TR Turkiye's F-35 Project and Discussions

[Manomed The Second]

(Copied from the other thread from @Windchime

I know which blog it is the article is mentioning. Said blog is ran by a team which also publishes a Korean military magazine called Defense Review. It's an unreliable media with lots of wrong claims in their articles. This particular article was met with a lot of criticism for the sheer amount of misinformation.

No, there were no Korean pilots or soldiers interviewed. No, the F-35 doesn't need any "codes" to boot or start up. What the magazine article/blog post mentioned was the code for Link 16 connection, which is updated every day. Publishing of Link 16 codes are controlled by the respective US commands in each theater around the globe and any of these "restrictions" the article is mentioning also applies to every allied forces that uses Link 16, including Türkiye.


F35 DOES NOT NEED CODES TO OPERATE

 

[Mehmed Ali]

F35 is only usable against Russia and Iran which we are on good terms with, no thanks.

I doubt even that.

 

[Gamal]

Isn't it very obvious; American allies and partners. Greece, can you?

most likely only for regional militias

 

[Oublious]

F35 will not get next gen engine, insteed they will improve F-135 engine.

 

[Baklava Consumer]

What's the possibility that we send S-400 air defence system to Ukraine after Erdogan is gone? The opposition has promised we will return back to F-35 program.
Apparently we don't even need S-400 anymore as we have SIPER and HISAR (from Aselsan)

 

[the]

What's the possibility that we send S-400 air defence system to Ukraine after Erdogan is gone? The opposition has promised we will return back to F-35 program.
Apparently we don't even need S-400 anymore as we have SIPER and HISAR (from Aselsan)

I'm not even sure if its worth returning at this point.

They would never get the same level of partnership as originally formed (manufacturing, repair hub) - given that most of the Turkish defence industry's involvement in the project has been transferred to German companies.

It might be best to receive delivery of the original 6 aircraft for the $1.4bn and just invest any future budget to MMU. But I'm not sure if this is even feasable as you have to consider the logistical and maintainance cost of keeping just 6 aircraft.

 

[Manomed The Second]

I'm not even sure if its worth returning at this point.

They would never get the same level of partnership as originally formed (manufacturing, repair hub) - given that most of the Turkish defence industry's involvement in the project has been transferred to German companies.

It might be best to receive delivery of the original 6 aircraft for the $1.4bn and just invest any future budget to MMU. But I'm not sure if this is even feasable as you have to consider the logistical and maintainance cost of keeping just 6 aircraft.

We just need the F35B thats all

 

[Ryder]

We just need the F35B thats all

I believe the Turkish Airforce should get the F35B over the A.

While the Turkish Navy planned on getting the F35B too.

 

[uçuyorum]

I believe the Turkish Airforce should get the F35B over the A.

While the Turkish Navy planned on getting the F35B too.

Significantly more expensive, significantly smaller fuel tanks and lower range, smaller weapon bays that can't carry some of the munitions F35A can. Don't know if it is even compatible with air force style refuel system as opposed to the ones used by US Navy and EU.

 

[Manomed The Second]

Significantly more expensive, significantly smaller fuel tanks and lower range, smaller weapon bays that can't carry some of the munitions F35A can. Don't know if it is even compatible with air force style refuel system as opposed to the ones used by US Navy and EU.

B is for anadolu that ship was made for F35B in the first place

 

[Bogeyman]

Pentagon Says Only Half of Its F-35 Jet Fleet Is Mission-Ready​

• Air Force general promises to fix the readiness problem
• Cooling system for F-35 considered to be under-performing

Only about half of the Pentagon’s fleet of F-35 fighter jets are considered mission-capable, well below the target of 65% and a state of readiness the program manager terms “unacceptable.”

As of February, the monthly average rate of mission-capable jets in the US’s fleet of more than 540 F-35s was 53.1%, according to Air Force Lieutenant General Michael Schmidt, the program manager. That means they can fly at least some of their required missions, such as combat, show-of-force flights, training and testing.

