Live Conflict Military Operations Syria

Kartal1

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Honestly, these UAV attacks are meaningless tbh
The only thing they do is weaken the organisation temporarily until they elect a new one to take their positions. Turkey has been undergoing a sucdessful hunting operation against the PKK from 2022 but all what it had done is weaken the PKK temporarily and nothing more. They just grow another tail and come back again

To defeat the PKK you need to either
1- Cut their primary source of income which comes from USA, Iran, Assad, and Russia
2- Just go in there, take the areas that they unrightfully claim to own by force and throw them towards Assad and let them spread their filth there
3- Cut their source of training and tech expertise which comes from USA and Iran

The elections, IMO, are happening nonetheless regardless of Turkey's UAV attacks since the PKK knows that this the only was to consolidate their power after Turkey's intensified Iraq operation. If these elections were to happen, PKK in Syria would strangthen and Turkey's ambition to secure the Syrian border would be going back to square one

Till this day, Iam waiting for Erdogan's Syria operation that he promised since 3 years ago. The more he waits, the more energy, manpower, and casualities he will have to commit to restore it later on and that is if he will be able to restore it, when he is this late, in the first place
Meaningless? Due to these UCAV attacks PKK is militarily on its knees. The only thing preventing PKK from a total collapse is the situation on other fronts. The people that PKK lose to these UCAVs attacks can not be filled the way you imagine. These are not ordinary terrorists which are targeted. They may be able to fill the numbers, but not the expertise and quality. If it was not for these strikes we would have talked a totally different picture today, like the one in 2012 for example where we were losing more than 5 soldiers every day within the borders of Turkiye. Such people can not be replaced easily.

Which operation exactly you are waiting for? The one in Manbij, the one in Tal Rifat, the one on Ayn Al-Arab, or Ayn Issa? These are totally different things requiring different efforts so the situations at these places can be sorted out. A lot of you guys make the mistake to look at Syria and the PYD/YPG problem as one whole while the reality is totally different.

What MIT is doing is a part of a systematic approach towards the YPG (note: not the HRE!) in Syria so the threat can be contained until a suitable environment for this operation is established. For this operation to happen there are many requirements which should be met both in the political, but also on the military side of things. We will never be at square one in Syria. With elections or not Turkiye will not allow "Terroristan" at its borders. The last one to try such a move was Barzani and we can see where he is now. Different from Barzani, the YPG is a terrorist organization so you can imagine how the situation will end for them.
 

Saithan

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Tbh I was hoping for something more that deals with their political structure. Especially where they fool kids and people in the cities.
 

Lool

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Meaningless? Due to these UCAV attacks PKK is militarily on its knees. The only thing preventing PKK from a total collapse is the situation on other fronts. The people that PKK lose to these UCAVs attacks can not be filled the way you imagine. These are not ordinary terrorists which are targeted. They may be able to fill the numbers, but not the expertise and quality. If it was not for these strikes we would have talked a totally different picture today, like the one in 2012 for example where we were losing more than 5 soldiers every day within the borders of Turkiye. Such people can not be replaced easily.

Which operation exactly you are waiting for? The one in Manbij, the one in Tal Rifat, the one on Ayn Al-Arab, or Ayn Issa? These are totally different things requiring different efforts so the situations at these places can be sorted out. A lot of you guys make the mistake to look at Syria and the PYD/YPG problem as one whole while the reality is totally different.

What MIT is doing is a part of a systematic approach towards the YPG (note: not the HRE!) in Syria so the threat can be contained until a suitable environment for this operation is established. For this operation to happen there are many requirements which should be met both in the political, but also on the military side of things. We will never be at square one in Syria. With elections or not Turkiye will not allow "Terroristan" at its borders. The last one to try such a move was Barzani and we can see where he is now. Different from Barzani, the YPG is a terrorist organization so you can imagine how the situation will end for them.
Iam not trying to discredit the TSK by any chance but I just feel that the effect of assassinations within the PKK isnt that effective as before

As I said before, Turkey has been assassinating those assholes since 2021 and yet just new heads keep coming to replace the old ones. In fact they have become really good at such habits that they even started imrpoving their weapons program (according to rumors that the PKK is trying new drones in Iraq)

So from what I can see is that the PKK's allies, primarily USA and Iran, have established some sort on infrastructure/pathway within their own lands or the territory they own in order to continuously pump out PKK officers of a certain expertise level at a certain rate in order to fill the gaps caused by the PKK. Think of it more of like a mediocre factory that keeps pumping out officers/products at a stable rate no matter how much Turkey kills.

