Even if they somehow manage to find a solution to the drones (they can't) how are they going to resist TSK in a way that would make them reach their goals of sustainability and independence? Let's put Turkiye to the side for a moment and think about who will allow such thing to happen in our neighbourhood? Iran, Assad, Russia, Iraq? Nobody wants an independent Kurdish State in Syria apart from the US. Kurds are used as tools and nothing more.
TSK is much more than drones. I want to remind that after 2-3 days of MIT drone campaign YPG basically stopped functioning and it took them weeks, even months to restart their normal operations. We are talking not even about the army, this was the intelligence service of Turkiye! What would happen if TSK unleash its force on them without agreeing on an airspace limitation by foreign forces, which would be the case if the situation somehow gets out of control and our operation is based on the UN Article 51? There's no way that they may show a resistance. YPG and TSK are not comparable militarily in any way. In the moment which Operation Euphrates Shield started this whole project died.
The fate of YPG is either to join the ranks of SAA under Russian and Iranian guidance or be annihilated like it happened west of Euphrates with the rebranding of YPG as the HRE which operates in close coordination with the Regime, Russia and Hezbollah. If they don't comply with the Regime, Iran and Russia they will make them comply. If they don't do it, we will take the situation in our hand even the biggest Kurdish power center in the region will provide us support in this. Don't be deceived by the "100.000" men figure, the shiny uniforms and propaganda. YPG is nothing more than a simple abortion living its last minutes. In the end only the memories will remain.
We for sure could've managed the whole process better, but there's no usage in beating a dead horse. If we concentrate at the current situation we can conclude that the "Lock" in Iraq is about to be completed, 25.000 additional professional soldiers will join the ranks of TSK soon, the weight of TSK in Iraq will get lighter and after that you know what's coming. We may see some limited action soon, here and there, but I think the big thing is coming in 2-3 years if there's no major changes like a rapid US or Iranian decline.
The reality is that everything that considers timing is depending on the attrition warfare going on between Iran and the US. We are spectators and balancers here. Any rapid change of the balance between the two is a negative thing for us as we still don't have established mechanisms and capabilities to effectively fill the power vacuum that would form and effectively control the dynamics in such an event. The US will lose this war and the slower it loses it, the more time we got to prepare so we can face the other regional power contender in the face of Iran and force them to negotiate and coordinate with us, which we can only achieve trough deterrence that we currently don't have enough from. During this time, we keep in check YPG's force potential by killing whoever pose a threat to Turkiye and keep an eye at the logistics, finance and their political contacts in Iraq. The recent developments around their drone programs is a sign that we pushed too much, gained too much power in this game and someone (Iran) is trying to balance things out. The bad news for them is that all PKK targets in Iraq are within our reach and it is only a matter of time before our intelligence intercept the whole supply chain and we start hunting while simultaneously complete the rest of the "Lock". After that, all eyes on KRG as they will be the ones leading the local reflexes to the newly established "Kurdistani Hezbollah" threat in close cooperation with MIT trough forces that will be sponsored and trained with our help. By the time our job in Zap and Metina will be finished and our only work in Iraq will be to keep in check the PKK in Gara, Sinjar and Suleymaniye trough enhanced Peshmerga monitoring, intelligence (COMINT,HUMINT) operations and surgical strikes.
As a conclusion I want to say that such a threat is not possible to be destroyed even if we invade half of Syria and Iraq. This is not something that would just perish just like that and as long as there are forces that are feeding this fire, the PKK will exist. If we want to think realistically, we will not be able to fully destroy PKK in short to middle term. What we can do is dismantle their armed components that are posing a threat to us and keeping the cancer in check so it doesn't spread. Unfortunately we can't do everything by ourselves and this is why we should keep by the balls KDP in Iraq so we can deepen cooperation with KRG regarding this matter as Kurdish political support is of crucial importance now and will be of crucial importance when the times of PKK being forced to put down arms and concentrate mainly in the political realm of the whole struggle comes.
TSK could end it very quickly but it hasn't
I do not believe it is a question of can we, but will we?
how are they going to resist TSK in a way that would make them reach their goals of sustainability and independence? Let's put Turkiye to the side for a moment and think about who will allow such thing to happen in our neighbourhood? Iran, Assad, Russia, Iraq?
I don't think it will be full independence, it will be autonomy.
Iraq, Iran, Syria have limited to no say on the YPG, Iraq even trades with them and has diplomatic connections. Syria is too weak and is dependent on them for agriculture and oil. Iran cannot fight the rebels and the YPG, who are close to the PKK which they align with in Iraq (therefore making them more useful).
Putting TSK aside would mean little to no cards on the Iran, Iraq Syria front to not concede autonomy.
Autonomy means the building of official institutions and cultural opposition which will put TR into a position that it will be recognized the same way the Barzanis are, state visits and so on.
Probably even more so as they are closer to the Kurds in the southeast.
Is the operations against the PKK or Kurdish autonomy?
If it's Kurdish autonomy, why do the supply routes through Iraq matter? Surely the more reinforcements, the more you can remove from the field in a battle.
If it's just PKK, are we only striking close to PKK or PKK aligned members in Syria? Hence Mazloum and a lot of others being safe? What's the game plan if this is the case?
Also the KDP have been trying to postpone the elections because it looks like they will lose the majority to PKK aligned Talabani. If we lose the KDP, what happens then? Confrontation with Talabani will draw Iran and Iraq in, and I don't think our leadership have the balls at the moment
Currently the thing to pay attention to most is the sanctions on the northeast. As soon as those go, our veto power in the Syrian civil war resolution goes as well
And the jihadists in Idlib will be a huge headache
EDIT:
Are we just hoping they'd collapse without us doing to much? Hence the relatively cheap assassinations
