I would agree; that was after the conquest of Skardu (or rather, in terms of time-line, parallel to the siege of Skardu), and counts for nothing but the submission of a conquered people to the demands of the conquerors, and post-facto glorification of their enforced role.
That may be a practical, village patwari view of the situation, but constitutionally, I beg to submit, there were clear definitions of the role of the sovereign rulers of these states.
I believe that the personalities of the individuals concerned had less influence than is necessary to bring up. If we were to do so, I need to point out that the duplicity of the subsequent redressal of grievances does not do credit to the other personalities, on the other side.
India may; I do not. I am responsible here only for my own arguments for and against, and I am also aware of the fact that these cannot be connected, except to make a counter-balancing cases. If we were to treat each separately, we will find that there is a lot of daylight between the two positions. But that, as the good Colonel in Irma La Douce declares, is another story.
Let us not anticipate these juicy details. Not just yet.
Leaving aside the elided portion, I have nothing to say about this, which is entirely an internal matter for Pakistan and Pakistanis. Considering that her whole position has always, in each and every case, been dependent on clandestine action and surprise attacks, it is merely an academic matter for someone from the other side, even given a willingness to listen to the Pakistani point of view, and to sympathise with her current problems of national identity.
It might seem that animosity was promised rather later, once the rioting started. Or even later, once the matter progressed from civil strife to military conflict. The Indian perspective on that is quite clear. There was nothing in the Act, forced on the situation by the Muslim League, for good reasons or bad, that predicated violence, but it is equally true that the demand for partition was fraught with the built-in prospect of violence. Nobody could have predicted the scale; but the occurrence should have come as no surprise.
K/J, the term that you have used, had no influence except in the very thin sliver of territory that today constitutes Azad Kashmir. So it is difficult to understand how they should have imposed democratic rule on other parts that were already well along the path, further along it than they themselves (presumably you mean the Muslim Conference in Muzaffarabad).
With the greatest kindness, I suggest that you delve into the facts further.
562. Around 17 opted for Pakistan, or were compelled to opt for Pakistan (in one case).
Trust me, it had got to a point where both Kashmiri Pandits (a tiny minority of Hindus in the Vale, but politically very vocal and assertive) and Kashmiri Muslims (among whom I have a great many friends) had asked me to write a definitive account of those days and what came before. I refused unless I had access to a set of books, as a narrative without references and citations would merely be a political tract; the persons pledged failed to fulfill their pledges, and that account never got written.
I am merely narrating the case, not seeking to impose a solution.
Nothing to say to all this.
Please check.
I am very happy to acknowledge your strikingly different point of view, and to accept that you are entitled to it, with no rancour whatsoever. But it is not my view.
When I think of that situation, and of today's, in my own country, it is completely dominated by my belief in the rule of law; in other words, in constitutionalism.
Sorry, but that was not very clear. At best, a non-sequitur. It was for the Bangladeshis to set up a tribunal, and it was for them to agree or to disagree with the provisions of the Simla Agreement, the terms of which were shared in scrupulous detail with them before the agreement was signed.
A six-month war would be sufficient.