In other words, the PKK (as an organisation) have somehow evolved into becoming an entity tha wont be removed regardless of the number of assassinations but will just operate less effectively for a time period until such gaps are placed later on

In order to solve that, Turkey should either
1- Curb their human resources
2- Occupy/destroy the areas where they are training/producing such officers
3- Just completely kick the PKK out of the Turkish border

The first 2 options are nearly impossible since PKK's modus operandi is based on a "belief" or "faith" of a more prosperous race in a more prosperous nation called Kurdistan. Honestly, by now such faith have developed into something akin to religion and this wont be defeated except by brute hard force and reality just like with Armenia and Artsakh. The second option is also difficult since the US will just keep pressuring Turkey by using the myriads of economic cards within its hand

The military option seems the most realistic and is the most effective in dealing with such scenarios as it was proven in the Azerbaijan/Armenia war

I know that all of the methods are difficult to initiate but if you think that the upcoming elections will be canceled due to these drone attacks, then you are mistaken and now with the PKK being threatened in Iraq, they need some kind of justification to start kidnapping/brainwashing a larger populace to become able to resist the flow of time (as some might say) by recruiting them into their ranks legitimately
 

Kartal1

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Iam not trying to discredit the TSK by any chance but I just feel that the effect of assassinations within the PKK isnt that effective as before

As I said before, Turkey has been assassinating those assholes since 2021 and yet just new heads keep coming to replace the old ones. In fact they have become really good at such habits that they even started imrpoving their weapons program (according to rumors that the PKK is trying new drones in Iraq)

So from what I can see is that the PKK's allies, primarily USA and Iran, have established some sort on infrastructure/pathway within their own lands or the territory they own in order to continuously pump out PKK officers of a certain expertise level at a certain rate in order to fill the gaps caused by the PKK. Think of it more of like a mediocre factory that keeps pumping out officers/products at a stable rate no matter how much Turkey kills.

In other words, the PKK (as an organisation) have somehow evolved into becoming an entity tha wont be removed regardless of the number of assassinations but will just operate less effectively for a time period until such gaps are placed later on

In order to solve that, Turkey should either
1- Curb their human resources
2- Occupy/destroy the areas where they are training/producing such officers
3- Just completely kick the PKK out of the Turkish border

The first 2 options are nearly impossible since PKK's modus operandi is based on a "belief" or "faith" of a more prosperous race in a more prosperous nation called Kurdistan. Honestly, by now such faith have developed into something akin to religion and this wont be defeated except by brute hard force and reality just like with Armenia and Artsakh. The second option is also difficult since the US will just keep pressuring Turkey by using the myriads of economic cards within its hand

The military option seems the most realistic and is the most effective in dealing with such scenarios as it was proven in the Azerbaijan/Armenia war

I know that all of the methods are difficult to initiate but if you think that the upcoming elections will be canceled due to these drone attacks, then you are mistaken and now with the PKK being threatened in Iraq, they need some kind of justification to start kidnapping/brainwashing a larger populace to become able to resist the flow of time (as some might say) by recruiting them into their ranks legitimately
We assassinate them and we will continue to do so. All terrorists in these lists carry very big importance in their respective branches. As I said before the new ones can't compare to the old ones. There are more to their "job" if we can call it that way than just fulfilling their administrative duties.

