India Army Indian Army Armour Archive

[Nilgiri]

India has now turned to native development of a light tank rather than import them. This development should be applauded, but without obscuring the problems plaguing force planning for India’s armoured corps.

Who is this expert being quoted?
Ask him what happened to the RAPID.

That is my take on the whole issue summarised neatly.

 

[RogerRanger]

Personally I am very into light-tanks, specifically designed light-tanks. For bypassing enemy positions, moving behind the lines and destroying enemy communications and logistics. As they don't need a massive gun, 90 mm is great. They don't need armour beyond 40 mm protection and they don't need as much fuel, have greater speed, maneuver and range. I want the British to design one, with its usual variations. There would be a huge export market for it, as we see with the wheeled tank destroyers.

I like this thing here. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SK-105_Kürassier

I would give it a 90 mm gun, up armour it slightly, give it modern tank defences and technology, and increase its operational range to 500 miles. However its a good idea I think. And you can see the export potential to smaller countries as well. You don't want anything more than 20-25 tons the lighter the better.

 

[Nilgiri]

As commendable as the indigenous development of light tanks by the Indian Army is, we need to be aware of the thorny path that lies ahead.

Getty

• BATTLE TANKS
• DRDO
• INDIAN ARMY
• K-9 VAJRA
• LIGHT TANKS
• MK1A
• PLA
• SINO-INDIAN

The Modi government on 3 March 2022 announced the development of light tanks for the Indian Army (IA). This decision was taken under the Make-I category of the 2020 Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) and comes against the backdrop of India’s conversion of the K-9 Vajra mobile howitzer in to a light tank. A regiment of the K9-Vajra, which is a tracked 155mm/2 self-propelled howitzer capable of striking targets 50 kilometres away is now deployed in Ladakh in the ongoing stand-off with the Chinese. Further, deployments of the Vajra are likely in other parts of the Sino-Indian boundary. The K9-Vajra, however, was never going to be sufficient or a credible substitute for a dedicated light tank, which the government has now given an in-principle approval. The decision to deploy the Vajra was largely to meet the immediate military contingency facing India on its border with China and service some part of the firepower requirements of the IA. In terms of weight, the K9-Vajra is a 50-tonne tracked vehicle slightly exceeding the weight class of actual tanks such as the T-90 and T-72 Main Battle Tanks (MBTs), which are also deployed in Ladakh. T-90s combat weight is 48 tonnes and the older T-72s weigh 46 tonnes. Both Russian-built MBTs are equipped with 125mm guns.

Notwithstanding their current deployment, the weight of the K9-Vajras, the T-90s, and T-72s make them much too heavy for effective combat at high altitudes along the Sino-Indian boundary. In any case, even if they were effective, their deployment imposes logistical burden on the IA, which the service for several years now has been trying to reduce. The Directorate General of Mechanised Forces has been working intensively to reduce the weight of weapons systems and platforms. Apart from that, the Chinese have designed and developed a dedicated light tank called the Type-15 and deploy them due to their suitability for high altitude warfare against India. The Type-15 weighs 35 tonnes with a 105 mm gun making it significantly lighter than the IA’s T-90, T-72, and K9-Vajras. It is one of the few light tanks built in the last three decades. It is widely recognised to be a capable armoured platform, despite its smaller gun size compared to its Indian counterparts. The Chinese built the Type-15 light tanks, because they anticipated the need for low-weight armoured platforms for high altitude warfare and specifically for the kind of military contingency confronting the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) presently against the IA along the contested boundary between India and China.