The percentage of planes capable of flying all their missions — the so-called full mission capable rate — was less than 30%, Schmidt said in written testimony prepared for a Wednesday hearing of the House Armed Service Committee’s aviation subcommittee.

“This is unacceptable and maximizing readiness is my top priority,” Schmidt said in his prepared remarks. Schmidt said his goal is to increase readiness rates by at least 10% in the next 12 months.

“Readiness challenges remain, as indicated in multiple Government Accountability Office findings,” he said, according to the remarks.

The readiness rates marked a drop from 2020, when the fleet’s average full mission-capable rate stood at about 39%, according to the GAO. The partial capability rate was 69% in fiscal year 2020. The availability rate for jets assigned to combat missions stood by the end of fiscal 2022 at 65%, according to the Defense Department’s operational test office.


It’s not clear if last month’s readiness rates represent temporary dip or the beginning of a long-term trend. Schmidt’s statement doesn’t spell out the reasons for the drop but past culprits have been a lack of spare parts as well as parts and engine components breaking more frequently than anticipated.

Other problems include long depot repair times as well as Pratt & Whitney engine power modules needing repair or replacement faster than expected.

Schmidt’s plan to fix the problem will focus on addressing unspecified “top degraders” of readiness by gathering program personnel, international users, Lockheed Martin Corp, Pratt & Whitney and their subcontractors every two weeks.

In a preview of its annual report on the F-35, the GAO also found:

* Lockheed Martin delivered 50% of aircraft late last year, in what it said was the worst result in six years. A preliminary analysis of Raytheon Technologies Corp’s Pratt and Whitney 2022 performance “indicate that the contractor again delivered nearly all engines late.”

* The “Power and Thermal Management System” designed by a Lockheed Martin subcontractor that provides cooling for the engine “is under-performing, resulting in reduced engine life” so the Pentagon determined it must be upgraded.

Bloomberg - Are you a robot?

 

[YeşilVatan]

Pentagon Says Only Half of Its F-35 Jet Fleet Is Mission-Ready​

• Air Force general promises to fix the readiness problem
• Cooling system for F-35 considered to be under-performing

Only about half of the Pentagon’s fleet of F-35 fighter jets are considered mission-capable, well below the target of 65% and a state of readiness the program manager terms “unacceptable.”

As of February, the monthly average rate of mission-capable jets in the US’s fleet of more than 540 F-35s was 53.1%, according to Air Force Lieutenant General Michael Schmidt, the program manager. That means they can fly at least some of their required missions, such as combat, show-of-force flights, training and testing.

The percentage of planes capable of flying all their missions — the so-called full mission capable rate — was less than 30%, Schmidt said in written testimony prepared for a Wednesday hearing of the House Armed Service Committee’s aviation subcommittee.

“This is unacceptable and maximizing readiness is my top priority,” Schmidt said in his prepared remarks. Schmidt said his goal is to increase readiness rates by at least 10% in the next 12 months.

“Readiness challenges remain, as indicated in multiple Government Accountability Office findings,” he said, according to the remarks.

The readiness rates marked a drop from 2020, when the fleet’s average full mission-capable rate stood at about 39%, according to the GAO. The partial capability rate was 69% in fiscal year 2020. The availability rate for jets assigned to combat missions stood by the end of fiscal 2022 at 65%, according to the Defense Department’s operational test office.


It’s not clear if last month’s readiness rates represent temporary dip or the beginning of a long-term trend. Schmidt’s statement doesn’t spell out the reasons for the drop but past culprits have been a lack of spare parts as well as parts and engine components breaking more frequently than anticipated.

Other problems include long depot repair times as well as Pratt & Whitney engine power modules needing repair or replacement faster than expected.

Schmidt’s plan to fix the problem will focus on addressing unspecified “top degraders” of readiness by gathering program personnel, international users, Lockheed Martin Corp, Pratt & Whitney and their subcontractors every two weeks.

