Historical The biggest strength of Wehrmacht which is rarely mentioned

[mulj]

You are wrong on many levels.

1) Me262 could not enter massive service before 1944 in any case.
2) In terms of quality/price there was no any serious advantage for Me262 over piston fighters. Me262 was faster but piston fighters were much more agile. Me262 could stay little time in air and could not operate from simple ground airfields.

In fact bomber version of Me262 could change history if they were ready during the D day invasion. They could destroy Mullberry harbours which allies used for supplies.

Not exactly, it was lack of vision and comitted resources as this article point it out. In theory they could deploy it parge numbere by 42 but decision were made like they did.

Messerschmitt Me 262 - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

 

[Joe Shearer]

Suffice to say Germany did not help matters by engaging in extreme evil with its armed forces (and related directives and strategies for the general civilian forces etc).

The einsatzgruppen for example, under rational leadership (though this likely would have been one that never did the ostplan to begin with among other things) could have been repurposed as part of the spearheads and support units at the front than what they were used for instead.

Point made, but not necessarily valid. The Einsatzgruppen were largely psychopaths; while there is a liberal-pacifist-conscientous objector trope of a psychopathic disposition being a necessary part of being a good soldier, most formations are made up of perfectly normal people, who abhor violence and inflicting injuries on others in general, but who rationalise their doing these things in a battle situation.

So it is difficult to see these murder squads repurposed as elite fighting unit (or, for that matter, even as fighting units per se). Otto Skorzeny was the exception that proved the rule.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Then the larger matter of the Wehrmacht Eastern front reaching its zenith (near Moscow) and could not advance past it, and later went for the caucasus and Don strategy the following year to try achieve another breakthrough (And ended up with Stalingrad at the end of it).

It is perhaps here that Hitler's lack of mental balance did the most damage. Shifting from the Moscow axis to head towards the Caucasus and the Donbas was a certifiable act.

 

[Joe Shearer]

You can almost calculate (to the last barrel) how many oil barrels were in deficit during such intense counter-liquidations of the German army like operation bagration. They all had good weaponry (even with the masses lost during the retreats so far)....problem was the tanks and logistic supply vehicles really were not at liberty to use fuel like they once could.

You overlooked the almost ludicrous dependence of the Wehrmacht on livestock for its transport and logistics. Or maybe it was the 800 lb. guerilla in the room; the complete mismatch of the Reich production machinery, Schacht notwithstanding, with the Soviet system.

 

[Kaptaan]

It is perhaps here that Hitler's lack of mental balance did the most damage. Shifting from the Moscow axis to head towards the Caucasus and the Donbas was a certifiable act.

I don't think that would have made a differance. When the German advance halted on the outskirts of Moscow down to logistics and weather the writing was on the wall. Red Army that built up in the following spring was another beast. Russian production was now outpacing German production and huge number of new divisions equipped with what was probably the best tank of the war - the T-34 were ready to bleed German armies. The war on the eastern front would turn into battle of attrition and Russia with it's vastly greater industrial and manpower resources would prevail.

And that is exactly what happened.

 

[Kaptaan]

You overlooked the almost ludicrous dependence of the Wehrmacht on livestock for its transport and logistics. Or maybe it was the 800 lb. guerilla in the room; the complete mismatch of the Reich production machinery, Schacht notwithstanding, with the Soviet system

I mentioned that earlier. Contrary to common perception Wehrmacht depended on horses and mules for logistics.

The WWII German Army was 80% Horse Drawn; Business Lessons from History​

The bulk of the German Army—the dough feet of the normal infantry divisions—moved on shank's mare. The rifle companies' transport consisted of three-horse wagons, on which the troops loaded their packs, as did this outfit on campaign in Russia in the summer of 1941.

 

[500]

Not exactly, it was lack of vision and comitted resources as this article point it out. In theory they could deploy it parge numbere by 42 but decision were made like they did.

Messerschmitt Me 262 - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

Hitler ordered to divert Me262 into bomber in September 1943. So obviously this decision could not influence what happened in 1942. The main problem of Me262 were engines. Germans could not made them reliable enough and produce in good numbers until 1944.

Besides it was 5 times more expensive than piston fighter but hardly 5 times more effective. It could not operate as front fighter because it needed concrete runways and complicated technical support.

Even against bombers it was not that effective.

 

[Nilgiri]

Part of that process that played a role in the downfall were Hilter's purges of his top generals, the likes of Rommel et al. The adverse effects rippled throughout Hitler's forces.

The war was over (1944, even before op overlord, which doubtless quickened its end) at that point for all intents and purposes. As I will flesh out in a following post.

Point made, but not necessarily valid. The Einsatzgruppen were largely psychopaths; while there is a liberal-pacifist-conscientous objector trope of a psychopathic disposition being a necessary part of being a good soldier, most formations are made up of perfectly normal people, who abhor violence and inflicting injuries on others in general, but who rationalise their doing these things in a battle situation.

