Latest Thread

TR Sensors and Detector Programs

Afif

Afif

Experienced member
Moderator
Bangladesh Correspondent
DefenceHub Diplomat
Bangladesh Moderator
Messages
4,748
Reactions
94 9,070
Nation of residence
Bangladesh
Nation of origin
Bangladesh
The role of IRIS-100 and Yildirim-100 is understood.
The first is IR missile warning system that detected the missiles launched and relayed the information to Yildirim-100 (DIRCM). Which then shoots highly accurate laser beam directly to the missile IR seeker and successfully throws it outside of its trajectory.

However, LIAS-100 (the laser warning receiver) detects the incoming laser and then what?
The helicopter just take a turn and avoid the missile?
Or am I missing something?
 
Quasar

Quasar

Contributor
The Post Deleter
Messages
734
Reactions
51 3,280
Nation of residence
Turkey
Nation of origin
Turkey
Afif said:
The role of IRIS-100 and Yildirim-100 is understood.
The first is IR missile warning system that detected the missiles launched and relayed the information to Yildirim-100 (DIRCM). Which then shoots highly accurate laser beam directly to the missile IR seeker and successfully throws it outside of its trajectory.

However, LIAS-100 (the laser warning receiver) detects the incoming laser and then what?
The helicopter just take a turn and avoid the missile?
Or am I missing something?
Click to expand...
LIAS-100 (the laser warning receiver) is a passive laser warning system against both for laser range finders and laser guidance systems, enabling the aircrew to take evasive action. Most probably 360 degrees around and +/- 45 degrees in elevation of the helicopter like its contemporaries
 
Last edited:
Afif

Afif

Experienced member
Moderator
Bangladesh Correspondent
DefenceHub Diplomat
Bangladesh Moderator
Messages
4,748
Reactions
94 9,070
Nation of residence
Bangladesh
Nation of origin
Bangladesh
Quasar said:
infact yes a passive laser warning system against both for laser range finders and laser guidance systems, enabling the aircrew to take evasive action.
Click to expand...

No offense , but I doubt evasion with helicopter against incoming guided missiles would be as easy as it looks.


IMHO, while the introduction of Aselsan's Yildirim-100 greatly improves the platform's survivability against IR seeking missiles with hard kill DIRCM, laser guided manpads lile starstreak and RBS-70 remains a significant threat to rotary wing aviation.
 
Afif

Afif

Experienced member
Moderator
Bangladesh Correspondent
DefenceHub Diplomat
Bangladesh Moderator
Messages
4,748
Reactions
94 9,070
Nation of residence
Bangladesh
Nation of origin
Bangladesh
Quasar said:
infact AN/AVR-2A on AH-64A/D, MH-47E, MH-60K, OH-58D, EH-60A does the exact same job
Click to expand...

I know. The same situation applies to all of those platforms.

My argument is, there's need to be some sort of hard kill capability against laser guided missiles also lile DIRCM agaisn IR missiles. Just mere warning is not gonna be enough.
 
Last edited:
M

manifesto

Committed member
Messages
153
Reactions
3 474
Nation of residence
Turkey
Nation of origin
Turkey
Afif

Afif

Experienced member
Moderator
Bangladesh Correspondent
DefenceHub Diplomat
Bangladesh Moderator
Messages
4,748
Reactions
94 9,070
Nation of residence
Bangladesh
Nation of origin
Bangladesh
1692890195647.png



Putting AREAS-2NC on USV is ingenious. Specially considering the strategic context of Aegean Sea.
Given Greece own the vast majority of Islands in Aegean, in any potential conflict they will try to leverage it by tactically positioning hundreds of smaller units in those Islands.

Even if they are equipped lightly, (like with Mnapad, system like SKIPE NLOS, loitering ammunitions, man portable SIGINT and EW systems) by digging in and working coherently within a network-cetric command and control architecture, these smaller units could pose a serious challenge to Turkish joint force.

Conventional approach of systematic and sequential physical desctruction of these hundreds of smaller units in the operational environment of Aegean would be difficult, costly and time consuming.

Instead, the maneuverist approach that seeks to avoid enemy strengths and focus on identifying and attacking enemy weaknesses, and emphasizes dislocation, disruption, and the undermining of enemy will and cohesion to fight rather than the physical destruction of the adversary, would be the key here.

In particular, effective disruption and undermining of these small unit's C2 system by neutralizing their communication and battle management/coordination network would shatter the enemy's moral and paralyze their tactical decisions making, (remember, unlike on land, when you are on small islands it is not easy to withdraw and reorganize quickly) allowing joint Turkish forces to avoid their strength, isolate them and aggressively exploit their vulnerabilities.

While there is no single magic bullet in modern warfare, in the context of Aegean, a USV equipped with highly capable offensive EW suite might come close to it for Turkish Navy.

It is small, fast, agile, and unlike corvettes and OPVs, it is much cheaper. Thus, easily able access areas where it would too risky for bigger manned vessels.

Thanks to the curvature of horizon and its small shape, it is stealthier.

Along with other land and areal assets, by stablishing local superiority in electro-magnetic domain across the Aegean, it would play a decisive role in successfully neutralising enemy's communication and battle management network. Thus, effectively undermining these small units command and control.
 
Last edited:
You must log in or register to reply here.

Follow us on social media

Latest posts

About us

Welcome to the one and only hub of defence news and discussion. With a growing community of defence enthusiasts and analysts, Defence Hub is the premier location for international defence updates.

Newest members

Top Bottom