Tom Cooper
Today, 5th day of the war in Ukraine, I’ll continue the coverage of events over the last 24 hours, and answer a few questions, too. There’s too much activity on the diplomatic/international plan: the mass of that is useless babbling. Sufficient to say that the West – plus Japan and South Korea – have imposed massive sanctions upon Russia, blocking de-facto all the trade, all the Russian assets abroad, and all the cooperation in a mass of other fields (space, sports etc.). Let me concentrate on military developments instead.
STRATEGIC LEVEL
Putin has put his nuclear forces on ‘special alert’, as ‘deterrence’ against ‘aggressive statements by the NATO’. There was no reply from the USA and/or NATO – and that’s good that way. Better to avoid engaging in a spiral of escalation with a bully.
AIR
The EU – repeat for emphasis: the EU – is intending to donate old MiG-29s and Su-25s of different NATO-air forces to Ukraine. Sounds logical: Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria etc. are still flying MiG-29s, for example. Ukrainians can fly such jets, even if their communications and IFF have been significantly modified over the time. Still, I consider this for useless political decision in style of, ‘we must do something’. It’s going to make Ukrainians happy, no doubt, but, jets in question are 40 years old and ‘bent’ from all the training over the years, and some of installed equipment (especially IFF and radios) is not going to be ‘compatible’ with the Ukrainians.
On top of that, it’s near pointless, because of the massive Russian superiority, and hiding fighter jets is anything else than easy. Thus, I’m curious to see if and how anything of this kind might be realised.
‘Hiding fighter jets’ brings me to a question several have asked yesterday. That is: how does the Ukrainian Air Force operate? In the night prior to the Russian aggression, it dispersed its aircraft and helicopters on airfields in the west and south of the country. A few are at ‘official’ air bases, but the mass is at minor airfields. Even then, Ukrainians are keeping them 1000-4000 metres away from any runways, well-concealed. Thus, except for destroying many of old, ‘stored’ – actually: abandoned – jets left behind, the Russians hit less than a handful of Ukrainian combat aircraft and helicopters on the ground.
For the Russians,´finding these jets is anything else than easy. Because Ukrainian S-300s are still operational, the Russians can’t freely move their handful of precious Tu-214R reconnaissance jets equipped with SLARs. They can’t bring them closely enough to find Ukrainian jets on the ground. Thus, they have to wait for Ukrainians to fly.
Now, MiG-29 and Su-25 were built for operations from ‘primitive’ facilities, can use even grass runways. That far, no problem. Where there is a massive problem is the command and control of such a ‘force’: what jet is where, which one to scramble in what case, and, hand on heart, one can’t just scramble a jet and send it ‘to attack whatever enemy it finds’, nowadays. Jets are moving very fast. What’s ‘here’ one moment, is ‘there’ the next, and thus easier to completely miss than to find. Moreover, the Russians are ‘hiding’ their aircraft with massive volumes of electronic warfare, and thus any Ukrainian jets that are airborne but do not have very specific targeting information, only serve as targets for the enemy. Especially, MiG-29 needs good support from the ground control to operate effectively: it needs ground control to tell the pilot where is the target and what is it doing. Unsurprisingly, Ukrainians have already lost a number of MiG-29s – to Russian interceptors, to surface-to-air missiles and other Russian weapons.
By now, Ukrainian Air Force can operate only in the west and the south, where the Russian air defence- and electronic warfare assets have not yet been deployed, are too far away, or are yet in the process of development. This is why we only see videos of Ukrainian Su-25s attacking advancing columns of the Russian Army, and then, primarily, in the south, where the battlefield is ‘still fluid’. When doing so, they are facing a full range of air defence means, from AKM assault rifles to S-400s (ASCC/NATO-codename ‘SS-21 Growler’).
Unsurprisingly, they’re flying very low, to limit detection and exposure – and still suffering heavy losses: at least 3 Ukrainian Su-25s were shot down yesterday and this morning. Apparently, all their pilots were killed.
Why such losses? Fast- and low-flying jets operating in the skies ‘saturated’ by enemy aircraft and air defences are ‘perfect targets’ for own air defences, too – as there is no way for ground troops well-supplied with MANPADs to say which is Russian and which is Ukrainian, while Russian aircraft are better-protected by countermeasures. Unsurprisingly, at least one of three Ukrainian Su-25s lost yesterday and today was shot down by own troops.
Generally, when you see a video shown a jet over Ukraine these days, you can gauge the following: if flying low, it’s Ukrainian. Only Russian Su-25s are flying low: all others are operating at medium and high altitudes.
Operations-wise, the Keystone Cops in Moscow claim the destruction of over 1,150 military targets in Ukraine, and have, for the first time ever, admitted suffering casualties – but without providing any kind of figures. They also declared ‘total aerial superiority’ in the skies, indicating there must be a reason why they’re as happy (probably shot down some Ukrainian MiG-29s and/or Su-27s).
The whole afternoon, Russian forces deployed in Belarus continued firing 9K720 Iskander (ASCC/NAtO-codename ‘SS-26 Stone’) tactical ballistic missiles at Ukraine. One, after the other.