So it is difficult to see these murder squads repurposed as elite fighting unit (or, for that matter, even as fighting units per se). Otto Skorzeny was the exception that proved the rule.

Indeed. This was just one tiny example I give of thousands of things (from the upstream planning before it and downstream consequence of it) that severely affected and degraded the chances (as bad as they were from the onset).

Will flesh this out more next.

There is just a huge amount of material that is still influenced (or even treated as conventional wisdom) by the "Clean" wehrmacht theory (and its later more muffled iterations) without going into the requisite details of the sheer logistical analysis w.r.t the irrationality present (that would not be in some different hypothetical - though these all have a catch 22 thing going on at the root as to the "Why"? to begin with for the operation+ambition if there was closer to rational "Non-Nazi" approach etc from say requisite series of events from the mid 1920s and early 1930s)

It is perhaps here that Hitler's lack of mental balance did the most damage. Shifting from the Moscow axis to head towards the Caucasus and the Donbas was a certifiable act.

Yes. But he was not alone in this (initially).

For the bulk of Barbarossa, a compromise of neither here nor there was made (Halder's/OKH "management" I speak of)...and in some way this seems to have fit in (for that early stage moment) Hitler and the Nazi leadership's supremacist thinking anyway (we can do this all and do this fast....soviets will be crushed because they are inferior etc).

When Barbarossa did not deliver what was intended, that also then neatly offered a "see I told you so we should have gone for the wheat and oil all along..." etc and that propelled Fall Blau but more to the point the horrible intervention by Hitler in Fall blau.

You overlooked the almost ludicrous dependence of the Wehrmacht on livestock for its transport and logistics. Or maybe it was the 800 lb. guerilla in the room; the complete mismatch of the Reich production machinery, Schacht notwithstanding, with the Soviet system.

Oh its not overlooked. That is already baked in and I believe Kaptaan mentioned it already. The other kind of things (I plan to get into, but were in full operation as consequence by this point in 1943- 1944) was what was going on and above what was baked in (from get go)....due to severe mistakes made during the two years of 1941 - 1943...w.r.t a larger logistical approach that was taken (knowing full well the problem of horse reliance).

Germany was always going to be extremely horse-reliant given the reliance it had on expensive synthoil (which then had to be prioritised and rationed with huge compromises regarding this) ever since the crude +refined oil imports from US, Venezuela and others stopped in 1939.

Romania could not make up for it and there was just 2 years of limited import from the Soviets (largest oil reserves at that point in world history) and they were always fairly reluctant suppliers anyway (i.e help extend molotov-ribbentrop only to a level needed) given Stalin knew something was on the horizon (just didn't believe it would be so soon).

The horse logistics is thus a first principle baked-in problem for German logistics hemming in the whole endeavour in a big way.

By operation bagration point, my point is things had accumulated way past that w.r.t the logistical mistakes (compounded immensely and incalculably by irrationality of supremacist lebensraum+generalplan ost on top).

 

[Nilgiri]

Let me present now some points w.r.t core logistical issue of the Eastern front in all the rough broad stages/markers (Barbarossa, Fall Blau, Citadel, Bagration).....that doomed Germany by 1943/44 (given what it had, how it chose to organise and execute with those resources in two crucial years, and what it lost and simply could not make up for..and thus was doomed after it)

I might go into more depth on some points here if there is interest...this in itself is a very limited summary to give an idea of what is often overlooked (especially the impact on logistics and the high sensitivity of logistics to downstream consequences).

First a prologue:

A good logistics book I would recommend for the interested reader (it has crucial WW2 analysis in it from the perspective I am coming from, but also very good coverage of other wars before it):

Supplying War: Logistics From Wallenstein To Patton: Amazon.co.uk: Creveld, Martin Van: 9780521546577: Books

Buy Supplying War: Logistics From Wallenstein To Patton 2 by Creveld, Martin Van (ISBN: 9780521546577) from Amazon's Book Store. Everyday low prices and free delivery on eligible orders.

www.amazon.co.uk

I would also recommend readers to distill what is and isnt (in literature available today) influenced by (or outright is) clean-wehrmacht theory that was pushed along after WW2 (and nuremberg) ended initially by a number of Generals such as Von Manstein and Guderian et al.....and their clear blatant bias for taking this approach.

This has made its way (directly or non-directly, with or without intent) into a huge body of conventional wisdom and further literature (often taken from granted, and by many very well read authors)....given the incorporation of it into a huge amount of NATO and American immediate post war publications too for a number of purposes.

It is not hard to also find authors that have called out and call out (especially since the 1970s) and debunk this kind of stuff and given strong counter-arguments (some also overdo it)....but this other perspective (especially when given the requisite well-founded sources and archives to reference it) must also be looked at (if the reader/student has not)...and must be done so diligently to at least get as close to the full picture of all possibilities....i.e there is a full large greyer spectrum in between these two perspectives.

