TR UAV/UCAV Programs | Anka - series | Kızılelma | TB - series

[Reviewbrah]

Hürjet program will be the one of the most important stepping stone for jet UAVs

 

[Cabatli_TR]

Unmanned helicopter study from ITU

@AVCI

 

[Cabatli_TR]

ITU Tailsitter drone studies can be a nice kamikaze drone solution.

@AVCI

 

[Sinan]

Geometry of the wings and the plane in general and the material of the macro structure play a big role in how much of the radar signals are deflected, how much are bypassed and how much are absorbed. That is why BAE System engineers are employed at Tusas. This know how is important.
The size of the B2 bomber is huge. But it’s rcs value is as good as f22; 0.0001 m2. The new B21 similar in size to B2 is going to be virtually invisible!

I personally don't believe that chart. It is literally impossible to know the RCS of those aircraft. Countries keep that as a state secret.

 

[Nutuk]

It won't be exact of course but pretty close. The RCS values of F22 is for instance even for X-band radars a problem and that makes the F22 so unique, otherwise technologically the F35 is much much more modern and advanced.

 

[Sinan]

It won't be exact of course but pretty close. The RCS values of F22 is for instance even for X-band radars a problem and that makes the F22 so unique, otherwise technologically the F35 is much much more modern and advanced.

So an F-35's RCS is 50 times more than F-22 how do we know that?
IMO it is a made up chart.

For example "In 2005 the USAF said the F-22’s RCS was the same as a steel marble, and that the F-35’s would be that of a metal golf ball. People deduced from that, that the RCS of the F-22 was .0001M2 and the F-35’s was .001M2."

Nothing official, everybody has different interpretations and they based on a vague statements which we don't know even the statements are true.

 

[Saithan]

ITU Tailsitter drone studies can be a nice kamikaze drone solution.

@AVCI

View attachment 6949

Won’t it need fixed tail, wing to hold balance. I kinda like the foldable wing solutions. Gives more sleek design.

 

[AzeriTank]

So an F-35's RCS is 50 times more than F-22 how do we know that?
IMO it is a made up chart.

For example "In 2005 the USAF said the F-22’s RCS was the same as a steel marble, and that the F-35’s would be that of a metal golf ball. People deduced from that, that the RCS of the F-22 was .0001M2 and the F-35’s was .001M2."

Nothing official, everybody has different interpretations and they based on a vague statements which we don't know even the statements are true.

it is also different depending on what direction the radar waves come from, f35 front RCS is ok but from sides, behind, top of it is totally different. lets say they shoot the missile and try to run away... they might get intercepted from behind

 

[neosinan]

I wanna point out to a misconception I've read in a number of our Members. TB-2 drones doesn't have low RCS or at least that isn't the reason why It wasn't be able to shot down easily by SAM systems.

S300 or many other SAM system is developed to shoot down very fast fighter jets and alike. Their Radars were specialized to target such aircrafts both hardware or software wise. Our UAVs and Israli Harpy loitering munition both are slower than detection range of these SAM systems. This has been discussed in twitter similar discussions among other places.

There is no way of knowing Developing barely stealthy UAVs (like that is mentioned many post here) would do us any good. Some F16, F18 variants have such stealthy features and There hasn't any military literature claiming these would be useful in any real conflict ı've seen.

I agree we need to make turbofan/jet powered UAVs but there is no need to invest into terribly complicated design with internal weapon bay. What We need is cheap, Simple and reliable solution like TB-2 which can carry number of mk82/mk83 very quickly without risking F16. We need to spend our R&D budget on MMU not these.

@Nutuk I posted This acouple weeks ago And This should help you understabd the reasons Why TB-2 was effective against these SAM systems.

 

[Nutuk]

Ok, tell me also why TB2 and Harop were so successfull and not other types of drones that are equally slow

 

[Era_shield]

@Nutuk I posted This acouple weeks ago And This should help you understabd the reasons Why TB-2 was effective against these SAM systems.

In Libya, TB-2s took out many Pantsirs which are designed to destroy drones. Even older AD systems are designed to also detect slow moving helicopters and small targets like missiles, and should be able to detect the propeller of the TB-2 at the very least. Also, as Nutuk pointed out, the TB-2 isn't the only drone in the world - many drone attacks have been done for years by other actors, for example HTS in Syria, and they have mostly been shot down by AD systems, yet somehow the TB-2 is able to crush these same AD systems.

IMO still a mystery how Turkey is able to do it.

 

[Nutuk]

mistery is called stealth, composite body. Same with the Harop

 

[CAN_TR]

RAM paint eventually? For sure composite materials have their impact on low visibility.

