death of Colonel Gore at the hands of another band of infiltrators (Group E of NUSRAT Force) led by Major Haq Nawaz Kiani. His loss was devastating for the regiment as they had lost one of the few Indian officers on the ground who took immediate action against GIBRALTAR Force.

The six companies’ strong SALAHUDDIN Force was commanded by Major Mansha Khan who had vast experience and knowledge of the Srinagar valley. Between 24th and 28th July 1965, SALAHUDDIN Force concentrated in the Bedori Bulge near its jump-off point at Hillan, which is located near the junction of Nilkanth Nala and Betar Nala„ approximately 3.5 miles from the Cease Fire Line. The route of infiltration lay over the snow clad Pir Panjal Range but forward movement was kept under 9000 feet heights as far as possible so as to remain below the tree line in order to avoid detection by the Indian forces holding the Cease Fire Line in this area. Major Mansha dispatched a company under Captain Farooq of the SSG to secure the route through Nilkanth Gali (Point 11830). TWO other companies were dispatched through Jamiamauli Gali (Point 13420) presumably to secure the base camp that was to be at Tosha Maidan, a huge plateau southeast of Jamianwali Gali. Descending from the passes of the Pir Panjal Range, Major Mansha discovered a large number of Kashmiri shepherds with their flocks swarming the meadows (called margs locally) on the eastern slopes of the mountains. Arriving on 3rd August at Tosha Maidan which was the Intended base camp of Force, it was found that it had been converted into a field firing range. In fact, on that very day an Indian infantry battalion was actually conducting firing training there. Mansha immediately held a conference and decided to change the location of his base camp and establish it in the thick Khag Forest, lying between and Tosha Maidan. Major Mansha's plan was to infiltrate into Srinagar by mixing with the throng of local people who were expected to be moving towards the city to celebrate the anniversary of Pir Dastagir, which is celebrated on 8th August. However misfortune befell SALAHUDDIN Force before that date as the guides with the force deserted and to make matters worse, on 5th August, a local shepherd discovered the presence of strangers in the nearby glens, which he promptly reported to the police station in Tangmarg. Lieutenant General Harbakhsh Singh writes,

“The infiltration campaign destined to spark off a major conflict between INDIA and PAK had an inauspicious beginning. On 5th August 1965 a youngster, MOHAMMAD DIN while tending his cattle near DARA KASSI in the vicinity of GULMARG (about 3 to 4 miles south-east of Tangmarg), was approached by two armed strangers wearing green salwar kameez uniforms. They solicited his assistance for obtaining certain information in exchange for a bribe of Rs 400. The lad grew suspicious and under the ostensible excuse of complying with their request rushed off to the nearest police station at TANGMARG. Within a short space of time the Army was alerted and a strong patrol was on its way. In the ensuing action the group of infiltrators disintegrated. A few hours later, in an entirely different sector, one WAZIR MOHAMMAD of village DHABROT (about 12 miles north west of Rajauri and a mile off the road to Bhimbar Gali) stumbled upon a few suspicious looking armed men near GALUTHI (about 2 miles south east of Dhabrot) [see Map 4], in MENDHAR Sector, who after profuse conciliatory gestures to win his cooperation, offered him a cash prize for a similar purpose. He too promising the required help, promptly made his way instead to Headquarters 120 Infantry Brigade. (sic)[7]

Major Mansha was slowly discovering that the situation on the ground was quite different from the intelligence report as it was a colossal failure of ground intelligence if their initial location for a base turned out to be the firing range of the enemy and it only got worse as the locals were not only unwilling to aid these suspicious men but were actively informing the enemy of their locations. Mansha had considered attacking the enemy unit on Tosha Maidan but in order not to give away surprise and thereby jeopardize the security of other GIBRALTAR Forces, he sent the information over wireless to Headquarters 12 Division requesting permission to engage the enemy. According to Lieutenant Colonel Waqi us Zaman, a message was received from the commander of SALAHUDDIN Force on the night of 5-6th August saying that his force had been discovered by civilians who appeared to be hostile and that they were likely to report his presence to the local Indian authorities, and that by next morning the Indian Anny could move in against him. Therefore he should be allowed by a certain that very night to ambush or attack the Indian unit that if he were not granted permission by the given time he would not be able to do so without sacrificing valuable time required to cover the long distances to his targets. The wireless message had to be coded and decoded which took time. On receipt of the message, GOC 12 Division immediately gave mansha the permission to act, but by the time Mansha got the permission to go ahead, much time had been lost and it was no longer possible for him to attack the enemy and also continue towards his main objective which would be first of the many instances where the lower command, whether due to military diligence or strictness of the higher command, failed to take initiative. According to instructions issued to all the GIBRALTAR Forces a clash with the enemy was to be avoided only as long as surprise was not lost. When Mansha found that his presence had been detected, he should have acted on his own initiative and dealt with the threat immediately instead of seeking permission from the GOC. The opportunity was lost and ironically the very Indian unit which Major Mansha had sought permission to attack, was on his heels. it is once again highlighted how the force commanders were not ready to lead guerrilla operations as saboteur strikes and guerrilla warfare demands immediate decision making and on-moment strikes and it is these on-moment strikes that changes the very formation of the battle and the scope of the entire war. The fact that they were not informed nor trained to make these decisions would play a critical role in failure of military operations by Pakistan Army. History of Pakistan would be filled with such examples.

Lieutenant Colonel Waqi highlights that with the discovery of SALAHUDDIN Force, the Indians alerted their forces in the entire Valley and thus none of the GIBRALTAR groups was able to benefit from the surprise initially achieved through undetected infiltration which meant that all the forces should have changed and morphed their operational objectives and capabilities with the new environment. Lieutenant General Harbakhsh Singh writes:

“The importance of the above events however, lay not so much in the patriotic instincts of MOHAMMAD DIN and WAZIR MOHAMMAD, or the gallantry displayed by our troops by their prompt reaction but in the early discovery of the raiders on our soil. There is no doubt that the unexpected detection of the 'coups on 5th August 1965 put out of gear the carefully calculated designs of PAK. The news of PAK's elaborate plan for this gigantic venture came to us as a surprise. .... our Intelligence set up had given only vague inklings of what was happening on other side of the hill; of the actual scale and scope of the massive campaign that was to follow. we had no information.”[8]

Major Mansha left one company in the area of Gulmarg and directed the remaining five companies towards their objectives in the vicinity of Srinagar. Captain Zia's company was to raid the Srinagar airfield; the radio station was given to Captain Farooq's company; petrol dumps to Captain Shafti's company and the Punjab Reserve police Headquarters was the target of Captain Hashim’s company. Lieutenant General Harbakhsh Singh describes the initial Indian response:

“…on the afternoon of 8th August, I was sent by the Chief of Army Staff to meet him in JULLUNDUR where he was visiting 16 CAVALRY as Colonel of the regiment. Chief of the Air Staff was also on station on an inspection visit to ADAMPUR. After a discussion of the situation J&K and the likely development of hostilities across the International Border, during which General Officer Commanding Xl corps was also present, the Chief of the Army staff left both the MES Inspection Bungalow and went over to 16 CAVALRY to address the men. Soon afterwards, at 1800 hours, the Defence Secretary rang up from Delhi and asked to speak to the Chief of the Army staff. Upon being told that the Chief was away he said the situation in SRINAGAR city was critical and the J&K Government had requested that the Army should take over the state and declare martial law. He asked for my opinion as the emergency meeting of the Cabinet in session and wished to take a decision on the subject. I pleaded against the proposal of the J&K Government. I argued that by doing so we would be playing into the hands of the enemy. I further assured the Defence Secretary that the situation was not as bad as depicted by the Government and promised to get in touch with the Corps Commander straightaway to ascertain the latest position. On his return the Chief of the Army Staff would be apprised of the situation and asked to speak to the Defence Minster. I immediately got in touch with Lt General K S KATOCH. Corps Commander, on telephone at SRINAGAR and enquired about the latest situation. The Corps Commander informed that although the infiltrators had managed to enter into one of the suburbs of the town of SRINAGAR, their number was not so large and he was waiting for the first company of 2/9 GORKHA RIFLES due to arrive any minute from JAMMU so that he could send the men to clear the area. The rest of the battalion, he mentioned was following behind and should be in by midnight. He felt quite confident of being able to control the situation but requested for some more troops. I promised to fly in as soon as possible 4 SIKH LIGHT INFANTRY which had been, as mentioned above, already assembled at AMBALA Airfield with this object in view. I told him that I would coming to see the situation for myself the next morning by air and further suggested that he should move 163 Infantry Brigade from by road the earliest. The Chief returned after about half an hour and rang up the Defence Minister to tell that he agreed with my advice that the army should NOT take over control of the State. Defence Minister was also that he (the Chief) would discuss with me the measures that should taken to meet the situation. In the discussion that followed between the Chief of Air Staff and myself. I briefed them about the situation in SRINAGAR as told to me by the Corps Commander and requested that arrangements should be made to fly to SRINAGAR 4 SIKH LIGHT INFANTRY from Ambala. This was agreed to by the Chief of the Air Staff who ordered the necessary number of aircrafy to be made available. Towards the evening (8th August), reports trickled in of a large number of infiltrators in the suburbs of SRINAGAR. A sizeable batch was reported in village QASHA BIRU NM 6404 and it was indicated that they were moving towards the SRINAGAR Airfield, our most sensitive target in the Valley. A company of 8 J&K Militia, two tank troops and one rifle troop of Central India Horse were, therefore, immediately deployed for the protection of the air field.[9]

