TR Defence Exports & Updates

[Agha Sher]

SONGAR in Nigeria

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1591383341672321024

 

[Hexciter]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1591450607973433345

 

[what]

Didn't STM imply at the fair in Indonesia that the first customer will be very likely a foreign one? The plot thickens.

 

[Rodeo]

I think, iirc it was announced months ago pakistan will be the first customer!

I think you're overusing exclamation marks on your posts. Just a friendly observation.

 

[Afif]

I think you're overusing exclamation marks on your posts. Just a friendly observation.

My bad, I think it little bit has to do how exclamation marks used in my language compared to English. Unfortunately, i mix them up in my writing.

 

[NitricAcid]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1592476370097303559

 

[Huelague]

Have we sold Nurol Yoruk 4x4 to Indonesia?

 

[Hexciter]

The United Arab Emirates can make a large-scale defense procurement from Turkey.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1593160700951945216

 

[Knowledgeseeker]

Turkey's ambassador to Morocco

- A Turkish company provided Morocco with armament systems to protect its unity and security.

- Military cooperation between Morocco and Turkey will not only include drones.

- Turkey is open to investing in the military industry in Morocco because Morocco is the gateway to Africa.


Ambassador dogan also mentioned this:
Turkiye’s Ambassador to Morocco Omer Faruk Dogan conveyed his country’s support for Morocco’s territorial integrity, describing the Western Sahara dispute as “purely artificial.”

“We are two brotherly countries, allies and strategic partners. Relations between Morocco and Turkey are very deep and rooted in history, dating back to the 16th century,” the diplomat said.


source:

(from minute 11.26. Its in french)

 

[kenny]

Bahrain’s Viper attack helo makes debut at BIAS 2022, whole fleet expected by 2023 - Breaking Defense

The gulf nation will get 12 birds, munitions and related parts in a $911 million deal.

breakingdefense.com

 

[Hexciter]

The United Arab Emirates can make a large-scale defense procurement from Turkey.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1593160700951945216

The United Arab Emirates which had previously requested to buy UCAVs from the USA, turned to Turkey because the USA did not give approval.

The cost of the UCAVs that the UAE wants to supply is based on ammunition and so on. Together with the systems, it is estimated to be over $1 billion.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1593287210953998336

 

[Fuzuli NL]

Why African countries are lining up to buy Turkey's weapons​

Turkish weapons systems have had successful outings in a number of recent conflicts, and the deals come with little political baggage

Signature of Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is pictured on a Bayraktar drone at SAHA EXPO Defence & Aerospace Exhibition in Istanbul, Turkey, on 27 October 2022 (Reuters)

By
Paul Iddon

Published date: 16 November 2022 20:53 UTC | Last update: 1 day 6 hours ago

For the past few years, Turkey has made a record number of arms sales to several African countries interested in acquiring its domestically produced military hardware, including armed drones, attack helicopters, and turboprop aircraft.
Algeria is near a deal to buy 10 Anka-S military drones produced by Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI). Algiers' neighbour and rival Morocco already ordered 13 Bayraktar TB2 armed drones from Turkey's Baykar drone manufacturer the year before.
In 2021, Niger became the first foreign customer to order TAI's Hurkus turboprop trainer/light attack aircraft. Chad and, reportedly, Libya, have since ordered the aircraft as well. TAI expects many more customers for the Hurkus in Africa, its deputy general manager said in September.

In November 2021, Nigeria ordered two Turkish-built Dearsan offshore patrol vessels for its navy. It has since ordered six TAI T129 ATAK helicopters. Ethiopia also acquired TB2 drones sometime in 2021 and used them during the Tigray war. At least ten African countries have also ordered Turkish-manufactured armoured military vehicles.