How the IA got here and challenges ahead​

Against this backdrop, India had considered acquiring the Russian light tank the Sprut SDM1 following the outbreak of the current Sino-Indian boundary in May 2020. In April 2021, the Directorate General of Mechanised Forces issued a Request for Information (RFI) under the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for 350 light tanks in the weight class of 25 tonnes. Notwithstanding Russia’s offer, India has now turned to native development of a light tank rather than import them. This development should be applauded, but without obscuring the problems plaguing force planning for India’s armoured corps. The public writ large should be aware that India’s pressing need and quest for light tanks only emerged in the wake of the current Sino-Indian boundary crisis. In India, a crisis invariably tends to tip the scales lending urgency to decisions on new developmental initiatives—the government’s decision on the indigenous development of light tanks is no exception. It is also the product of the IA’s constricted vision in meeting the capability and operational challenges facing India against its primary foe—the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). Generally, the service has privileged medium to heavy weight armour over light armour. Pakistan has tended to disproportionately preoccupy the mind space of the IA’s planners. Consequently, the development of light tanks has not gained traction until the eruption of the present boundary stand-off with the PRC.
Irrespective of the merits of native development of light tanks, India’s decision-makers have to recognise that there could potentially be a minimum five-year lag before the country witnesses the emergence of the initial variant of a homemade light tank. Unless the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), the Combat Vehicles Research and Development Establishment (CVRDE), the Heavy Vehicles Factory (HVF) Limited and presumably some private sector company—the entities most likely spearheading the incipient light tank project achieve a miraculous breakthrough in less than five years.

Regardless of the duration of the development cycle, which hopefully will not be too long, the IA must be clear right at the outset about the technical specifications which meet its combat performance and deployment requirements for a light tank to obviate needless delays. Otherwise, it will leave tank designers at the DRDO and its subsidiaries in the “dark”. The light tank project cannot be hobbled by past native development of armoured platforms such as the nearly 70 tonne—Arjun MBT. Shifting performance benchmarks by the IA has a precedent in the Arjun MBT, which the IA has inducted with some reluctance and under the government’s directives. Despite significant improvements in the Mk1A variant, it is an overweight tank and can only be deployed in “pockets” such as the desert areas along the India-Pakistan border. The Arjun has also experienced considerable cost overruns. The delayed and lukewarm integration of both variants—Mk1 and Mk1A of the Arjun MBTs by the IA also serves as a reminder of how not to proceed with the development of an indigenous light tank, because it could compel the IA and the government importing light tanks at the cost of an indigenous capability. A heavily-sanctioned Russia in the coming months and years will be a highly risky source of supply. If India turns to an alternative source, it still condemns the country to importing hardware, grating against the current and any future government’ intent to acquire military capabilities from India’s domestic defence industry. Finally, Indian decision-makers must ensure sustained funding, despite a turnover in government at the national level and closely monitor the Research and Development (R&D) and eventual production that involves all stakeholders in realising a credible light tank capability.

https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/light-tanks-a-shot-in-the-arm-for-the-indian-army/

@Nilgiri @Jackdaws @T-123456 @Joe Shearer @Peace Lover @Lonewolf

The k9 chassis is capable reliable one.

But the thinking must evolve to one of eating good sound breakfast (when it comes to our combined arms units like RAPID) instead of eternally scanning the dinner menu....and finding eye for an eye reactionary equivalencies with whomever had made it to that fancier joint (for whatever reason of theirs).

For a country the size of India, a great deal could have been done and proven by now even with the BMP and BTR chassis if there was actual core competency and drive. Its not like the world lacks 105 mm guns to buy and produce too.

If those chassis were found deficient, there was a huge amount of scope to look at a french or israeli chassis (or korean back then, if you look at where K9 came from).

This just all gets back to me thinking why India didnt just approach FN for the FNC (given our use of FAL)....but made a large (sorely energy consuming) INSAS sillywalk instead.

Don't get me started on the bofors.... the very reason we are at breakfast stage still for combined arms.

We got enough drive and change to deliver the artillery needed before we get to the pathfinder AT stuff?

You can get results, or use up time and paper.

Guess which one more successful areas of Indian defence and technology establishment adopted.

But they have to be pushed up against a wall to go that way.

Has that really changed with the easy-street laggards now?

Are they actually thinking holistically?...in this era of drones and all kind of other things to consider and account for.

I plan to go deeper into the artillery thread discussion later, hopefully once the subject material pro (the korean member) has time/thoughts to share.

Also the Indian ORBAT thread...I will be later updating some US ORBAT for combined arms reforms they are doing for comparison as to what the holistic process was and is.

What they did long ago (that India still has not and will not for god knows how long) should be painfully apparent.