When it comes to the drone program of PKK we can say that they are experimenting with drones for at least 7 years now. Nobody should get me wrong, but I want to say that PKK from a professional point is a very advanced terrorist organization. The fact that they couldn't achieve an effective drone usage and manufacturing capability to this day says more than I can explain. They can only achieve some level of capability trough a transfer of knowhow and this comes from Iran and mainly PMU towards YBS. If we want to take a closer look at YBS I can only say that these dudes are afraid to point out a leader because their leader usually gets fried by a drone after a couple of months active duty on the roads of Sinjar. The only reason for the current one to live is the contacts between Hakan Fidan and PMU and the recent joint efforts by the Iraqi Army and TSK in Iraq. Judging by the looks and the most recent developments we may hear some good news after stable positions are established at Tepe Bahar and the logistics routes towards Gara are fully covered. In the context of US support we witnessed that they gave YPG terrorists helicopter piloting training, tried to bypass the "Highway of Death" in Sinjar and started to directly fly to Suleymaniye. This proved ineffective as we targeted a joint YPG-PUK Peshmerga exercise at an airfield and somehow PKK helicopters started falling in the skies of the north of Iraq.

PKK is not an organization which will die easily. Its structure is very elastic, it may change forms and gather support from all kinds of people with different ideologies. It may be largely suppressed in Turkiye and an effective buffer zone can be established in Iraq. The military option is always on the table when it comes to Syria, but this will not be enough. A military intervention against YPG on the east of Euphrates at this point will not bring the results we all want. We are doing what we need to do trough surgical operations, containing the YPG potential, keeping the pressure up until our endgame. If we want to talk about a military intervention I would say we better concentrate at Tal Rifat and Manbij at this point. This is where the real threat comes from. This is where the center of the dangerous IRGC/Russia/Assad/PKK relationship is and this is where the barrels of their rifles are really pointed at us.

The conjecture shows us that we will clash with Iran over them after the US is forced to leave. We should be able to exploit and direct the dynamics on the field in order to be successful in our game. I think it may be possible to cook something with the support of KDP especially around these elections. Currently with the events around IRGC and Israel, the death of the Iranian President Raisi we may have a chance to push one or two buttons on other fronts too. PYD/YPG is not nearly as powerful as most of the people believe. They are the spoiled children of PKK that believe everything is possible since they got the protection, but this protection will be lifted one day and they will either be forced to disintegrate and join the SAA or they will face us. The big heads in the US are currently thinking of how they can do it without causing an immediate collapse, provide some level of guarantee and prevent the feel of treachery in YPG's ranks that many will feel. PKK ideology will not cease to exist, but as long as it is suppressed we are fine. The goal is to keep the situation under control and prevent bombs exploding in Turkish cities.

These elections carry no importance as they should be conducted under already determined international standards and under a level of international support in order to have any real legitimacy. A couple of media headlines and statements by the likes of Macron wouldn't cut it. If even the US, the global democracy police is shy of supporting these elections than you can decide for yourself what will be the outcome of this. Support from the biggest Kurdish power center in the region, the KRG also carries a big importance and they already expressed their opinion as ENKS (KDP supported Kurdish party in Syria) is constantly oppressed by PYD and this is endangering the interests of KDP in Syria.

My read of the situation is that the US has an obligation towards Turkiye to not support these elections and in return Turkiye ceases its large scale drone campaigns and this was the case after the last drone fest which resulted in the crippling of the PYD oil business for long enough so that they felt it. We hurt them so bad that the US was forced to give a warning by dropping one of our drones out of the sky saying "Enough!" After the last drone fest we didn't witnessed a serious drone activity on the east of Euphrates for months until now. The drone strikes are a result of slow, but serious escalation by the PKK in response to our successful operations in Zap and Metina. These strikes can force US use its influence over the YPG and deescalate both in Syria and Iraq.

In my opinion we will be able to handle the PKK both in Iraq and in Syria until 2028. What really concerns me is the situation in Idlib. In the case of PKK you can drone them to the stone age and call it a day while with HTS the situation is very different. The PKK side of things may consume the most resources as the structure and scale is bigger, but I am sure that the decision makers and strategists within the relevant State institutions in Turkiye think about the HTS before they go to sleep.
 

Ryder

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We assassinate them and we will continue to do so. All terrorists in these lists carry very big importance in their respective branches. As I said before the new ones can't compare to the old ones. There are more to their "job" if we can call it that way than just fulfilling their administrative duties.

