an excerpt from the works of Agha Amin. A fascinating read one most will not like.
@Joe Shearer @Kaptaan @Nilgiri @Yankeestani @VCheng
The Pakistan Army
From 1965 to 1971
Selected Excerpts from “Pakistan Army Since 1965”re-drafted as an article exclusively for the “Defence
Journal”. “The Pakistan Army Since 1965” is thesecond volume of the Two Volume history of PakistanArmy and covers Pakistan Army from 1965 till 2000.
The finest summarising of the incalculable qualitative harm inflicted on the Pakistan Army, by the self-promoted FieldMarshal of peace, by a contemporary, was done by Major
General Fazal I Muqeem, when he described the state ofaffairs of the Pakistan Army during the period 1958-71; inthe following words: "We had been declining according to
the degree of our involvement in making and unmaking of
regimes. Gradually the officer corps, intensely proud of its
professionalism was eroded at its apex into third class
politicians and administrators. Due to the absence of a
properly constituted political government, the selection and
promotion of officers to the higher rank depended on one
man’s will. Gradually, the welfare of institutions was
sacrificed to the welfare of personalities. To take the
example of the army, the higher command had been
slowly weakened by retiring experienced officers at a
disturbingly fine rate. Between 1955 and November 1971,
in about 17 years 40 Generals had been retired, of whom
only four had reached their superannuating age. Similar
was the case with other senior ranks. Those in the higher
ranks who showed some independence of outlook were
invariably removed from service. Some left in sheer
disgust in this atmosphere of insecurity and lack of the
right of criticism, the two most important privileges of an
Armed Forces officer. The extraordinary wastage of senior
officers particularly of the army denied the services, of the
experience and training vital to their efficiency and welfare.
Some officers were placed in positions that they did not
deserve or had no training for" 1.
The advent of Yahya Khan and Yahya’s Personality
Immediately after the 1965 war Major General Yahya Khan
who had commanded the 7 Division in the Grand Slam
Operation was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant
General, appointed Deputy Army C in C and C in C
designate in March 1966 2. Yahya was a Qizilbash3
commissioned from Indian Military Academy Dehra Dun
on 15 July 1939. An infantry officer from the 4/10 Baluch
Regiment, Yahya saw action during WW II in North Africa
where he was captured by the Axis Forces in June 1942
and interned in a prisoner of war camp in Italy from where
he escaped in the third attempt4. In 1947 he was
instrumental in not letting the Indian officers shift books 5
from the famous library of the British Indian Staff College
at Quetta,where Yahya was posted as the only Muslim
instructor at the time of partition of India.Yahya was from a
reasonably well to do family, had a much better
schooling than Musa Khan and was directly
commissioned as an officer. Yahya unlike Musa was
respected in the officer corps for professional competence.
Yahya became a brigadier at the age of 34 and
commanded the 106 Infantry Brigade, which was deployed
on the ceasefire line in Kashmir in 1951-52. Later Yahya as
Deputy Chief of General Staff was selected to head the
army’s planning board set up by Ayub to modernise the
Pakistan Army in 1954-57. Yahya also performed the
duties of Chief of General Staff from 1958 to 1962 from
where he went on to command an infantry division from
1962 to 1965.
Yahya was a hard drinking soldier approaching the scale
of Mustafa Kemal of Turkey and had a reputation of not
liking teetotallers. Yahya liked courtesans but his passion
had more to do with listening to them sing or watching
them dance. Thus he did not have anything of Ataturk’s
practical womanising traits. Historically speaking many
great military commanders like Khalid Bin Waleed,
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Eftikhar Khan and Grant were
accused of debauchery and womanising. These personal
habits still did not reduce their personal efficiency and all
of them are remembered in military history as great
military commanders! The yardstick is that as long as a
military commander performs his job as a military leader
well, debauchery drink etc is not important. Abraham
Lincoln a man of great integrity and character when told by
the typical military gossip type commanders, found in all
armies of the world and in particular plenty in the Indo-Pak
armies, about Grants addiction to alcohol dismissed their
criticism by stating "I cannot spare this man. He fights"!
