French Ministry of Defense Mediterranean defense report, NOVEMBRE 2025
https://www.defense.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/academ/BEM_mediterranee orientale_synthese.pdf
3 TURKISH STRATEGIC HYBRIDITY: BETWEEN COOPERATION AND CONFRONTATION
3.1 Turkey's neo-Ottoman ambitions: to regain a central place on the regional stage
3.1.1 geostrategic position as a maritime stronghold
Turkey's geographical configuration, situated at the crossroads of three distinct maritime areas (the Black Sea, the Aegean Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean), gives it regional centrality. This position as a natural "bridge" is materialized by its control of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits, governed by the 1936 Montreux Convention, which constitute the vital arteries linking the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Turkish control over these straits is variable. Turkey regulates access for foreign warships in peacetime, thus consolidating its strategic autonomy. In situations of crisis or tension, it can restrict or suspend passage through the straits, notably affecting Russian military access or that of NATO member states. The Convention is sometimes used as a foreign policy tool, its application varying according to Turkish interests and the prevailing geopolitical context. This control of the "keys"
to the Straits provides Ankara with a significant strategic advantage in terms of maritime traffic and
naval projection, transforming Turkish territory into a potential barrier to regional flows
3.1.2 In its quest for maritime hegemony, Turkey is confronted with its structural limitations.
As the second most populous country in the Mediterranean basin, Turkey has embarked on a large-scale naval and commercial capacity-building process aimed at consolidating its status as an emerging regional power. This rise in power is reflected in impressive quantitative indicators: the Turkish navy ranks 8th in the world and constitutes the 5th largest NATO fleet by tonnage, mobilizing approximately 45,000 sailors. This expansion is based on a policy of accelerated technological modernization, symbolized by the commissioning of the light aircraft carrier TCG Anadolu, the development of new-generation Reis-class submarines, and the progressive widespread adoption of naval drone systems. While very real, this naval power buildup must nevertheless be considered in light of regional geopolitical balances. Faced with the Greek, French, and Italian navies, supported by the European and Atlantic security architecture, Turkey's capabilities, despite their development, remain limited for achieving true maritime hegemony. Despite its ambitions, Turkey remains fundamentally a middle power that fails to fully dominate its regional space. Furthermore, major internal challenges compromise its ability to project power externally. The chronic economic crisis, characterized by persistent inflation and recurring currency depreciation, drastically limits the resources available to support its geopolitical ambitions.
3.1.3 The Mavi Vatan doctrine
This hegemonic quest finds its theoretical conceptualization and ideological foundation in the affirmation
of the Mavi Vatan (“Blue Homeland”) doctrine to designate Turkey’s maritime zone of influence.
It was initially conceptualized in 2006 by anti-Atlanticist and secular military figures, “nationalist”
(ulusalci) and Eurasianist48. Initially, it was an unofficial concept with vague outlines, designating a
more active approach to defending Turkish maritime interests, notably sovereignty over the Aegean and Mediterranean waters, the potential extension of Turkey’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ),
and, more broadly, the strengthening of its naval capabilities, considered fundamental to
regional strategic issues.49 Although not officially recognized by the Turkish state, this
doctrine nevertheless plays a structuring role in how Turkey envisions its maritime projection and
territorial delimitation in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, after 2015, under the leadership of President ErdoÄźan, this doctrine, integrated into official discourse,began to form the basis of Turkey's active military strategy in the maritime domain (as evidenced by the 2019 "Blue Homeland" military exercise). Far more than a maritime strategy,
it embodies a comprehensive geopolitical vision, a projection that draws on a neo-Ottoman interpretation of
regional history to justify expanded sovereignty over maritime zones that far exceeds the
frameworks established by contemporary international law.
This doctrinal approach manifests itself in a challenge to the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of Greece and Cyprus. In this logic of legal confrontation, Turkey seeks to secure control of maritime areas particularly rich in natural resources51 while deliberately circumventing the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a treaty to which Turkey remains a non-signatory, notably because of Article 121, which specifies that islands constitute complete maritime zones. This Turkish stance is not accidental: it reflects a deliberate desire not to be constrained by an international legal framework perceived as unfavorable to its interests in the Aegean Sea.
3.2 Ankara is structuring a strategic hinterland policy to consolidate its position in the Mediterranean.
Beyond its strictly maritime ambitions, Turkey relies on a three-pronged approach of complementary instruments aimed at projecting its influence and consolidating a strategic hinterland, coherently linking the spaces of the Black Sea, the Eastern and Central Mediterranean.
3.2.1 Offensive diplomacy and the strategic exploitation of failed states
Turkish foreign policy is characterized by interventionism in crisis zones, particularly in the Mediterranean in "failed states" such as Libya and Syria.