When it comes to the drone program of PKK we can say that they are experimenting with drones for at least 7 years now. Nobody should get me wrong, but I want to say that PKK from a professional point is a very advanced terrorist organization. The fact that they couldn't achieve an effective drone usage and manufacturing capability to this day says more than I can explain. They can only achieve some level of capability trough a transfer of knowhow and this comes from Iran and mainly PMU towards YBS. If we want to take a closer look at YBS I can only say that these dudes are afraid to point out a leader because their leader usually gets fried by a drone after a couple of months active duty on the roads of Sinjar. The only reason for the current one to live is the contacts between Hakan Fidan and PMU and the recent joint efforts by the Iraqi Army and TSK in Iraq. Judging by the looks and the most recent developments we may hear some good news after stable positions are established at Tepe Bahar and the logistics routes towards Gara are fully covered. In the context of US support we witnessed that they gave YPG terrorists helicopter piloting training, tried to bypass the "Highway of Death" in Sinjar and started to directly fly to Suleymaniye. This proved ineffective as we targeted a joint YPG-PUK Peshmerga exercise at an airfield and somehow PKK helicopters started falling in the skies of the north of Iraq.

PKK is not an organization which will die easily. Its structure is very elastic, it may change forms and gather support from all kinds of people with different ideologies. It may be largely suppressed in Turkiye and an effective buffer zone can be established in Iraq. The military option is always on the table when it comes to Syria, but this will not be enough. A military intervention against YPG on the east of Euphrates at this point will not bring the results we all want. We are doing what we need to do trough surgical operations, containing the YPG potential, keeping the pressure up until our endgame. If we want to talk about a military intervention I would say we better concentrate at Tal Rifat and Manbij at this point. This is where the real threat comes from. This is where the center of the dangerous IRGC/Russia/Assad/PKK relationship is and this is where the barrels of their rifles are really pointed at us.

The conjecture shows us that we will clash with Iran over them after the US is forced to leave. We should be able to exploit and direct the dynamics on the field in order to be successful in our game. I think it may be possible to cook something with the support of KDP especially around these elections. Currently with the events around IRGC and Israel, the death of the Iranian President Raisi we may have a chance to push one or two buttons on other fronts too. PYD/YPG is not nearly as powerful as most of the people believe. They are the spoiled children of PKK that believe everything is possible since they got the protection, but this protection will be lifted one day and they will either be forced to disintegrate and join the SAA or they will face us. The big heads in the US are currently thinking of how they can do it without causing an immediate collapse, provide some level of guarantee and prevent the feel of treachery in YPG's ranks that many will feel. PKK ideology will not cease to exist, but as long as it is suppressed we are fine. The goal is to keep the situation under control and prevent bombs exploding in Turkish cities.

These elections carry no importance as they should be conducted under already determined international standards and under a level of international support in order to have any real legitimacy. A couple of media headlines and statements by the likes of Macron wouldn't cut it. If even the US, the global democracy police is shy of supporting these elections than you can decide for yourself what will be the outcome of this. Support from the biggest Kurdish power center in the region, the KRG also carries a big importance and they already expressed their opinion as ENKS (KDP supported Kurdish party in Syria) is constantly oppressed by PYD and this is endangering the interests of KDP in Syria.

My read of the situation is that the US has an obligation towards Turkiye to not support these elections and in return Turkiye ceases its large scale drone campaigns and this was the case after the last drone fest which resulted in the crippling of the PYD oil business for long enough so that they felt it. We hurt them so bad that the US was forced to give a warning by dropping one of our drones out of the sky saying "Enough!" After the last drone fest we didn't witnessed a serious drone activity on the east of Euphrates for months until now. The drone strikes are a result of slow, but serious escalation by the PKK in response to our successful operations in Zap and Metina. These strikes can force US use its influence over the YPG and deescalate both in Syria and Iraq.

In my opinion we will be able to handle the PKK both in Iraq and in Syria until 2028. What really concerns me is the situation in Idlib. In the case of PKK you can drone them to the stone age and call it a day while with HTS the situation is very different. The PKK side of things may consume the most resources as the structure and scale is bigger, but I am sure that the decision makers and strategists within the relevant State institutions in Turkiye think about the HTS before they go to sleep.

