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Lool

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Alright the whole “peace troops” framing is outdated. What’s being built now is basically a Turkish‑led Syrian security zone, not some UN‑style buffer. Ankara has more than 20,000 troops and security personnel in northern Syria under formal defence cooperation, plus influence over the new Syrian army structure and doctrine. That’s not symbolic—that’s hard power on the ground.

For Israel, the message is simple: any strike on that belt is no longer “just Syria”, it’s hitting a Turkish‑integrated security zone with Turkish assets, Turkish drones, Turkish radar, and Turkish logistics behind it. That alone makes casual raids much more politically and militarily expensive.

Is it enough to stop a full‑scale Israeli or US attack by itself? No. Ground troops alone don’t stop air campaigns. What locks this in long‑term is:

A fully layered air and missile defence over northern Syria (Hisar/O, Siper, integrated radar, EW, hardened bases).

Persistent ISR and drones (Bayraktar, Akinci, Anka) tied into Syrian command so any movement is tracked in real time.

Joint command and legal frameworks that make it crystal clear any strike on “Syrian” assets in that belt is a strike on Turkish‑protected infrastructure.

Gradual removal of Iranian militias and parallel networks in Syria and Lebanon, so there’s one coherent security architecture instead of a messy proxy playground.


Lebanon and Iraq are the long game. Lebanon only works if Iranian influence is rolled back and the Lebanese army is actually equipped and backed in a serious way. Iraq is a full tangle of Kurds/US/Iran/Israel, so there I’d say: secure the Turkish–Syrian belt first, lock in air defence and command integration, then expand east once the political ground is ready.
I think that the turkish government doesnt think about northern Syria only anymore
What the Israelis are crying about is the turkish armed forces slowly crawling their way towards central/southern Syria by first installing AD systems and then gradually bring troops forward; the aim of the turkish government is clear and that is Palmyra air base.

When Turkey tried to send its troops to Palmyra air base back in December following the fall of Assad, Israeli fighter jets razed the base to the ground to send a message to Turkey. Now Turkey seems to take its precautions before expanding to avoid loss of troops. This disturbs Israel since Turkey holding Palmyra Air base will provide a strategic AD umbrella over sensitive Syrian logistics and bases in around 50% of the country and this will translate to a stronger Syria and possibly a tougher fight for when Syria fights for the Golan heights sooner or later

Aside frome the inevitable Israeli/Syrian war over the Golan, I wanna also point out that the proposed new trade and oil route connecting Turkey with Saudi Arabia runs close to Palmyra air base; thus, not only will Israel face a tougher Syria but also will have the final nail on the coffin for Israeli ambitions to become an energy trade hub by ensuring all Med East oil flows through its borders

In other words, whoever gets Palmyra Air base gains majority of Syria and dictates the rules of the game within the Sham region
 

Lool

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Wasnt it Emiratis alongside Egyptians?
Really? I thought that it was UAE Mirage fighter jets accompanied by French Rafale jets that killed Turkish troops; ofcourse with Russian blessings

As far as my info goes, Egypt doesnt have the green light to use the Rafale jets outside the Egyptian border. Moreover, the fighter jets deployed throughout Libya at that time were Emiratis and Russian
 

Ryder

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Yep, It was perperated by UAE but the jet that was used during that combat sortie was a Egyptian Mirage.

Reminds me of the 2020 debacle where Russia's airforce and Bashar Al Assads planes bombed Turkish soldiers. It was Russian led of course.

Still no revenge because Russia easily made Syria the fall guy.

Bashar Al assads regime fell and Russia's influence pretty much gone.

We have to thank Ukraine too for making Russia get bogged down. But Turkiye not striking 1 Russian base still leaves a sour taste in my mouth.
 

Ryder

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Really? I thought that it was UAE Mirage fighter jets accompanied by French Rafale jets that killed Turkish troops; ofcourse with Russian blessings

As far as my info goes, Egypt doesnt have the green light to use the Rafale jets outside the Egyptian border. Moreover, the fighter jets deployed throughout Libya at that time were Emiratis and Russian

Egypt was there albeit with soldiers. I think there were posts of Libyans using Turkish drones which drone striked Wagners and Egyptian soldiers. Egyptian soldiers were not confirmed.

Egypt did try to stop the Turkish navy alongside Greece to reach Libya.
 

Corvus

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A New Route from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean​

It is no longer enough to look at recent developments in the Middle East only through the Gaza war, developments in Syria, or tensions between Iran and Israel.

The real struggle is taking place along the routes that connect continents.

Where will energy flow? Which ports will handle trade? Through which route will the Gulf be connected to Europe? Who will have the final say in the Eastern Mediterranean? And who will guarantee the security of the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab?

Türkiye’s increasingly active diplomatic engagement with Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Palestine and Syria needs to be viewed in this broader context.

A New Equation in the Eastern Mediterranean​

For years, Israel, Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration have been trying to establish an order in the Eastern Mediterranean that leaves Türkiye out.

Türkiye’s response, however, is not limited to military measures.

Hakan Fidan’s meetings with both sides of Libya’s civil conflict, followed by his visit to Egypt and his contacts with the head of Egyptian intelligence, and then his informal dinner with his Egyptian and Saudi counterparts, are all noteworthy.
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What makes these meetings even more significant is that they are taking place at a time when Egypt’s possible accession to the Mecca Alliance is being discussed.

The Palestinian map placed between Fidan and the Libyan Prime Minister during their meeting was another striking detail. Symbolically, it reflected the fact that the region’s problems can no longer be treated as completely separate issues.
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When we add the recent high-level contacts with Lebanon, Palestine and Syria, a much larger picture begins to emerge.

