Yes after the Preveze class, Gür class will undergo mid-life modernization.I'm guessing for Gür Class? Ideas?
Yes after the Preveze class, Gür class will undergo mid-life modernization.I'm guessing for Gür Class? Ideas?
I remember seeing triple launchers and twin launchers on some ships of the same class at different times. Might as well be a peacetime/wartime configuration difference, just like using half the full AShM payload.That opens another can of worms though. Why showcase the twin launcher as standard? We'll probably see it on Istanbul soon and know for certain.
Tactical length could be a challenge, the ship has 2 deck levels (+1~ at the bridge/CC). Total available height from the keel could be limiting.@Anmdt
How feasible is the integration of a tactical level vertical launch system on ships of this class, and how much of a practical advantage can the addition of this capability to the weapon configuration provide within the mission structure of thise missile boats/corvettes?
I mean this doesn't mean S80 is true, but we have been speculating about working with Navantia for MILDEN especially where AIP is involved for a while.
Apparently the news of joint submarine production with the Spanish was true. Navantia officials confirmed the news at the fair. However, the level of cooperation is not yet clear.
Apparently the news of joint submarine production with the Spanish was true. Navantia officials confirmed the news at the fair. However, the level of cooperation is not yet clear.
c4defence:
Aselsan General Manager Akyol said, "Deringöz is about to meet its first customer." Aselsan General Manager Ahmet Akyol stated, "We recently added Aselsan's MARLİN IDA to the inventory of the Turkish Naval Forces. The underwater autonomous version of this vehicle, Deringöz, is now ready to meet its first customer."
Export?
Picture from trhaber:
View attachment 65449
Latest missile corvette Ukraine sank was hit in the same place one after another, they literally tore the ship open with the first and blew the second kamikaze drone in that same space, you can find the video easily.Even if kamikaze boats manage to overcome the self-defense systems of warships while cruising, it is probably impossible for them to make successive contacts from the same point.
That wouldn't be reliable at all, drones can simply manoeuvre away from the barrier and if the barrier far too long for them to get around, it would be far too long/heavy to be thrown into the water. Not to mention it would be chaotic and dangerous as fuck to try to throw something in the water in the hopes that it might stop a drone from hitting.As soon as the attacking boat enters the dangerous distance, a barrier can be thrown into the water from the port or starboard side of the ship, whichever side the engagement is on, and it can be opened.
Yusuf Akbaba shared a nice video and addressed the issue of base security with portable floating barriers that some types can expanding over water by a mechanical system, exactly as the US is trying to do. However, my question is not about port protection.
Can we see a cage system on frigates and destroyers sailing in coastal waters or close to coastal areas? Think like the cage system used in tanks and APCs. Even if kamikaze boats manage to overcome the self-defense systems of warships while cruising, it is probably impossible for them to make successive contacts from the same point. As soon as the attacking boat enters the dangerous distance, a barrier can be thrown into the water from the port or starboard side of the ship, whichever side the engagement is on, and it can be opened. What are your ideas? Is it a Zihni Sinir style idea or would it work? @Anmdt
" Not to mention it would be chaotic and dangerous as fuck to try to throw something in the water in the hopes that it might stop a drone from hitting."Latest missile corvette Ukraine sank was hit in the same place one after another, they literally tore the ship open with the first and blew the second kamikaze drone in that same space, you can find the video easily.
That wouldn't be reliable at all, drones can simply manoeuvre away from the barrier and if the barrier far too long for them to get around, it would be far too long/heavy to be thrown into the water. Not to mention it would be chaotic and dangerous as fuck to try to throw something in the water in the hopes that it might stop a drone from hitting.
Any weight you add to the ship with something like that has to come by taking that weight out from something else. And again, you don't have a guarantee that USV will not just get out of the way, or that the line would be strong enough to explode it. And what are you going to do if there are multiple USV coming one after the net is fired?" Not to mention it would be chaotic and dangerous as fuck to try to throw something in the water in the hopes that it might stop a drone from hitting."
Maybe it isn't bad idea maybe we can use modified floating Tamgec munition (M58 MICLIC) (100m length with 10m width effective area) with delayed and contact activation to create floating explosive barrier . I know it isn't ideal but it can increase survivability of the ship also it is very quick action munition. Also after action it can be detonated.