We seen the same with Fartsakh it all came tumbling down.

Rojava is no different here its a matter of time before it collapses as it is too weak to sustain itself.
 

YeşilVatan

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We seen the same with Fartsakh it all came tumbling down.

Rojava is no different here its a matter of time before it collapses as it is too weak to sustain itself.
Pride goeth before fall. There is a non-zero possibility of YPG "pulling a rabbit out of the hat" in the near future. Sure, it seems impossible, but is it really? What if they somehow find an effetive countermeasure to our drone fleet? What if they mount a successful resistance campaign that would cost us too much? What if, what if...

Even if they were a disorganized rabble, they are still a hundred thousand strong armed group just across our border. You never know.

Su uyur, düşman uyumaz.
 

Kartal1

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Pride goeth before fall. There is a non-zero possibility of YPG "pulling a rabbit out of the hat" in the near future. Sure, it seems impossible, but is it really? What if they somehow find an effetive countermeasure to our drone fleet? What if they mount a successful resistance campaign that would cost us too much? What if, what if...

Even if they were a disorganized rabble, they are still a hundred thousand strong armed group just across our border. You never know.

Su uyur, düşman uyumaz.
Even if they somehow manage to find a solution to the drones (they can't) how are they going to resist TSK in a way that would make them reach their goals of sustainability and independence? Let's put Turkiye to the side for a moment and think about who will allow such thing to happen in our neighbourhood? Iran, Assad, Russia, Iraq? Nobody wants an independent Kurdish State in Syria apart from the US. Kurds are used as tools and nothing more.

TSK is much more than drones. I want to remind that after 2-3 days of MIT drone campaign YPG basically stopped functioning and it took them weeks, even months to restart their normal operations. We are talking not even about the army, this was the intelligence service of Turkiye! What would happen if TSK unleash its force on them without agreeing on an airspace limitation by foreign forces, which would be the case if the situation somehow gets out of control and our operation is based on the UN Article 51? There's no way that they may show a resistance. YPG and TSK are not comparable militarily in any way. In the moment which Operation Euphrates Shield started this whole project died.

The fate of YPG is either to join the ranks of SAA under Russian and Iranian guidance or be annihilated like it happened west of Euphrates with the rebranding of YPG as the HRE which operates in close coordination with the Regime, Russia and Hezbollah. If they don't comply with the Regime, Iran and Russia they will make them comply. If they don't do it, we will take the situation in our hand even the biggest Kurdish power center in the region will provide us support in this. Don't be deceived by the "100.000" men figure, the shiny uniforms and propaganda. YPG is nothing more than a simple abortion living its last minutes. In the end only the memories will remain.

We for sure could've managed the whole process better, but there's no usage in beating a dead horse. If we concentrate at the current situation we can conclude that the "Lock" in Iraq is about to be completed, 25.000 additional professional soldiers will join the ranks of TSK soon, the weight of TSK in Iraq will get lighter and after that you know what's coming. We may see some limited action soon, here and there, but I think the big thing is coming in 2-3 years if there's no major changes like a rapid US or Iranian decline.

The reality is that everything that considers timing is depending on the attrition warfare going on between Iran and the US. We are spectators and balancers here. Any rapid change of the balance between the two is a negative thing for us as we still don't have established mechanisms and capabilities to effectively fill the power vacuum that would form and effectively control the dynamics in such an event. The US will lose this war and the slower it loses it, the more time we got to prepare so we can face the other regional power contender in the face of Iran and force them to negotiate and coordinate with us, which we can only achieve trough deterrence that we currently don't have enough from. During this time, we keep in check YPG's force potential by killing whoever pose a threat to Turkiye and keep an eye at the logistics, finance and their political contacts in Iraq. The recent developments around their drone programs is a sign that we pushed too much, gained too much power in this game and someone (Iran) is trying to balance things out. The bad news for them is that all PKK targets in Iraq are within our reach and it is only a matter of time before our intelligence intercept the whole supply chain and we start hunting while simultaneously complete the rest of the "Lock". After that, all eyes on KRG as they will be the ones leading the local reflexes to the newly established "Kurdistani Hezbollah" threat in close cooperation with MIT trough forces that will be sponsored and trained with our help. By the time our job in Zap and Metina will be finished and our only work in Iraq will be to keep in check the PKK in Gara, Sinjar and Suleymaniye trough enhanced Peshmerga monitoring, intelligence (COMINT,HUMINT) operations and surgical strikes.