Indeed while the US Civil War was being fought a remark
about Grant was attributed to Lincoln and frequently
repeated as a joke in army messes. The story thus went
that Lincoln was told about Grant’s drinking habits, and
was asked to remove Grant from command. Lincoln
dismissed this suggestion replying "send every general in
the field a barrel of it"! Once Lincoln heard this joke he
said that he wished very much that he had said it! 6
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, praised by his enemies, i.e. the
British, in the British Official History of WW One, as one of
the greatest military commanders in world’s history was a
great consumer of alcohol and chronic womaniser! It has
been alleged that Kemal was a homosexual (a typically
Turkish pastime) too and frequently suffered the ravages
of venereal disease! The same was true for Petain one of
the greatest military commanders of the French Army in
WW One!
Gul Hassan Khan who served with Yahya in the General
Headquarters in the early 1960s described Yahya as
"professionally competent" and as a man of few words
whom always approached the point at issue without
ceremony.7 Muqeem described Yahya as "authoritarian by
nature" and "reserved by temperament".8 Major General
Sher Ali under whom Yahya served assessed Yahya as an
officer of the "highest calibre". Shaukat Riza writing as
recently as 1986 described Yahya as a good soldier, as a
commander distinguished for his decision making and
generous nature and one who gave his total trust to a man
whom he accepted as part of his team or a colleague.9
Contrary to Gauhar’s judgement Yahya, at least in 1966-
69, was definitely viewed as a professional in the army. His
shortcomings in functioning as the Supreme Commander
that became evident in the 1971 war were not known to
anyone in 1966. No evidence exists, but it appears that
Yahya’s sect and ethnicity may have played a part in
Ayub’s decision to select Yahya as C in C. Musa writes in
his memoirs that Yahya was not his first choice as Army C
in C but was selected by Ayub overruling Musa’s
reservations about Yahya’s character 10. This further
proves that Ayub selected Yahya as the army chief for
reasons other than merit. I am not implying that Yahya was
incompetent, but merely the fact that Ayub was motivated
by ulterior reasons to select Yahya. These reasons had
something to do with Yahya’s political reliability by virtue of
belonging to a minority! Yahya was not a Punjabi or a
Pathan but belonged to a minority ethnic group as well as
a minority ethnic group, just like Musa.This was no mere
coincidence but a deliberately planned manoeuvre to have
as army chief a man who was not from the two ethnic
groups which dominated the officer corps, the Punjabis
being more than 60 % of the officer corps and the Pathans
being the second largest group after the Punjabis!11 Altaf
Gauhar Ayub’s close confidant inadvertently proves this
fact once he quite uncharitably, and for reasons, other than
dispassionate objective historical considerations,
described Yahya as one " selected…in preference to some
other generals, because Yahya, who had come to hit the
bottle hard, had no time for politics and was considered a
harmless and loyal person".12
Selection of Army C in C
Foreign readers may note that almost all army chiefs of
Pakistan Army were selected primarily because they were
perceived as reliable as well as pliable! In Addition ethnic
factors Vis a Vis prevalent political considerations played a
part in their selection. Thus Liaquat the first premier
selected a non Punjabi as the army’s first C in C since in
1950 Liaquat was involved in a political confrontation with
Punjabi politicians of the Muslim League and had
established a Hindustani-Pathan-Bengali alliance to
sideline the Punjabi Muslims. Thus the most obvious
nominee for the appointment of C in C i.e. Major General
Raza, a Punjabi Muslim was not selected. Instead Ayub an
ethnic Pathan, and one who already had been superseded
and sidelined, and with a poor war record was selected as
the first Pakistani Muslim army C in C. Similarly Ayub
selected Musa simply because Musa was perceived as
loyal despite not being competent! Yahya as Gauhar
Ayub’s closest adviser and confidant admits, as earlier
mentioned, was selected because he had hit the bottle
hard; i.e. was harmless, and was loyal, and thus no danger
to Ayub! In other words Gauhar advances a theory that
Ayub selected Yahya (Gauhar’s subjective judgement)
simply because it was politically expedient for Ayub to
have this particular type of man as army chief! Gauhar
judgement of Yahya has little value since it was highly
subjective but Ayub’s reasons for selecting his army chief,
as Gauhar describes it speaks volumes for the character
of Ayub and I would say the orientation of all Pakistani
politicians, both civilian and military! In third world
countries every army chief is a military politician! The
process was carried on and continues to date but this
chapter deals with only 1965-1971, so more of this later!