In a preview of its annual report on the F-35, the GAO also found:

* Lockheed Martin delivered 50% of aircraft late last year, in what it said was the worst result in six years. A preliminary analysis of Raytheon Technologies Corp’s Pratt and Whitney 2022 performance “indicate that the contractor again delivered nearly all engines late.”

* The “Power and Thermal Management System” designed by a Lockheed Martin subcontractor that provides cooling for the engine “is under-performing, resulting in reduced engine life” so the Pentagon determined it must be upgraded.

Bloomberg - Are you a robot?

1- Do these problems stem from the basic technical issue of complexity, or is it organizational ineptitude?
2-If Americans can't keep up with 5th gen maintainance, how will we?

I am concerned.

 

[Zafer]

1- Do these problems stem from the basic technical issue of complexity, or is it organizational ineptitude?
2-If Americans can't keep up with 5th gen maintainance, how will we?

I am concerned.

Probably mostly engine issues. A single engine working too hard to power a plane is like a single parent supporting the family. Our TFX will have both parents active.

 

[Bogeyman]

F-35 Engine Running Too Hot Due To ‘Under-Speccing,’ Upgrade Now Vital​

The U.S. military sees planned engine upgrades for all the variants of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter as critical because the Pratt & Whitney F135 engines that power all of the aircraft have been "under spec since the beginning," according to the top officer in charge of the program. This means the engines have to routinely operate at higher-than-expected temperatures, which has led to costly increased maintenance and logistics requirements and has. hurt the F-35's overall readiness rates.
Senior U.S. military officials stressed the F135 engine's limitations while defending a plan to pursue an Engine Core Upgrade (ECU) effort before members of a subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee yesterday.

The Pentagon's Fiscal Year 2024 budget proposal, released earlier this month, revealed that the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps had decided not to seek an all-new engine for their F-35s, building on the Advanced Engine Transition Program (AETP), due to high expected costs and technical hurdles. The Air Force has said that work done under AETP will feed into its follow-on Next Generation Adaptive Propulsion (NGAP) program.

They also highlighted the importance of power and thermal management system (PTMS) improvements for the jets. This is essential for meeting the additional electrical power and cooling needs that the Technology Refresh-3 (TR-3) and Block 4 upgrade programs – both of which continue to suffer delays – will require.

"We compared these engines [options for the F-35], the AETP engine, the current engine, [and] modernization of the current engine," Air Force Lt. Gen. Michael Schmidt, the current head of the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO), explained. He said his office also had done work on "identifying a significant power and thermal management system requirement, and we evaluated numerous options of power and thermal management systems to get us to various levels of cooling and power that is required."

"We have been eating into the life of this engine since the beginning of the program, because we did under-spec the engine and its requirements," he continued. "We are building costs into this program by eating into the life of this engine with additional overhauls that are expected over the life of the program."

The video below is of the complete hearing from yesterday. Lt. Gen. Michael Schmidt's comments about under-speccing start at around 1:02:00 mark in the runtime.

In his written testimony, the head of the F-35 JPO provided additional details on exactly what this means.
"The original program engine specification allocated 15 kW [kilowatts] of bleed air extraction to support system cooling requirements, and the F135 engine was designed, tested, and qualified to this specification with a level of margin available for future growth," Schmidt wrote. "During the final stages of initial aircraft development, air vehicle cooling requirements grew to exceed planned bleed air extraction."
"To provide the necessary bleed air, the engine is required to run hotter, and the program is realizing the effects of this through an increase in operating temperature, and a decrease in engine life, which is driving earlier depot inductions and an increase in lifecycle cost," the written testimony adds.
So, "I also have a derived requirement for power and thermal management, because I'm running out of power at the end of Block 4," Schmidt added when actually speaking during the hearing.
"Without upgrades, the addition of Block 4 capabilities will further degrade engine life and increase program lifecycle costs, because while the current TR-2 and TR-3 aircraft have sufficient cooling and power (while impacting the engine life as stated above), capabilities in Block 4 and beyond will increase cooling and power demands beyond current capabilities of the air system," he elaborated in his written remarks.