NORTH
Despite announcements of ‘massive aerial onslaught’ and reports about ‘Russian attacks on Kyiv’, the area around the Ukrainian capitol is relatively quiet. Actually, the Russians are trying to push a mass of their mechanised units down the corridor along the Dnepr River, an they are widening that corridor towards the west. So much so, roads north of Kyiv are choke-full of Russian military vehicles (see attached sat-photos taken by Maxar). The same is valid for north-eastern approaches to Kyiv.
EAST
The Russians are both pushing their forward units in between Chernhiv and Kharkiv (both of which are meanwhile encircled), and rushing (or at least towing) additional units into this gap. Russian Army units deployed in this area are suffering the worst losses so far, definitely have very poor morale, and a bare minimum of supplies. That’s why I say ‘towing’: many of involved combat vehicles are broken or out of fuel. Many are abandoned by their crews for mechanical breakdowns; others because their crews are shocked by Ukrainian resistance. This is why the Russian advance on Kyiv from this direction is now lagging days behind the schedule.
That said, yesterday morning (27 Feb 22), there was another ‘thunder run’ by a Russian mechanised forces – this time into downtown Kharkiv. Stretched along major roads in between densely built neighbourhoods, this was hit by defenders, suffered losses and was forces to retreat. The city remains under Ukrainian control.
West of Kharkiv, the Russians reached Okhtyrka, but were repulsed when trying to enter the town. They then turned around and continued in direction of Poltava.
This is all classic Soviet/Russian tactics: advance on urban centres, check if they’re protected, and if not, by-pass them.
Sumy is still under Ukrainian control, but surrounded by the Russians from three sides, while the mayor of Kupianks simply handed out the town to the Russians.
In Severodonetsk (population about 110,000), the last night, somebody hit the giant Azot fertiliser plant (owned by an Ukrainian oligarch, but financed by the Russians), causing a detonation comparable to the Beirut blast. Right now, I’ve got no further details.
Further east: any reports about the Russians making no territorial gains in Donbas are nonsense. Ukrainians are holding out on most of the LOC, but withdrew from Shchastya to Sievierodonetsk (about 20km), and have lost Donske. Thus, their frontline was breached. Ukrainian officials have announced the recapture of Volnovakha, yesterday evening, but I have my doubts about this.
Mariupol is now surrounded from the west and the east and there are first reports about the Russians running probing attacks.
SOUTH
This area remains a ‘mechanised-force-commander’s paradise’ – for the Russians are continuing their rapid advances over the flat, frozen steppe in northern and eastern direction, there are lots of ‘meeting engagements’, air- and artillery-strikes, there is a major bridgehead with Russians trying to punch over Dnepr towards West, and at least on that side, the Ukrainians are counterattacking with everything at their disposal.
The Russians have completed the occupation of the southern bank of Dnepr from the Black Sea up to around Zaporozhye. Their troops are not yet inside Zaporozhye, though. The reason is the Russian bridgehead at Nova Kakhovka, from where they’re trying to assault Mykolaiv, while hit by Ukrainians from both flanks. Ukrainians are defending Kherson and Mykolaiv, and bringing in additional forces from the north. Their Su-25s and TB.2s remain highly active over this battlefield.
On the north-eastern side: the Russians are pushing on Zaporozhye, have reached Tokmak (not sure if they’ve taken it), and are attacking on Mariupol.
CONCLUSION
The classic Soviet/Russian military doctrine envisages campaigns of this kind to be run so that the Russian forces first ‘tie’ the enemy by numerous attacks on a wide frontline. Then, once the enemy has committed its reserves, and/or its strategic reserve is localised, the Russians are to deploy their major force (‘operational group’) for the main blow. This is how the theory goes ever since back in 1944.
….and is one reason why Gerasimov is only now rushing his ‘best’ units into Ukraine.
Other are as follows:
Strategists like him are always keeping about a third of their force in reserve. After all, and even if the NATO would never attack into Belarus, he can’t ignore the deployment of NATO forces in the Baltic states and Poland. He knows he couldn’t face such a threat with ‘B-class’ units, like the mass of those already involved in Ukraine. That’s why ‘A-class’ – ‘crack’, ‘elite’, ‘best-trained/equipped’ units are still kept back, whether deployed in Belarus or in western Russian Federation.
The main penetration into Ukraine took place in the ‘wrong’ part of the country: the south. It’s complex and taking time to get heavy, mechanised units to Crimea and then drive them all the way to the frontlines.
…which is why I have my doubts about Western reports along which the Russians have already deployed ‘three quarters’ of their available forces. They might have the intention to, eventually, do so, but about 50% of their troops available for this operation, are still not on the frontline.
Finally, one observation regarding official Ukrainian claims: as much as those released by the Keystone Cops are little more than a laugh, the longer this war goes on, the more are the Ukrainian releases about military developments reminding me about Armenian claims from the Second Nagorny Karabakh War of 2020. They simply can't be trusted.
Ah yes and: can one expect from the Russians to try linking-up with Russian-occupied Transnistria in Moldova? Yes, 1000% sure. This is definitely one of Putin's war aims. This is why his forces are pushing so hard on Mykolaiv: in order to reach Odessa (up to 80% of the population are Russians), and then Transnistria.