As a conclusion I want to say that such a threat is not possible to be destroyed even if we invade half of Syria and Iraq. This is not something that would just perish just like that and as long as there are forces that are feeding this fire, the PKK will exist. If we want to think realistically, we will not be able to fully destroy PKK in short to middle term. What we can do is dismantle their armed components that are posing a threat to us and keeping the cancer in check so it doesn't spread. Unfortunately we can't do everything by ourselves and this is why we should keep by the balls KDP in Iraq so we can deepen cooperation with KRG regarding this matter as Kurdish political support is of crucial importance now and will be of crucial importance when the times of PKK being forced to put down arms and concentrate mainly in the political realm of the whole struggle comes.
 

Bozan

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Even if they somehow manage to find a solution to the drones (they can't) how are they going to resist TSK in a way that would make them reach their goals of sustainability and independence? Let's put Turkiye to the side for a moment and think about who will allow such thing to happen in our neighbourhood? Iran, Assad, Russia, Iraq? Nobody wants an independent Kurdish State in Syria apart from the US. Kurds are used as tools and nothing more.

TSK is much more than drones. I want to remind that after 2-3 days of MIT drone campaign YPG basically stopped functioning and it took them weeks, even months to restart their normal operations. We are talking not even about the army, this was the intelligence service of Turkiye! What would happen if TSK unleash its force on them without agreeing on an airspace limitation by foreign forces, which would be the case if the situation somehow gets out of control and our operation is based on the UN Article 51? There's no way that they may show a resistance. YPG and TSK are not comparable militarily in any way. In the moment which Operation Euphrates Shield started this whole project died.

The fate of YPG is either to join the ranks of SAA under Russian and Iranian guidance or be annihilated like it happened west of Euphrates with the rebranding of YPG as the HRE which operates in close coordination with the Regime, Russia and Hezbollah. If they don't comply with the Regime, Iran and Russia they will make them comply. If they don't do it, we will take the situation in our hand even the biggest Kurdish power center in the region will provide us support in this. Don't be deceived by the "100.000" men figure, the shiny uniforms and propaganda. YPG is nothing more than a simple abortion living its last minutes. In the end only the memories will remain.

We for sure could've managed the whole process better, but there's no usage in beating a dead horse. If we concentrate at the current situation we can conclude that the "Lock" in Iraq is about to be completed, 25.000 additional professional soldiers will join the ranks of TSK soon, the weight of TSK in Iraq will get lighter and after that you know what's coming. We may see some limited action soon, here and there, but I think the big thing is coming in 2-3 years if there's no major changes like a rapid US or Iranian decline.

The reality is that everything that considers timing is depending on the attrition warfare going on between Iran and the US. We are spectators and balancers here. Any rapid change of the balance between the two is a negative thing for us as we still don't have established mechanisms and capabilities to effectively fill the power vacuum that would form and effectively control the dynamics in such an event. The US will lose this war and the slower it loses it, the more time we got to prepare so we can face the other regional power contender in the face of Iran and force them to negotiate and coordinate with us, which we can only achieve trough deterrence that we currently don't have enough from. During this time, we keep in check YPG's force potential by killing whoever pose a threat to Turkiye and keep an eye at the logistics, finance and their political contacts in Iraq. The recent developments around their drone programs is a sign that we pushed too much, gained too much power in this game and someone (Iran) is trying to balance things out. The bad news for them is that all PKK targets in Iraq are within our reach and it is only a matter of time before our intelligence intercept the whole supply chain and we start hunting while simultaneously complete the rest of the "Lock". After that, all eyes on KRG as they will be the ones leading the local reflexes to the newly established "Kurdistani Hezbollah" threat in close cooperation with MIT trough forces that will be sponsored and trained with our help. By the time our job in Zap and Metina will be finished and our only work in Iraq will be to keep in check the PKK in Gara, Sinjar and Suleymaniye trough enhanced Peshmerga monitoring, intelligence (COMINT,HUMINT) operations and surgical strikes.