The three main F-35 variants are each powered by a different F135 sub-variant. The F135-PW-400 on the carrier-based F-35C differs from the F135-PW-100 in the F-35A primarily in its use of corrosion-resistant materials that are better suited to operations at sea. The short and vertical takeoff and landing-capable F-35B uses the F135-PW-600, which features an articulating exhaust nozzle and other features necessary to connect it to the large lift fan in the forward fuselage on that version.

The development of the F135, which was derived from the F119 engine that powers the F-22 Raptor stealth fighter, dates back to the late 1980s. The original plan was to develop an alternative engine for the F-35 family – the General Electric/Rolls-Royce F136 – but this was canceled in 2011 as a cost-cutting measure very late in its development process. With the benefit of hindsight, now including the revelation yesterday that the F135 has been under-specced the entire time, this has increasingly appeared to have been a short-sighted decision.
The F135-PW-100 and F135-PW-400 both have a stated maximum thrust rating, at full afterburner, of 43,000 pounds, according to Pratt & Whitney. The F135-PW-600 has a slightly lower maximum thrust rating of 41,000 pounds.

Issues with the F135 engine have already been increasingly apparent in recent years. A massive maintenance backlog emerged two years ago, which was blamed on a broad combination of factors, including the heat-protective coatings on the turbine blades in the engines wearing out sooner than expected.

Just between December and February 2023, deliveries of new F135s were halted amid the investigation into the causes of a dramatic accident involving an F-35B at Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base Fort Worth in Texas. The aircraft in question had been hovering during a test flight ahead of delivery to the U.S. Marine Corps when it dropped quality, hitting the ground hard and prompting the pilot to eject, as you can read more about here.


At yesterday's hearing, Lt. Gen. Schmidt confirmed previous reports that the primary cause of the December incident was traced to a "resonance issue between the main fuel throttle valve and the tube." He explained that a fix involving a modified "orifice" was subsequently developed and implemented.
Issues with the F135 have been further exacerbated by problems in securing adequate supplies of spare parts and a shortage of qualified maintainers, as you can read more about here. Bloomberg reported today that the readiness rate for all F-35s in U.S. service, collectively, is around 53.1 percent, more than ten percent lower than the target rate. It's unclear whether this is the full mission capable rate or if it reflects available jets with any degree of partial mission capability.
This is also notably substantially lower than the target of 80 percent that the Pentagon under Secretary of Defense James Mattis had attempted to set for all tactical combat jets starting in 2018.
However, U.S. government officials do not appear to have explicitly stated before that the engine itself is under-specced and has been the whole time.

Underscoring this point, in the course of the hearing yesterday, Donald Norcross, a Democratic Representative from New Jersey, mentioned a "cutting down to 1,600 hours" with regard to the F135. This would appear to be in reference to the target time between major scheduled maintenance on those engines, which has been said to be approximately 2,000 flight hours in the past. If this is indeed what Norcoss' figure refers to and it is accurate, this would mean that the U.S. military is only getting just over 75 percent of the expected life out of these engines before significant work has to be done.