The same was true for extensions given to the army
chiefs. Ayub got three extensions since Iskandar Mirza
perceived him as a reliable tool. He booted out Mirza, his
benefactor, after the last extension in 1958! Ayub gave
Musa an extension of four years in 1962 since he
perceived Musa as reliable and politically docile, and thus
no threat to Ayub’s authoritarian government. Since 1962
when Musa got his extension of service by one additional
term of four years, which prolonged his service from 1962
to 196613, no Pakistani army chief was given an extension
beyond his three or four year term. The situation however
was still worse since Yahya took over power in 1969 and
thus automatically extended his term as C in C till
December 1971. Zia usurped power in 1977 and thus gave
himself a nine year extension as Army Chief till he was
removed to the army and the country’s great relief in
August 1988 by Divine Design! Beg attempted to get an
extension by floating the idea of being appointed as
Supreme Commander of Armed Forces14 but was
outmanoeuvred by his own army corps commanders, who
gave a lukewarm response to the idea and by Ghulam
Ishaq who was a powerful president and had a deep
understanding of the military mind by virtue of having
loyally and successfully served three military dictators.
Yahya Khan as Army Chief-1966-1971
Yahya energetically started reorganising the Pakistan
Army in 1965. Today this has been forgotten while Yahya is
repeatedly condemned for only his negative qualities (a
subjective word which has little relevance to generalship
as proved in military history)! The post 1965 situation saw
major organisational as well as technical changes in the
Pakistan Army. Till 1965 it was thought that divisions could
function effectively while getting orders directly from the
army’s GHQ. This idea failed miserably in the 1965 war
and the need to have intermediate corps headquarters in
between the GHQ and the fighting combat divisions was
recognised as a foremost operational necessity after the
1965 war. In 1965 war the Pakistan Army had only one
corps headquarter i.e the 1 Corps Headquarters. Soon
after the war had started the US had imposed an embargo
on military aid on both India and Pakistan. This embargo
did not affect the Indian Army but produced major changes
in the Pakistan Army’s technical composition. US
Secretary of State Dean Rusk well summed it up when he
said, "Well if you are going to fight, go ahead and fight,
but we’re not going to pay for it"!15 Pakistan now turned to
China and for military aid and Chinese tank T-59 started
replacing the US M-47/48 tanks as the Pakistan Army’s
MBT (Main Battle Tank) from 1966. 80 tanks, the first
batch of T-59s, a low-grade version of the Russian T-54/55
series were delivered to Pakistan in 1965-66. The first
batch was displayed in the Joint Services Day Parade on
23 March 196616. The 1965 War had proved that Pakistan
Army’s tank infantry ratio was lopsided and more infantry
was required. Three more infantry divisions (9, 16 and 17
Divisions) largely equipped with Chinese equipment and
popularly referred to by the rank and file as "The China
Divisions" were raised by the beginning of 196817. Two
more corps headquarters i.e. 2 Corps Headquarters
(Jhelum-Ravi Corridor) and 4 Corps Headquarters (Ravi-
Sutlej Corridor) were raised.
In the 1965 War India had not attacked East Pakistan
which was defended by a weak two-infantry brigade
division (14 Division) without any tank support. Yahya
correctly appreciated that geographical, as well as
operational situation demanded an entirely independent
command set up in East Pakistan. 14 Division’s infantry
strength was increased and a new tank regiment was
raised and stationed in East Pakistan. A new Corps
Headquarters was raised in East Pakistan and was
designated as Headquarters Eastern Command.18 It was
realised by the Pakistani GHQ that the next war would be
different and East Pakistan badly required a new
command set up.
Major General Sahibzada Yaqub Khan took over as the
army’s Chief of General Staff and thus Principal Staff
Officer to the C in C soon after the 1965 war. Yaqub was
an aristocrat from a Hindustani Pathan background and
was altogether different from the typical north of Chenab
breed in depth of intellect, general outlook and strategic
perception! In words of Fazal Muqeem a sharp observer
and one who was not lavish in praising anyone "planning
had taken a turn for the better when Major General Yaqub
Khan became the Chief of General Staff”.19 In other words
Muqeem was implying that planning level in the army was
relatively poor before Yaqub became the Chief of General
Staff. But Muqeem went further and stated that the army’s
war plans in the post 1965 era were still vague about "what
action should be taken in West Pakistan if an attack was
mounted against East Pakistan".20 We will discuss more
of this later.
