Pakistan-India Conflict (2025)

[Tabmachine]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1927046239859667394

 

[Nilgiri]

Four Days in May: The India-Pakistan Crisis of 2025 • Stimson Center

An early assessment of available evidence on what transpired in the recent India-Pakistan crisis and its implications

www.stimson.org

Four Days in May: The India-Pakistan Crisis of 2025​

An early assessment of available evidence on what transpired in the recent India-Pakistan crisis and its implications

By Christopher Clary
May 28, 2025



The recent India and Pakistan crisis was the most significant between the two nuclear-armed adversaries in several decades. It saw military action unfold that crossed previous thresholds in geographic reach, systems employed, and impacts produced, and concluded with significant diplomatic engagement, primarily by the United States. It also generated unprecedented levels of mis- and disinformation that continue to cloud understandings of what actually transpired between May 7-10. This working paper reviews and assesses the available evidence in order to distill an initial understanding of the conflict’s trajectory—albeit one that will no-doubt evolve as additional information becomes available. Given the unprecedented nature of the military action and the likelihood that this crisis will not be the last between the two sides, such an effort is vital in seeking to build a shared understanding of the Four-Day Conflict.


Executive Summary
Following a terrorist attack on April 22, India launched punitive strikes on Pakistan on May 7. This began a four-day conflict between India and Pakistan from May 7-10, which became the most serious military crisis in decades between the two rival nuclear states. Both sides have declared victory amid considerable misinformation and disinformation about what occurred. This essay seeks to offer a factually grounded narrative of the evolution of the crisis, while mindful of severe data limitation problems in the public domain that complicate analysis. Even with the limited or contested information currently available, some tentative conclusions are possible.
The conflict represents several military firsts:

• This was the first time India used cruise missiles on Pakistan, both the BrahMos cruise missile (co-developed with Russia) as well as the European SCALP-EG.
• This was the first time Pakistan used conventionally armed short-range ballistic missiles on India, in the form of the Fatah-I and Fatah-II missiles and possibly other missile types.
• While drones have been used sporadically along the Line of Control in Kashmir and elsewhere for smuggling, this is the first instance of drone warfare in the India-Pakistan rivalry where both sides employed drones with the intent of causing damage on the other.

Available information also permits several conclusions about the military situation during the crisis:

• India demonstrated an ability to deliver precise standoff attacks across large swathes of Pakistan on each day of the conflict but especially May 7 and May 10. While Pakistani air defenses likely interfered with or intercepted some attempted strikes, Pakistan has a meaningful and serious vulnerability to Indian air attack.
• There is no evidence of any manned aircraft crossing into the airspace of the other side, which indicates the seriousness with which both sides viewed the air defense threat of the other even on the final day of the conflict.
• On the first day of hostilities, May 7, India likely lost several aircraft to Pakistani counterair operations. While Indian officials neither acknowledged nor denied the losses, they represent perhaps the most meaningful military costs India experienced during the Four-Day Conflict.
• On May 8 through May 10, India’s integrated air and missile defense system appears to have largely defeated several waves of Pakistani drone attacks of ambiguous scope, scale, and intensity. On May 9-10, the Indian air and missile defense system appears to have worked against limited Pakistani short-range ballistic missile attacks as well.
• After its apparent downing of Indian aircraft on May 7, Pakistan inflicted virtually no observable damage on Indian military units or facilities, though Indian officials have said there was some damage at four installations.
• While attention focused primarily on the air and drone campaigns, most of the May 7 strikes occurred in or near Kashmir; subsequent fighting along the Line of Control in Kashmir was deadly and served as a major source of casualties for both sides.

Political conclusions are also possible:

• The India-Pakistan relationship remains crisis-prone, and those crises are likely to continue to escalate in severity over time.
• While the mutual possession of nuclear weapons heavily conditioned the responses of both sides, overt nuclear signaling was lower than in many prior India-Pakistan crises.
• Both sides worked to calibrate escalation and showed some ability to manage escalation adequately. Both sides were sometimes surprised, however, by choices made by the other and, in some instances, likely viewed an adversary’s response as escalatory rather than proportional.
• The crisis was costly in terms of human lives and expended or destroyed military equipment. Those costs will likely work to induce some caution in the bilateral relationship in the near-term, a probable principal aim of Indian policy.
• The United States played a major role in crisis management, especially in the final hours of the crisis. While it is conceivable another actor could have played this role as crisis communicator of choice for both combatants, and some alternative third parties did play a role in crisis diplomacy, none of those alternative actors appear to have participated with the same efficacy as the United States.