U.S. Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Michael Cederholm, the deputy commandant for Aviation, also offered up additional details about the benefits of the ECU for the F135.
"On the Marine Corps perspective, what this engine core upgrade does is it gives us greater bring back capability to the boat. What does that mean? We can bring back 1,000 pounds more to the boat, which gives us life," he explained. "Fuel is life. Time on station is life for us. So that's why we are excited about the ECU and PTMS upgrades."
For Navy and Marine Corps F-35B and C pilots operating from the decks of aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships, having additional fuel reserves at the end of a sortie can be an extremely valuable extra margin of safety given the potential lack of alternative places to land. As Lt. Gen. Cederholm noted, that extra gas would allow the aircraft to have more time on station while conducting the missions, too. It could also help extend their operational range, another long-standing issue for F-35s.
It is also worth remembering here that the Marines are the only branch of the U.S. military to operate the F-35B, which uses the F135-PW-600 with its lower maximum thrust rating. Serious safety concerns about the F-35B's ability to maintain sufficient power to sustain vertical flight at high temperatures had previously emerged in 2019. The aircraft's manufacturer, Lockheed Martin, said at the time that it would implement a fix to the aircraft's flight software to address these issues.

As critical as it is, the ECU is still years away from becoming a reality. Lt. Gen. Schmidt said that the F-35 JPO is hoping the upgrades will start to be added to operational jets sometime between 2030 and 2032, but stressed that these dates were still very "notional." At the hearing, Andrew P. Hunter, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics separately said that he expected the development of the upgrade package to take at least between five and six years. The Air Force is the lead service in charge of the ECU program.
Schmidt warned that limitations with the current flight test infrastructure for the F-35 could be a limiting factor, and that this had already contributed to delays in the TR-3 upgrade package. The TR-3 improvements underpin the forthcoming Block 4 upgrades, as you can read more about here.

Development of TR-3 is now not expected to be finished until April 2024, a year later than expected. Lockheed Martin is hoping to be able to finish the work sooner, perhaps by December of this year, according to Schmidt. He further clarified that this goal is defined as being able to support TR-2-equivalent capabilities on a representative TR-3-configured aircraft. The additional Block 4 upgrade package is not currently expected to roll out until 2029.

It is also worth noting that a formal decision to approve full-rate production of the F-35 has not yet been made, which is dependent on the completion of the Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) process. The completion of the IOT&E continues to be held up primarily by issues with the new Joint Simulation Environment training tool. Lt. Gen. Schmidt said that the hope now is that the full rate production decision could finally come in December of this year.
All of this together raises questions about when the ECU, PTMS, TR-3, and Block 4 upgrades for the F-35 will ultimately arrive, as well as what the costs may be to fully integrate them onto even a portion of the existing fleets of all three variants. This is important given that the Air Force, in particular, views the Block 4 upgrades as essential for ensuring the F-35A's relevance in future high-end conflicts, such as one against a potential near-peer adversary like China or Russia.
How this may further impact additional concerns about the long-term sustainment costs for these jets, which are already set to be significant, remains to be seen. The ECU and PTMS improvements are certainly intended to address maintenance and logistics issues, as well as performance and capability-related ones.
The F-35 program, as a whole, has made significant efforts to address years of technical and other issues as the aircraft have become increasingly integrated into routine operations across the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. At the same time, as underscored especially by the disclosure about the F135 engine being under-specced, there is still significant work left to do to address long-standing systemic problems that continue to limit the capabilities and availability of the jets.

F-35 Engine Running Too Hot Due To 'Under-Speccing,' Upgrade Now Vital (Updated)

The F-35's engine is having to work harder to cool and power the aircraft's systems, leading to a logistical mess.

www.thedrive.com

 

[Blackeyes90]

Lockheed-Martin F-35 Lightning II & X-35​

After competing head-to-head with Boeing/Northrop on the contract to develop and build the fifth generation multirole fighter (the Joint Strike Fighter-JSF), Lockheed-Martin won with its X-35. Not surprisingly the F-35 developed from the X-35 shares components and therefore external appearance with the F-22 Raptor. Still there are many differences.
The F-35 Lightning II comes in three main variants, one for conventional take-off and landing, one with short take-off and vertical landing capabilities and one to operate from aircraft carriers. All are single engine fighters with trapezium shaped wings, conventional horizontal stabilisers and two outward facing vertical stabilisers. The air intakes at the side of the fuselage are facing inward, so they are hardly visible when you look at the F-35 from the side. Like the F-22 it has a sharp edge between the top and bottom half of the forward fuselage.

