TR Air Defence Programs

[Zafer]

That really depends on how is Turkey going to align itself in the future. If in the future Turkey is going to be a completely independent state that only acts on it's own interests even if it contradicts that of USA then it would face sanctions.

What does anyone gain from sanctioning Türkiye that is already highly self reliant and has options to source supplies from multiple sources. Türkiye sits at the center of the world which nobody can ignore. They can only wish Türkiye aligns with them and they need to align with Türkiye too.

 

[IC3M@N FX]

Nobody will sanction Türkiye for having nukes.

In a crisis, all the major players would likely impose sanctions – the US, Europe, Russia and China alike.
And yet, simply by virtue of its demographics, geographical location and size, Turkey has the potential to establish itself as a minor superpower. It will not become a global superpower – but that is not its real advantage.
Its real leverage lies elsewhere: network power.
The ability to speak to virtually all sides at the same time, to trade with them, and not to lose credibility immediately in the process.
Turkey is effectively the only NATO member state with which both Russia and China would communicate openly in a serious crisis – precisely because it is not a classic bloc state, but a pivotal state.
And it is precisely such actors that are needed:
Sometimes it is not the projection of power that decides, but the role as a broker or mediator between the blocs.
That is why Turkey is strategically pursuing several options simultaneously:
– Rapprochement with BRICS, but more as a privileged observer
– In parallel, an interest in the EU, though primarily via a modernised customs union rather than full membership
The end result is a deliberately chosen state of affairs:
Not belonging fully to any one side.
This is both a strength and a weakness –
a balancing act between maximum flexibility and permanent uncertainty.

That is why we are not particularly popular within Europe, Russia and the US/Israel – because, strategically speaking, we hold too many keys.

That’s the dilemma… see the F-110 engine blockage from US Parlament (building the 40-60 TAI KAAN would be a Power Shift in South East Europe and Middle East by 2032).
If we were geographically situated between Italy and Spain, we’d get everything we wanted; the only question then would be money.

 

[Huelague]

The meaning of sanctions is, to prevent nuclear capabilities of a state. If the state reach the capability, sanctions would not make any sense.

 

[IC3M@N FX]

But that is precisely the point: as soon as you reach the threshold of that state, you will feel the full force of it coming at you from all sides – and that is certain.
Do you really believe that Russia and China actually want Iran to possess nuclear weapons? They, too, do not want to negotiate with new nuclear players, just as the US, Israel and Europe do not.
Nuclear power is an exclusive commodity – their power is based on it, at least in large part, and if you possess it, you restrict their room for manoeuvre.

 

[Huelague]

But that is precisely the point: as soon as you reach the threshold of that state, you will feel the full force of it coming at you from all sides – and that is certain.
Do you really believe that Russia and China actually want Iran to possess nuclear weapons? They, too, do not want to negotiate with new nuclear players, just as the US, Israel and Europe do not.
Nuclear power is an exclusive commodity – their power is based on it, at least in large part, and if you possess it, you restrict their room for manoeuvre.

Has you heard anything about North Korea? No, it makes no sense to talk about N.K. anymore. It’s a point of no return with no turning back. If you reached your goal (developing nukes), why should you step back? Even countries intense the pressure by sanctions?
India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, no one steps back. No body wants to step back. No matter what.

 

[IC3M@N FX]

That is true, but the US’s unease towards China highlights the fact that its operational reach in Asia is far more limited than is often assumed. As its influence rests almost exclusively on Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, Washington’s power base remains fragile, particularly as India is best regarded as an independent actor rather than a reliable ally. For the neighbouring states, this also presents a fundamental security dilemma: Whilst the US can withdraw across the Pacific at any time following a conflict – as history in Vietnam demonstrated – the geography remains unchangeable for Asian countries. They would have to bear the long-term consequences of a wrong decision, which is why unconditional allegiance to the US is considered too risky.
This loss of power is also evident in the event of nuclear proliferation by states such as Indonesia or Malaysia. The West could do little more than exert economic pressure here, as military intervention would immediately drive the region into China’s arms. Beijing, for its part, tends to adopt an inward-looking stance as long as its core interests are not directly affected. This makes the situation in Southeast Asia vastly different from that in Iran, whose ambitions simultaneously clash with the interests of the US/Israel/Europe, Russia and China, leaving it completely isolated in the event of a crisis.

We, too, would feel this pressure because we are a pivotal nation, acting as both a gatekeeper and a hub; geographically, we hold so many keys that all parties involved would prefer to see a weakened and controllable as Turkey.

We are too much of a thorn in their side; we hold too many keys.