 

[Yasar_TR]

TB2 SİHA’lar Rusya’da “Endişe” Uyandırdı

Ukrayna Hava Kuvvetlerinin tatbikat amaçlı TB2’leri uçurduğu belirtilirken, Rus basını bu uçuşu “tehlikeli” olarak tanımladı.

www.c4defence.com

Ukraine has been flying the TB2 UAV’s quite close to Russian border in Crimea. Russians were worried as they have realised that the Ukrainians have learnt to fly them so that the Russians are not able to detect them.

 

[Timur]

mistery is called stealth, composite body. Same with the Harop

look rebels in syria used this kind of drones and russians were able to detect them somehow:

these drones are really made out of cheap wood or worser from chipboards.. rarly any matal scrap is found on them so it must be something important for our drones wich are much bigger in size..

is it about radar absorbing materials? ew systems ? or must it be a combination!?

 

[Bogeyman]

look rebels in syria used this kind of drones and russians were able to detect them somehow:

these drones are really made out of cheap wood or worser from chipboards.. rarly any matal scrap is found on them so it must be something important for our drones wich are much bigger in size..

is it about radar absorbing materials? ew systems ? or must it be a combination!?

According to an article published on May 22, 2019, it has been proven that plastics such as fiberglass, styrene and acrylic can be detected remotely with Hyperspectral infrared imaging techniques. Do not let it be impossible to develop similar technologies to detect UAVs.

Dual-band discrimination and imaging of plastic objects | (2019) | Hibbitts | Publications | Spie

 

[Combat-Master]

Armenia’s most ‘modern’ air-defence systems, the S-300PT and PS series and the 9K37M Buk-M1, were both developed in the 1980s. While the missiles are still potent, their sensors are designed to detect, identifiy and track fast-moving fighters, and their moving-target indicators disregard small, slow drones. Like many 1980s systems, a lot of computing is predetermined by hardware layout, and reprogramming requires an extensive refit of the entire system, which the Armenians had not done. These systems are also incapable of plot-fusion: accumulating and combining raw radar echoes from different radars into one aggregated situation report. Plot-fusion is essential to detecting small and low-observable targets such as advanced drones or stealth aircraft. None of the export versions of Russia’s air-defence systems that it has sold to Syria, Turkey, North Korea, and Iran are capable of plot-fusion. (In the latter two cases, these are disguised as ‘indigenous’ systems like the Raad or Bavar 373.) There is therefore a huge difference in performance between Russian air-defence systems protecting Russian bases in Armenia and Syria and those Russian air-defence systems exported to Armenia and Syria.

Military lessons from Nagorno-Karabakh: Reason for Europe to worry

The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war holds important lessons for European defence. European governments should study it urgently.

ecfr.eu

 

[Yasar_TR]

Plot-fusion is essential to detecting small and low-observable targets such as advanced drones or stealth aircraft. None of the export versions of Russia’s air-defence systems that it has sold to Syria, Turkey, North Korea, and Iran are capable of plot-fusion.

In that case why did TuAF buy S400 system?

 

[Binh Nguyen]

In Libya, TB-2s took out many Pantsirs which are designed to destroy drones. Even older AD systems are designed to also detect slow moving helicopters and small targets like missiles, and should be able to detect the propeller of the TB-2 at the very least. Also, as Nutuk pointed out, the TB-2 isn't the only drone in the world - many drone attacks have been done for years by other actors, for example HTS in Syria, and they have mostly been shot down by AD systems, yet somehow the TB-2 is able to crush these same AD systems.

IMO still a mystery how Turkey is able to do it.

I think the successfulness of TB2 in Syria, Lybia and Armenia were combined of many factors such as ground electronic warfare measures, small RCS, low attitude flight envelope, low speed, experienced TB2 operators, pour training/tactic Pantsir operators.

 

[Era_shield]

While the missiles are still potent, their sensors are designed to detect, identifiy and track fast-moving fighters, and their moving-target indicators disregard small, slow drones.

Even AD systems from the 80s were designed to detect and engage slow-moving helicopters, and they often have a function to detect the Doppler effect of rotating propellers, which makes the AD system identify it as a non-clutter true target regardless of its speed. So I don't find this argument convincing.

Also, Armenia's most modern AD systems aren't what that article claims, it's the Pantsir S1E which are very new.

What it says about plot fusion is a bit misleading too, since that's done at a higher level than the AD battery itself. So Iran for example has its own AD management system which would do plot fusion and include plots from the Bavar.

Another part of the article which shows the author doesn't know what they're talking about:

The numbers of vehicles claimed to be destroyed are most likely exaggerated – for example, this Azeri-language Sputnik report claims that more tanks were destroyed than the number of tanks Armenia has in active duty.

Armenia is party to certain treaties which limit how many tanks it can have to around 240 (can't remember the exact number but it's in the mid 200s). It's known to evade this limit by stationing most of its tanks in Karabak and avoiding any official inclusion of them as part of its inventory, and the real number is thought to be at least 400. Armenia's visually confirmed tank losses are 190, so the "exaggerated" claim of 241 isn't an exaggeration at all.