Note the sharp edge between the upper and lower half of the forward fuselage of the F-35 and air intake that is hardly visible from this viewpoint.​

The relatively large diameter engine is clearly visible from this angle, as are the horizontal and vertical stabilisers.​

The wings of the Lightning II are more trapezium shaped than a true delta.​

Different versions​

The different versions of the F-35 and X-35 can be recognised by:

• the shape of the nose gear
• the wing span
• the presence of a tail hook
• the presence of doors for the lift fan
• the shape of the canopy
• the shape of the air intakes

F-35A & F-35I Adir​

F-35A is the designation of the conventional take-off and landing version of the Lightning II. It has a single wheel nose landing gear with two gear doors. The canopy has a bow frame perpendicular to the air flow; it opens forward.
The Israeli air force has its own version, based on the F-35A, but with different systems. This F-35I Adir seems to be externally the same as the F-35A though.

A full view of a Lockheed-Martin F-35A Lightning II of the United States Air Force coming in to land.​

Here you can see three differences between the F-35 and X-35: the F-35 has a forward opening canopy, two nose gear doors and a three sided air intake.​

On this photo you can see better that there are no doors on top of the fuselage of the F-35A.​

F-35B​

Basically, the shape of the F-35B is the same as that of the F-35A. However, to provide the Lightning II with a vertical landing capability, it can tilt the nozzle of the main engine down. Additionally, it has a lift fan behind the canopy. Doors on top of and below the fuselage open when this lift fan is deployed. These doors are still visible though when they are closed.

The F-35B is of course best recognisable when all doors are opened to enable vertical flight and hover.​

Even when the lift fan doors are closed the edges are still visible, as is demonstrated on this photo.​

F-35C​

The last main Lightning II version is the one for carrier operations. Compared to the F-35A and F-35 it has a wider wing span and the wings are foldable for storage on board. The nose gear has two wheels and an additional diagonal strut at the back. Naturally the F-35C has an arrestor hook for grabbing a cable upon landing.

The larger wing span and different nose gear of the F-35C are clearly visible from this angle. (photo WikiMedia/US Navy)​

X-35A​

The X-35 was the Lockheed demonstration aircraft for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) competition, against the X-32 of Boeing. There are quite some differences between the X-35 and F-35 though. Most notable on the X-35 compared to the F-35 are the single nose gear side door and the canopy opening sidewards and having a bow frame that is tilted forward, closer to the forward edge. Also the air intake is different when viewed from the side: it has four edges instead of three on the F-35 (see photo below). Finally, the X-35 had a large boom on the nose. The X-35A was the conventional demonstrator and in many ways comparable to the F-35A.

An X-35A.​

X-35B​

The X-35B is the development counterpart of the F-35B, so also with a swivel nozzle on the main engine and a lift engine. For the rest it retains the external characteristics of the X-35A.

After completion of the flight test programme, the sole X-35B was displayed in the National Air & Space Museum. The lift fan doors can be seen on top of the fuselage. (photo WikiMedia/Barry Greyjoy)​

From this angle you can better see that the air intake of the X-35s have four edges, compared to three on the F-35s. Also note the single nose gear side door. (photo WikiMedia/Clemens Vasters)​

X-35C​

Like the F-35C the X-35C has a large wing span than the other X-35 demonstators, although the difference is not as big as on the F-35 versions. Other key features of the carrier based F-35C, like the arrestor hook and sturdier two-wheel landing gear, seem to have been omitted from the X-35C.

The X-35C is now also on display, in the Patuxent River Naval Air Museum. (photo WikiMedia/Carl Lindberg)​

Link ; https://www.aircraftrecognitionguide.com/lockheed-martin-f-35

 

[Bogeyman]

Pentagon Can’t Account for Thousands of F-35 Parts, GAO Says​

• Lack of accountability seen as symptom of audit failures
• US, allies tap into a common spare parts pool for fighter

The Pentagon can’t account for hundreds of thousands of spare parts worth millions of dollars that are stored worldwide for the US and allies that use its costliest weapon, the F-35 jet, according to congressional auditors.