Rather than simply responding to individual crises, Türkiye appears to be working towards a new regional balance stretching from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Red Sea.

The Real Issue Is the Corridors​

It would be a mistake to see this struggle as being only about military alliances.

At its heart, it is about energy and trade routes.

The emerging alignment between India, the UAE, Israel and Greece, and the increasingly close relations between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Türkiye, need to be viewed together in this context.

One of the most important issues here is IMEC.

The project aims to connect India to the Eastern Mediterranean and then to Europe through the Gulf. It could also strengthen Israel’s economic and strategic position in the region.

But as Türkiye strengthens its relations with Egypt, Libya, Lebanon and Syria, projects designed to bypass Türkiye become much more difficult to implement.

In particular, if Türkiye, Egypt, Libya, Lebanon and Syria develop a common understanding on the Eastern Mediterranean, it could seriously undermine Israel’s strategy of containing and isolating Türkiye.

This is why Egypt’s possible accession to the Mecca Alliance matters not only from a military perspective, but also for the future of the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Corridors Ahead of Türkiye​

The security problems in the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea have reminded the world of a simple truth: the security of trade routes is just as important as trade itself.

This is where Türkiye’s geography becomes a major advantage.

The Development Road aims to connect the Persian Gulf to Türkiye through Iraq and then to Europe. It is much more than a transportation project. It could bring together Gulf capital, Iraq’s geographic position and Türkiye’s routes into Europe along a single strategic corridor.

The Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, Iraq-Syria oil connections, Gulf-Ceyhan energy routes, the Zangezur Corridor and the Middle Corridor are also part of the same broader picture.

Even the historic Hejaz Railway carries an important lesson for today.

The Hejaz Railway was not built simply to transport people and goods. It became a strategic artery carrying the Ottoman Empire’s military logistics, communications, security and administrative power deep into the region.

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The question today is still the same:

Who will build and protect the routes that connect the region?

Where Does the Power of Great Powers Come From?​

Throughout history, one of the defining characteristics of great powers has been their ability to control not only territory, but also the flows moving through it.

Once, all roads led to Rome. The Mongols secured the Silk Road and controlled a significant part of Eurasian trade. Britain built one of the world's greatest empires by controlling the seas and the routes of maritime commerce.

After the Second World War, the United States took over much of this role.

Today, however, we see the United States struggling to guarantee uninterrupted security at some of the world's most critical chokepoints, including the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

At the same time, China is rebuilding a modern Silk Road through massive projects linking land and maritime routes.

This is exactly where Türkiye’s importance comes into focus.

As the world order changes, the value of countries located along major trade and energy routes increases.

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The Ottoman Experience Tells the Same Story​

Turkish history also shows the close relationship between trade routes and political power.

The changing routes of the Silk Road and Spice Route were among the developments that gradually weakened the Ottoman Empire’s economic and geopolitical weight.

Of course, the decline of the Ottoman Empire cannot be explained simply by changes in trade routes. Economic problems, the cost of wars, changes in the military system, administrative difficulties and major transformations in Europe were all part of the same story.

But the lesson is clear:

When a state loses its trade routes, it does not only lose money. It also loses geopolitical weight.

This is why Türkiye’s corridor policies today should not be seen merely as economic projects. Doing so would mean missing the bigger picture.

Where Is the Mecca Alliance Heading?​

The Mecca Alliance should also be viewed in this context.

If it remains limited to military cooperation, its impact will be relatively narrow. But if it brings security, energy, economic, trade and transportation issues under the same framework, it could take on a much greater significance.

Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan each bring different strengths to the table, and those strengths complement one another.

Saudi Arabia has financial power, investment capacity and a global diplomatic and lobbying network.

Türkiye and Pakistan, meanwhile, have strong militaries, defense industries, military experience and significant strategic capabilities.

Egypt’s participation could change the balance even further.

Egypt would give the alliance a direct Eastern Mediterranean dimension.

Over time, such a structure could develop into a broader security network stretching across the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab, the Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

From security problems in Yemen and the Red Sea to Sudan and Somalia, from the stability of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Libya to the security of energy and trade routes, many of these issues could be addressed within the same strategic framework.

This is why seeing the Mecca Alliance simply as a military agreement would miss the bigger picture.

If developed in the right way, it could become a structure capable of reshaping the region’s security and economic order.

Türkiye’s Great Opportunity​

Türkiye has two choices.

It can accept the place assigned to it within systems built by others.

Or it can connect the security, energy, transportation and trade networks within its own geography and become one of the architects of its own regional order.

This is why the Development Road, the Middle Corridor, energy routes, Eastern Mediterranean diplomacy and the Mecca Alliance should not be seen as separate issues.

They are all trying to answer the same question:

Who will stand at the center of the great flows of trade, energy and power between Europe and Asia?

Türkiye’s goal should not be merely to be a transit country that others pass through.

Türkiye should be a country that can shape the direction of those routes.

A Türkiye dependent on neither East nor West, seeking no one’s approval, capable of protecting itself, deterring its adversaries and having a say over the world’s most important energy and trade arteries.

That is the real issue.
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Throughout history, great powers became great not only because of their armies, but because they had the power to determine how and where the world moved.

That is exactly the opportunity before Türkiye today:

To build its own security order, open its own trade routes and secure its own energy corridors.

If Türkiye succeeds in doing this, it will no longer be a country merely responding to regional developments. It will become one of the countries shaping the future of the region and the wider world.
 
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