An example of the reverse of the clean-wehrmacht (i.e that the holocaust cannot be separated at all from it) in relation to crucial logistical self-harm the Germans did (past the more well known harm to the opponent and civilians) can be found in many books, but one that pops to mind is:

Holocaust versus Wehrmacht: How Hitler's "Final Solution" Undermined the German War Effort (Modern War Studies): Pasher, Yaron: 9780700620067: Amazon.com: Books

Holocaust versus Wehrmacht: How Hitler's Final Solution Undermined the German War Effort (Modern War Studies) [Pasher, Yaron] on Amazon.com. *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. Holocaust versus Wehrmacht: How Hitler's Final Solution Undermined the German War Effort (Modern War Studies)

www.amazon.com

It was not exactly a "good read" for me (but that is matter of varying tastes), but it did contain good points and source materials in it. A short summary review of it is found here:

Westermann on Pasher, 'Holocaust versus Wehrmacht: How Hitler's "Final Solution" Undermined the German War Effort' | H-Net

Yaron Pasher. Holocaust versus Wehrmacht: How Hitler's "Final Solution" Undermined the German War Effort. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2014. xiii + 364 pp. $34.95 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-7006-2006-7. Reviewed by Edward Westermann (Texas A&M University, San Antonio) Published on H-War...

networks.h-net.org

============================================================================================

A brief commentary on logistics w.r.t Germany in the war:

Without further ado some of the points I would like to make about the Eastern Front logistics (that is often overlooked or totally ignored).

Sorry in advance if this is structured all weird, I am just airing out spontaneously in interest of conserving time from my end. (I went back and added some headers etc though)

Germany had a number of things baked-in from the onset that gave severe logistical challenges for any endeavour (especially one that would need long logistical chains).

Germany was notably good to superb at two basic access + input sectors relevant to war (especially at that time):

Coal and Steel.

Logistically this meant a reliance on railways and trains as much as possible (and keeping these logistics as close to fully operational as possible). You could make good quality locomotives that made use of the coal. You could lay or improve railway lines that made use of the steel (which also used coal in production). This was a strong ecosystem infrastructure and knownhow Germany had developed during the industrial revolution in general.

Germany was similarly deficient at: Natural (Crude) oil and Rubber.

These were both things it largely imported during the industrial revolution and right up to 1939.

The problem of this reliance (as evidenced during WW1 and its final disastrous result for Germany) was one of the veins that pushed forms of pragmatic autarky (well before Hitler arrived on the scene) and deployed significant scientific and technical for the substitute of synthetic crude (made from Coal) and its further refined products "synthoil" as I call it (that were effectively the same as Diesel and Gasoline and aviation gasoline).

Without going into the details too much, this synthoil was far more expensive to make than sourcing natural crude itself....and needed immense (novel) capital investment on top...capital investment that would become scarce during war time.

Thus synth-oil was logistically prioritised and rationed to vehicles that absolutely need them...and there was no easy surplus of it.

Thus even with Germany's huge industrial capacity there was a deep reliance on horses for logistics (especially at mid and final tier delivery)

It must also be noted that every % (and even fraction of %) upstream counts immensely more downstream with any input scope and ceterus paribus.....when it comes to logistics.

If you get "95%" right (at the most relevant thrust/input/setting initially) even with the 100% reference mark beset by the structural "baked in" issues....that is still 5% wrong that will cascade inevitably downstream...especially as time and inertia wears on (given all the resources dependent on these are finite, you cannot resurrect a dead soldier or apparate a lost tank...or the resources that went into training and producing them). Every % counts here.

The numbers are figurative, they cannot be calculated well given the information deficit and fog of war, but the concept and perspective at large is very important to always have in mind when studying any war or conflict.

Given specific and notable things I will now get into....the Wehrmacht on the eastern front was nowhere close to the "95%" and aggravated much of this potential by their own doing (well past what they inherited structurally and the basic scale of the issue at hand..i.e the 100% reference mark). Whether it was 90%, 80% or 70%...doesnt matter to argument as it was not close to 100% that it would need to be and the deficit was larger enough to grow and create a grandiose failure at the end of it (even though the raw force levels and even numbers were superior for the Wehrmacht at many instances during the campaign, especially at the start w.r.t the Soviets).

Logistics is that ultra-crucial transmission component for force level and numbers to objective/ambition.

No matter how good your engine and wheels are of a car, if your transmission sucks, you ain't going anywhere you want to. You put bad fuel (irrationality etc) in the fuel tank for the engine, you compound the problem extra.

It was this irrationality in many vectors of approach and decisions and execution aggravated many % points of the logistics (in my estimation) well past a more neutral scope would have otherwise been.... that too at the onset (1941 - 1942), in the midcourse (1942 - 1943).

By the downstream (1943 - 1945) it really didnt matter (given the material losses w.r.t time and effort commited and spent by then already)....so the shortening logistical chain really didn't help much to stave off the doom....even in a hypothetical where there was no operation overlord or a failed one.

=============================================================================================

Let us unpack some details of note:

Basic setup:

General Gercke (railways), General Wagner (gen. supplies, motor transport) were the two assigned for bulk of the logistics side.

