But outsourcing is bad news. Boeing shit quality nowadays not just due to sjw crap and affirmative action but also outsourcing to other countries.
That's not true. There is a rigorous applied safety protocol (extensive testing and verification at various levels of the hierarchy).
That deals with all "outsourced" work before it can make it to where human souls are depending on it.
So outsourcing is not the problem, something(s) failed in the protocol application....that is 100% on Boeing.
Design department strictly within Boeing after all have made flawed designs before that have been rejected by the protocol process....and some have gotten through previously as well (again by flawed application of the protocol)
Details of this (and the penalties + remedial actions) w.r.t 737 MAX (or say 787 battery) can be read in the FAA investigation but they tend to be quite long reads. A lot of detail is lost in the media clickbait articles unfortunately (which have various agendas to peddle).
It is part of my current job to do just this kind of thing (for both what we do in-house and outsource to say universities and external design + coding groups) before I can put my seal on it and pass it upwards for more final checks.
I have yet to be overruled....but I have overruled those below me at various times if things did not tick all the boxes we have stringently set up (before we can evaluate performance dividends past it)....including for work outsourced.
None of the outsourced work teams put their seal on it (or are part of the vetting + overruling process) and bear no liability on the contracted work....as we do not outsource safety and testing standards to them given what we finally are liable for when we take ownership of the work.
TAI similarly would have its stringent protocols for anything done both in its domestic design teams and any international branches/outsourcing/consultancy.
There is often slightly different rubric for military (since you are pushing the envelope and the final product has far fewer human lives on the line directly) but overall same concept applies how you approach safety (and the things past that afterwards).
But there should be absolutely no difference (in the consistent safety protocol approach used) between what you receive from internal design teams and what you contract or delegate elsewhere.
This stringency would also govern IP and industrial secret (or military secret) access and info flow. You simply design the "need to know" structure from inside out. That is again something TAI would take seriously already.
www.straturka.com
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