The men of SALAHUDDIN Force roamed far and wide but without meeting significant success anywhere. Mankekar writes,

"The group that headed for Yusmarg spread into Anantnag through Shupiyan and Kulgam and operated in the Anantnag—Achhibal— The airfield was well guarded, Qazigund area.....”[10]

The airfield was well guarded reportedly by a battalion and some tanks. The Banihal Pass was defended by two companies of 3 Kumaon Battalion, A battalion guarded the dumps at Achhibal. Lieutenant General Harbakhsh Singh writes:

“The Chief of the Army staff left JULLUNDUR for DELHI in the morning and I flew to SRINAGAR to see the situation for myself. The city was quiet when I arrived there at about 1300 hours (on 9 August 1965) after a third attempt to cross the clouded ZOJILA. The streets were deserted and there were visible signs of anxiety and tension on the faces of the residents peering through the windows. By that time however, the whole of 2/9 GORKHA RIFLES had arrived in the Valley and were suitably deployed in the city. 4 SIKH LIGHT INFANTRY which was flown from ANIBALA that morning could not reach SRINAGAR due to bad weather and had been deplaned at PATHANKOT. An attempt was to be made to fly them in the next morning. The Corps Commander, with whom I discussed the situation in the city, felt confident enough to handle it with the help of the Gorkhas until the Sikh light infantry arrived…”[11]

As enemy troops rushed into the Srinagar valley, the Indian position began to improve with each passing day,

“…At about midday (10th August) the advance party of 163 Infantry Brigade arrived from LEH by road and two companies of 4 SIKH LIGHT INFANTRY completed their landing at the SRINAGAR airfield. With the arrival of these troops, and as the immediate threat to SRINAGAR had been foiled, 8 J and K Militia was ordered to move to PIR PANJAL with Battalion Headquarters at SHUPIYAN.”[12]

On 13 August, a sympathetic local Kashmiri informed Major Mansha that the Indians were planning to raid his base in the Khag Forest. Major Mansha informed Captain Nisar whom he had left behind with a company to guard the base camp and also strike the targets in Gulmarg area. Captain Nisar too did his job well and sacrificed his life in the process. Captain Nisar served as a commando from the engineer corp and his name is honored at multiple locations within Pakistan such as Nisar Shaheed Road or Nisar Shaheed Park. His name is also written at the SSG HQ Cherat second from the top after Maj Muhammad Sarwar of the Armoured Corps on the Honours roll. He commanded a platoon and unfortunately due to the secrecy of the Operation and the denial of the Pakistani Army later on regarding the said Operation, the heroism of Captain Nisar. In his letter to his wife, Nisar actually highlights the preparation of Gibraltar in the following words,

“My love, on the 3rd of June, 1965 I was assigned to HQ 12 Div on a special duty i.e. to org[anize] and conduct the tr[ainin]g of certain Azad Kashmir soldiers and DAFA-MUJAHIDS. Later I came to know that I am under a new HQ set up for this purpose i.e. HQ L[ine] of C[ontrol] Sub Area Murree and that I will be required to go into Indian Held Kashmir on a m[is]s[io]n to conduct c[omman]do actions and organise Guerilla Warfare with the help of the local there. … Our action commenced on the night 29/30 Jul[y, 19] 65. However, the night for the Raid on targets was appointed on the 7/8 [August] night. The area I was assigned was GULMARG and PATTAN where Brigade Headquarters were located.”[13]

How Captain Nisar died remains a question and a mystery since the war memorials mention him absent details and most individuals of Pakistan, who would have seen his plaque would have thought that his valor was recorded in the defense of Lahore or at tank battles of Sialkot. However two works in the Urdu language do cast a light perhaps as to what happened to him. One is the book by Inayatullah titled “Dou Pullon ki Kahani” translated as “Story of two bridges” and Mahaz e Kashmir, a Memoir by commando alamgir. The tales within are the closest to help us understand as to what happened to the platoon led by Captain Nisar. Now Inyataullah himself is a character as he served the British Army in 1944, Burma Front, was involved in a prison break from the Japanese and then deserted to join the struggle at Malaya. One of Inayatullah’s significant contribution was meeting with soldiers and documenting their stories from the active front immediately after 1965 Indo-Pak war. His stories although exaggerated which is typical to war reportage do provide us with valuable details. One of Inayatullah’s publications of the 1965 war stories was titled ‘Do Puloñ Ki Kahani’. Quite interestingly the story carrying the title of the book is the story of Captain Nisar Ahmed from the Gibraltar Force.

Sometime during 90s Maktaba Al Mukhtar, a publishing house in Rawalpindi printed a memoir penned by one Commando Alamgir, reportedly an officer from Pakistan’s Special Services Group who actually led a platoon, (Initially it could be that he did indeed lead a platoon which was later formed into command over a Company and thus called Nisar’s Company) and fought with the Gibraltar force. The book is the reprinted version of the memoir “Commando Alamgir Ki Kahani” that was first featured in the 1985 Silver Jubilee Number of Urdu Digest and then appeared in the subsequent issues of the monthly. The name Alamgir is a likely nom de plume of the writer who is said to be the son of certain Brigadier Gulzar Ahmed.

Now Inayatullah remained an editor of monthly Sayyara Digest and later started another monthly Hikayat. It is very likely that while writing Dou Pulon Ki Kahani he might have consulted the memoirs published in ‘Urdu Digest’ or Commando Alamgir’s book ‘Operation Gibraltar: Mahaz e Kashmir’. In Inayatullah’s story the details keep getting lost to the verbose narrative and emotional twists. What we do manage to gather are a few names from Captain Nisar’s platoon, Subedar Sher Alam, Neik Muhammad Din and two civilian mujahids Abdul Rehman and Hafiz Ataullah. The platoon was tasked to demolish two bridges in a radius of 3 – 8 miles from their base. We don’t get the names or locations of these bridges from the story but what we do get from the story is that the first bridge was a concrete structure in the vicinity of a supply dump and was guarded by soldiers from a Sikh regiment. The other bridge was a smaller wooden structure. The mission to destroy the former through explosives was successful and a huge explosion also took care of the supply dump close to the bridge. The tactic adopted to destroy the wooden bridge a few days later was simply setting the bridge on fire. This was the mission where we lost both Captain Nisar and Subedar Sher Alam. The civilian mujahids had also embraced shahadat, Abdul Rehman in the explosion on the first bridge and Hafiz Ataullah with his commander in the second mission. The body of Captain Nisar was carried back from the site of the bridge and was later buried somewhere enroute to the base camp. Whilst we may struggle to find source based history within the story, there is an element of authenticity when investigated in light of SALAHUDDIN operations. Coming to the Book by Alamgir. Our man who uses the pseudonym Alamgir, was a Special Services Group Captain (later retired as Brigadier) who led a company as part of Salahuddin Force in Operation Gibraltar. The narrative focuses on the task assigned to Alamgir in organizing raids on Srinagar, the book also gives us a scanty account of Captain Nisar to whom Alamgir refers to as Barey Bhai (elder brother). The main task assigned to Nisar Force was securing the base camp. It was much later in the book, almost during the withdrawal phase that Alamgir came to know of the fate of Nisar and his men. While at the base camp, Nisar got the wind of a Battalion Order Group of Indian outfit assembling in the jungle near village Khag to attack the base camp of SALAHUDDIN Force. In a pre-emptive move Nisar with a raiding party moved out and led the assault on the assembled group. Nisar valiantly led the attack and was killed by machine gun fire from Indian Battalion Commander. The entire raiding party was wiped out less one individual who later narrated the story to Alamgir and mentioned that those killed in action including Nisar were buried in the graveyard of village Khag by the locals. This might be a more accurate depiction and is more true to the events of SALAHUDDIN as indeed the Indian Army was about to raid Khag Village and that is where he is presumed to have embraced Shahadat. The field Diary of Commando Alamgir is another source for the tale of Captain Nisar who was mentioned to be a masterful Tarot reader and a good singer and he lied buried south of Gulmerg in a village named Khag. Her wife is in exile in United States as she was charged for Blasphemy and had to escape for her life which is a tale in its own self. Now why did I go so deep into the tale of one soldier? The answer is because we never found out his story. We celebrate a war hero and the people are not told as to how he died and what feats did he accomplish? His wife was not even told of his death and was informed that he was missing in action, only much later to find out that he had embraced martyrdom all so that the planners of this Operation could escape scrutiny for its failure. His tale and like so many others remain a mystery which is no way to honor our heroes when their tale is left hidden in the darkest corners of the cabinets so that people don’t know what truly conspired in 1965. Within this study, it is to help us understand that the men sent were not mere numbers commissioned in numbers but men of the soil and the state and the command owed them the proper training, supplies and on-ground intelligence and rather than hanging their heads in shame, the top brass decided to blame each other.