There was significantly bad cooperation (w.r.t time, costs, organisation, "middlemen" etc) here off the bat ..when there should have been just one concerted logistics guy/organisation.

This split was not helped (and I suspect likely done/preserved to fulfill) by larger OKH directives steering their distinct separation...things like the barbarossa directive for POWs and civilian prisoners...though there were other factors.

There was only one good major road in ukraine (and lack of proper railway iirc). This was a huge logistics nightmare (given throughput needed).

There was a good railway + better roads from warsaw to moscow (but oil + resources not found in this route, rather a focus on political + industrial knock and/or keeping a stable front for a southern push...this caused the dithering from the onset as to what the clear goal even was)

Route to leningrad complete mess logistically, an immense number of resources were squandered here (even with Finnish proximity and continuation war).


Aggravations to this basic setup (at the large, mid and final tiers):

- Gauge conversion problem all over the place (to use german locomotives to logistical railheads needed)

- Presence of the needed watering and coaling station intensity was insufficient...needing precious capital investment or associated logistical compromise/workaround

- Gen. Wagner estimated 300 miles supply range from the large logistics...but barbarossa (as it was planned and executed) required 900 miles (3x basic disparity putting pressure)

- Soviet POW and encircled armies were treated in Nazi way. Let me summarise it that way. The opportunity cost (w.r.t logistics) were immense on this IMO (and often overlooked). Imagine say soviet POW (as captured) labour to improve final tier logistical infra and handling this (with provision of food and work team org.) rather than ostplan liquidation and often logistical gumming for dealing with this.

Thus the opportunity costs that arose of (prioritising food, war material and oil) ostplan (as it happened) versus a hypothetical rational plan for an invasion east (based on logistics first and foremost and using captured human resource to improve logistic chains at end tier delivery rather than liquidating them)...cannot be understated.

This all got worse and worse downstream w.r.t fall blau (a potentially logical move if allowed to be implemented rationally) and then the irrational obsession with taking stalingrad (ruined any semblance of the logic).

Some armies (like 9th) eventually (at crucial time to their presence being there) were supplied by motor vehicles only (horses all died, froze, starved), severely degrading their operational capability. There was no railway line nearby there at all.

Eventually (and far earlier than most people know/think/assume), whole armies had to make awful decisions (for them) to choose between ammunition + supplies vis-a-vis reinforcements (when they sorely needed both).

Logistical basic pressure calculation by Gen. Wagner around stalingrad time was about as far as smolensk, thus it was extremely overstretched (and that grim analysis was with living off the land/ stealing from peasants etc i.e hunger plan, including lot of needless killing of these peasants rather than rational approach, aggravating things for next year if you plan to win)

Mud mud mud... pre-winter (a famous aspect in the highlight reels compared to other stuff im mentioning)....but also winter cold pressure on bulk logistics (steam boilers bursting in trains and stuff)...absolutely atrocious issues...the situation was worse than grim for half the year from a logistics standpoint.

Logistical challenge and then degradation of logistics (even without liquidation of human resource in hypothetical more rational German war effort) already made the whole objective extremely tough and unlikely to succeed.

But with (Nazi) liquidation of captured human resources (at the frontier and behind it and further behind it) and tieing up of own resources in these crucial areas (esp. behind it) tipped it well beyond any remote chance....whatever the spearheads had going for them (arms, training, cohesion) and the initial surprise+initiative factor in 1941.

There was also an irrational inability to retreat lot of times when it was needed (and often needed long before the situation)...again largely or near completely driven by NSDAP supremacist directive.

Not to mention the general economics/politics of NSDAP affecting the larger economics funding these logistics.
That is far bigger to get into (extends back to 1932 and even before that) w.r.t downstream.

By 1943 the war was basically over (whatever the western allies did, it would just help accelerate the end tbh)....it was a matter of time given the scale of the mess up for 2 complete years. Kaptaan gives fairly good account on Kursk earlier in thread.

If you study the logistical issue (at this point in 1943) and the results on specific major battles and theatres....it is quite stark. E.g Germans could not get anywhere near to the core Soviet operational depth during Kursk for example (even after MASSIVE planning and resource commited to it, for not only this very basic requirement but to action far more purpose beyond it).

Operation Bagration was just more of the same of an already terminal situation, a complete utter destruction of more than half a million Wehrmacht soldiers (dead, forget however many more total casualties) in 3 months. I don't think this feat has occurred before or after in such intensity and scale.

Again a rational military would have realised the massive mistake it made to lead to this point and unconditionally surrendered well before (or during) Operation Bagration, to save human life.

The war (solely keeping it reich vs ussr and say operation overlord never happened) was more than over at this point to be perfectly and brutally honest about it.

It was not a direct numbers game or power level thing only (which at majority of this period 1941 - 1944, wehrmacht compared quite favourably or even better than USSR for the majority of it). The transmission (i.e logistics challenge and self-inflicted logistics aggravation past it) makes close to 2/3rds of the failure in my estimation....maybe even more...but definitely at least half.

