As someone who has long been a staunch advocate of the brotherhood between Azerbaijan and Turkiye and the unity of the Turkic world in this forum, I would like—with your indulgence—to highlight a couple more points, as the discussion on social media is now veering into truly absurd territory.
First of all, Turkiye did not interfere in elections the way Azerbaijan did. Because Azerbaijan viewed an AKP election victory as being in its own strategic interest at the time, it attempted to influence the elections even at the level of the head of state.
Nor did it establish national news channels to take sides in domestic politics (unlike the actions Azerbaijan took to bolster its image) in the national media.
Yet, despite all this, the Turkish public—excluding, of course, the "useful idiots" within the country—continues to defend Azerbaijan in latest issue, insisting that these are internal matters and that others should not interfere.
Beyond receiving the most extensive legal and financial support in the history of the Turkish Republic, Azerbaijan benefited from funding provided entirely by Turkish banks—including financing for the Petkim privatization, the STAR Refinery project (2014), a new terminal loan, and a syndicated loan (2021). Strategic partnerships were formed with THY (Turkish Airlines) and TPAO; customs duty and VAT exemptions were granted; EIA reports were fast-tracked without bureaucratic hurdles; and no support was spared to ensure Azerbaijan could rapidly prepare for the financial costs of the Karabakh war. Azerbaijan’s established investments in Turkiye are, at their core, a reflection of the Turkiye-Azerbaijan strategic partnership; they are by no means a one-sided phenomenon. I am writing this specifically because anti-Türkiye arguments particularly target these investments. All of these investments hold a strategic place in Azerbaijan's national output, which today exceeds $70 billion.
On the military front: Turkiye largely trained Azerbaijan's army to ensure victory—providing support so sensitive that some aspects cannot be detailed in open forums—and stood firmly behind its "brother" throughout the conflict, even at the risk of facing embargoes at critical junctures. It provided strategic military guidance when the war reached a stalemate, and immediately after the victory, it safeguarded Azerbaijan's gains via the Shusha Declaration; by preventing third-party intervention, Turkiye effectively equated Azerbaijan's national security with its own. Throughout the war and in the years that followed, hundreds of thousands of Turks—spanning the entire spectrum from atheists and Muslims to leftists and rightists—defended Azerbaijan's cause as if it were their own and battled disinformation day and night. The "hard power" that protects Azerbaijan's gains—including during the recent tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan—is the deterrent capability of the Turkish military. For Azerbaijan is Türkiye's eastern gateway, and Türkiye is Azerbaijan's western gateway. We share a common destiny.
Unlike Israel—which, despite providing technology in exchange for payment and intelligence, exercised caution in its rhetoric and refrained from openly declaring support for Azerbaijan (maintaining a political stance toward Armenia)—the Turkish state avoided such hypocrisy. Had a third country intervened at that time, Turkiye would have entered the war; indeed, Turkish military planners were already active on the ground at various points. This support has also come at a cost to Türkiye in European politics, yet this was not even mentioned.
Much more could be written. To cut a long story short, certain social media "perception agents" and figures in the national media within Azerbaijan seized upon a highly ambiguous statement—"we paid for whatever we received"—and, acting in unison as if following a cue, used it as a tool to "put Türkiye in its place," treating it as an indisputable fact that the remark was directed at Türkiye. We are a public well-versed in social media-driven psychological operations; it is not difficult to detect the foul odor here.
There is an action-reaction mechanism at play. One must look at the big picture, observing not only the handful of fools who were easily incited but also the clique that rationalized that reaction and began lashing out at Türkiye in an equally crude and dangerous manner. Azerbaijan’s bond with Turkiye is its path to sovereignty. Unfortunately, if this bond is successfully eroded and severed, Azerbaijan will find itself trapped in a quagmire from which it can never escape. I hope that reason prevails in both countries as soon as possible. My fear is not for Türkiye; rather, my primary concern is the suspicion that a major trap is being set for Azerbaijan.