[1] Ibid Gen. Harbakhsh Despatches
[2] Ibid Lt Col Waqi uz zaman interview
[3] Ibid Ref DR Manekar
[4] Ibid Lt Col. Waqar uz Zaman Interview
[5] KC Praval Valour Triumphs- A History of the Kumaon Regiment, Thomson Press India, 1976
[6] Ibid History of Kamaon Regiment
[7] Ibid Gen Harbakhsh Singh Despatches
[8] Ibid Gen Harbakhsh Singh Despatches
[9] Ibid Gen Harbakhsh Singh Despatches
[10] Ibid DR Manekar
[11] Ibid Gen Harbakhsh Singh Despatches
[12] Ibid Gen Harbakhsh Singh Despatches
[13] Captain Nisar was married to a widow named shameem and he wrote several letters to her which not only highlighted his love for family and country but also gives us an insight into the days before Gibraltar.
 

Saiyan0321

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OPERATION GIBRALTAR PART 7


Coming back despite loss of surprise, SALAHUDDIN Force did manage to create some impact on the Indian side as DR Manekar records.

“….Of the several groups of Pakistani raiders that infiltrated into Kashmir, the SALAHUDDIN Force, which headed for Srinagar and the Valley, and the GHAZNAVI Force that operated in the Mendhar-Rajauri area have taxed our security authorities the most.... On August 9, they clashed with the Kashmir Armed Police and also attacked and destroyed the Bimna bridge killing a police guard. It was this group (SALAHUDDIN) that was responsible for the many incidents at Baramula, in the Valley, around the city of Srinagar and in Badgom and Yusmarg. Elements of the group penetrated four key suburbs of Srinagar, in the vicinity of the cantonment, the military depots, the army installations. the radio transmitter and the Government Secretariat. Near here was discovered a large ammunition dump secretly built up by their alhes inside the city. They entrenched themselves behind the Tattoo Ground and came out at night to snipe at the police lines.”[1]

On 15 August, the Indian Security Forces burnt down a large number of houses in Batmalu (a section of Srinagar city) which was allegedly used by infiltrators as a sanctuary. The Indians called it an act of arson carried out by the infiltrators because of sheer frustration caused by refusal of the patriotic Kashmir people to co-operate with the guerrillas,

“Headquarters SRI Sector reported that a fire had broken out in Area BATMALU in SRINAGAR, It appeared that the infiltrators having failed in their task at SRINAGAR were indulging in acts of arson. The report further mentioned that approximately 100 infiltrators were seen in area village KHAG and, after a notice of vacation, the village was shelled by us, Fifteen infiltrators were killed during the action.”[2]

While it is true that the GIBRALTAR forces faced a hostile population, there were some who were more receptive and provided information, some gave food, others offered shelter and a small number even came forth to join the ranks of SALAHUDDIN Force but then melted away when the operations of this group failed, Widely dispersed all over the Valley, Mansha struggled to keep a high morale in light of Indian advancement by 18th August. Thereafter, the enemy began to tighten his noose around SALAHUDDIN Force but the companies slipped through the Indian traps, exfiltrating in penny packets on their own. Some emerged near Kel (Farooq and Shafi companies), others opposite Rajauri (Nisar's company) and Mandi (Hashim’s company and remnants of other companies). Major Mansha himself came out near Chakothi. The losses of SALAHUDDIN Force were largely insignificant: three killed including Captain Nisar, fourteen wounded and four taken prisoners. If the literary versions are to be believed then it seems that this count does not take into account the loss of Mujahideen which would explain the numbers highlighted by the Indian sources. We know that Mujahideen were part of the Forces and it seems that the losses recorded largely focused on those of regular soldiers rather than irregulars.

From its base at Dungi in the Khuiratta valley, GHAZNAVI Force commanded by Major Munawar, made its way to Rajauri-Budil area without detection (Map 4). Undoubtedly, the most successful of all the Forces was GHAZNAVI Force. To quote the historyof the Kumaon Regiment,

“…its depredations caused the maximum worry to our security..”[3]

In the words of DR Manekar,

“This group operated in the Mendhar—Rajauri—Chingas— Jhangar area. They signaled their entry with an attack on the ammunition dump in Narian (about six miles north of Naushahra) but were beaten back by our troops.”[4]

One of the companies of GHAZNAVI Force was dispatched to destroy the bridge at Ramban. It had to cover a considerable distance so that when it arrived at its objective on 10th August, instead of the D Day (6 August), it found the bridge heavily guarded. The Indians had already been alerted by the discovery of SALAHUDDIN Force and by GHAZNAVI own exploits. 3 Kumaon Battalion was on its way to Ladakh from India. On arrival at Udhampur on 10 August, Headquarters XV Corps cancelled its move to Ladakh and instead ordered the battalion to join 68 Infantry Brigade at Tangmarg to fight the guerrillas. According to the Kumaon Regiment's history:

“Elements the GHAZNAVI Force were reported to be heading to the bridge at Rambam. This strategic budge on the road was guarded by five policemen at that time. Speed was essential to save it and, Lieutenant Colonel Sinha was ordered to rush one of his companies to Ramban and take the remainder of the battalion to Srinagar. It was 6 p.m by the time the battalion arrived in Udhampur, telling them to follow him at once. The commanding oddicer took the road to Ramban. When he arrived there, he found a crowd gathered near the bridge, it included some civil officials. They told him that the enemy was approaching fast. Just then a truck full of Hindu refugees arrived from Dhamkund, 15 miles west of Ramban, with the news that the enemy was nearing the Dhamkund bridge on the Chenab……The battalion arrived at Ramban around 10:30 that night. A platoon from C Company was then deployed at the bridge and the remainder of the company were ordered to push off to Dhamkund. They arrived just in time to save the bridge there.”[5]

Amidst the activity of the GHAZNAVI Force, the commander of the Indian Western Command, lieutenant General Harbakhsh Singh reached Raiauri see the situation for himself,

“I flew to RAJAURI (Headquarters 25 Infantry Division) in the morning, arriving there at 1100 hours (on 13th August 1965), The General Officer Commanding 25 Infantry Division Major General AMREEK SINGH, gave out on the map and ground the latest situation regarding the infiltration in his area and showed me a large quantity of captured arms and equipment, which included 81 millimeter Rockets, light machine guns and specially prepared demolition charges. After lunch I flew to SRINAGAR (via JAMMU) where the Corps Commander was present and discussed with him the latest situation. he informed me that there had been heavy firing the previous night in the Training Centre Area and BADAMI BAGH Cantonment,”[6]

Having saved the bridges and blocked GHAZNAVI Force's path from the eastern side, the Indians mounted an operation from the west along the road Rajauri—Budil with a battalion group supported by a battery of artillery. According to Lieutenant Colonel Waqi, Major Munawar trapped them in a gorge and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy forcing them to withdraw. This blow to the Indians won Major Munawar and his men the support of the locals of the area. By 18th August, he was in complete control of Budil. According to Lieutenant Colonel Waqi:

“For the rest of the period, he was administering the area. He had his police officials, he had his Tehsildar, he had his own government. The local population was fully supporting him, providing whatever assistance they could. He was operating against the entire Rajauri valley..”[7]

He truly became the king of Rajuari. A large number of local inhabitants of Budil volunteered to join the light for freedom and here the Operation was a complete success and it showed that if the command was better trained,(Major Munawar knew how to fight as a guerilla) and if the locals had risen up then the Indian Army would have been in deep trouble and would have struggled to contain the issue. On Major Munawar’s request a sortie of PAF C-130 Hercules dropped 500 rifles which he distributed among the new recruits. This is corroborated to an extent by an Indian account as well,

“The raiders were milling around this area in considerable strength from the very beginning. By August 18, they got virtual control of Budil. They established their headquarters at Dudaruni, and by Septeunber 7, as many as 1500 raiders were reported to be concentrated in the Dana-Budil area, In this region, the raiders were often supplied by airdrops, and on one occasion they got 500 rifles dropped at Dana. In the first of September a convoy of nearly 100 mules infiltrated and delivered arms and ammunition and other supplies to the groups.."[8]



Controlling a vast area now (500 square miles according to Lieutenant Colonel waqi Zaman which was later to become the bargaining chip in Tashkent for exchange of occupied territory), Munawar organized training of the local volunteers and then let them loose against the Indian occupation forces. It is perhaps for this reason that Indian sources credit GHAZNAVI Force with much more strength than it actually had,

“The men of this group were also sighted at Mohr, where they attacked an Armed Police post and otherwise did considerable damage. Some also got to Arnos and Riasi, and others penetrated as deep as Rambam. Right through the 22 days shooting war between India and Pakistan. a wide region in western and south western Jammu was dominated by the infiltrators. An all-out drive against the raiders in this region could actually he launched only after the cease fire. But a majority the infiltrators managed to retreat to POK during the nights of September 25 and 27.”[9]

By 23 September. GHAZNAVI Force had been ordered to exfiltrate, But Major Munawar protested against the withdrawal arguing that the people of Budil would have to pay a heavy price for their loyalty to his Force. He and his men were ready to stay and fight to the very end. However the orders to withdraw were firm and final. With a heavy heart Major Munawar and men of GHAZNAVI Force began exfiltration by 27 September abandoning those that had taken up arms at the behest of Pakistan against one of the largest army in the world and were now abandoned by Pakistan to the mercy of one of the largest army in the world who had struggled to retake the region for over a month and was in no mood to show mercy. During nearly months in 11-1K, this force lost four killed, sixteen uounded; two were taken prisoners. There no casualties during exfiltration. The Operation was also supported by joined sub-operation codenamed as NUSRAT and the forces called NUSRAT Forces.