Its the same concept saiyan mentions here at a scale far far larger (logistics and giving it the best rational scope possible is very much influenced by geography, environment among other things):

I often cite the Russo Finnish war in this regard. The GFP of that time would have had Russia steamrolling Finland but the way Finland used it's geography and environment and determination to beat a far more powerful enemy is proof that firepower is not everything.

This was essentially the largest scale ever done on the world map and world history.

@Madokafc logistics logistics logistics!

@Paro @anmdt @#comcom @Kartal1 @Vergennes @xenon5434 @Sinan @UkroTurk @T-123456 @Webslave @Saithan

 

[TR_123456]

And yet they lost the war, despite such clear advantages.

The leadership was stupid enough to make the US its enemy.
With US help it was easy even for the Russians.
And who would be dumb enough to go against the Russians in the winter on their turf?

 

[Madokafc]

Let me present now some points w.r.t core logistical issue of the Eastern front in all the rough broad stages/markers (Barbarossa, Fall Blau, Citadel, Bagration).....that doomed Germany by 1943/44 (given what it had, how it chose to organise and execute with those resources in two crucial years, and what it lost and simply could not make up for..and thus was doomed after it)

I might go into more depth on some points here if there is interest...this in itself is a very limited summary to give an idea of what is often overlooked (especially the impact on logistics and the high sensitivity of logistics to downstream consequences).

First a prologue:

A good logistics book I would recommend for the interested reader (it has crucial WW2 analysis in it from the perspective I am coming from, but also very good coverage of other wars before it):

Supplying War: Logistics From Wallenstein To Patton: Amazon.co.uk: Creveld, Martin Van: 9780521546577: Books

Buy Supplying War: Logistics From Wallenstein To Patton 2 by Creveld, Martin Van (ISBN: 9780521546577) from Amazon's Book Store. Everyday low prices and free delivery on eligible orders.

www.amazon.co.uk

I would also recommend readers to distill what is and isnt (in literature available today) influenced by (or outright is) clean-wehrmacht theory that was pushed along after WW2 (and nuremberg) ended initially by a number of Generals such as Von Manstein and Guderian et al.....and their clear blatant bias for taking this approach.

This has made its way (directly or non-directly, with or without intent) into a huge body of conventional wisdom and further literature (often taken from granted, and by many very well read authors)....given the incorporation of it into a huge amount of NATO and American immediate post war publications too for a number of purposes.

It is not hard to also find authors that have called out and call out (especially since the 1970s) and debunk this kind of stuff and given strong counter-arguments (some also overdo it)....but this other perspective (especially when given the requisite well-founded sources and archives to reference it) must also be looked at (if the reader/student has not)...and must be done so diligently to at least get as close to the full picture of all possibilities....i.e there is a full large greyer spectrum in between these two perspectives.

An example of the reverse of the clean-wehrmacht (i.e that the holocaust cannot be separated at all from it) in relation to crucial logistical self-harm the Germans did (past the more well known harm to the opponent and civilians) can be found in many books, but one that pops to mind is:

Holocaust versus Wehrmacht: How Hitler's "Final Solution" Undermined the German War Effort (Modern War Studies): Pasher, Yaron: 9780700620067: Amazon.com: Books

Holocaust versus Wehrmacht: How Hitler's Final Solution Undermined the German War Effort (Modern War Studies) [Pasher, Yaron] on Amazon.com. *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. Holocaust versus Wehrmacht: How Hitler's Final Solution Undermined the German War Effort (Modern War Studies)

www.amazon.com

It was not exactly a "good read" for me (but that is matter of varying tastes), but it did contain good points and source materials in it. A short summary review of it is found here:

Westermann on Pasher, 'Holocaust versus Wehrmacht: How Hitler's "Final Solution" Undermined the German War Effort' | H-Net

Yaron Pasher. Holocaust versus Wehrmacht: How Hitler's "Final Solution" Undermined the German War Effort. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2014. xiii + 364 pp. $34.95 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-7006-2006-7. Reviewed by Edward Westermann (Texas A&M University, San Antonio) Published on H-War...

networks.h-net.org

============================================================================================

A brief commentary on logistics w.r.t Germany in the war:

Without further ado some of the points I would like to make about the Eastern Front logistics (that is often overlooked or totally ignored).

Sorry in advance if this is structured all weird, I am just airing out spontaneously in interest of conserving time from my end. (I went back and added some headers etc though)

Germany had a number of things baked-in from the onset that gave severe logistical challenges for any endeavour (especially one that would need long logistical chains).

Germany was notably good to superb at two basic access + input sectors relevant to war (especially at that time):

Coal and Steel.

Logistically this meant a reliance on railways and trains as much as possible (and keeping these logistics as close to fully operational as possible). You could make good quality locomotives that made use of the coal. You could lay or improve railway lines that made use of the steel (which also used coal in production). This was a strong ecosystem infrastructure and knownhow Germany had developed during the industrial revolution in general.