It is all stuff you have to get interested in taking in and exploring deeper...to have the soundest base possible. Hope you and others follow and respond in those threads. It will take some time I feel though.

You cannot expect short easy answers at all.....that is what the morons running the joint always expect you to think (and hence the various fluff pieces and tasty crumbs they throw out now and then), so they can keep charades and gamesmanship going as is to suit them.

Indian defence (very much like the Indian state) is a hotch potch massive thing lurching into a brave new world with little easy-learning time and easy-buffet for its size.

Yet those in privilege positions do all they can to tell you different for a number of different reasons. You have to learn to mistrust and despise all of them equally (as default till they PROVE they arent) as first step. That is my take on it.

 

[Ryder]

India needs a mix of light and medium tanks especially in tough terrain areas where heavy tanks are useless.

While heavy tanks should be used for heavy hitting to fight a conventional war.

India is should try devise whats best. I dont think apcs or ifvs are inadequate in such places like mountains you need firepower.

MLRS proving once again how important they are in the battlefield.

 

[Joe Shearer]

India needs a mix of light and medium tanks especially in tough terrain areas where heavy tanks are useless.

While heavy tanks should be used for heavy hitting to fight a conventional war.

India is should try devise whats best. I dont think apcs or ifvs are inadequate in such places like mountains you need firepower.

MLRS proving once again how important they are in the battlefield.

Sure, you are making sense, but the answer to "What is it India needs, a mix of light and medium tanks?" is "Well, yes. And no!"

Bear with me while I plough through an earlier post, that should be of interest to you as well.

 

[Ryder]

Sure, you are making sense, but the answer to "What is it India needs, a mix of light and medium tanks?" is "Well, yes. And no!"

Bear with me while I plough through an earlier post, that should be of interest to you as well.

Warfare at times confuses me to be honest.

Because there is so many requirements and factors that are taken into consideration. Whats best, what will work and what will fail.

You also wonder what is the enemy doing. How do we counter them.

 

[Ryder]

When was I teen even a kid all I believed that weapons decided everything

You can go blast them like rambo when you grow up you realise thats all bs.

Every weapon has a flaw and there is no God weapon that can take on everybody.

History has proven this so many times everytime a new weapon system was invented that the makers advertised it as the wonder weapon to win the war. Until you realise money, supplying, logistics and training are taken into account.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Personally I am very into light-tanks, specifically designed light-tanks. For bypassing enemy positions, moving behind the lines and destroying enemy communications and logistics.

Here, we have several concepts jostling for mind-space.

On the one hand, there is the atavistic look-back at what the British called the LRDG - the Long Range Desert Groups, basically Tommies on light four wheel drives looping around the southern flank of both sets of combatants in the desert, and striking unwary and unguarded assets on their right flank. If very lucky, on their left flank as well. That is possible - was possible - in the African desert north of the main Sahara, with its stony soil punctuated by basins of deep sand that swallow up vehicles and soldiers alike - not quicksand, just a smart-alecky way of saying the distances were considerable.

This doesn't work in the Thar. The sand is of a different composition and does not encourage chuntering around looking for trouble. It does encourage camel-based warfare, but somehow I don't see in my mind's eye the XVII Camel Corps giving the enemy any trouble.

It particularly doesn't work, unless someone has screwed up and not patrolled far enough, patrolled long enough, or sorted out the patrol photographs and put them up for photo-interpretation day before yesterday. Day before yesterday in the military lands up with Hannibal, nothing beyond 'now' attracts the normal military attention.

On the second hand, there is that wishful PBI thought that keeps coming up again and again and again, that some big steel monster would turn up to crouch behind, and keep the other guy skipped around with a storm of shell and shot. First, it was the Gatling Gun, without the comfort of cover behind a steel body; then the unmistakable round barrel of the water-cooled Lewis gun, on to the Rolls Royce armoured cars so beloved of the Lawrence of Lawrence of Arabia, until the tank appeared. Then onwards, there was the constant conflict between the fast-moving armoured column, sweeping around obstacles, moving with great speed, assisted on its way by lethal close air support, and the slow, reliable monster that the infantry could walk beside, and could fool itself into thinking that the bulk of steel represented safety.