Tile orders for planning these operations were contained in the directive issued by Headquarters 12 Division on 17 May 1965. NUISRAT operations were to commence on the day as GIBRALTAR on the record i.e. 7th August. Based on the general concept outlined by General Akhtar, these operations were planned and executed exclusively by the sector commanders. The task of the NUSRAT Forces was essentially fixation of the Indian troops deployed along the Cease Fire Line through harassing attacks. NUSRAT Forces consisted of fourteen groups, each varying in strength tween 100 to 350 strong. A letter of the alphabet designated each of these groups (Map 4). A and B groups were provided by DIG Northern Area: C, D and E Groups were raised by Number 1 Sector: groups F. G and H were provided by Number 2 sector: J, K and L came from Number 3 sector: M and N were provided by Number 4 Sector. Group P the fourteenth group belonged to 102 Brigade. NUSRAT Forces were to operate in the immediate rear of the Indian positions along the Cease Fire Line and their targets being enemy headquarters, military communication centers, gun positions and supply dumps. Where opportunity arose, enemy convoys were to be ambushed and the lines of comtuunication disrupted. NUSRAT operations were expected to last ten to fifteen days and depending on their outcome, the groups were either to merge with the GIBRALTAR Forces operating in their vicinity or exfiltrate to AK.

Groups A and B operated from the Northern Areas. Both groups were drawn from Ghazi Company of SSG and Mujahids. These groups operated in four teams, each comprising twenty-five men including an officer. Each team was armed with rifles, two machine guns, one light mortar (2 inch), and a 3.5 inch rocket launcher. A and B Groups infiltrated on the night of 4-5th August over heights ranging between 17000-18000 feet. Their targets were Indian cantonments at Dras and Murad Bagh (located of west of dras) and disruption of the line of communication between Dras-Kargil-Leh. The first targets they struck were bridges at Tasgatu and Pashkyum (Map 4). An enemy company guarded the bridge at the latter named place. B group commanded by Captain Nasrullah was to attack this bridge on the night of 7-8th August but the rugged terrain took a heavy toll on their stamina and time. Therefore, the group commander decided to rest his men on 8th August. The next day was spent in reconnaissance of the target during which it was discovered that some elements of 3 Indian Infantry Division had passed through towards Srinagar on these very days of 8-9th August. This group executed its raid on the night of 9-10th August considerably damaging the bridge and inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy holding it. B Group exfilrated on 12th August. Meanwhile Group A had headed for the bridge at Tasgam which was about ten miles north-east of Dras. The bridge was guarded by an enemy platoon. The difficult terrain delayed this group too. However, the bridge was successfully raided. The raiding party stealthily approached this target on 18-19th August and penetrated the outer perimeter. Machine guns, light mortars and rocket launcher were quietly positioned and then all the weapons opened up at once. In the confusion that followed among the enemy, the raiders withdrew over the inhospitable mountains whence they had come. Murad Bagh was likewise struck on 4-5th September. The exploits of Groups A and B induced a violent reaction from the Indians. Lieutenant General Harbakhsh Singh writes,

“In 121 Infantry Brigade Sector. the infiltrators were most active during this night. They damaged the bridges at PASHKYUN (south east of KARGIL) and SHAMSHAH (12 miles north east of DRAS on road SRINAGAR—LEH). The SIRU River Valley, dominated by Point 13620, appeared to be the obvious line of ingress. 163 Infantry Brigade en route to the Valley had to be halted at KARGIL until these bridges were repaired. During the halt, the brigade was continuously sniped from PAK posts at Point 13620. SADDLE and BLACK ROCKS. It was apparent that presence of these PAK posts overlooking KARGIL would continue to pose a serious threat to our line of communication in this sector. I, therefore. telephonically sought permission from the Chef of the Army Staff for the capture of these posts. This was accorded on 13th August 1965 and were secured by 121 Infantry Brigade during Night 14th/15th August 1965.”[10]

Groups C, D and E launched by Number I Sector were to operate in the area bounded by the River Jhelum in the south and by Handwara in the east. C and D Groups were tasked to disrupt the road Tangdhar—Handwara and support KHALID Force. Group E was to destroy the bridge and raid a battalion camp at Naugam (about five miles south of Panzgam) and hit administrative installations at Parian Chakla. In the event, C and D Groups did not achieve any Worthwhile results. However, E Group commanded by Major Haq Nawaz Kiani (killed in Lipa action during 1972) was much more successful. This force infiltrated on the night of 5-6th August from Chota Kazi Nag and raided two targets on the night of 7-8th August. E Group then raided the Indian base at Naugam (south of Panzgam), the victims being 8 Kumaon Battalion camped there. Moving all night, Major Kiani and his men struck Naugam at 0630 hours on 13th August and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy which included the commanding officer of 8 Kumaon. Lieutenant Colonel Gore, and three other officers, all of whom were killed. A leaf from the Kumaon Regiment's history describes the action,

“...Supported by 2-inch mortars. Sten guns, Browning machine-guns and 83-mm rockets t it started at 5.30. Lieutenant Colonel Gore was killed within the first five minutes while moving from his mortar position to a forward trench. The raid lasted ten minutes. Within this period 8 Kumaon lost seven men in killed; Major Gopal Singh. a J.C.O. and 18 other ranks were wounded. In 1874 A. T. Company, also located at Naugam, two other ranks were killed and ten wounded. They also lost 77 of their animals. It was a bold raid but also costly to the enemy; he left behind 12 of his dead. That afternoon the enemy attacked the convoy carrying the wounded to hospital, killing three men from Kumaon and two from other units: five other ranks of 8 Kumaon were also wounded. On 14 August another attempt was made on Naugam but 8 Kurnaon repulsed it. That day the seriously wounded were evacuated by helicopter, and the other casualties were sent in a convoy escorted by light tanks of the Central India Horse….”[11]

Lieutenant General Harbakhsh Singh writes,

"Subsequently, the convoy evacuating casualties was ambushed and in the confused fighting that followed we incurred five other ranks killed and five wounded. The enemy toll in comparison was light—only 12 killed throughout the action."[12]

The Indians reacted swiftly by moving two battalions to trap Major Kiani and his men who successfully evaded the enemy and exfiltrated. Group E was later employed to support KHILJI Force (named after the commander of Number I Sector).

Number 2 Sector organized and launched Groups F. G and II. Group F was assigned the mission of raiding an enemy brigade headquarters in Rajnpur, ambushing convoys on road Ranipur-Chotali and severing telephone lines along this road. The group carried out its tasks with some degree of success but the Indian attack on the Bedori Bulge forced it to rejoin the troops in defence. Group G was tasked to operate in the general area of Mandi and Chandak disrupting the communications and ambushing military traffic between Punch and these places. Next to GHAZNAVI Force, this group operated with the greatest degree of success behind the enemy lines:

“A number of clashes were reported in this sector during that serious of them place on the GALI picquet (602)-the gateway into the MANDI Valley. Here the Pakistanis launched four vicious attacks in a determined effort to overrun the post. But 7 SIKH, who were in occupation of this picquet, repulsed all these assaults inflicting severe casualties, Posts 603 and 604 (DODA), also in sector, were repeatedly attacked but in all cases the infiltrators were beaten back with heavy losses.”[13]

Perceiving that the situation was deteriorating rapidly in 25 Division's area, on 8th August 1965, the commander of the Indian Western Command ordered the move of 52 Mountain Brigade from 26 Division.[14] On the night of 8-9th August, Group G struck 3 Rajputana Rifles which was encamped at Amarnath (a mile north of Mandi) killing seventy-one and wounding another fifteen. Emboldened by their success, the men of Group G renewed their pressure on the exhausted enemy troops guarding the approaches to Mandi,

“In the PUNCH area, the gallant defenders of the GALI picquet, now severely depleted in strength and administratively isolated for over a week, abandoned the post in the early hours of the morning. They had put up a brave fight in a tactical situation of great disadvantage, for the post lay in a bowl dominated by heights held by overwhelming hordes of infiltrators. The picquet had been unable to draw any water or to cook food ever since 10th August 1965.”[15]

The following night Group G advanced on Mandi and captured the town by early morning on 10th August. Ihe Indians launched incessant attacks supported by artillery fire over the next three days but in vain. However. the Indian reinforcement arrived and the enemy made a more deliberate effort which paid off as narrated by Lieutenant General Harbakhsh Singh writes,