Germany was similarly deficient at: Natural (Crude) oil and Rubber.

These were both things it largely imported during the industrial revolution and right up to 1939.

The problem of this reliance (as evidenced during WW1 and its final disastrous result for Germany) was one of the veins that pushed forms of pragmatic autarky (well before Hitler arrived on the scene) and deployed significant scientific and technical for the substitute of synthetic crude (made from Coal) and its further refined products "synthoil" as I call it (that were effectively the same as Diesel and Gasoline and aviation gasoline).

Without going into the details too much, this synthoil was far more expensive to make than sourcing natural crude itself....and needed immense (novel) capital investment on top...capital investment that would become scarce during war time.

Thus synth-oil was logistically prioritised and rationed to vehicles that absolutely need them...and there was no easy surplus of it.

Thus even with Germany's huge industrial capacity there was a deep reliance on horses for logistics (especially at mid and final tier delivery)

It must also be noted that every % (and even fraction of %) upstream counts immensely more downstream with any input scope and ceterus paribus.....when it comes to logistics.

If you get "95%" right (at the most relevant thrust/input/setting initially) even with the 100% reference mark beset by the structural "baked in" issues....that is still 5% wrong that will cascade inevitably downstream...especially as time and inertia wears on (given all the resources dependent on these are finite, you cannot resurrect a dead soldier or apparate a lost tank...or the resources that went into training and producing them). Every % counts here.

The numbers are figurative, they cannot be calculated well given the information deficit and fog of war, but the concept and perspective at large is very important to always have in mind when studying any war or conflict.

Given specific and notable things I will now get into....the Wehrmacht on the eastern front was nowhere close to the "95%" and aggravated much of this potential by their own doing (well past what they inherited structurally and the basic scale of the issue at hand..i.e the 100% reference mark). Whether it was 90%, 80% or 70%...doesnt matter to argument as it was not close to 100% that it would need to be and the deficit was larger enough to grow and create a grandiose failure at the end of it (even though the raw force levels and even numbers were superior for the Wehrmacht at many instances during the campaign, especially at the start w.r.t the Soviets).

Logistics is that ultra-crucial transmission component for force level and numbers to objective/ambition.

No matter how good your engine and wheels are of a car, if your transmission sucks, you ain't going anywhere you want to. You put bad fuel (irrationality etc) in the fuel tank for the engine, you compound the problem extra.

It was this irrationality in many vectors of approach and decisions and execution aggravated many % points of the logistics (in my estimation) well past a more neutral scope would have otherwise been.... that too at the onset (1941 - 1942), in the midcourse (1942 - 1943).

By the downstream (1943 - 1945) it really didnt matter (given the material losses w.r.t time and effort commited and spent by then already)....so the shortening logistical chain really didn't help much to stave off the doom....even in a hypothetical where there was no operation overlord or a failed one.

=============================================================================================

Let us unpack some details of note:

Basic setup:

General Gercke (railways), General Wagner (gen. supplies, motor transport) were the two assigned for bulk of the logistics side.

There was significantly bad cooperation (w.r.t time, costs, organisation, "middlemen" etc) here off the bat ..when there should have been just one concerted logistics guy/organisation.

This split was not helped (and I suspect likely done/preserved to fulfill) by larger OKH directives steering their distinct separation...things like the barbarossa directive for POWs and civilian prisoners...though there were other factors.

There was only one good major road in ukraine (and lack of proper railway iirc). This was a huge logistics nightmare (given throughput needed).

There was a good railway + better roads from warsaw to moscow (but oil + resources not found in this route, rather a focus on political + industrial knock and/or keeping a stable front for a southern push...this caused the dithering from the onset as to what the clear goal even was)

Route to leningrad complete mess logistically, an immense number of resources were squandered here (even with Finnish proximity and continuation war).


Aggravations to this basic setup (at the large, mid and final tiers):

- Gauge conversion problem all over the place (to use german locomotives to logistical railheads needed)

- Presence of the needed watering and coaling station intensity was insufficient...needing precious capital investment or associated logistical compromise/workaround

- Gen. Wagner estimated 300 miles supply range from the large logistics...but barbarossa (as it was planned and executed) required 900 miles (3x basic disparity putting pressure)

- Soviet POW and encircled armies were treated in Nazi way. Let me summarise it that way. The opportunity cost (w.r.t logistics) were immense on this IMO (and often overlooked). Imagine say soviet POW (as captured) labour to improve final tier logistical infra and handling this (with provision of food and work team org.) rather than ostplan liquidation and often logistical gumming for dealing with this.

Thus the opportunity costs that arose of (prioritising food, war material and oil) ostplan (as it happened) versus a hypothetical rational plan for an invasion east (based on logistics first and foremost and using captured human resource to improve logistic chains at end tier delivery rather than liquidating them)...cannot be understated.

This all got worse and worse downstream w.r.t fall blau (a potentially logical move if allowed to be implemented rationally) and then the irrational obsession with taking stalingrad (ruined any semblance of the logic).