'Completely unprecedented'​

"Turkey's defence equipment exports to Africa are completely unprecedented in terms of quantity, quality, value, and reach," Dr Ali Bakir, a non-resident senior fellow at The Atlantic Council and assistant professor at the Ibn Khaldon Center at Qatar University, told Middle East Eye.
"This reality should not be separated from the rise of Ankara's influence in the continent and its strategy to strengthen the political, economic, and security ties with several African countries."
Nicholas Heras, director of strategy and innovation at the Newlines Institute, echoes that notion, noting that Turkey's defence industry is now "benefiting from the many years of persistent effort that Turkish diplomats have put into making Turkey a major exporter to Africa".
"The Turkish defence industry has a proven ability to produce weapons systems quickly, efficiently, and in bulk," he told MEE.
Bakir explained that over the last five years or so, leading Turkish defence industry companies have been looking to increase their exports, expand their reach, diversify their foreign markets, and find new buyers.

'The Turkish defence industry has a proven ability to produce weapons systems quickly, efficiently, and in bulk'
- Nicholas Heras, Newlines Institute

The battlefield testing of Turkish and Russian systems in Libya, Syria and Nagorno Karabakh have made a tangible difference in promoting Turkey’s weapons industry, Bakir added.
Heras also added that another critical factor that makes Turkish hardware attractive to several African countries fighting local non-state actors is that Turkey’s weapons sales don’t come with conditions.
"Turkey's weapons don't come with human rights strings attached, which is exactly what many African state actors want: durable, combat-proven weapons systems that come quickly and with no red tape."

'Combination of factors'​

The fact that Turkish systems, particularly drones, have repeatedly demonstrated their capabilities and effectiveness in active conflict zones in recent years is another reason these countries are seeking them.
"By far, Turkey's customers in Africa want Turkish drones because Turkey's drones are rugged, easy to operate and maintain, and have been used in combat against both state and non-state actors," Heras said.
While Turkey’s drones don’t have the same record against state actors with advanced air defence systems, such as Russia, that’s not what buyers are necessarily seeking.
Bakir believes there is "a combination of factors" behind this sudden demand for Turkish military hardware in Africa. Cheaper prices, high efficiency, as well as being tested in real-world theatres of war have helped Turkey’s pitch, but there is one more intangible.
"The absence of colonial history also encourages the African countries to engage with Turkey on the basis of a win-win situation."

Security and stability​

Many of these weapons are being sold to recently active conflict zones or potential flashpoints, raising questions about how they will affect security and stability.
For example, Turkey is now arming Algeria and Morocco, neighbouring states on opposite sides in the decades-old Western Sahara conflict.
Then there is the Libya situation.
Turkey's military intervention in Libya's internal conflict enabled the UN-recognised government in Tripoli to decisively rout General Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA), which had brutally besieged the capital, from western Libya.
That round of fighting halted in 2020, with forces under the Government of National Unity (GNU), led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid al-Dbeibah controlling Tripoli and the west and the LNA retaining its hold on the east. Recent reports claim that Tripoli is acquiring Hurkus aircraft and Bayraktar Akinci drones, the latter much larger and more advanced than the TB2.

Jalel Harchaoui, a Libya specialist and associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, explained that Turkey's military presence in Libya "remains formidable".
"Turkey's existing mission in Libya now consists of hundreds of military officers as well as spies and other Turkish personnel, 2-3,000 Syrian mercenaries, plus a comprehensive array of hardware,” he told MEE.
"Now, as we speak, even before any new delivery of fancy items like the Akinci, the Libyan enemies of Turkey are already quite afraid of the pro-Turkey camp," he said. "In other words, the sheer amount of military deterrence is already as effective as can be."
Nevertheless, there have been growing tensions between Libyan armed groups and the more prominent factions in the country. Clashes in Tripoli on 27 August left around 40 Libyans dead. Harchaoui believes even more significant clashes are "a distinct possibility".
"Turkey's military footprint can't necessarily prevent such deterioration," he said. "In fact, Turkey's rigidity and self-confidence in Libya arguably adds to the worsening political crisis. It certainly doesn't help promote stability or good governance."
Bakir believes that Turkish arms contribute, rather than undermine, the security and stability of the areas to which they are exported.
"As far as the facts on the ground show in several regional theatres that witnessed the use of Turkey's defence systems, they helped resolve stalled struggles, prevented the spillover of some conflicts, stabilised the situation in some countries, and blocked the expanding role of some actors, such as Iran and Russia."