“In the afternoon of that day (12 August), 8 GRENADIERS with a company of 7 SIKH under command launched attack on MANDI under the overall direction of Headquarter' 52 Mountain Brigade. By the evening, the heights guarding the approach to MANDI were secured and all was set for an assault on this important town the next day……Two companies from 6 DOGRA were moved to CHOR PANJAL Pass, DEVA HARI GALI JAMIANWALI GALI to seal off these ingresses in the PIR PANJAL range. Further south, in the PUNCH Sector, I MADRAS cleared Point killing 12, wounding four and capturing 16 infiltrators. This was followed by the capture Of MANDI 52 Mountain Brigade, And with that the first ray of brightened an otherwise dismal situation prevailing in PUNCH Sector where all semblance of command and control was rapidly slipping through the fingers of the local Brigade Commander for want of initiative and offensive spirit.”[16]

One of the Indian battalions assaulted across the bridge over Mandi Nala in the drive against the infiltrators occupying the town. Group G had kept the bridge intact in the hope of using it but when the situation deteriorated, it could not be destroyed for want of sufficient explosives and was recaptured intact by the enemy. Having lost Mandi, Group G shifted to the area around Surankot, a town southeast of Punch on the road to Chandak-Bhimber Gali. Thereafter it confined its activities to raids and ambushes although on 27th August three more companies reinforced this force. By 9th September, Group G started exfiltrating, completing it by 17th September. Group H carried out raids against the enemy in area Gulpur (situated two miles west of Punch) and Jhalas (about two miles south-west of Punch, on the left bank of the river). The Indian author KC Praval writes,

“In the Punch sector (93 Infantry Brigade), where 14 Kumaon were holding positions around Jhalas, the infiltrators created a good deal of confusion, blowing up bridges, ambushing convoys and occupying tactically important features. They even succeeded in cutting off Punch from Bhimbar Gali for some days..... At Jhalas they made their opening move at midnight August 7/8th with a rocket attack on 14 Kumaon’s base and firing on their company localities with mortars and machine-guns. Thereafter, the shelling of their positions became a daily affair. On 15th August, the battalion lost their quartermaster havildar, he had gone to draw stores from the rear and was killed in an ambush on the Surankot-Bhimbar Gall road. No reserve troops were available to deal With the guerrillas and pickets had to be milked to form parties for combing operations. In one of these, Major GK Sahney and an N.C.O. of the battalion were wounded. Between August and September 24, 14 Kumaon suffered eight casualties due to shelling; three other ranks were killed and wounded.”[17]

Groups J. K and l. belonged to Number 3 Sector. These groups operated in areas of Rajauri, Mendhar and Naushahra. Groups J and K were tasked to destroy enemy camps at Sagar (about six miles of Mendhar on the road to Punch) and Dharamsala (only 500 yards from Mendha, on the northern bank of the River) and dominate road Surankot-Bhimber Gali (Map 4). Group J perhaps undertook the latter task while Group K infiltrated across the Cease Fire Line on the night of 6-7th August and raided the two enemy camps on 9-10th August:

“There was yet another encounter with approximately 100 infiltrators directly south of BALNOI (near the junction of Rivers Punch and Mendhar) during which we recovered two rifles and four grenades. A comparatively minor engagement took place in the BHIMBER GALI area where our troops clashed with about 200 infiltrators and successfully disintegrated the gang.”[18]

Group J then raided Potha Camp. Mistaking the actions of this group for GHAZNAVI Force's activity, the Indian author DR Mankekar wrote in his book,

“This group was also responsible for the incidents in Rajauri, Mendhar, Surankot, Galuthi and Bhimber Gali. Indeed, by the middle of September, this region was swarming with infiltrators who shot at our posts and convoys, raided villages, carried out sabotage activity and clashed with our security forces. One company of this force spread out to Poonch and Mandi."[19]

On I September the enemy attacked Group K in area Shah Sattar during which the group commander who was a junior commissioned officer got wounded. This resulted in disintegration of the group and the men made their way back individually or in small packets. Group L was tasked to raid Dharamsala and Kalsian both in the Naushahra valley but it did not stay behind the enemy lines long enough to accomplish this mission. Infiltrating on the night of 5-6th August, the group raided Bohani (between Naushahra and Jhangar) and exfiltrated on 8th August.

Groups M and N belonged to Number 4 Sector. Their task was to dominate road Chhamb-Akhnur and carry out raids behind the enemy lines in this sector. Group M was assigned raids on Kalal (about five miles due south of Naushahra) and Ding (about six miles south-east of Naushahra) while Group N was to raid Dewa. The former group's raid was partially successful but Group N was counter- attacked by the enemy resulting in some casualties to the infiltrators. Both groups then raided Burejal and Dalla (both places in the Munawwar Gap) with considerable effect on the enemy. General Harbakhsh Singh Writes:,

“….from the CHHAMB area came the depressing news that with the exception of our posts between MOEL and BURFJAL, the remaining picquets guarding the approaches to DEWA had been abandoned. A PAK attempt to blow up the budge at NM 5244 had been foiled-- the bridge was only slightly damaged but remained fit for traffic….”[20]

Eventually, enemy's pressure accompanied by artillery fire forced both groups to exfiltrate on Group P was launched by 102 Infantry Brigade to raid Jaurian and Kalith areas (in the Chhamb sector). This group infiltrated on the night of 7-8th August and raided an ammunition dump at Jaurian on the very night of their infiltration,

“….approximately 30 to 40 infiltrators launched a raid on 369 held Company at JAURIAN camp, using 3 inch Mortars, medium machine guns, light machine guns and rockets, our troops appeared to have been caught off guard and consequence suffered five killed and wounded in casualties. A few vehicles were also damaged. Casualties inflicted on the infiltrators could not be assessed, but it appeared that they got away lightly."[21]

Group P exfiltrated on the night of 12-13th August hitting a police post at Palanwala on their way back.

The Indians resorted to the use of field artillery ostensibly to destroy the bases and hideouts of the guerrillas. The first targets to be shelled in AK territory were the villages of Chanir, opposite Paur, and Koil opposite Moel (all places in the Chhamb sector). The enemy had no fear of retaliation from AK side because there were only six 25-Pounder guns belonging to 81 AK Field Battery in the Bhimber area. Therefore, on request by General Akhtar, a few units of IV Corps Artillery (at that time concentrated at Kharian) were ordered to reply to the Indian shelling. Pakistan artillery responded with devastating accuracy which was to be its chief characteristic during the war of 1965. On the night of 14-15th August, 2 and 39 held Regiments, 28 Medium Regiment and a battery of 10 Medium Regiment moved into pre-selected gun positions on the western Side of the Cease Fire Line in Munawwar Gap area. The counter bombardment was executed through an ingenious plan, Having deployed the guns and his locating deuces. Brigadier Amjad Ali Chaudhry, Commander IV Corps Artillery ordered the 25 Pounders of 81 AK Field Battery to open up on the Indians to draw the fire of the enemy artillery. A passage out of the history of IV Corps Artillery narrates the rest of the action,

“The bombardment started at 0745 hours on 15th August. The original H Hour which was 0600 hours had to be changed due to poor visibility. The fire plan opened with intense and sharp CB on the offending Indian field regiment that had been accurately pinpointed by our sound rangers. The Indian field regiment was attacked with four medium and four field batteries. The air OP, who had been briefed to keep the Indian gunners under fire when they tried to pull out, directed our fire with such telling effect that this Indian regiment never recovered from the punishment it received that morning. An Indian Artillery officer who was captured by us on 2nd September disclosed that the CO of this field regiment was relieved of his command because he fled across Tawi (River) with the debris of his regiment.”[22]

IV Corps Artillery's account corroborated by the history of the Indian Artillery as well,

“On 15 August, the commander 191 Infantry Brigade (Brigadier BF Masters) assembled his orders group in the Mandiala—Dewas area alongside the gun position of a battery of 14 Field Regiment. The remainder of the 14 Field Regiment was on its way to build up on the battery at Mandiala-Dewas. The men of an infantry battalion had collected a little rear of the guns. The B vehicles of the orders group and the battalion transport were parked in the immediate vicinity. All of a sudden, a crescendo of shells landed and burst right on top of the guns and the Brigade Commander's group. The Brigade Commander was killed. The gun position officer lost his life. The men of the infantry battalion and the gunners the gun position scattered. The gun groups of the other two batteries were by then approaching the Mundiala area. They were ordered to deploy in the alternative gun area which had been surveyed previously. The Commanding Officer and the Second-in-Command of 14 field regiment went over to the alternative gun area to oversee the deployment of the guns. As the gunners unhooked the guns from the tractors, the Pakistan artillery opened up on the gun area making it impossible to get into action.”[23]