Some armies (like 9th) eventually (at crucial time to their presence being there) were supplied by motor vehicles only (horses all died, froze, starved), severely degrading their operational capability. There was no railway line nearby there at all.

Eventually (and far earlier than most people know/think/assume), whole armies had to make awful decisions (for them) to choose between ammunition + supplies vis-a-vis reinforcements (when they sorely needed both).

Logistical basic pressure calculation by Gen. Wagner around stalingrad time was about as far as smolensk, thus it was extremely overstretched (and that grim analysis was with living off the land/ stealing from peasants etc i.e hunger plan, including lot of needless killing of these peasants rather than rational approach, aggravating things for next year if you plan to win)

Mud mud mud... pre-winter (a famous aspect in the highlight reels compared to other stuff im mentioning)....but also winter cold pressure on bulk logistics (steam boilers bursting in trains and stuff)...absolutely atrocious issues...the situation was worse than grim for half the year from a logistics standpoint.

Logistical challenge and then degradation of logistics (even without liquidation of human resource in hypothetical more rational German war effort) already made the whole objective extremely tough and unlikely to succeed.

But with (Nazi) liquidation of captured human resources (at the frontier and behind it and further behind it) and tieing up of own resources in these crucial areas (esp. behind it) tipped it well beyond any remote chance....whatever the spearheads had going for them (arms, training, cohesion) and the initial surprise+initiative factor in 1941.

There was also an irrational inability to retreat lot of times when it was needed (and often needed long before the situation)...again largely or near completely driven by NSDAP supremacist directive.

Not to mention the general economics/politics of NSDAP affecting the larger economics funding these logistics.
That is far bigger to get into (extends back to 1932 and even before that) w.r.t downstream.

By 1943 the war was basically over (whatever the western allies did, it would just help accelerate the end tbh)....it was a matter of time given the scale of the mess up for 2 complete years. Kaptaan gives fairly good account on Kursk earlier in thread.

If you study the logistical issue (at this point in 1943) and the results on specific major battles and theatres....it is quite stark. E.g Germans could not get anywhere near to the core Soviet operational depth during Kursk for example (even after MASSIVE planning and resource commited to it, for not only this very basic requirement but to action far more purpose beyond it).

Operation Bagration was just more of the same of an already terminal situation, a complete utter destruction of more than half a million Wehrmacht soldiers (dead, forget however many more total casualties) in 3 months. I don't think this feat has occurred before or after in such intensity and scale.

Again a rational military would have realised the massive mistake it made to lead to this point and unconditionally surrendered well before (or during) Operation Bagration, to save human life.

The war (solely keeping it reich vs ussr and say operation overlord never happened) was more than over at this point to be perfectly and brutally honest about it.

It was not a direct numbers game or power level thing only (which at majority of this period 1941 - 1944, wehrmacht compared quite favourably or even better than USSR for the majority of it). The transmission (i.e logistics challenge and self-inflicted logistics aggravation past it) makes close to 2/3rds of the failure in my estimation....maybe even more...but definitely at least half.

Its the same concept saiyan mentions here at a scale far far larger (logistics and giving it the best rational scope possible is very much influenced by geography, environment among other things):



This was essentially the largest scale ever done on the world map and world history.

@Madokafc logistics logistics logistics!

@Paro @anmdt @#comcom @Kartal1 @Vergennes @xenon5434 @Sinan @UkroTurk @T-123456 @Webslave @Saithan

Germany is doomed since the beginning, they are trying to do something outside of their league, come on even the Soviet which they called as untermehnen is already more mechanized at logistic point of view and almost all of their soldier , food and munition being delivered toward the frontline using Truck or train cargo, in which largely different from Wehrmacht which still rely on the good old horse drawn carriage for almost twenty to forty percentage of their logistic units in the frontline. Let alone for facing against the US and Great Britain which is far more industrious, wealthy , had more natural resources and had very large man power at their disposal. If not for excellent tactician German had on the field, and Soviet inept leadership in the beginning , German resistence should be eliminated in the first few years of the war. It is only natural for the Soviet to rolling the German with their immense number of Tanks, Trucks and heavy artillery, as Soviet industrialization goals and armaments industry since the beginning is more geared toward to facing capitalist western allies like the US and Great Britain Empire which is far more affluent, rich and blesses with far more resources.

The Germany itself is already shooting their own feets with many ilogical decision of their top brass leader. For example, Ukraine and Poland occupation policy, then other thing. Even Final Solution is one of the hell idiot policy in which doesn't generate more of war resources (with all of the concentration camps, guard expenses and so on) with almost no contribution toward their war efforts.

 

[mulj]

Hitler ordered to divert Me262 into bomber in September 1943. So obviously this decision could not influence what happened in 1942. The main problem of Me262 were engines. Germans could not made them reliable enough and produce in good numbers until 1944.