This crisis involved the use of several weapons systems, often in innovative ways, which neither India nor Pakistan possessed at the time of their last crisis in 2019. While this crisis provides a baseline for the next India-Pakistan crisis, the pace of military technological change means that the contours of that next crisis might be meaningfully different. Both sides’ perceived setbacks and failures will serve as a major driver for defense acquisitions and doctrinal innovation.

(More at link)

 

[Jackdaws]

Officially IAF chief has said they have no knowledge of any nuclear weapons present in Murid Airbase (with a smile). The objective was pretty simple, Call Pakistans nuclear threat as bluff. India has shown the ability to neutralize the PAF AD & penetrated & attacked their airfields. If the conflict had continued for just 2 more days, IAF would be flying over Islamabad.

The immediate escalation came after Pak fired Ballistic missiles towards Delhi or in that direction. It was intercepted. This was considered unacceptable by Indian leadership. And this started the cruise missile attacks on 6-9 Pakistan Air Bases. Some were intercepted, some like Noor Khan, Murid, Bhola etc are for the world to see.

We believe aircraft had been lost, but officially no number has been provided. Eventually they will be shared. IAF also used drones spoofed with fighter radar signature believing Pak to believe they downed 6,7,8,9 etc the number keeps on increasing every day.

I think IAF chief said that about Nur Khan, not Murid

 

[Afif]

Four Days in May: The India-Pakistan Crisis of 2025 • Stimson Center

An early assessment of available evidence on what transpired in the recent India-Pakistan crisis and its implications

www.stimson.org

Four Days in May: The India-Pakistan Crisis of 2025​

An early assessment of available evidence on what transpired in the recent India-Pakistan crisis and its implications

By Christopher Clary
May 28, 2025



The recent India and Pakistan crisis was the most significant between the two nuclear-armed adversaries in several decades. It saw military action unfold that crossed previous thresholds in geographic reach, systems employed, and impacts produced, and concluded with significant diplomatic engagement, primarily by the United States. It also generated unprecedented levels of mis- and disinformation that continue to cloud understandings of what actually transpired between May 7-10. This working paper reviews and assesses the available evidence in order to distill an initial understanding of the conflict’s trajectory—albeit one that will no-doubt evolve as additional information becomes available. Given the unprecedented nature of the military action and the likelihood that this crisis will not be the last between the two sides, such an effort is vital in seeking to build a shared understanding of the Four-Day Conflict.


Executive Summary
Following a terrorist attack on April 22, India launched punitive strikes on Pakistan on May 7. This began a four-day conflict between India and Pakistan from May 7-10, which became the most serious military crisis in decades between the two rival nuclear states. Both sides have declared victory amid considerable misinformation and disinformation about what occurred. This essay seeks to offer a factually grounded narrative of the evolution of the crisis, while mindful of severe data limitation problems in the public domain that complicate analysis. Even with the limited or contested information currently available, some tentative conclusions are possible.
The conflict represents several military firsts:

• This was the first time India used cruise missiles on Pakistan, both the BrahMos cruise missile (co-developed with Russia) as well as the European SCALP-EG.
• This was the first time Pakistan used conventionally armed short-range ballistic missiles on India, in the form of the Fatah-I and Fatah-II missiles and possibly other missile types.
• While drones have been used sporadically along the Line of Control in Kashmir and elsewhere for smuggling, this is the first instance of drone warfare in the India-Pakistan rivalry where both sides employed drones with the intent of causing damage on the other.