Promotions and Appointments
Selection and assessment of officers for higher ranks had
depended on one man’s will and his personal likes and
dislikes since 1950. Initially it was Ayub from 1950 to 1969
and Yahya from 1969 to 1971. Dictators fear all around
them and this was the principal tragedy of the Pakistan
Army. Selection and assessment of men was not a plus
point in Yahya’s personality. It appears that either Yahya
was not a good judge of men. In this regard Yahya
continued Ayub’s policy of sidelining talented officers who
had the potential of becoming a rival at a later stage! We
will first deal with selection for higher ranks vis-a-vis war
performance. Almost no one, who had blundered, except
Brigadier Sardar Ismail the acting divisional commander of
15 Division, was really taken to task for having failed in the
discharge of his military duties!21 Lord Bashir of Valtoha
fame was promoted, and commanded the 6th Armoured
Division after the war! On the other hand Major General
Abrar, who had proved himself as the finest military
commander, at the divisional level, at least by sub
continental standards, was sidelined and ultimately retired
in the same rank!22 Lieutenant Colonel Nisar of 25
Cavalry who had saved Pakistan’s territorial integrity from
being seriously compromised at a strategic level at Gadgor
on the 8th of September 1965 was sidelined. This may be
gauged from the fact that at the time of outbreak of the
1971 War Nisar although promoted to brigadier rank, was
only commanding the Armoured corps recruit training
centre, a poor appointment for a man who had
distinguished himself as a tank regiment commander in
stopping the main Indian attack. A man whose unit’s
performance was described by the enemy opposing him
as one "which was certainly creditable because it alone
stood between the 1st Indian Armoured Division and its
objective"23 was considered by the Pakistani General
Headquarters pedantic officers as fit only to command a
recruit training centre while one who was instrumental in
failure of the main Pakistani armour effort at Khem Karan
was promoted to Major General rank and trusted with the
command of Pakistan’s Armoured division! Brigadier
Qayyum Sher who had distinguished himself as a brigade
commander in 10 Division area in Lahore was also not
promoted! Qayyum Sher was one of the few brigade
commanders of the army who had led from the front. Major
General Shaukat Riza who rarely praised anyone had the
following to say about Sher’s conduct while leading the
Pakistan army’s most important infantry brigade counter
attack on Lahore Front as a result of which the Indian 15
Division despite considerable numerical superiority was
completely thrown off balance. Shaukat stated that
"Brigadier Qayyum Sher, in his command jeep, moved
from unit to unit and then personally led the advance, star
plate and pennant visible. This was something no troops
worth their salt could ignore".24 but the Army’s Selection
Boards ignored Qayyum Sher once his turn for promotion
came! Qayyum Sher did well in war and was awarded the
Pakistani D.S.O i.e. the HJ! But war performance or even
performance in peacetime training manoeuvres was, and
still is, no criteria for promotion in the Pakistan Army!
Qayyum retired as a brigadier, remembered by those who
fought under him as a brave and resolute commander,
who was not given an opportunity to rise to a higher rank,
which Qayyum had deserved, more than any brigadier of
the Pakistan Army did.
Analysis and reappraisal after the 1965 War
The 1965 War was rich in lessons and many lessons were
learned; however the army’s reorganisation was badly
affected by the political events of 1968-71. The two major
areas of improvement after the war were in the realm of
military organisation and military plans. It was realised
finally that infantry and armoured divisions could not be
effectively employed till they were organised as corps with
areas of responsibility based on terrain realities.
The post 1965 army saw major changes in terms of
creation of corps headquarters. On the other side no major
doctrinal reappraisal was done after the 1965 War except
raising new divisions and corps no major reform was
undertaken to produce a major qualitative change in the
army’s tactical and operational orientation. Today this is a
much criticised subject. The events of 1965-71 however
must be taken as a whole. When one does so a slightly
different picture emerges. A major start was taken soon
after 1965 after Yahya had been nominated as the deputy
army chief, towards improving higher organisation and
corps were created, but this process was retarded by the
much more ominous political developments which
increasingly diverted the army chiefs energies into political
decision making from 1969 onwards.
The 1965 War was a failure in higher leadership. This was
true for both sides. However, qualitative superiority by
virtue of superior doctrine strategic orientation and
operational preparedness became relatively far more
important for the Pakistan Army than the Indians.
The Indians had already embarked on a programme of
rapid expansion since the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962. The
material and numerical gap between the Indian and
Pakistan armies started widening from 1962 and after
1965 it reached dangerous proportions! Further because
of the 1965 War the Indians got an opportunity to improve
their command and control procedures. The Indians the
reader must note were already one step ahead of the
Pakistanis in higher organisation since their army was
organised to fight as corps since 1947-48 while the
Pakistan Army had fought the 1965 War organised in
divisions.