Again, South Asian armies have to do their homework, if they are to survive to do their classwork. They need to work out what their doctrine will be, in fact, they need to figure out if there will be one all-encompassing doctrine or different ones for different war-conditions, and consequently different inventories of soldiers, weapons and vehicles. Sweeping lunges by armoured formations have never really been tried, and where they were tried in embryo, the numbers were so small that even a comprehensive victory would have given the winning side a possible opening to the other people's jugular.

So the second conflicted concept is the question of how to use armoured vehicles, at high speed to run around the enemy's flanks, or steadily advance guiding groups of foot-weary soldiers.

The third is of protection. Walls of steel normally calm down men who are sheltering behind it, until the opposition finds the weaknesses and outlines them with a few, well-aimed shots. Sadly, even a heavily armoured battle tank cannot offer invulnerability. Consider the amount of protection of armoured vehicles; at their designed level of protecting the occupants against a reasonable chance of heated shrapnel or medium machine guns, that leaves us with an extremely fragile armoured vehicle.

 

[Joe Shearer]

The fourth is of fire-power. This is the heart-breaking dilemma that will only grow.

 

[Joe Shearer]

a 90 mm gun,

Neither here nor there. If it has to hurt an opposing MBT, and not fight intermediate actions with similarly protected and equipped armoured cars, IFVs or APCs, it has to be 105 mm or 120 mm; if the target is to be opposing infantry, then an automatic 20mm/40mm/60mm cannon is best.
Why not both options? Maximum flexibility that way.

Sure, but another problem kicks in. Inventory. Keeping track of how much replenishment is needed, and how to ensure that a sufficient stock of diverse ammunition types is available.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Some glimmerings of a doctrine-driven vehicle now begin to emerge.

Warfare at times confuses me to be honest.

Because there is so many requirements and factors that are taken into consideration. Whats best, what will work and what will fail.

You also wonder what is the enemy doing. How do we counter them.

At this point, do things look a little clearer? I've paused to check that this is making sense.

 

[Madokafc]

To my opinion,

the needs for light tank medium tank or MBT is arose from operational requirement in which largely dictated by logistic management issue, not from capability wise.

 

[Joe Shearer]

To my opinion,

the needs for light tank medium tank or MBT is arose from operational requirement in which largely dictated by logistic management issue, not from capability wise.

Again, yes and no.

Yes, logistics management is a constraint in this case, not a causal factor.

That means that we need a tank because of operational requirements, but it is the logistical constraint that makes us look for a light tank. Operationally a beast of 65 mt is fine; logistically it is not.

 

[Joe Shearer]

To my opinion,

the needs for light tank medium tank or MBT is arose from operational requirement in which largely dictated by logistic management issue, not from capability wise.

With this in mind, we need to look at why and how a tank might be used, or a tank-substitute might be used, in order to draw out the specs from these use situations.

That is what we are doing.

 

[Zapper]

Personally I am very into light-tanks, specifically designed light-tanks. For bypassing enemy positions, moving behind the lines and destroying enemy communications and logistics. As they don't need a massive gun, 90 mm is great. They don't need armour beyond 40 mm protection and they don't need as much fuel, have greater speed, maneuver and range. I want the British to design one, with its usual variations. There would be a huge export market for it, as we see with the wheeled tank destroyers.

I like this thing here. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SK-105_Kürassier

I would give it a 90 mm gun, up armour it slightly, give it modern tank defences and technology, and increase its operational range to 500 miles. However its a good idea I think. And you can see the export potential to smaller countries as well. You don't want anything more than 20-25 tons the lighter the better.