Available information also permits several conclusions about the military situation during the crisis:

• India demonstrated an ability to deliver precise standoff attacks across large swathes of Pakistan on each day of the conflict but especially May 7 and May 10. While Pakistani air defenses likely interfered with or intercepted some attempted strikes, Pakistan has a meaningful and serious vulnerability to Indian air attack.
• There is no evidence of any manned aircraft crossing into the airspace of the other side, which indicates the seriousness with which both sides viewed the air defense threat of the other even on the final day of the conflict.
• On the first day of hostilities, May 7, India likely lost several aircraft to Pakistani counterair operations. While Indian officials neither acknowledged nor denied the losses, they represent perhaps the most meaningful military costs India experienced during the Four-Day Conflict.
• On May 8 through May 10, India’s integrated air and missile defense system appears to have largely defeated several waves of Pakistani drone attacks of ambiguous scope, scale, and intensity. On May 9-10, the Indian air and missile defense system appears to have worked against limited Pakistani short-range ballistic missile attacks as well.
• After its apparent downing of Indian aircraft on May 7, Pakistan inflicted virtually no observable damage on Indian military units or facilities, though Indian officials have said there was some damage at four installations.
• While attention focused primarily on the air and drone campaigns, most of the May 7 strikes occurred in or near Kashmir; subsequent fighting along the Line of Control in Kashmir was deadly and served as a major source of casualties for both sides.

Political conclusions are also possible:

• The India-Pakistan relationship remains crisis-prone, and those crises are likely to continue to escalate in severity over time.
• While the mutual possession of nuclear weapons heavily conditioned the responses of both sides, overt nuclear signaling was lower than in many prior India-Pakistan crises.
• Both sides worked to calibrate escalation and showed some ability to manage escalation adequately. Both sides were sometimes surprised, however, by choices made by the other and, in some instances, likely viewed an adversary’s response as escalatory rather than proportional.
• The crisis was costly in terms of human lives and expended or destroyed military equipment. Those costs will likely work to induce some caution in the bilateral relationship in the near-term, a probable principal aim of Indian policy.
• The United States played a major role in crisis management, especially in the final hours of the crisis. While it is conceivable another actor could have played this role as crisis communicator of choice for both combatants, and some alternative third parties did play a role in crisis diplomacy, none of those alternative actors appear to have participated with the same efficacy as the United States.

This crisis involved the use of several weapons systems, often in innovative ways, which neither India nor Pakistan possessed at the time of their last crisis in 2019. While this crisis provides a baseline for the next India-Pakistan crisis, the pace of military technological change means that the contours of that next crisis might be meaningfully different. Both sides’ perceived setbacks and failures will serve as a major driver for defense acquisitions and doctrinal innovation.

(More at link)

I have not seen evidence of any side using TBMs. India Used cruise missiles and drones, Pak used drones and Fatah-1 rockets. They were broadcasting Fatah-1 launches but didn’t see any Fatah-2. There was also rumours of shaheen interception but haven’t seen any evidence either.

*I think the biggest takeaway here is that solid IADS is imperative and should be the first thing in order of priorities. If you have good IADS it will work in most circumstance. That includes both the quality and the quantity. Indian armed forces investment in a wide range of AD solutions has paid off.


*Second biggest takeaway is Air Forces CONOPS operation in future battlefield. The fact is that air bases are vulnerable. Specially when you lack strategic depth. Traditional AD is important but you can’t rely on it as your main defence to keep your large static infra (relatively) intact and preserve your combat power. As inevitably AD will loose the war of economics. Yes MRSAM has shot down Fatah-1 but it each interceptor cost around $1 million from what I read. While a Fatah-1 rocket cost around $100k or less.

The AF with the most recourses in the world has realised this and introduced ACE (Agile combat employment) as their new CONOP. Perhaps this is the most reformative CONOP in decades.

This is the way. Mobile capabilities coupled with thousands of km of existing road networks. Modifying them in locations temporarily and constantly, to meet the need. Then deploying IADS in innovative ways (as part of broader integrated counter-air ops) to deny adversaries ISR capabilities to get a fix (on those temporarily locations of sortie generations) and complete the kill chain. This way AD can better keep up with the war of economics. Cost effective C-UAS solutions (Jammers+AAA guns) is going to play an important role here as I imagine, Adversary will likely attempt to spam areas of interest with cheap recon drones when more traditional ISR platforms are denied by IADS and friendly counter air. All of these would require extensive complementing CCD (camouflage, concealment and decoy) operations Considering enemy's Space based ISR capabilities will also be at play here.