The findings by the Government Accountability Office offer a concrete current example of “material weaknesses” in the Pentagon’s financial management that resulted in the military’s failure to pass a department-wide audit for the fifth consecutive year, according to the review that was released Tuesday.

Unlike scores of GAO reports and other assessments that analyze the fighter jet’s cost, schedule and flying performance, the new audit delved into the more mundane and largely invisible work of supporting the aircraft once it’s delivered to international customers. The operation and support bill for the F-35 may reach an estimated $1.4 trillion through 2088.

Allies don’t own parts and tap into the Defense Department’s worldwide shared pool of spares, including engines, tires, landing gear and items such as bolts, screws and other fasteners. The Pentagon’s F-35 program office doesn’t maintain accountability over the parts, “the total value of which is unknown,” the GAO said.

The parts are held at more than 50 locations worldwide, including subcontractors’ facilities, domestic and international military bases, facilities managed by foreign partners in the F-35 program’s supply chain and Defense Logistics Agency warehouses, the GAO said.

Although the F-35 program office “has taken initial steps to establish property records, after spending approximately $12 million to conduct the inventory,” it “was unable to provide the cost, total quantity, and locations of spare parts in the global spares pool,” the GAO said and continues to rely on contractor Lockheed Martin Corp.’s “records for this information.”

“As a result of this lack of accountability, the total value and quantity of the spare parts is currently unknown,” the watchdog agency found.


The Pentagon’s F-35 program office said that although it agreed with the GAO’s recommendations for improvement, “it is important for the American people and our global partners to understand that we know where the vast majority of F-35 spare parts are in the global supply chain” and “we will continue to work with the services to improve parts accountability and drive readiness” improvements.

The F-35 parts issue is emblematic of the Pentagon’s chronic failure to succeed in conducting a department-wide audit, the GAO said. Its “lack of accountability over the global spares pool affects its ability to resolve the material weakness related to the F-35 program, as well as other DOD material weaknesses,” the GAO said.

That “increases the risk of misstatement on DoD’s financial statements and the risk of mismanagement of the F-35 global spares pool,” it said of the Department of Defense.

The GAO said that Defense Department officials it interviewed said that “the material weakness related to the F-35 program may affect DoD’s ability to resolve other material weaknesses because of the department’s lack of accountability over the F-35 assets and the sheer volume of these assets — the total value of which is currently unknown, but estimated to be in the billions of dollars.”

The “ongoing issues with reporting the F-35 assets will most likely continue to contribute” to the Pentagon’s inability to certify an audit until that’s remedied, the GAO said.

Bloomberg - Are you a robot?

 

[Bogeyman]

Pentagon Can’t Account for Thousands of F-35 Parts, GAO Says​

• Lack of accountability seen as symptom of audit failures
• US, allies tap into a common spare parts pool for fighter

The Pentagon can’t account for hundreds of thousands of spare parts worth millions of dollars that are stored worldwide for the US and allies that use its costliest weapon, the F-35 jet, according to congressional auditors.

The findings by the Government Accountability Office offer a concrete current example of “material weaknesses” in the Pentagon’s financial management that resulted in the military’s failure to pass a department-wide audit for the fifth consecutive year, according to the review that was released Tuesday.

Unlike scores of GAO reports and other assessments that analyze the fighter jet’s cost, schedule and flying performance, the new audit delved into the more mundane and largely invisible work of supporting the aircraft once it’s delivered to international customers. The operation and support bill for the F-35 may reach an estimated $1.4 trillion through 2088.

