I have been following your conversation on the side with 500.
Let me add my 2 cents on it.
The decision was just one of many concerning the luftwaffe at consequence (both good and bad depending on the theatre and time period).
Hitler did not come up with it out of the blue, rather this was debated by planners who influenced/impressed upon him...and the debates for this trace well back during the 1930s at large w.r.t luftwaffe planners and industry experts.
Remember at start of war in 1939, Luftwaffe had 5 flight schools: 3 bomber, 1 naval aviation and only 1 fighter school.
This always steered decision toward bomber and dive bomber philosophy for the larger strategies (support the Heer especially).
Thus the overall situation creation (regd the luftwaffe) was not only due to Hitler ...and again logistics come into things front and centre as to what the real reason was for luftwaffe's abysmal performance as the war wore on
Me -262 whatever its advantages, was beset by a number of significant issues. These included being resource, infra and production hogs in both production and maintenance and operation. There were engine issues too.
I would suggest a thorough reading of these to get the details and relevant numbers:
(latter one all 4 volumes are highly recommended)
Logistically there is also the main design drive factor to consider.... of the turbojet in first place w.r.t German inability+high expense to improve octane rating of synthoil for piston engines.
That is a turbojet could consume the synthoil fractions that Germany was able to produce in larger amounts compared to refining say Romanian oil for aviation gasoline (at high enough octane rating).
Germans themselves knew this was a compromise (resource, infra, mro problems etc) given they would have much preferred larger numbers of high performance piston engine aircraft, if only the high-octane fuel was available for it (it wasnt). This was the basic goal of both Jumo and BMW turbojet design drive....cetane rating of the synthoil diesel was found acceptable relative to performance and the maintenance needs and issue prevalance.
Logistically though there were, numerous other factors for the luftwaffe to consider....even if we go with an air superiority resource allocation over ground support allocation and assume this can be done perfectly by the industry of Germany (which was already constrained by synthoil among other issues).
You can even do a best case scenario mapping of units for a theater of your choice. But if you then do follow up on the logistic issues for that theatre (eg afrika corps) accurately and with requisite depth, the serious issues will become quite clear
i.e first model how many Me-262s you want there...and then analyse the logistical strain from what german capacity (and transport) can give to it's support. Relevant things like oil supply (given specific distillate and quality on already limited situation), maintenance crews, engine overhaul time etc....and provision of these over the distances needed compared to the alternative force level units (piston eng fighters, bombers, dive bombers) you say are suboptimal. Then consider what the power levels are relative to that...and the needs of the theatre in question itself.
It is never a black and white position that simply because "Hitler" picked A over B (and without hindsight we have now), that picking B would have been the miracle....especially if you put into context what the logistics and strategic suitability (to the other strategies picked) was.
Pilot training and provision (given the flight school structure and attrition during war) is an especially underappreciated one.
The single biggest issue was Germany never expected a protracted air war (especially fighter based), hence just one school for it. They just assumed that the existing pilot corps (many were experienced veterans from WW1) would need very few replacements.
Eventually the huge need for new pilots, low availability of appropriate fuel for the flight schools and the limited number of schools themselves was really the death knell in the last 3 years of the war....as the training standards dropped considerably.
Paraphrasing from a paper
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1020261.pdf:
By 1944, The average Luftwaffe pilot was experiencing only 115 total flight hours before being pushed out to an operational unit.
Compare to RAF and USAAF who were receiving 340 and 360 total flying hours, respectively.
For fighter pilots, the situation was even worse. They were only receiving an average of 30 instructional hours in fighter aircraft before being thrust into combat, while the RAF fighter pilot was getting more than twice that at 75 hours.
The most highly trained fighter pilots during this time, in terms of training hours were the USAAF pilots who logged 165 hours of flight time in a combat aircraft before going to war.
As previously stated, both pilot attrition rates and a diminishing number of aircraft allocated for training were a primary cause of insufficient flying hours.
However, restrictions on aircraft fuel also played a significant role in the gradual disintegration of the Luftwaffe training program.
In 1942, the allocation of aviation fuel to the Chief of Training was so restricted that only a very limited number of personnel in certain critical categories could receive flight training at all.
As a result, the Luftwaffe trained a very small number of bomber and fighter pilots in the fall of 1942, and not nearly enough to replace the mounting losses as war intensified in the East.
So both Kaptaan and 500 are spot on about this decision by Hitler/OKW/advisors/planners being fairly inconsequential in first place (as to the larger problems confronting the Germans in air warfare to begin with past the fighter vs bomber choice)...and actually it was quite a pragmatic one if you study the Me-262 issues.