Of course, I am not advocating for vacating traditional air bases during war. lol. Its given, keeping them operational through quick fixes and rapid repair would also be imperative as significant numbers of sortie generations will naturally occur from there.

The point is, today static air bases and AD systems to defend them alone is not good enough to keep your AF competitive in a fight against peer adversaries.

@Nilgiri it's been some time since the events of 7-10 may. Looking forwards to your takeaways too.

 

[Zapper]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1928070381031612474

 

[Nilgiri]

Four Days in May: The India-Pakistan Crisis of 2025 • Stimson Center

An early assessment of available evidence on what transpired in the recent India-Pakistan crisis and its implications

www.stimson.org

Four Days in May: The India-Pakistan Crisis of 2025​

An early assessment of available evidence on what transpired in the recent India-Pakistan crisis and its implications

By Christopher Clary
May 28, 2025



The recent India and Pakistan crisis was the most significant between the two nuclear-armed adversaries in several decades. It saw military action unfold that crossed previous thresholds in geographic reach, systems employed, and impacts produced, and concluded with significant diplomatic engagement, primarily by the United States. It also generated unprecedented levels of mis- and disinformation that continue to cloud understandings of what actually transpired between May 7-10. This working paper reviews and assesses the available evidence in order to distill an initial understanding of the conflict’s trajectory—albeit one that will no-doubt evolve as additional information becomes available. Given the unprecedented nature of the military action and the likelihood that this crisis will not be the last between the two sides, such an effort is vital in seeking to build a shared understanding of the Four-Day Conflict.


Executive Summary
Following a terrorist attack on April 22, India launched punitive strikes on Pakistan on May 7. This began a four-day conflict between India and Pakistan from May 7-10, which became the most serious military crisis in decades between the two rival nuclear states. Both sides have declared victory amid considerable misinformation and disinformation about what occurred. This essay seeks to offer a factually grounded narrative of the evolution of the crisis, while mindful of severe data limitation problems in the public domain that complicate analysis. Even with the limited or contested information currently available, some tentative conclusions are possible.
The conflict represents several military firsts:

• This was the first time India used cruise missiles on Pakistan, both the BrahMos cruise missile (co-developed with Russia) as well as the European SCALP-EG.
• This was the first time Pakistan used conventionally armed short-range ballistic missiles on India, in the form of the Fatah-I and Fatah-II missiles and possibly other missile types.
• While drones have been used sporadically along the Line of Control in Kashmir and elsewhere for smuggling, this is the first instance of drone warfare in the India-Pakistan rivalry where both sides employed drones with the intent of causing damage on the other.

Available information also permits several conclusions about the military situation during the crisis:

• India demonstrated an ability to deliver precise standoff attacks across large swathes of Pakistan on each day of the conflict but especially May 7 and May 10. While Pakistani air defenses likely interfered with or intercepted some attempted strikes, Pakistan has a meaningful and serious vulnerability to Indian air attack.
• There is no evidence of any manned aircraft crossing into the airspace of the other side, which indicates the seriousness with which both sides viewed the air defense threat of the other even on the final day of the conflict.
• On the first day of hostilities, May 7, India likely lost several aircraft to Pakistani counterair operations. While Indian officials neither acknowledged nor denied the losses, they represent perhaps the most meaningful military costs India experienced during the Four-Day Conflict.
• On May 8 through May 10, India’s integrated air and missile defense system appears to have largely defeated several waves of Pakistani drone attacks of ambiguous scope, scale, and intensity. On May 9-10, the Indian air and missile defense system appears to have worked against limited Pakistani short-range ballistic missile attacks as well.
• After its apparent downing of Indian aircraft on May 7, Pakistan inflicted virtually no observable damage on Indian military units or facilities, though Indian officials have said there was some damage at four installations.
• While attention focused primarily on the air and drone campaigns, most of the May 7 strikes occurred in or near Kashmir; subsequent fighting along the Line of Control in Kashmir was deadly and served as a major source of casualties for both sides.