[1] Ibid DR Manekar
[2] Ibid Gen Harbakhsh Singh Despatches
[3] Ibid KC Praval
[4] Ibid DR Manekar
[5] Ibid KC Praval
[6] Ibid Gen Harbakhsh Singh Despatches
[7] Ibid Lt Col. Waqar uz Zaman Interview
[8] Ibid Dr Manekar
[9] Ibid DR Manekar
[10] Ibid Gen Harbakhsh Singh Despatches
[11] Ibid KC Praval
[12] Ibid Gen Harbakhsh Despatches
[13] Ibid Gen Harbakhsh Despatches
[14] Ibid Gen Harbakhsh Despatches
[15] Ibid Gen Harbakhsh Despatches
[16] Ibid Gen Harbakhsh Despatches
[17] Ibid KC Praval
[18] Ibid Gen Harbakhsh Despatches
[19] Ibid DR Manekar
[20] Ibid Gen Harbakhsh Despatches
[21] Ibid Gen Harbakhsh Despatches
[22] IV Corps Artillery—Chhamb Up To 31st August
[23] History of the Regiment of Artillery---Indian Army, edited by Major General DK Palit, 1972
 

Saiyan0321

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Lieutenant General Ilarbakhsh Singh writes:

“A major tragedy struck the CHHAMB on this day (15 August 1965), Enemy artillery directed by an Air Observation Post shelled our post at DEWA where an artillery ammunition dump was located. A stray shell blew up this dump and inflicted heavy casualties which included personnel from the Brigade Orders Group, Brigadier BF MASTERS, Commander 191 Infantry Brigade Group, was killed and along with him died Major BALRAM, 8 J&K Rifles, captain RK CHAHAR. 2/Lieut NARINDER H 14 Field Regiment, one Junior Commissioned and four other ranks. Two officers and 38 other tanks wounded. Six guns of 14 Field Regiment were tendered of action. PALANWALA post abandoned and line to all the forward units were disrupted. After discussing the situation with General Officer commanding XV Corps on telephone, I directed him to.-

  • Move Brigadier MANMOHAN SINGH, Commander 162 Infantry Brigade under 26 Infantry Division to JAURIAN to take over 191 Infantry
  • Reinforce Infantry with 2 SIKH from 26 Infantry Division
  • Reinforce 191 Infantry Brigade artillery effort with a battery of medium guns from 26 Infantry Division, from a position east of the DAGGER
  • Order Commander 191 Infantry Brigade to recapture lost ground in CHHAMB Area."[1]
Enemy gunners were not the only victims of IV Corps Artillery's wrath. Indian 191 Infantry Brigade, which was responsible for the defence of Munawwar Gap, had been ordered to clear the area of the infiltrators. On 15 August, two companies of 15 Kumaon had been placed under the command of 8 J&K Rifles for the anti-guerrilla operations. According to the Kumaon Regiment's history,

“On 15th August, B Company joined C Company, both were to take part in an operation that was being mounted by 191 Infantry Brigade to drive out the infiltrators who had swarmed into Laleali-Kalidhar area. At 9 a.m. on the following day, while most of the brigade was concentrated in the assembly area, the brigade commander, Brigadier B.F. Master, and his GSO 3 were killed in shelling by the Pakistanis. It was heavy shelling and resulted in considerable loss of equipment. The two companies of 15 Kumaon also lost six men—three killed, three wounded, The operation was called off; subsequently, some of our forward posts were lost.”[2]

After dealing with the enemy guns, IV Corps Artillery switched to Indian fortifications and defence works, All these targets had been carefully analyzed from the artillery point of view well before the guns were deployed. Starting at 1000 hours on 15th August Pakistan artillery fired concentrated salvos at the Indian positions until 1900 hours that evening. The history of Indian Artillery records,

“Pakistan then switched fire on to the picquets along the Cease Fire line, taking them on in succession, two or three posts at a time. Every shell was on target. Taken completely by surprise, some of the posts had to abandoned, so and accurate was the shelling.”[3]



Having caused havoc in the enemy lines, IV Corps artillery quietly moved back to Kharian during the night of 15-16th August 1965. Taking advantage of the chaos caused by the shelling Number 4 sector’s 5 and 19 AK Battalions captured the vacant Indian Positions at Laleali, point 2086 and point 1760 in the Chambh Sector. However all three posts had to be given up three days later when the Indians recovered from their shock and recaptured these posts. All three were vital to the enemy for surveillance of the approach through the Munawar gap.









CONCLUSION



The Operation itself was brilliant in conception and was even recognized by the Indian Forces such as by General Harbakhsh who admitted to as much,

“…the plan infiltration was brilliant in conception.”[4]

And moreover the forces of Gibraltar especially Ghaznavi force and Salahuddin Force did great damage whereas the former met the political and military and saboteur objectives, the latter was able to meet the saboteur objectives. B.M Kaul highlighted in his book that,

“….It took considerable effort to get rid of the administration which the infiltrators had setup there….”[5] Whereas D.R Manekar highlights that throughout the month of September there was great fighting in the area of Western and South-Western Jammu and the Indian troops clearly failed to dislodge the infiltrators therein. This is corroborated by the Military account by General Harbakhsh and General Mahmud Ahmed. Also corroborates this account by stating that the operation tied down 4 Indian Divisions during the pendency of the war. However despite these accolades, largely due to the efforts of the Ghaznavi Force, it is largely agreed upon that the Operation was a failure as a whole and required much longer period of planning, resources provision and ground intelligence network that would have required years of pre-planning. The British Military Review of the war summed up the planning regarding the operation as ‘…calling Heads with a double-headed coin..’ and that Pakistan only saw three situations that either there would be a full scale revolt after which Pakistan would claim that it was an indigenous revolt and that Kashmir had spoken and if there was a partial revolt or a guerrilla war then the prolonged guerrilla war would drain the Indian Army, demoralize the troops and allow Pakistan to convince the world that Kashmir was burning and the third scenario wherein India, exasperated and desperate due to the insurgency would try to launch attacks across the CFL and through this Pakistan would then declare the Indian Army the aggressor, Launch Grand Slam to take down the Indian Supply route to further demoralize and isolate the Indian Army in IHK and watch as the International Community scrambles to prevent an all-out war and pressurize India to solve the Kashmir issue once and for all and for a desperate India to be more pliable during the said talks. Pakistani planners did not consider three major scenarios during the planning. The first being what was Pakistan to do if there was No Revolt as was witnessed. Pakistani infiltrators found a scared and hostile nation not willing to invite disaster upon itself nor willing to trust infiltrators whose previous stint had resulted in looting of Kashmiri Cities by raiders and this was well recorded on both sides of the border. Zahid Chaudhary wrote that the invaders indulged in an orgy of looting, plundering, burning and raping of Jammu and the massacre, most notably, at Baramula continued for 2 to 3 days which resulted in the famous Srinagar Airlift.[6] This was corroborated by eyewitness accounts, intelligence reports and other notable works regarding the matter.[7]It was clear that Pakistan had done little to no ground work to bridge this chasm nor made any effort to correct this wrong, compensate the victims or repatriate the abducted girls. Second scenario that Pakistan failed to consider was the morale of troops in foreign land, completely cut off from their homeland in a hostile land. It was clear that the troop morale of 12th Division was low as highlighted in the military section but a few months of reforms and morale raising was not enough to send these men on such a dangerous and suicidal mission. The Lack of time and preparation was clear and the British Military Review assessed the troops as neither physically fit, prepared as to morale or briefed as to their targets and as the nation they wanted to liberate, turned against them and gave away their positions and the advancing Indian Army, it was clear that proper training was necessary for this operation and high morale was not supposed to be just an asset but a major requirement for this operation. Pakistan clearly did not take into consideration the high level of morale and preparation that was required which stemmed from the inexperience of the Military which had, despite having officers who had served in the WWII, had little experience when it came to planning and executing large scale military operations that could result in wars. The 8th August broadcast of two members of this force giving away all the plans was evidence of this low morale and lack of preparation. The third Scenario that Pakistan did not consider was the Indian willingness to take the fight across the International Border and push Pakistan to a defensive position and suck the steam out of the Pakistani Offensive. It was clear that most of the brass neither wanted nor expected a massive retaliation despite this being highlighted and mentioned yet it seems that Pakistan had turned a blind eye to this and decided to storm ahead with the hope that the International Community would believe all Pakistan would state in contrast to their own intelligence finding which was a serious failure in planning. After the war, the foreign office and the military would play the blame game, but the ultimate responsibility of these weaknesses and failures to consider these scenarios rested with Ayub. Ayub was a not a civilian leader and was a military commander and during Military Rule, it was expected that he would be able to perceive these scenarios. What is even more surprising is that in the presence of insurgency examples like Vietnam and Algeria, present conflicts at that time, Pakistan still felt that it needed no proper groundwork or years long planning to create a proper insurgency network. Operation Gibraltar looked to be a first draft that needed to be reworked and expanded and constantly discussed upon before implementation.

Bhutto would wash his hands off this by stating that he had suggested guerrillas from Azad Kashmir and establishment of a network rather than regular soldiers and stated that ‘Fish in the Water theory was needed’ which is quite contrary to his other statements at that time wherein he repeatedly proposed immediate action by citing how History was to be made and Pakistan only had this opportunity. When Bhutto was asked in an interview that the trained guerrilla would still be non-local as it needed to be trained from the village for this to work with Bhutto answering ‘Maybe’ and then he continues to blame the military that it was their job to know these things.[8] Bhutto’s interview proves what was being discussed in the Kashmir Committee and nothing of proper concrete ground planning but big plans and big expectations. This failure would haunt Pakistan and would forever impact Pakistan’s Kashmir policy and without a doubt, this would make sure that Pakistan would never be able to find neither a military solution nor a diplomatic solution to the Kashmir Issue. The end of the war would cement the Kashmir line and prove Kashmir was partitioned and would remain so till the existence of these two states.