For example as an application method 6 munition can be fired at same time from one port side 1 back to front, 1 back to back , 1 front to back, 1 front to front , 1 middle to front , 1 middle to back with all of them 80>x>60 degree. Original tamgeç too heavy for this (2800 kg all set) job but it can be lighter. Effective Width can be reduced to 2 m and also net size distance can be defined 70 cm between for each explosive charge . So one set (6 munition) about 3000 kg it can be acceptable for a ship.
M58 MICLIC
The MICLIC system consists of an M353 3½ ton (3,175 kg)[6] or M200A1 2½ ton (2,268 kg) trailer (or M200 tracked trailer) chassis, a launcher assembly, an M147 firing kit, an M58A3 line charge and a 5-inch (127mm) MK22 Mod 4 rocket. The line charge is 350 feet (107 meters) long and contains 5 pounds (2.27 kg) per linear foot of C-4 explosive. In the event a MICLIC fails to detonate normally, it can be manually activated by time-delay fuses every few feet along the length of it.
Yes I don't have a guarantee that USV will not just get out of the way . But this time consuming process for USV . Ship gain some time for self defense with 25mm guns or a missile like Umtas. I'm pretty sure the 5 pounds C-4 line would be strong enough to explode USV look to Russian tanks which hit by drones their charge not too bigger than it. Also my example layout from attack direction create two line defense at intersection enough to stop two USV. You can think that as last chance defense.Any weight you add to the ship with something like that has to come by taking that weight out from something else. And again, you don't have a guarantee that USV will not just get out of the way, or that the line would be strong enough to explode it. And what are you going to do if there are multiple USV coming one after the net is fired?
It would be much simpler and effective to use 25mm guns or a missile like Umtaş or a loitering munition like Alpagut.
Üstad, as I wrote above, my main focus is on whether another layer can be added as an emergency-situation in the defense of main combatants cruising close to coastal areas against asymmetric elements such as kamikaze swarm boats. These unmanned kamikaze boats are probably the biggest asymmetric threat that naval enthusiasts will be thinking about the most in the coming period, and therefore we are likely to see many new approaches even on an experimental scale in the coming period. Although the example I gave may sound a bit absurd, what I actually mean is to create a physical barrier that will prevent the kamikaze from coming into contact with the hull sheet. Therefore, there may be approaches with a very different mechanism in implementation based on same logic.It is logical if we ignore the need to access these ports, not a practical solution, just a protective one. It is like installing cages around a tank going into urban warfare without increasing situational awareness or adding gunshot detection systems. Nor does it provide any protection against UUVs that may use a retractable periscope/SATCOM and pass through.
How deep should these structures be? Is it 2 metres, 3 metres? There is no end to it, and it is impractical to make it go all the way to the bottom with 10-15 metres. Also, once some of them are hit, they will sink and make a passageway for other USVs, an explosion can create a 4-5 metre gap to let another USV through.
We should have modular structures like this to close the harbour entrance if necessary, but before that it is also necessary to have ULAQ PSVs at each base, coupled with sensors (underwater and surface surveillance) etc.
There is a saying in Turkish, "Alemin akıllısı" So in the end, this the first thought even a common person on the street would have said this, if you have mentioned of port protection, even something employed since historical times.
Against the kamikaze boat threat, loitering mini-drones, compactly packaged and held in the launcher ready to fire, can also offer an effective solution. A countermeasure configured solely and directly against asymmetric threats from the surface. Since reaction time is a critical factor here, an additional layer can be created with such munitions before the threat element enters a critical distance. I think STM's Alpagut solution can be used to work on naval countermeasure studies against these asymmetric surface threats." Not to mention it would be chaotic and dangerous as fuck to try to throw something in the water in the hopes that it might stop a drone from hitting."
Maybe it isn't bad idea maybe we can use modified floating Tamgec munition (M58 MICLIC) (100m length with 10m width effective area) with delayed and contact activation to create floating explosive barrier . I know it isn't ideal but it can increase survivability of the ship also it is very quick action munition. Also after action it can be detonated.