Political conclusions are also possible:

• The India-Pakistan relationship remains crisis-prone, and those crises are likely to continue to escalate in severity over time.
• While the mutual possession of nuclear weapons heavily conditioned the responses of both sides, overt nuclear signaling was lower than in many prior India-Pakistan crises.
• Both sides worked to calibrate escalation and showed some ability to manage escalation adequately. Both sides were sometimes surprised, however, by choices made by the other and, in some instances, likely viewed an adversary’s response as escalatory rather than proportional.
• The crisis was costly in terms of human lives and expended or destroyed military equipment. Those costs will likely work to induce some caution in the bilateral relationship in the near-term, a probable principal aim of Indian policy.
• The United States played a major role in crisis management, especially in the final hours of the crisis. While it is conceivable another actor could have played this role as crisis communicator of choice for both combatants, and some alternative third parties did play a role in crisis diplomacy, none of those alternative actors appear to have participated with the same efficacy as the United States.

This crisis involved the use of several weapons systems, often in innovative ways, which neither India nor Pakistan possessed at the time of their last crisis in 2019. While this crisis provides a baseline for the next India-Pakistan crisis, the pace of military technological change means that the contours of that next crisis might be meaningfully different. Both sides’ perceived setbacks and failures will serve as a major driver for defense acquisitions and doctrinal innovation.

(More at link)

Interview with the author (Clary):

 

[Nilgiri]

I have not seen evidence of any side using TBMs. India Used cruise missiles and drones, Pak used drones and Fatah-1 rockets. They were broadcasting Fatah-1 launches but didn’t see any Fatah-2. There was also rumours of shaheen interception but haven’t seen any evidence either.

*I think the biggest takeaway here is that solid IADS is imperative and should be the first thing in order of priorities. If you have good IADS it will work in most circumstance. That includes both the quality and the quantity. Indian armed forces investment in a wide range of AD solutions has paid off.


*Second biggest takeaway is Air Forces CONOPS operation in future battlefield. The fact is that air bases are vulnerable. Specially when you lack strategic depth. Traditional AD is important but you can’t rely on it as your main defence to keep your large static infra (relatively) intact and preserve your combat power. As inevitably AD will loose the war of economics. Yes MRSAM has shot down Fatah-1 but it each interceptor cost around $1 million from what I read. While a Fatah-1 rocket cost around $100k or less.

The AF with the most recourses in the world has realised this and introduced ACE (Agile combat employment) as their new CONOP. Perhaps this is the most reformative CONOP in decades.

View attachment 75413

This is the way. Mobile capabilities coupled with thousands of km of existing road networks. Modifying them in locations temporarily and constantly, to meet the need. Then deploying IADS in innovative ways (as part of broader integrated counter-air ops) to deny adversaries ISR capabilities to get a fix (on those temporarily locations of sortie generations) and complete the kill chain. This way AD can better keep up with the war of economics. Cost effective C-UAS solutions (Jammers+AAA guns) is going to play an important role here as I imagine, Adversary will likely attempt to spam areas of interest with cheap recon drones when more traditional ISR platforms are denied by IADS and friendly counter air. All of these would require extensive complementing CCD (camouflage, concealment and decoy) operations Considering enemy's Space based ISR capabilities will also be at play here.

Of course, I am not advocating for vacating traditional air bases during war. lol. Its given, keeping them operational through quick fixes and rapid repair would also be imperative as significant numbers of sortie generations will naturally occur from there.

The point is, today static air bases and AD systems to defend them alone is not good enough to keep your AF competitive in a fight against peer adversaries.

@Nilgiri it's been some time since the events of 7-10 may. Looking forwards to your takeaways too.

India basically will strategically commit to increasing the (drone+missile)/AD ratio it can bring to bear versus what Pakistan can do in reverse direction now that this conflict tier is proven (without nuclear escalation).

This is part of larger strategy and capability over decades:

- The advantage of what Tata, Nehru et al did in cultivating IISc, IIT et. al ecosystems early to not be stuck to import reliance from large power patrons.