https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/why-african-countries-are-lining-up-to-buy-turkeys-weapons

 

[Fuzuli NL]

The UAE just received twenty drones from Turkey. What’s the backstory?​

By Ali Bakir


In March 2021, Tawazun, the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) defense and security acquisitions authority for the armed forces, and Turkey’s Baykar Defense, the manufacturing company of the renowned indigenous Bayraktar TB2 drone, held discussions on possible cooperation. The talks continued for a few months before the Emiratis introduced a mouthwatering $2 billion offer. The deal included Abu Dhabi’s request to meet a shopping list of 120 TB2 drones, ammunition, command and control units, and training.


The news came in light of discussions on taking defense cooperation between the two states to the next level. On September 21, Turkey reportedly delivered twenty of its Bayraktars to the UAE. A senior Turkish official confirmed that his country had delivered some drones and that Abu Dhabi was indeed seeking more. Many observers that I spoke to found this development on the defense and military level quite surprising for two primary reasons.


First, TB2 production lines are fully occupied after hitting their maximum capacity with the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February. According to Baykar’s CEO, Haluk Bayraktar, the Turkish drone maker is fully booked for three years. Although Ankara is working to increase its production capacity amid the rising international demand for its TB2, there is no room at the moment to meet surprising and unscheduled needs swiftly.


Another reason is the UAE’s assertive foreign policy and experience with Chinese drones. It presumably suggests that Abu Dhabi could use the Turkish drones in a way that contradicts Ankara’s regional interests or even pass them to third parties that could threaten such interests. In this sense, one can recall a precedent during which Libyan warlord General Khalifa Haftar, accused of committing war crimes, used UAE-acquired, China-made Wing Loong drones against the United Nations-recognized and Turkey-backed Libyan government in Tripoli in 2019.


The fact that Baykar Defense decided to deliver Abu Dhabi twenty of its flagship TB2 drones despite the circumstances in Libya means that Turkey attaches great importance to the Emirati offer, and the two parties resolved the concern related to the nature of using the Turkish drone. The Turks did not want to lose the deal. However, they did not deliver all that the UAE asked for either. This strategy should keep both sides engaged in defense talks for quite some time.

A surprising offer​

In 2011, Abu Dhabi and Ankara signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on defense industry cooperation. The MoU was ratified in 2017. Although the UAE has remained one of the top importers of Turkey’s defense equipment in the last decade, no significant progress has been made on defense industry cooperation. However, the possible realization of a $2 billion deal is undoubtedly a departure from the traditional trend.


Following the normalization of relations with Turkey in February 2021, the UAE expressed its intention to fast track the cooperation on the level of defense. This resulted in the two parties signing a letter of intent in defense industry cooperation that set up regular meetings between their representatives to define areas of cooperation and follow up on outcomes. During a meeting with the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) Central Executive Committee in July 2021, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan uncovered that the UAE offered to build a factory for the TB2 in Abu Dhabi. But why Turkish drones in particular? And what is the justification for buying 120 units or even building a factory?


The UAE’s drone force depends mainly on some aging US drones as well as modern Chinese versions. Abu Dhabi’s inventory of drones includes MQ-1 Predators, the export version of the RQ-1 Predator (which is incapable of carrying weapons), and Chinese Wing Loong I and Wing Loong II drones. Most of these drones are intended for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions.


Concerning drones acquired from the United States, the UAE requested to buy the superior MQ-9 Reaper two years ago, but Washington suspended its request in 2021. As for the Chinese drones, although the Wing Long II, capable of carrying multiple types of ammunition, has been promoted as the cost-effective alternative to the US-made MQ-9 Reaper, its performance has been modest. Compared to the Turkish TB2, although bigger and heavier, the Chinese drones did not shine. Several buyers have expressed disappointment with the performance of China-made drones.


