An Effective Emirati Training Model
Parallel training efforts by the United States, the European Union, Turkey, and Britain have generally fallen short because most SNA brigades are, in fact, clan militias beholden to the interests of their respective elders. As a result, SNA units—no matter the quality of their training—have mostly pursued clan interests and proven ineffective at fighting al-Shabab, especially outside their own lands. Alongside the Danab Brigade, only the Turkish-trained Gorgor special forces are truly capable of offensive operations, but Turkey has not taken sufficient steps to protect it from political misuse. In the case of Danab, the United States has circumvented this problem by recruiting cadets from a diverse array of clans, setting up a command-and-control system insulated from politics, ensuring on-time pay, and training carefully vetted cadets separately from the regular forces.
The UAE has implemented similar measures for the units it trains, including by intentionally maintaining multi-clan representation among its trainees. It also names combat veterans to lead units and monitors new units through a continuous retraining program at Camp Gordon. Finally, it provides on-time salaries at about twice the regular SNA rate.
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