In Libya, Turkey intervened militarily starting in 2019 in support of the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA). This intervention involved the deployment of troops and allied Syrian militias, the use of drones, and the establishment of military installations, the most significant of which were located at Al-Watiya airbase, recaptured in May 2020 by GNA forces with crucial support from Turkish TB2 Bayraktar drones. However, since July 2025, a diplomatic rapprochement has been observed between Ankara and the opposing faction, the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by Marshal Khalifa Haftar, who has de facto controlled the east of the country since 2014. This normalization aims to secure ratification by the LNA's House of Representatives, based in Benghazi, of the 2019 Turkish-Libyan maritime agreement, which it declared itself ready for such ratification in June 2025. This development nevertheless reveals the inherent contradictions in Turkey's strategy: by simultaneously seeking to appease rival factions, Ankara risks weakening its established positions and seeing its local partners question their commitments.
In Syria, Turkey has actively supported the Syrian opposition uprising (notably the Syrian National Council) against Bashar al-Assad's regime since 2011 by providing logistical and political support to rebel groups. Ankara has consolidated its positions in the north of the country, particularly around the Idlib Governorate, according to a strategy of defensive depth and territorial entrenchment. Officially presented as a campaign against the Kurdish organizations of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the People's Protection Units (YPG), this strategy was in reality aimed at imposing a substantial strategic buffer zone between the Turkish border and the territories controlled by Kurdish forces. Following the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime in December 2024, Turkey quickly intervened in the new Syrian political landscape and demonstrated its willingness to play a central role in the country's political and economic reconstruction, particularly with a view to encouraging the gradual return of Syrian refugees.
3.2.2 A disruptive member of NATO
A NATO member since 1952, Turkey occupies a unique position within the Atlantic Alliance:
simultaneously an indispensable strategic player due to its geography and military capabilities, and a disruptive actor due to its unorthodox choices, particularly since ErdoÄźan came to power. Since the failed coup of 2016, Ankara's stance has appeared increasingly out of step with that of the other Allies.54 Examples of this disruptive stance are numerous: Turkey long blocked Sweden's accession to the Alliance (finally ratified by the Turkish Parliament in January 2024), on the pretext that Sweden supports "Kurdish terrorists"; it also refused to join Western sanctions against Russia following its aggression against Ukraine in 2022, and then helped circumvent these measures; It purchased Russian S-400 anti-aircraft systems from the Kremlin, which prompted the Americans to exclude it from the F-35 fighter jet military program.
Turkey is also accused of engaging in a form of diplomatic "bargaining," skillfully capitalizing on the security dependencies of other Alliance members. Involved in cross-cutting crises (managing migration flows, combating jihadist terrorism, securing energy corridors), it often leverages these resources to negotiate bilateral or multilateral advantages.<sup>55</sup>
Ankara is thus developing a diplomacy of confrontation and cooperation that defies traditional alliance dynamics, a policy of strategic about-face that undermines any predictability. This is evidenced by its position following the Russian invasion of Ukraine: Turkey alternates between ad hoc cooperation with Moscow (absence of sanctions and circumvention of Western sanctions) and support for Kyiv. Although relations between Turkey and some NATO members are gradually deteriorating, Turkey remains a key ally for the Alliance's defense system, and vice versa, fielding the second-largest military after that of the United States. It provides NATO with a number of strategic bases, notably Incirlik, which hosts American nuclear weapons used for NATO-led deterrence.
CONCLUSION
Russia, China, and Turkey converge in their shared desire for "de-Westernization," which aims to challenge the established geopolitical order in the Mediterranean, although they adopt distinct methods of action.
They deploy a multidimensional approach combining military, economic, technological, and informational means, going beyond traditional hard power strategies to engage in the realm of soft power. Whether it be Russian mercenaries in Libya, Chinese investments in Mediterranean ports, or Turkish interventionism, the three countries seek to establish a lasting foothold in the Mediterranean region through permanent physical presences.
However, Russia, China, and Turkey develop different methods of power projection depending on their context. Russia, at war with Ukraine since 2022, adopts an offensive posture that aims to undermine Western credibility while expanding its sphere of influence through hybrid and asymmetrical means. China favors an integration strategy based on creating technological and economic dependencies. Its approach fosters its integration into critical regional supply chains, carefully avoiding direct confrontation while establishing itself as an indispensable player. Turkey, for its part, adopts an ambivalent position between its Atlantic alliance and an autonomous national agenda, exploiting the inherent contradictions of its status as a reluctant ally.
This triple presence generates differentiated effects on the Atlantic Alliance, forcing NATO and the European Union to simultaneously manage a declared adversary (Russia), a systemic competitor (China), and an unpredictable ally (Turkey). Even if Washington and the EU currently maintain a clear military and economic superiority in this region, the interaction of these three strategies reveals a structural transformation of the Mediterranean space, which is gradually ceasing to be the "mother sea" of the West and becoming an arena of multipolar competition.