In this sense, buying Turkish drones would diversify and modernize the UAE’s inventory. Additionally, acquiring Turkish unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) would serve the UAE’s current strategy of investing in and developing autonomous capabilities, electronic warfare capacity, and smart munitions. Looking for technology, expertise, and equipment from major advanced suppliers beyond the US means building a working relationship with Turkey.

Motives behind the deal​

Despite its importance, the diversification motive does not alone offer a comprehensive answer as to why the UAE would ask for 120 Turkish drones or even offer to build a factory to produce them. A host of political, business, and defense-related reasons might help clarify the motives behind the mega Emirati offer.


First, it’s worth considering the TB2’s performance in untraditional military confrontations as well as hybrid warfare. What makes Turkish drones extremely desirable to customers from around the globe is that it is generally a highly-efficient military system at low cost. It has been battlefield-tested in several critical geopolitical theaters of different hostile circumstances and environments. Despite some limitations on its operational range with the absence of enough ground stations and its dependence on them instead of satellite communications, the TB2’s performance is sufficient to provide Abu Dhabi a meaningful new drone fleet.


Second, the deal serves as a message to the United States: “If you do not sell us weapons, we will get them from elsewhere.” During the Donald Trump administration, Abu Dhabi asked to buy Lockheed Martin F-35 fighter jets, General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc. (GA-ASI) MQ-9 Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPAS), and other equipment and munitions with an estimated value of $23 billion. Although the Trump administration initially agreed to proceed with the ask, the Biden administration later suspended the deal, including up to eighteen MQ-9B and related equipment reportedly worth $3 billion.


Third, Abu Dhabi’s deal should not be solely seen from a technical perspective. A $2 billion offer is meant to buy Emirati influence inside Turkey and create strong working relations with political institutions and the rising defense industry based on shared interests and threats. Recently, the UAE and Turkey have been facing an increasing threat from the expansion of the Iran-backed Shia militias in their neighboring theaters. The TB2 has proved to be a pretty compelling offensive platform against highly-valued military assets, armed groups, and militias.


Following normalization relations with Ankara, the UAE has displayed its financial power and deepened its business ties with Turkey. The defense industry sector is one arena where Abu Dhabi can meet some of its defense needs and simultaneously make business and profit.


As for Turkey, bearing in mind the significance of the possible realization of a $2 billion deal, it probably had several delicate matters to consider before cautiously proceeding. One of the problematic issues is that selling 120 drones at once to the UAE—even if they are available—would alter the delicate military balance within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), especially with Qatar and Saudi Arabia. By delivering twenty TB2s in September, however, Ankara still had the chance to test others’ will to buy more of its drones and even stimulate them to do so without seriously undermining the balance within the GCC.


Ultimately, the UAE and Turkey probably consider the current formula under which they executed the TB2 deal a win-win situation. Turkey showed that it could secure UAE’s defense requirements even in unique or urgent times. At the same time, Abu Dhabi proved that it could put its money where its mouth is in terms of opening a new page with Ankara and boosting bilateral relations.


Ali Bakir is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council. He is also an assistant professor at Qatar University. Follow him on Twitter: @AliBakeer.

The UAE just received twenty drones from Turkey. What’s the backstory?

On September 21, Turkey reportedly delivered twenty of its Bayraktars to the UAE. A senior Turkish official confirmed that his country had delivered some drones and that Abu Dhabi was indeed seeking more.

www.atlanticcouncil.org

 

[Lool]

The UAE just received twenty drones from Turkey. What’s the backstory?​

By Ali Bakir


In March 2021, Tawazun, the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) defense and security acquisitions authority for the armed forces, and Turkey’s Baykar Defense, the manufacturing company of the renowned indigenous Bayraktar TB2 drone, held discussions on possible cooperation. The talks continued for a few months before the Emiratis introduced a mouthwatering $2 billion offer. The deal included Abu Dhabi’s request to meet a shopping list of 120 TB2 drones, ammunition, command and control units, and training.