- How that fed into the IGMDP in 80s. Maraging steel and so on with what Tata + IISc + allied steel/alloys RnD were able to bring to bear upstream when starting costs were more conducive compared to late stage backfill now for others.

- How this fed into turning BM's into proven SLV capability (and thus what that means for BM advancement as well alongside the missile ecosystem be it for offense or defense). The adversary on the other hand remains stuck staring at its limited BM (and what this means for missile tech + scaled production in general)....quite unlike what say North Korea and Iran have done.

- Economic wherewithall. Bad policy accumulates and needed one IMF Bailout in the early 90s. With more sound economic policy, greater resources at hand that suit strategic push on this. Things like maintaining:

~ Forex level at 20% of GDP forex level, investment grade credit ratings
~ Market cap at 100+% of GDP
~ Investment ratio (capital formation etc) at 30+% of GDP
- A functioning democracy and commensurate institutions under their stress and strain, but functioning...unlike one taken for a ride by vested powers from the get go.

These are floorboards that will bring a strategic disparity with an adversary that provably doesn't do this and keeps kicking the can on it for its DHA needs first at all cost....and commensurately gets single digit or teen %s on much smaller GDP to begin with (both total and now half per capita of India's in nominal too) to run alongside whichever umpteenth IMF bailout happening on a day of the week that ends with "day".

The single digit and teenage attitude complex (PMIK, PTI, Vigos, Khaki clans, musical chairs and all) is attempted to be made up in various online anonymous troll outlets though in its way, maybe inevitably.

India suffers from a variant of that too given being X-times better state overall than Pakistan is still well inside the woods of heavy problems (though there is a way out if refinement to maturity in economics and strategy continues).....but in India's case its really more of it not being zero sum, it indulges with it at same time it indulges with (relatively) competent growth and strategic resilience, unlike Pakistan where it's long boiled down to a stark choice and it going for DHA + Khaki, rest submits and/or gets worn as a mask around it.

So it ends up biting around the edges compared to India. India will just have to factor in all these bites and edges that Pakistan can afford with what it has baked in for itself, and at same time keep growing India's disparity to afford a lot more from the inside out comprehensive way.

i.e no use being satisfied with just Vishy Anand, 100 Chess Grandmasters and then 200 downstream. This unlocks things in each realm...be it competition + interaction with Iranian GMs, Central Asian Turkic, Arabic, Chinese, Turkish, European, Russian and so on where the clear arc of chess interest and history has spread....or simply sitting at more and more tables, proving that much more in reality.

Those two countries that mark out flat zeroes in this arc have some problems, thats on them to learn why that is. This extends to every domain in the end.

Parts of this inevitably get expressed in toxic angry way when trolls, normies and even some more fair-minded Pakistani's see exactly what falls flat in reality versus their long term build up of delusional desires when they hear what folks like Owaisi and Omar Abdullah say about things (i.e country wont be split/fractured when it comes to Pakistan's terrorism export, given what patience worn thin w.r.t Mumbai 08 already and India strategic restraint policy then).

So strategy favours India...it should lean more and more into this, buttress whats working better and remedial correction and reform on whats not working better....

....while Generals do their job as prescribed by the constitution and not self-promote to Field Marshall after this number of AFBs hit and this conflict tier unlocked for next time for more liquidation at pretty much India's discretion given these factors in play.

The puerile egotist extremist complex hits them like it does too for a long time now post-Ayub usurpation (that set in the DHA complex)..... 65 was a "win", Niazi saying he will do this and that in 71.... 1000 year rule in East Pakistan, easily invade Calcutta to silence BD exile govt and refugee camps (from their own mass atrocity actions in first place) and so on.

Its folks like Joe and my dad that saw that as they did growing up. My first one I saw realtime was 99 Kargil and Musharaff era bluster. So that will persevere, all that changes is India deciding to exercise what it does while proving no nuclear button is reached for....and whatever effect that may have on Pakistan inner core of decision makers regd terrorist safe havens, thats up to them to factor in, guess we will see.

James Holland had pretty good sit down interview with Lex Friedman recently regd WW2 thats well worth watching for that context of time....as to why Germany lost already by 1942.

