We assassinate them and we will continue to do so. All terrorists in these lists carry very big importance in their respective branches. As I said before the new ones can't compare to the old ones. There are more to their "job" if we can call it that way than just fulfilling their administrative duties.Iam not trying to discredit the TSK by any chance but I just feel that the effect of assassinations within the PKK isnt that effective as before
As I said before, Turkey has been assassinating those assholes since 2021 and yet just new heads keep coming to replace the old ones. In fact they have become really good at such habits that they even started imrpoving their weapons program (according to rumors that the PKK is trying new drones in Iraq)
So from what I can see is that the PKK's allies, primarily USA and Iran, have established some sort on infrastructure/pathway within their own lands or the territory they own in order to continuously pump out PKK officers of a certain expertise level at a certain rate in order to fill the gaps caused by the PKK. Think of it more of like a mediocre factory that keeps pumping out officers/products at a stable rate no matter how much Turkey kills.
In other words, the PKK (as an organisation) have somehow evolved into becoming an entity tha wont be removed regardless of the number of assassinations but will just operate less effectively for a time period until such gaps are placed later on
In order to solve that, Turkey should either
1- Curb their human resources
2- Occupy/destroy the areas where they are training/producing such officers
3- Just completely kick the PKK out of the Turkish border
The first 2 options are nearly impossible since PKK's modus operandi is based on a "belief" or "faith" of a more prosperous race in a more prosperous nation called Kurdistan. Honestly, by now such faith have developed into something akin to religion and this wont be defeated except by brute hard force and reality just like with Armenia and Artsakh. The second option is also difficult since the US will just keep pressuring Turkey by using the myriads of economic cards within its hand
The military option seems the most realistic and is the most effective in dealing with such scenarios as it was proven in the Azerbaijan/Armenia war
I know that all of the methods are difficult to initiate but if you think that the upcoming elections will be canceled due to these drone attacks, then you are mistaken and now with the PKK being threatened in Iraq, they need some kind of justification to start kidnapping/brainwashing a larger populace to become able to resist the flow of time (as some might say) by recruiting them into their ranks legitimately
When it comes to the drone program of PKK we can say that they are experimenting with drones for at least 7 years now. Nobody should get me wrong, but I want to say that PKK from a professional point is a very advanced terrorist organization. The fact that they couldn't achieve an effective drone usage and manufacturing capability to this day says more than I can explain. They can only achieve some level of capability trough a transfer of knowhow and this comes from Iran and mainly PMU towards YBS. If we want to take a closer look at YBS I can only say that these dudes are afraid to point out a leader because their leader usually gets fried by a drone after a couple of months active duty on the roads of Sinjar. The only reason for the current one to live is the contacts between Hakan Fidan and PMU and the recent joint efforts by the Iraqi Army and TSK in Iraq. Judging by the looks and the most recent developments we may hear some good news after stable positions are established at Tepe Bahar and the logistics routes towards Gara are fully covered. In the context of US support we witnessed that they gave YPG terrorists helicopter piloting training, tried to bypass the "Highway of Death" in Sinjar and started to directly fly to Suleymaniye. This proved ineffective as we targeted a joint YPG-PUK Peshmerga exercise at an airfield and somehow PKK helicopters started falling in the skies of the north of Iraq.
PKK is not an organization which will die easily. Its structure is very elastic, it may change forms and gather support from all kinds of people with different ideologies. It may be largely suppressed in Turkiye and an effective buffer zone can be established in Iraq. The military option is always on the table when it comes to Syria, but this will not be enough. A military intervention against YPG on the east of Euphrates at this point will not bring the results we all want. We are doing what we need to do trough surgical operations, containing the YPG potential, keeping the pressure up until our endgame. If we want to talk about a military intervention I would say we better concentrate at Tal Rifat and Manbij at this point. This is where the real threat comes from. This is where the center of the dangerous IRGC/Russia/Assad/PKK relationship is and this is where the barrels of their rifles are really pointed at us.
The conjecture shows us that we will clash with Iran over them after the US is forced to leave. We should be able to exploit and direct the dynamics on the field in order to be successful in our game. I think it may be possible to cook something with the support of KDP especially around these elections. Currently with the events around IRGC and Israel, the death of the Iranian President Raisi we may have a chance to push one or two buttons on other fronts too. PYD/YPG is not nearly as powerful as most of the people believe. They are the spoiled children of PKK that believe everything is possible since they got the protection, but this protection will be lifted one day and they will either be forced to disintegrate and join the SAA or they will face us. The big heads in the US are currently thinking of how they can do it without causing an immediate collapse, provide some level of guarantee and prevent the feel of treachery in YPG's ranks that many will feel. PKK ideology will not cease to exist, but as long as it is suppressed we are fine. The goal is to keep the situation under control and prevent bombs exploding in Turkish cities.
These elections carry no importance as they should be conducted under already determined international standards and under a level of international support in order to have any real legitimacy. A couple of media headlines and statements by the likes of Macron wouldn't cut it. If even the US, the global democracy police is shy of supporting these elections than you can decide for yourself what will be the outcome of this. Support from the biggest Kurdish power center in the region, the KRG also carries a big importance and they already expressed their opinion as ENKS (KDP supported Kurdish party in Syria) is constantly oppressed by PYD and this is endangering the interests of KDP in Syria.
My read of the situation is that the US has an obligation towards Turkiye to not support these elections and in return Turkiye ceases its large scale drone campaigns and this was the case after the last drone fest which resulted in the crippling of the PYD oil business for long enough so that they felt it. We hurt them so bad that the US was forced to give a warning by dropping one of our drones out of the sky saying "Enough!" After the last drone fest we didn't witnessed a serious drone activity on the east of Euphrates for months until now. The drone strikes are a result of slow, but serious escalation by the PKK in response to our successful operations in Zap and Metina. These strikes can force US use its influence over the YPG and deescalate both in Syria and Iraq.
In my opinion we will be able to handle the PKK both in Iraq and in Syria until 2028. What really concerns me is the situation in Idlib. In the case of PKK you can drone them to the stone age and call it a day while with HTS the situation is very different. The PKK side of things may consume the most resources as the structure and scale is bigger, but I am sure that the decision makers and strategists within the relevant State institutions in Turkiye think about the HTS before they go to sleep.