The news came in light of discussions on taking defense cooperation between the two states to the next level. On September 21, Turkey reportedly delivered twenty of its Bayraktars to the UAE. A senior Turkish official confirmed that his country had delivered some drones and that Abu Dhabi was indeed seeking more. Many observers that I spoke to found this development on the defense and military level quite surprising for two primary reasons.


First, TB2 production lines are fully occupied after hitting their maximum capacity with the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February. According to Baykar’s CEO, Haluk Bayraktar, the Turkish drone maker is fully booked for three years. Although Ankara is working to increase its production capacity amid the rising international demand for its TB2, there is no room at the moment to meet surprising and unscheduled needs swiftly.


Another reason is the UAE’s assertive foreign policy and experience with Chinese drones. It presumably suggests that Abu Dhabi could use the Turkish drones in a way that contradicts Ankara’s regional interests or even pass them to third parties that could threaten such interests. In this sense, one can recall a precedent during which Libyan warlord General Khalifa Haftar, accused of committing war crimes, used UAE-acquired, China-made Wing Loong drones against the United Nations-recognized and Turkey-backed Libyan government in Tripoli in 2019.


The fact that Baykar Defense decided to deliver Abu Dhabi twenty of its flagship TB2 drones despite the circumstances in Libya means that Turkey attaches great importance to the Emirati offer, and the two parties resolved the concern related to the nature of using the Turkish drone. The Turks did not want to lose the deal. However, they did not deliver all that the UAE asked for either. This strategy should keep both sides engaged in defense talks for quite some time.

A surprising offer​

In 2011, Abu Dhabi and Ankara signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on defense industry cooperation. The MoU was ratified in 2017. Although the UAE has remained one of the top importers of Turkey’s defense equipment in the last decade, no significant progress has been made on defense industry cooperation. However, the possible realization of a $2 billion deal is undoubtedly a departure from the traditional trend.


Following the normalization of relations with Turkey in February 2021, the UAE expressed its intention to fast track the cooperation on the level of defense. This resulted in the two parties signing a letter of intent in defense industry cooperation that set up regular meetings between their representatives to define areas of cooperation and follow up on outcomes. During a meeting with the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) Central Executive Committee in July 2021, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan uncovered that the UAE offered to build a factory for the TB2 in Abu Dhabi. But why Turkish drones in particular? And what is the justification for buying 120 units or even building a factory?


The UAE’s drone force depends mainly on some aging US drones as well as modern Chinese versions. Abu Dhabi’s inventory of drones includes MQ-1 Predators, the export version of the RQ-1 Predator (which is incapable of carrying weapons), and Chinese Wing Loong I and Wing Loong II drones. Most of these drones are intended for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions.


Concerning drones acquired from the United States, the UAE requested to buy the superior MQ-9 Reaper two years ago, but Washington suspended its request in 2021. As for the Chinese drones, although the Wing Long II, capable of carrying multiple types of ammunition, has been promoted as the cost-effective alternative to the US-made MQ-9 Reaper, its performance has been modest. Compared to the Turkish TB2, although bigger and heavier, the Chinese drones did not shine. Several buyers have expressed disappointment with the performance of China-made drones.


In this sense, buying Turkish drones would diversify and modernize the UAE’s inventory. Additionally, acquiring Turkish unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) would serve the UAE’s current strategy of investing in and developing autonomous capabilities, electronic warfare capacity, and smart munitions. Looking for technology, expertise, and equipment from major advanced suppliers beyond the US means building a working relationship with Turkey.

Motives behind the deal​

Despite its importance, the diversification motive does not alone offer a comprehensive answer as to why the UAE would ask for 120 Turkish drones or even offer to build a factory to produce them. A host of political, business, and defense-related reasons might help clarify the motives behind the mega Emirati offer.


First, it’s worth considering the TB2’s performance in untraditional military confrontations as well as hybrid warfare. What makes Turkish drones extremely desirable to customers from around the globe is that it is generally a highly-efficient military system at low cost. It has been battlefield-tested in several critical geopolitical theaters of different hostile circumstances and environments. Despite some limitations on its operational range with the absence of enough ground stations and its dependence on them instead of satellite communications, the TB2’s performance is sufficient to provide Abu Dhabi a meaningful new drone fleet.