For example as an application method 6 munition can be fired at same time from one port side 1 back to front, 1 back to back , 1 front to back, 1 front to front , 1 middle to front , 1 middle to back with all of them 80>x>60 degree. Original tamgeç too heavy for this (2800 kg all set) job but it can be lighter. Effective Width can be reduced to 2 m and also net size distance can be defined 70 cm between for each explosive charge . So one set (6 munition) about 3000 kg it can be acceptable for a ship.
M58 MICLIC
The MICLIC system consists of an M353 3½ ton (3,175 kg)[6] or M200A1 2½ ton (2,268 kg) trailer (or M200 tracked trailer) chassis, a launcher assembly, an M147 firing kit, an M58A3 line charge and a 5-inch (127mm) MK22 Mod 4 rocket. The line charge is 350 feet (107 meters) long and contains 5 pounds (2.27 kg) per linear foot of C-4 explosive. In the event a MICLIC fails to detonate normally, it can be manually activated by time-delay fuses every few feet along the length of it.
Russians just lost another ship, a landing ship this time, to a kamikaze USV. I hope we are looking at ways to stop them and looking at it hard.Against the kamikaze boat threat, loitering mini-drones, compactly packaged and held in the launcher ready to fire, can also offer an effective solution. A countermeasure configured solely and directly against asymmetric threats from the surface. Since reaction time is a critical factor here, an additional layer can be created with such munitions before the threat element enters a critical distance. I think STM's Alpagut solution can be used to work on naval countermeasure studies against these asymmetric surface threats.
Üstad, as I wrote above, my main focus is on whether another layer can be added as an emergency-situation in the defense of main combatants cruising close to coastal areas against asymmetric elements such as kamikaze swarm boats. These unmanned kamikaze boats are probably the biggest asymmetric threat that naval enthusiasts will be thinking about the most in the coming period, and therefore we are likely to see many new approaches even on an experimental scale in the coming period. Although the example I gave may sound a bit absurd, what I actually mean is to create a physical barrier that will prevent the kamikaze from coming into contact with the hull sheet. Therefore, there may be approaches with a very different mechanism in implementation based on same logic.
Even leaving aside IR and RF countermeasures, electronic decoys, etc., a medium level combatant frigate can track and illuminate multiple surface targets simultaneously. Also that can have at least two close-range engagement systems, and if we add stabilized 20/30mm turrets bot sides, a total of at least 3 close-range weapon systems in each direction can have coordination through running over common combat system. I don't know the status of the Russian navy in terms of this combat management system, navionics, but the current NATO systems standards are quite good in this regard.
The scenario I assumed was what to do in a situation where a frigate or destroyer on the move, with all search and tracking systems on and weapons systems working effectively, is able to neutralize most of the kamikaze boats that manage to get into close engagement as a swarm, but one or two manage to reach a dangerous distance. I just thinking aloud on how the point of detonation of a kamikaze boat can be stay out from the hull sheet when the countermeasure systems are breached.
Russians just lost another ship, a landing ship this time, to a kamikaze USV. I hope we are looking at ways to stop them and looking at it hard.
And I agree with you, I think Alpagut could make a great countermeasure against them. 60 kms of range, an hour of loitering time and supposed to be really effective against moving targets. At something like 50 kgs a piece, we could have a launcher and it could easily be reloaded after use.
I am thinking that the Hydro-GIDS system could be reconfigured to be installed on navy ships. With two launchers, each with 4/5 ALPAGUTs**, E/O system, Radar mast, and communication antennas, it would be a great countermeasure solution for these kamikaze USVs. If power management can be integrated on vessel, this weapon station can be extremely compact, it can be integrated into the superstructures of our combatant and support ships, including MILGEM corvettes, without the need for major modifications. I hope that this is exactly what we are currently working on.Russians just lost another ship, a landing ship this time, to a kamikaze USV. I hope we are looking at ways to stop them and looking at it hard.
And I agree with you, I think Alpagut could make a great countermeasure against them. 60 kms of range, an hour of loitering time and supposed to be really effective against moving targets. At something like 50 kgs a piece, we could have a launcher and it could easily be reloaded after use.