Besides it was 5 times more expensive than piston fighter but hardly 5 times more effective. It could not operate as front fighter because it needed concrete runways and complicated technical support.

Even against bombers it was not that effective.

Aware of alloy issue, but thing is onky 35 peolle worked for long time on project. My stand point if they were fully comitted to the project even with the all flows that early jets had they would be game changer amd allies could not respond in short time and that fact would propably change course of war for good but german war planners had different projections and visions. When me262 finakky entered into service in first couple of months he jad 10 to 1 kill ratio, nuber that speak for itself, if you put that in correlation of year 42 when luftwafe was still equal opponent conclusion is undisputable.

 

[500]

Aware of alloy issue, but thing is onky 35 peolle worked for long time on project.

Well obviously its not Hitlers fault.

My stand point if they were fully comitted to the project even with the all flows that early jets had they would be game changer amd allies could not respond in short time and that fact would propably change course of war for good but german war planners had different projections and visions. When me262 finakky entered into service in first couple of months he jad 10 to 1 kill ratio, nuber that speak for itself, if you put that in correlation of year 42 when luftwafe was still equal opponent conclusion is undisputable.

Kill ratio is not necessary a decisive factor. When you are doing escort mission your kill ratio will be many times lower than when you are in free hunt mission. Yet you can do much more important job escorting bombers.

As I said Me262 was not suited as front fighter. So it could not do change anything in Africa or East front. It could not work as escort fighter. And even as air defense fighter in Germany it was effective but nothing extraordinary in terms of price/effectiveness.

 

[mulj]

Well obviously its not Hitlers fault.


Kill ratio is not necessary a decisive factor. When you are doing escort mission your kill ratio will be many times lower than when you are in free hunt mission. Yet you can do much more important job escorting bombers.

As I said Me262 was not suited as front fighter. So it could not do change anything in Africa or East front. It could not work as escort fighter. And even as air defense fighter in Germany it was effective but nothing extraordinary in terms of price/effectiveness.

whatever point remains same, among other things hitler decision did not help but let put it aside, you are aware that in 42 there was quite good infrastructure in holland, belgium, france to resume pressure on great britain, dont you think that north africa would not happen at all if that was the case that german started again air raids on britain and had succsess in it? couple of hundreds me262 would obliterate raf in britain at that time.

 

[500]

whatever point remains same, among other things hitler decision did not help but let put it aside, you are aware that in 42 there was quite good infrastructure in holland, belgium, france to resume pressure on great britain, dont you think that north africa would not happen at all if that was the case that german started again air raids on britain and had succsess in it? couple of hundreds me262 would obliterate raf in britain at that time.

Thousands of V1 and V2 rockets falling on GB did not change anything at all. Attacking GB with string radar equipped air defence would not be so easy. All polits which were shot down would be lost and training pilots for Me262 was very expensive.

 

[mulj]

Thousands of V1 and V2 rockets falling on GB did not change anything at all. Attacking GB with string radar equipped air defence would not be so easy. All polits which were shot down would be lost and training pilots for Me262 was very expensive.

it is not same thing, i assumed hypotetical scenario, and you think raf pilots would grow on trees?

 

[500]

it is not same thing, i assumed hypotetical scenario, and you think raf pilots would grow on trees?

Ejecting RAF pilots land in Britain and can be reused again. Ejecting German pilot becomes a POW. This was one of the major factors of British victory in 1940.

Plus training piston pilots was much cheaper. Plus in 1942 America was already in war, which is basically unlimited source of pilots and resources.

 

[Ryder]

it is not same thing, i assumed hypotetical scenario, and you think raf pilots would grow on trees?

Whatever new tech comes wont change the tide. Tech takes decades to mature.

STG44 was way ahead of the competition but came too late to change the tide.

Germans and their newly weapons like the V2 worked but were impractical due to a wide range of factors.

The Germans lost the mass production and the standardised war compared to the Allies and wasted their time on prototypes and variants of tanks rather than improving and mass producing a certain vehicle.

The Tiger Tank was a reliability mess with improvements it would have carried the day especially if they mass produced their Panzer tanks like the Allies T34 and Sherman.

 

[Ryder]

Ejecting RAF pilots land in Britain and can be reused again. Ejecting German pilot becomes a POW. This was one of the major factors of British victory in 1940.

Plus training piston pilots was much cheaper. Plus in 1942 America was already in war, which is basically unlimited source of pilots and resources.

Didnt the Germans also target cities rather than airfields.

 

[mulj]

Ejecting RAF pilots land in Britain and can be reused again. Ejecting German pilot becomes a POW. This was one of the major factors of British victory in 1940.

Plus training piston pilots was much cheaper. Plus in 1942 America was already in war, which is basically unlimited source of pilots and resources.

it does not matter, either pilots or machines loss in couple of months of air battles in ratio where loss is 1 to 10 could not be sustainable for raf. apperiance of m263 in 42 would be game over for western allies no strawmanning can dispute that, totaly other question why it was not or was it possible at all to be introduced in large numbers on front lines.