Second, the deal serves as a message to the United States: “If you do not sell us weapons, we will get them from elsewhere.” During the Donald Trump administration, Abu Dhabi asked to buy Lockheed Martin F-35 fighter jets, General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc. (GA-ASI) MQ-9 Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPAS), and other equipment and munitions with an estimated value of $23 billion. Although the Trump administration initially agreed to proceed with the ask, the Biden administration later suspended the deal, including up to eighteen MQ-9B and related equipment reportedly worth $3 billion.


Third, Abu Dhabi’s deal should not be solely seen from a technical perspective. A $2 billion offer is meant to buy Emirati influence inside Turkey and create strong working relations with political institutions and the rising defense industry based on shared interests and threats. Recently, the UAE and Turkey have been facing an increasing threat from the expansion of the Iran-backed Shia militias in their neighboring theaters. The TB2 has proved to be a pretty compelling offensive platform against highly-valued military assets, armed groups, and militias.


Following normalization relations with Ankara, the UAE has displayed its financial power and deepened its business ties with Turkey. The defense industry sector is one arena where Abu Dhabi can meet some of its defense needs and simultaneously make business and profit.


As for Turkey, bearing in mind the significance of the possible realization of a $2 billion deal, it probably had several delicate matters to consider before cautiously proceeding. One of the problematic issues is that selling 120 drones at once to the UAE—even if they are available—would alter the delicate military balance within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), especially with Qatar and Saudi Arabia. By delivering twenty TB2s in September, however, Ankara still had the chance to test others’ will to buy more of its drones and even stimulate them to do so without seriously undermining the balance within the GCC.


Ultimately, the UAE and Turkey probably consider the current formula under which they executed the TB2 deal a win-win situation. Turkey showed that it could secure UAE’s defense requirements even in unique or urgent times. At the same time, Abu Dhabi proved that it could put its money where its mouth is in terms of opening a new page with Ankara and boosting bilateral relations.


Ali Bakir is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council. He is also an assistant professor at Qatar University. Follow him on Twitter: @AliBakeer.

The UAE just received twenty drones from Turkey. What’s the backstory?

On September 21, Turkey reportedly delivered twenty of its Bayraktars to the UAE. A senior Turkish official confirmed that his country had delivered some drones and that Abu Dhabi was indeed seeking more.

www.atlanticcouncil.org

The UAE received TB2 drones earlier in order to test them in their country. After months, it seems that they ended up liking turkish products and now rumors are emrging that they are planning for nearly a 1 billion dollar weapons sale from Turkey

 

[azaher77]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1593580136611430403

YÖRÜK 4X4 Tactical Wheeled Armored Vehicle
A contract was signed for export to 4 countries from different geographies, one of which is Europe.

 

[Hexciter]

A $2 billion UAV agreement has been signed with the UAE. It was on the agenda to open a factory in the UAE.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1593916455459823616

 

[Agha Sher]

A $2 billion UAV agreement has been signed with the UAE. It was on the agenda to open a factory in the UAE.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1593916455459823616

question is, what are they going to use all these UAVs for?

Turkey must ensure that they are not used against her interests (Qatar, Somalia, Libya etc)

and where is Philip the donkey? He used to brag so highly about all the plastic models UAE produced

 

[I_Love_F16]

They really need to expend their production capacity inside Turkiye instead of building factories here and there. Don't like their strategy to be honest. Especially with these countries from the Gulf. Who knows were these TB2's will end up ...

 

[Baris]

I wrote this a few months ago, Akıncı and Tb-2 is exported to UAE and they ordered a huge amount. Unless we got some really good concessions from them i think this sale shouldn't have happened, if it is only for the money then it's pointless as we sell the drones like hot cakes anyways.

 

[Agha Sher]

Most likely these 'factories' are nothing more than assembly plants. Parts produced in Turkey and shipping there to be assembled. I agree, it would be a major mistake to have actual production there. UAE and Saudi cannot be trusted.