As a conclusion I want to say that such a threat is not possible to be destroyed even if we invade half of Syria and Iraq. This is not something that would just perish just like that and as long as there are forces that are feeding this fire, the PKK will exist. If we want to think realistically, we will not be able to fully destroy PKK in short to middle term. What we can do is dismantle their armed components that are posing a threat to us and keeping the cancer in check so it doesn't spread. Unfortunately we can't do everything by ourselves and this is why we should keep by the balls KDP in Iraq so we can deepen cooperation with KRG regarding this matter as Kurdish political support is of crucial importance now and will be of crucial importance when the times of PKK being forced to put down arms and concentrate mainly in the political realm of the whole struggle comes.

TSK could end it very quickly but it hasn't

I do not believe it is a question of can we, but will we?

how are they going to resist TSK in a way that would make them reach their goals of sustainability and independence? Let's put Turkiye to the side for a moment and think about who will allow such thing to happen in our neighbourhood? Iran, Assad, Russia, Iraq?

I don't think it will be full independence, it will be autonomy.

Iraq, Iran, Syria have limited to no say on the YPG, Iraq even trades with them and has diplomatic connections. Syria is too weak and is dependent on them for agriculture and oil. Iran cannot fight the rebels and the YPG, who are close to the PKK which they align with in Iraq (therefore making them more useful).

Putting TSK aside would mean little to no cards on the Iran, Iraq Syria front to not concede autonomy.

Autonomy means the building of official institutions and cultural opposition which will put TR into a position that it will be recognized the same way the Barzanis are, state visits and so on.

Probably even more so as they are closer to the Kurds in the southeast.

Is the operations against the PKK or Kurdish autonomy?

If it's Kurdish autonomy, why do the supply routes through Iraq matter? Surely the more reinforcements, the more you can remove from the field in a battle.

If it's just PKK, are we only striking close to PKK or PKK aligned members in Syria? Hence Mazloum and a lot of others being safe? What's the game plan if this is the case?

Also the KDP have been trying to postpone the elections because it looks like they will lose the majority to PKK aligned Talabani. If we lose the KDP, what happens then? Confrontation with Talabani will draw Iran and Iraq in, and I don't think our leadership have the balls at the moment

Currently the thing to pay attention to most is the sanctions on the northeast. As soon as those go, our veto power in the Syrian civil war resolution goes as well

And the jihadists in Idlib will be a huge headache

EDIT:

Are we just hoping they'd collapse without us doing to much? Hence the relatively cheap assassinations
 
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Bozan

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TSK could end it very quickly but it hasn't

I do not believe it is a question of can we, but will we?



I don't think it will be full independence, it will be autonomy.

Iraq, Iran, Syria have limited to no say on the YPG, Iraq even trades with them and has diplomatic connections. Syria is too weak and is dependent on them for agriculture and oil. Iran cannot fight the rebels and the YPG, who are close to the PKK which they align with in Iraq (therefore making them more useful).

Putting TSK aside would mean little to no cards on the Iran, Iraq Syria front to not concede autonomy.

Autonomy means the building of official institutions and cultural opposition which will put TR into a position that it will be recognized the same way the Barzanis are, state visits and so on.

Probably even more so as they are closer to the Kurds in the southeast.

Is the operations against the PKK or Kurdish autonomy?

If it's Kurdish autonomy, why do the supply routes through Iraq matter? Surely the more reinforcements, the more you can remove from the field in a battle.

If it's just PKK, are we only striking close to PKK or PKK aligned members in Syria? Hence Mazloum and a lot of others being safe? What's the game plan if this is the case?