 

[mTT]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1928710859389391158

 

[Bogeyman]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1928710859389391158

Let's see what excuse our Indian friends will come up with for this. You won't deny your own chief of defense staff, will you?

 

[Jackdaws]

Let's see what excuse our Indian friends will come up with for this. You won't deny your own chief of defense staff, will you?

Who has denied the loss? It was accepted much earlier. The number falsely claimed by Pak has been refuted. Pak should of course should also come clean on all the losses - in air and in hangars that it suffered. Besides all the satellite images showing the damage on Pak airbases

 

[Zapper]

Let's see what excuse our Indian friends will come up with for this. You won't deny your own chief of defense staff, will you?

When did any Indian member here refuse those claims? I stated somewhere earlier in this thread and so did @Gessler in his most recent version of events along with @Nilgiri that we do believe at least 1-2 jets or 1 jet and a UAV likely Heron have been downed

The claim of 6 jets by pakistanis is absolutely ridiculous, let alone the 10-12 which they've been claiming more lately

 

[Jackdaws]

When did any Indian member here refuse those claims? I stated somewhere earlier in this thread and so did @Gessler in his most recent version of events along with @Nilgiri that we do believe at least 1-2 jets or 1 jet and a UAV likely Heron have been downed

The claim of 6 jets by pakistanis is absolutely ridiculous, let alone the 10-12 which they've been claiming more lately

Right now they are convinced they have a female pilot in custody!

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1928801849294876957

 

[Iskander]

Let's see what excuse our Indian friends will come up with for this. You won't deny your own chief of defense staff, will you?

There are many Indian members here, that's good. But where are our Pakistani forum members? Where did they go? What is the reason for their absence? It would be interesting to know the opinion of Pakistanis too.

 

[Nilgiri]

Right now they are convinced they have a female pilot in custody!

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1928801849294876957

"They" being some in their troll horde.

Their DG ISPR presser clearly announced in QnA that no Indian pilot is under custody.

 

[Huelague]

Let's see what excuse our Indian friends will come up with for this. You won't deny your own chief of defense staff, will you?

Malicious pleasure, Is inappropriate, given by the fact, that two nuclear powers want to wage in war.

 

[Ajatshatru]

Bholari Airbase

Sukkur Airbase

Shahbaz (Jacobabad) Airbase

Nur Khan Airbase (Nuclear Command Centre of Pakistan)

Rahim Yar Khan Airbase Runway
There are several other videos and pictures of other military sites which were targeted in Pakistan but these are satellite images released by Chinese company MAXXAR i will keep posting

 

[Ajatshatru]

Malicious pleasure, Is inappropriate, given by the fact, that two nuclear powers want to wage in war.

There’s no need to worry about nuclear war — India has the capability to locate and eliminate Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, and may have already done so under Operation Sindoor. This is exactly why India doesn’t give two hoots over Pakistan’s nuclear threats.

 

[Rajendra Chola]

Let's see what excuse our Indian friends will come up with for this. You won't deny your own chief of defense staff, will you?

That for some wile reason western media conduct has become anti Indian in this conflict is surprising. But no Indian have said 0 aircraft loss. Infact in the first media meet of our military bosses they accepted “losses are part of combat, but the objective is important”. So not sure what you are trying to imply here as if India tried to hide. IAF chief even said after the winding of Op Sindoor, we will share all relevant information.

 

[Rajendra Chola]

There are many Indian members here, that's good. But where are our Pakistani forum members? Where did they go? What is the reason for their absence? It would be interesting to know the opinion of Pakistanis too.

Busy trying to photoshop satellite pictures for Indian air base damages…

 

[Jackdaws]

View attachment 75519 View attachment 75520
Bholari Airbase
View attachment 75521
View attachment 75522
Sukkur Airbase
View attachment 75523
View attachment 75524
Shahbaz (Jacobabad) Airbase
View attachment 75525
Nur Khan Airbase (Nuclear Command Centre of Pakistan)
View attachment 75526
Rahim Yar Khan Airbase Runway
There are several other videos and pictures of other military sites which were targeted in Pakistan but these are satellite images released by Chinese company MAXXAR i will keep posting

Maxar is American, not Chinese