MAPS

MAP 1




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MAP 2







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MAP 3










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MAP 4








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[1] Ibid Gen Harbakhsh Despatches
[2] Ibid KC Praval
[3] Ibid History of Indian Artillery records, DK Palit.
[4] Ibid Gen Harbakhsh Despatches
[5] Confrontation with Pakistan, Delhi, Vikas Publication B.M Kaul
[6] ‘Pakistan ki siyasi Tarikh; 12 Volume by Zahid Chaudhary
[7] Agha Humayun in his work 1947-48 Kashmir War; War of Lost opportunities, highlights the massacre as well as eye witness records such as Reverend Father shanks and Khawaja Abdul Samad as well as the Speech by Sheikh Abdullah at the UN on 5th February 1948 “The raiders came to our land, massacred thousands of people mostly hindus and Sikhs but muslims too, abducted thousands od girls, hindus, sikhs and muslims alike, looted property and almost reached the gates of our summer capital, Srinagar.”
[8] Ibid ref Taseer
 

Saiyan0321

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The above are excerpts from a book i am writing and this is a skeleton. I predict its completion by 2024 and i am basically writing everything that had happened and analyzed the days before September 6 before the lahore front was opened. I have another book to complete which i am hoping to do this year on the legal history of Azad Kashmir.

@Joe Shearer @Nilgiri @T-123456 @Kaptaan @Saithan

Hope you guys enjoy this and i know i have been missing but i have been insanely busy. Hope to be more active and post here and there. :D
 

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The above are excerpts from a book i am writing

Yeah I could tell! Very high quality stuff.

I had time for part 1 and a bit of part 2 for now....rest will be reading material for this weekend.

Most appreciated my friend...and it is great to see you back here.

@TR_123456 did not get tagged right due to name change since....so let me fix that :)
 

TR_123456

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The above are excerpts from a book i am writing and this is a skeleton. I predict its completion by 2024 and i am basically writing everything that had happened and analyzed the days before September 6 before the lahore front was opened. I have another book to complete which i am hoping to do this year on the legal history of Azad Kashmir.

@Joe Shearer @Nilgiri @T-123456 @Kaptaan @Saithan

Hope you guys enjoy this and i know i have been missing but i have been insanely busy. Hope to be more active and post here and there. :D
First i will kick your azz for not saying ''Hi'' every now and then. 🤬 :mad: 🤬 :mad: 🤬 :mad:( very very very angry).
After that,

We were worried about and missed you bro,welcome back!!!!!

@Nilgiri ,i will also read it tomorrow.
 
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Saiyan0321

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Wb we’ve missed you. 😀

Thank you. I missed this place as well. Just got very busy but decided to definitely with routine appear here and post here and there
Yeah I could tell! Very high quality stuff.

I had time for part 1 and a bit of part 2 for now....rest will be reading material for this weekend.

Most appreciated my friend...and it is great to see you back here.

@TR_123456 did not get tagged right due to name change since....so let me fix that :)

Thank you. I think this is a good base to start. I have a few more sources to find and get. Pakistani military writer books are not easy to come. I recently discovered why? Its the number of books. Normally when you publish an edition, you get a thousand at the start and after that thousand, the publishing house then publishes tens of thousands looking at the response. The problem with these books which contain sensitive information is that the military allowed initial publications but discouraged any further printing. Like the General Mahmud book. The one i got initially was for his own private collection and is published by NUST University press which does numbered prints aka 10 copies or 20 copies or 100 copies whereas the old book was done by Oxford printing Publishers Korangi Karachi which dont provide select prints. You either get a 500 print or 1000 print. This makes source hunting within Pakistan very hard. Out of a 1000, 70% of that number is taken by libraries around the world.
First i will kick your azz for not saying ''Hi'' every now and then. 🤬 :mad: 🤬 :mad: 🤬 :mad:( very very very angry).
After that,

We were worried about and missed you bro,welcome back!!!!!

@Nilgiri ,i will also read it tomorrow.

:cry::cry::eek::eek:

I am so sorry for not keeping in touch. Thank you for worrying and i am doing fine, Will be active here and there and wont disappear like i did before. Thank you
 

Saithan

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Very long read, and difficult to follow for people who're not familiar with the history og geography of the area. Are you going to make sketches or have someone make them to show the different plans and moves ?

I'm thinking the small sketches could break the wall of text into smaller paragraphs and segments that could make it easier on the reader. Just something like a whiteboard sketch that shows the moves in 1, 2, 3, 4 go at x and pick up y. :)
 

Saiyan0321

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Very long read, and difficult to follow for people who're not familiar with the history og geography of the area. Are you going to make sketches or have someone make them to show the different plans and moves ?

I'm thinking the small sketches could break the wall of text into smaller paragraphs and segments that could make it easier on the reader. Just something like a whiteboard sketch that shows the moves in 1, 2, 3, 4 go at x and pick up y. :)
yeah i was thinking about making more maps, small time for each force for easier understanding for a layman. The maps i highlighted required alot of know how and not just military. I read the maps with a magnifying glass to truly appreciate the map itself. :D
 

Nilgiri

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I finished up to part 3 for now @Saiyan0321 , it is very interesting read so far...I will give a larger spate of questions and analysis a bit later when I have completed all the parts, hopefully Joe will join us by then too.

This part struck me though (for now):

Secondly, Pakistan must seriously give thought to India's nuclear potential.

I wonder if this was done in any serious way or just brought up for sake of bringing up at the time.

If it was brought up in any serious way, was the reasoning based more on:

1. deterrence format against attacking India at the time (we should not attack a potential/likely nuclear power), but just lost out argument wise among the Generals for whatever reason

or

2. along the line of we should forment trouble, attack and take what we can now before India becomes such?....(in line with the IA conventional force augmentation in response to PRC that would close this overall window of opportunity anyway by ~ 1970)

In hindsight, this has all after all become a huge factor in having such a unresolved problem (of this nature of territorial scale) with the larger trust deficit it has created among nuclear armed neighbours. This has no parallel in the modern world. So I feel whatever the logic and argument that was taken by the Pakistani Generals did not defer enough to the gravity of the issue even at the time....as the eventual actions taken precipitated quite against Pakistan's long term benefit.

In any case let me tag some more folks that might be interested to read your 7 part series (starting in the previous page) along with any of the earlier material you posted.... permitting to their own schedule, and give any thoughts upon it if they are inclined to.

@Gessler @Jackdaws , I have noticed @Paro already was pleased you have returned :)
 

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I finished up to part 3 for now @Saiyan0321 , it is very interesting read so far...I will give a larger spate of questions and analysis a bit later when I have completed all the parts, hopefully Joe will join us by then too.

This part struck me though (for now):



I wonder if this was done in any serious way or just brought up for sake of bringing up at the time.

If it was brought up in any serious way, was the reasoning based more on:

1. deterrence format against attacking India at the time (we should not attack a potential/likely nuclear power), but just lost out argument wise among the Generals for whatever reason

or

2. along the line of we should forment trouble, attack and take what we can now before India becomes such?....(in line with the IA conventional force augmentation in response to PRC that would close this overall window of opportunity anyway by ~ 1970)

In hindsight, this has all after all become a huge factor in having such a unresolved problem (of this nature of territorial scale) with the larger trust deficit it has created among nuclear armed neighbours. This has no parallel in the modern world. So I feel whatever the logic and argument that was taken by the Pakistani Generals did not defer enough to the gravity of the issue even at the time....as the eventual actions taken precipitated quite against Pakistan's long term benefit.

In any case let me tag some more folks that might be interested to read your 7 part series (starting in the previous page) along with any of the earlier material you posted.... permitting to their own schedule, and give any thoughts upon it if they are inclined to.

@Gessler @Jackdaws , I have noticed @Paro already was pleased you have returned :)
I was the first to read it 🙂. I already have saiyans previous book in my collection.
I wonder if this was done in any serious way or just brought up for sake of bringing up at the time.
Americans offered ready made nuclear weapon for detonation in late 1963 early 1964, before the chinese detonated theirs. Nehru initially agreed and a team was sent by the Americans to India or was about to be sent (dont remember) .

But then Nehru backtracked and rejected, probably due to babas confidence that we could make our own without western over watch.

Around the same time Americans with the help of Indian special frontier force who they helped raise and train few years earlier, were placing spy equipment with nuclear batteries deep inside china to monitor Chinese nuclear progress. Paks knew about the American nuclear talks with India.
 
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Nilgiri

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I was the first to read it 🙂. I already have saiyans previous book in my collection.

Americans offered ready made nuclear weapon for detonation in late 1963 early 1964, before the chinese detonated theirs. Nehru initially agreed and a team was sent by the Americans to India or was about to be sent (dont remember) .

But then Nehru backtracked and rejected, probably due to babas confidence that we could make our own without western over watch.