Also the KDP have been trying to postpone the elections because it looks like they will lose the majority to PKK aligned Talabani. If we lose the KDP, what happens then? Confrontation with Talabani will draw Iran and Iraq in, and I don't think our leadership have the balls at the moment

Currently the thing to pay attention to most is the sanctions on the northeast. As soon as those go, our veto power in the Syrian civil war resolution goes as well

And the jihadists in Idlib will be a huge headache

EDIT:

Are we just hoping they'd collapse without us doing to much? Hence the relatively cheap assassinations

Here is the Iraq border crossing at Rabia to Syria Hassakeh


 

Kartal1

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TSK could end it very quickly but it hasn't

I do not believe it is a question of can we, but will we?



I don't think it will be full independence, it will be autonomy.

Iraq, Iran, Syria have limited to no say on the YPG, Iraq even trades with them and has diplomatic connections. Syria is too weak and is dependent on them for agriculture and oil. Iran cannot fight the rebels and the YPG, who are close to the PKK which they align with in Iraq (therefore making them more useful).

Putting TSK aside would mean little to no cards on the Iran, Iraq Syria front to not concede autonomy.

Autonomy means the building of official institutions and cultural opposition which will put TR into a position that it will be recognized the same way the Barzanis are, state visits and so on.

Probably even more so as they are closer to the Kurds in the southeast.

Is the operations against the PKK or Kurdish autonomy?

If it's Kurdish autonomy, why do the supply routes through Iraq matter? Surely the more reinforcements, the more you can remove from the field in a battle.

If it's just PKK, are we only striking close to PKK or PKK aligned members in Syria? Hence Mazloum and a lot of others being safe? What's the game plan if this is the case?

Also the KDP have been trying to postpone the elections because it looks like they will lose the majority to PKK aligned Talabani. If we lose the KDP, what happens then? Confrontation with Talabani will draw Iran and Iraq in, and I don't think our leadership have the balls at the moment
I am sure we will make everything possible to end it.

Russia has influence over YPG. When US is out the Russians will step in and arrange a deal between Assad, YPG and Iran. Russia will be the moving factor while the Iranians will try to establish the connection between YPG/PKK, PKK Iraqi Branch and Talabani. I don't think we will see autonomy. This is not in the interest of anybody, but instead we will see pressure and eventually the integration of YPG into the SAA.

When it comes to the logistics of YPG the route between YPG and PKK Iraqi Branch matter. Iraq is the only connection between these two branches and Sinjar in particular is the gate trough which manpower, weapons and supplies are transferring from Iraq trough Syria and vise versa. Due to the pressure by MIT which acquires intelligence trough different methods they started using helicopters for VIP transport. Once this ended bad, they ceased these operations. Apart from YBS there are very little PKK HVTs that were hit in Sinjar in the last 1-2 years. The ones that manage to cross from Iraq to Syria somehow are intercepted in Syria and taken out either by our drones or by field operatives/special mission units.

Mazloum is safe out of courtesy to the US. He also must abide by some rules together with the US as we showed earlier with our warning shot at the Suleymaniye airport. No matter what is the situation there are some unwritten rules that both the US and Turkiye must abide by.

We can't allow losing KDP. The definition of a failed State or the lack of State institutions establishment have its positives in our situation. In countries in the Middle East the term democracy is understood differently. If we can, we should exploit this weakness.

When it comes to Talabani I think he will get the message soon. There's no need to involve his persona in all this, but people in his inner circle. We are closer than he can imagine. If needed I am sure we will do what needs to be done. We have our cards that we can play in Suleymaniye. All these soft messages till now are directed not only towards him, but also his handlers and as we know Talabanis like to be handled by more than one at a time.
 

Kartal1

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MIT hit 2 vehicles west of Qamisli and someone seems to have started burning off fields. That’s usually done after harvest and such
They are doing this on purpose. On other fronts they blame TSK for causing fires to their fields, but their version collapsed once footage showing TSK actually intervening against the fires emerged.
 

Saithan

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They are doing this on purpose. On other fronts they blame TSK for causing fires to their fields, but their version collapsed once footage showing TSK actually intervening against the fires emerged.
You mean the video showing a a teacked vehicle driving over the fires while zigzagging ?
 

Bozan

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