That level of armor is still not sufficient imo given the advancements in ATGMs. The Russian T-series tanks (not T-90s) which are way more armoured than a Sprut or the likes couldn't withstand Javelin hits as seen in Ukraine

I'm confident a Javelin or Spike ATGM will slice thru these light tanks like hot knife and butter. In our case fielding these light tanks against china...trying to mirror their deployments will be a futile attempt. It might be more effective to have dedicated ATGM teams to move in stealthily and take out these tanks by hiding in the mountains

 

[RogerRanger]

That level of armor is still not sufficient imo given the advancements in ATGMs. The Russian T-series tanks (not T-90s) which are way more armoured than a Sprut or the likes couldn't withstand Javelin hits as seen in Ukraine

I'm confident a Javelin or Spike ATGM will slice thru these light tanks like hot knife and butter. In our case fielding these light tanks against china...trying to mirror their deployments will be a futile attempt. It might be more effective to have dedicated ATGM teams to move in stealthily and take out these tanks by hiding in the mountains

Yeah totally. ATGM's would destroy them no problem. Which is why you need light infantry, light artillery and light air cover, with your light tanks as they bypass enemy lines. Once you get a contact and get a tank KO'ed, you then disengage and move around to encircle the enemy as well. Its expected that you lose a fair number of light-tanks in the operation, but you also destroy the enemies capacity to fight at the operational and strategic level, you make it so they only operate on the company and battalion level. I would also say that modern armour and counter-measures give the light-tank a level of survivability it didn't have 10 years ago against ATGM's.

 

[Joe Shearer]

So far, we have identified a vehicle that can be used as an independent scout or reconnaissance vehicle, that has sufficient armour to withstand at minimum artillery shrapnel, or 12.7 mm machine gun fire, available as either a wheeled or a tracked vehicle.

If these are configured to carry 10 soldiers as well as its own operating crew, we are looking at a 10 passenger battle-field taxi. At this level, as it is able to carry a section, we are looking for a smallish vehicle. For this, we need an automatic cannon firing 20 mm shells, or twin-mounted cannons, remotely aimed and fired from within the compartment.

This would be the smaller 'section' carrier, or the carrier for a section, weighing - with armour - around 25.0 tonnes, carrying automatic cannon, able to support infantry, and offer anti-aircraft defence, but not able to attack opposing armoured vehicles, or artillery.

A heavier version, carrying a platoon of three sections, would be a more potent battlefield threat to opposing forces. It would mount a 120 mm smooth-bore cannon, again, offer either tracked or wheeled drive, and bear a weight of closer to 35 MT.

These two should meet between them meet the requirements of light tank for the tasks of infantry support, infantry battlefield transport and anti-tank and anti-personnel roles, in good territory and bad.

It needs to be added that modifications will be necessary; what has already been done needs to be replicated; specifically, engine modifications for high-altitude use, and water-proofing for amphibious duties. Trying to put these into all models will slow down the development process, and instead it is preferable to finalise testing and trials of a base model, and to then modify that to specific environmental needs.

 

[Joe Shearer]

I'm confident a Javelin or Spike ATGM will slice thru these light tanks like hot knife and butter. In our case fielding these light tanks against china...trying to mirror their deployments will be a futile attempt. It might be more effective to have dedicated ATGM teams to move in stealthily and take out these tanks by hiding in the mountains

Belt and braces will do it.

It is certainly useful to do this as a regular practice; the Pakistan Army supplements its regular formations with LAT (Light Anti-Tank) teams and at a higher level, with HAT (Heavy Anti-Tank) teams reporting direct to the higher formation leadership. They have proliferated their Chinese cloned ATGM, the Bakhtar Shikan, right through the Army.

However, they have not therefore given up their armoured fighting vehicles.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Yeah totally. ATGM's would destroy them no problem. Which is why you need light infantry, light artillery and light air cover, with your light tanks as they bypass enemy lines. Once you get a contact and get a tank KO'ed, you then disengage and move around to encircle the enemy as well. Its expected that you lose a fair number of light-tanks in the operation, but you also destroy the enemies capacity to fight at the operational and strategic level, you make it so they only operate on the company and battalion level. I would also say that modern armour and counter-measures give the light-tank a level of survivability it didn't have 10 years ago against ATGM's.

If you ask me, there should be four different types of formation at root level itself. We need to walk away from the one formation fights all stereotyped doctrine.

 

[SavageKing456]

Drdo,L&T are prototyping it
Will be displayed next year