Allies don’t own parts and tap into the Defense Department’s worldwide shared pool of spares, including engines, tires, landing gear and items such as bolts, screws and other fasteners. The Pentagon’s F-35 program office doesn’t maintain accountability over the parts, “the total value of which is unknown,” the GAO said.

The parts are held at more than 50 locations worldwide, including subcontractors’ facilities, domestic and international military bases, facilities managed by foreign partners in the F-35 program’s supply chain and Defense Logistics Agency warehouses, the GAO said.

Although the F-35 program office “has taken initial steps to establish property records, after spending approximately $12 million to conduct the inventory,” it “was unable to provide the cost, total quantity, and locations of spare parts in the global spares pool,” the GAO said and continues to rely on contractor Lockheed Martin Corp.’s “records for this information.”

“As a result of this lack of accountability, the total value and quantity of the spare parts is currently unknown,” the watchdog agency found.


The Pentagon’s F-35 program office said that although it agreed with the GAO’s recommendations for improvement, “it is important for the American people and our global partners to understand that we know where the vast majority of F-35 spare parts are in the global supply chain” and “we will continue to work with the services to improve parts accountability and drive readiness” improvements.

The F-35 parts issue is emblematic of the Pentagon’s chronic failure to succeed in conducting a department-wide audit, the GAO said. Its “lack of accountability over the global spares pool affects its ability to resolve the material weakness related to the F-35 program, as well as other DOD material weaknesses,” the GAO said.

That “increases the risk of misstatement on DoD’s financial statements and the risk of mismanagement of the F-35 global spares pool,” it said of the Department of Defense.

The GAO said that Defense Department officials it interviewed said that “the material weakness related to the F-35 program may affect DoD’s ability to resolve other material weaknesses because of the department’s lack of accountability over the F-35 assets and the sheer volume of these assets — the total value of which is currently unknown, but estimated to be in the billions of dollars.”

The “ongoing issues with reporting the F-35 assets will most likely continue to contribute” to the Pentagon’s inability to certify an audit until that’s remedied, the GAO said.

Bloomberg - Are you a robot?

The F-35 fighter program has taken a new level of sinking. I think the program is about to become unable to provide logistical support worldwide. Or Lockheed Martin is starting a crazy fraudulent organization.

@Cabatli_TR @Test7 @TheInsider @OPTIMUS @Stimpy75 @Anmdt @Yasar @TR_123456 @Zafer @Merzifonlu @Sanchez

 

[Merzifonlu]

I think adding the "B" model was the "kiss of death" for the F-35 program. I can see the only solution: Upgrade with added swarm drone management capability and manage spare parts and maintenance properly. BTW, I would immediately cancel the "B" model.

After this stage, the only issue that concerns us in the F-35 project will be getting back the money we paid.

P.S. Correction, B model.

 

[Afif]

I think adding the "C" model was the "kiss of death" for the F-35 program. I can see the only solution: Upgrade with added swarm drone management capability and manage spare parts and maintenance properly. BTW, I would immediately cancel the "C" model.

After this stage, the only issue that concerns us in the F-35 project will be getting back the money we paid.

Conventional wisdome seems to suggest Marines screwed it up by demanding VTOL.

AFAIK, Carrier version for navy requires less modification compared to F-35B. Why do you think C variant was the 'kiss of death'?

 

[Merzifonlu]

Conventional wisdome seems to suggest Marines screwed it up by demanding VTOL.

AFAIK, Carrier version for navy requires less modification compared to F-35B. Why do you think C variant was the 'kiss of death'?

Because VTOL airplanes are not actually airplanes. They should be counted in the helicopter class, in aspect kinematically. It was like adding a helicopter to an aircraft development project. Costs skyrocketed.

In my opinion, they shouldn't even have included the "C" model. What they had to do was produce a single model designed as a navalize. And this plane will be fixed wing, of course. Just like F-18. Maybe only the wings would be interchangeable. While folding wing was used in the model deployed on ships, it was not used in the model to be deployed on land.