Around the same time Americans with the help of Indian special frontier force who they helped raise and train few years earlier, were placing spy equipment with nuclear batteries deep inside china to monitor Chinese nuclear progress. Paks knew about the American nuclear talks with India.

Beyond the intel Pakistan had on early Indo-US overtures on nuclear weapons, they also had access to the incredible resource that was Abdus Salam.

Salam would have definitely given a strong appraisal on India's capability as he was well versed with both Homi Bhabha's work and expertise....and knew quite well Bhabha's position on Indian WMD development.

I feel this (Bhabha's capacity and drive) also played some part in Nehru feeling his hand was quite strong vis a vis any concessions the US were demanding at the time (in the era of cold war) and Nehru wanting to persevere with non-alignment and of course not knowing the untimely death of Bhabha that would happen a few years later.

Their (Bhaba and Salam) research was closely related by way of especially Paul Dirac's inspiration and mentorship to both (Freeman Dyson of Dyson sphere fame was another of the Dirac branches along with Paul Taunton Matthews and others).

i.e Salam probably communicated to Pak establishment (if he was asked and taken seriously by them upon it) that it was a matter of time (given 1962 war, overall cold war and that Homi Bhabha was still alive in 1965) given the team and program India had set up that was built to be dual purpose if needed.

One can imagine the advice Salam would have given to Pakistani establishment at the time concerning this, given his account here:


Whether they took him seriously or not is another matter though (given he was already running afoul of them on the identity issue and their growing distaste for free thinking heavyweight intellectuals of magnitudes far above their own given the overall threat it could represent to their power/narrative)

Another story concerning Abdus Salam (just as an aside):

An interesting biography that gives greater measure of his interaction with many peers of his time (including Pauli whom he actually came to a conference in Bombay to meet...along with the Swiss CERN conference that Bhaba organised and many other episodes):

 
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Saiyan0321

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Hmmm personally two things. It is quite doubtful that the topic regarding Indian Nuclear Capabilities were given any extended review within the Kashmir Planning Committee. First of all it is important to understand that the entire Kashmir Planning Committee operated in great secrecy and it was greatly discouraged that unnecessary members especially civilians should not be invited to said meetings for any purpose even presentation. We are talking about meetings where naval and airforce officers were not invited to attend because they were not considered to be security minded. There was no way Abdus Salam, A Civilian Scientist would be invited to these meetings to deepen and understand the Indian Nuclear ambitions and capability. Indeed it is entirely possible and far more likelier that the Indian Nuclear program being mentioned was simply placed as an example of why Pakistan should pursue an immediate military solution. It is important to highlight that during the meeting the military men wanted to delay the operations for a year or two. General Musa, in his work, my version highlights that he constantly stated that Pakistan Army was not ready for war and needed to be provided adequate resources for a period of two years to be entirely capable for a war effort. This is also stated within the works by Gul Hassan. Akhtar Malik was also amicable towards a delay of operations till 1966 but it was pressured that operations should be launched as soon as possible. Bhutto was incredibly supportive of an immediate action and repeatedly stated that the impact of Kutch would be lost to us if we delayed any longer. The meeting largely discussed diplomatic impact, local support, terrain and capability and whether India had the capability to wage war for a long period of time. Every individual that had written about the meetings speak nothing of any discussion or presentation regarding India’s Nuclear Capability.

Coming to what @Paro has written. Informative but I heavily doubt that Pakistan had any awareness regarding this dealing between the US and Nehru. First of all it is important to understand that the Infamously capable agency that we see today was not as capable in 1965. Indeed military intelligence came under severe criticism during and post war. The ISI concentrated more on internal rather than external intelligence for the first three decades as the intelligence was seen as a mere branch of the Army and the Martial Law regime which stemmed from the myopic view of early Military minds which saw the Army as the main Military and all other branches meant solely to add to the Army Capabilities such as Artillery and this was especially related to the Airforce which was also seen as an extended branch of the Army.[1] A perusal of history does tell us that this myopic view also extended to the intelligence whose purpose was largely internal affairs as it focused on conducting espionage and disappearances of individuals who were deemed to be against the state or the regime. Gul Hassan Writes

“….these organs are designed to keep a watch on the subversive elements in our society and gather information on our foe; but their entire resources were concentrated upon internal happenings, and those too of no appreciable significance…”[2]

Ayub Khan was largely dissatisfied by the role of the ISI which came into more prominence in 1958. Prior to the creation of the ISI, the Intelligence Bureau (IB) as the sole intelligence agency was already in existence and was primarily a quasi-police organization headed by a senior police officer. The IB's poor performance in the 1947-8 Indo-Pakistan war over Kashmir resulted in the decision to create the ISI with an India-centric focus in 1948. The civilian government in the initial decade of independence depended on the IB for its intelligence inputs. Thereafter with the switch to military rule in 1958, the ISI was on the ascendant largely because the generals preferred to rely on an organisation with a military character rather than a quasi-police outfit. To an extent, the ISI-IB relationship was an extension of the civil-military equation in the country wherein the civil bureaucracy had weakened due to political interference, corruption and lateral entries from the armed forces, besides other sectors.[3] It would not be an exaggeration to state that when the war started there was a complete collapse of the operations of all intelligence agencies, which had been largely devoted to domestic investigative work such as tapping telephone conversations and chasing political suspects. The ISI after the commencement of the 1965 indo-pakistan war, was apparently unable to locate an Indian armored division due to its preoccupation with political affairs. After the war Ayub khan set up a committee headed by general Yahya khan to examine the working of the agencies.[4] The ISI under Yahya was also not capable and Yahya was also expressed disappointment within the Military Intelligence and the intelligence failure was not only noted by General Akhtar Malik, General Musa Khan, General Gul Hassan in 1965 but was repeated by General Kamal Matinuddin, General Tikka Khan, General Niazi, Air Marshal Asghar Khan, brigadier Sidiqque Salik, along with others, all agree that Pakistan was dominated by intelligence failures during that period.

Thereafter the ISI altered its focus with the Russian military entry into Afghanistan and has since evolved a greater external orientation. The ISI was closely involved with the guerilla war against Soviet forces through the 1980s and became the ISI we know and ….well… anyhow ISI evolved a lot under General Zia but its evolutionary process had begun by early 1970s when the army suffered a severe defeat and was forced to surrender their rule and be confined to barracks. It was during this time that its operational capabilities truly grew exponentially as the ISI was counted upon to keep tabs on politicians and create political unrest especially with the way Bhutto was running things from 1972 till 1976.

With the aforementioned in place, I highly doubt that the intelligence agency was able to discover anything related to Indian Nuclear Secrets or even understand capabilities.

We also need to understand the psych of these meetings. During that time, the army had largely become bureaucratic and there was a very bad habit that information was presented to senior officers or at committees without any verification or expansion and was accepted at face value. Gul Hassan sheds some light on this

“Another tendentious habit that became spontaneous in our daily routine was the reporting of any occurrence to our next superior, without even verifying its authenticity. The general idea behind instant reporting was to appear to be vigilant, and secondly to pass the buck on, to absolve oneself, to avert questions that might asked later…”[5]

This was proven within the narration of events by Asghar Khan as he highlighted how the Naval Admiral was replaced because he criticized the Army’s ignorance of Naval Defense and its dire need for more resources. He himself asserted how he was criticized for repeatedly wanting to upgrade the Air Force and to change the thinking of the Army command that the Air Force was not a mere arm of the Army but an extended Military branch that could shape the very field of war.[6]

Indeed the planning committee functioned in a similar fashion of the above as he highlights again,

“… I had raised the question of sounding the leaders on both sides of the line in our Cell meetings. The reply I received from the chairman Aziz Ahmad, was that they would not be averse to our intended enterprise……My question was not answered even in part but as everyone else seemed content with the Chairman’s statement, I decided not to press the issue further”[7]

With the above it is clear what kind of environment was Gibraltar being planned and it is highly doubtful that in this secretive and no question environment, Nuclear India or Abdus Salam was asked to report on the matter at any juncture. At this point, we can conclude that Nuclear Ambitions of India was simply cited as an example of why Pakistan should hurry rather than a topic of discussion on its own.



[1] The First Round by Asghar Khan
[2] Memoirs by Lt Gen Gul Hassan
[3] Cited by The ISI Role in Pakistan's Politics By Dr. Bidanda M. Chengappa, Senior Fellow, IDSA
[4] Pakistan Intelligence, Security Activities and Operations Handbook strategic information and development
International business publication
[5] Ibid Gul Hassan
[6] Ibid First Round Asghar Khan
[7] Ibid Gul Hassan
 

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There have been numerous Dark Moments in our country's short history but nothing compares with what happened on 16th/17th December 1971.
Many books have been written on this subject with each author coming up with his/her reasons for the Debacle.
One such author was Gen. Niazi himself who finally authored a book to clear his name. Whether he did or not only time will tell because todate the ordinary Pakistani remains confused.
After reading Gen.Niazi book it because quite clear to me that the GHQ which was located in the West of the country basically "abandoned " the Eastern Command. The rest is history as we know.
Gen. Niazi visited my father in the early 2000s. They were in the same regiment (5 Punjab) in the mid 50s. Niazi was CO and my father was his 2iC.
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