The shariazation of extremist politics By the late 1990s, ‘sharia’ had become a term coopted by variety of fringe groups in Pakistan as a means to distinguish themselves from the crowded marketplace of Islamist politics. In the 1970s, some Muslim authoritarian states implemented hudud (Quranic-prescribed punishments), such as public fl ogging for consump-tion of alcohol or cutting off hands for stealing, to show their resolve to Islamize their societies. It is not surprising that Pakistan, Sudan, and Libya, ruled by three military dictators, were at the forefront of this search for legitimacy by accentuat-ing the punitive measures in Islamic laws, which played a signif i cant role in cre-ating what Khaled Abu Fadl calls the ‘culture of ugliness’ frequently associated with sharia.35 In Pakistan, there was some public fl ogging during Zia-ul-Haq’s period, but stoning adulterers or cutting hands off thieves did not happen. It was the Taliban in Afghanistan who emerged as the model of an Islamic state for many extremist fringe groups in Pakistan. The Taliban’s insistence on limiting women’s movement, surveilling men’s facial hair and publicly fl ogging or killing adulterers despite strong opposition from most governments, international organizations and NGOs made them a model for extremist groups in Pakistan.
The ‘shariazation of politics’ is occurring in countries that face weak state structures, declining economic opportunities and intractable social conf l icts.
Noah Feldman argues that in places where we see a “quasi-Hobbesian environ-ment,” local communities have shown a “willingness to turn to self-established shari’a courts to engage in the most basic form of dispute resolution.”36 Quick and def i nitive justice is often the justif i cation given for the imposition of sharia. In the parliamentary debates on sharia I discussed earlier, many bemoaned the delayed and expensive judicial processes that emboldened predatory practices like rape and murder. For many communities in Pakistan, the traditional mechanism of con-f l ict resolution based on customary laws often produced better results. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), groups like Tehreek Nifaz Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM) in the Swat district and TTP in both FATA and Swat mimicked the Taliban’s practice of blowing up girls’ schools, forcing barbers to stop shaving young men’s beards, and publicly fl ogging those accused of crimes, all in the name of sharia. When the proponents of blasphemy statutes argue that showing any mercy to the accused is ‘against sharia’ they mean it in the sense of a ‘Talibanized’ conception of Islamic laws that brook no equivo-cation, since it is assumed that the laws are clear-cut.
What is the status of blasphemy laws in light of sharia? The Pakistan Sunni Therik statement I outlined earlier argued that showing leniency to Aaysia Bibi would be against sharia. The assertion is problematic because there is no clear-cut position taken in ‘sharia’ about imposing the death penalty for insulting the Prophet. I take up this issue in greater detail in the next chapter, but suff i ce it to say here that the term ‘sharia’ used in the statement is meant to signal the impossibility of compromise over blasphemy statutes and an implicit threat that if such a compromise is made the ST would become as radical as the TTP in challenging the state. I move next to a debate between a lawyer who argues in 88 Debating blasphemy favor of the death penalty for those guilty of insulting Prophet Muhammad and an Islamic scholar who argues against such punishment to show that the ground in which blasphemy statutes grow is fertilized more by nationalist passion than by sharia.
A lawyer’s passion for the Prophet Muhammad Ismail Qureshi is one of the pivotal fi gures in the movements Khatam-e-Nabuwat (Muhammad as the fi nal Prophet of God) and Namoos-e-Risalat (Movement for Protection of Prophet’s Honor). As an attorney, he has appeared in front of High Courts, the Supreme Court, and the Shariat Appellate Bench to argue in favor of declaring Ahmadis to be non-Muslims and to ensure that the only acceptable punishment for blasphemy against the Prophet Muham-mad (under Pakistan Penal Code 295-C) is the death penalty. Qureshi published a book entitled Namoos e Risalat aur Qanoon e Toheen e Risalat,37 which purports to make a def i nitive case that death is the only just punishment for any insulting remarks against Prophet Muhammad (shatim-e-Rasool).
Qureshi narrates the circumstances that made defending the sanctity of the Prophet (Namoos) the central goal of his adult life:
“A quarter century ago in Lahore I was living on Ghazi Ilum-ud-Din Shaheed road in Lahore opposite a mosque and used to go pray there often. One Friday I heard Sheikh-al Hadees, Maulana Moosa Khan, give the Friday sermon. He was wearing spotless white outf i t which made me wonder about the hypoc-risy of contemporary ulama, who claim to be following the example of the Prophet and his companions, but the Prophet lived a simple life among the growing wealth of the Islamic world and here is this famous alim, wearing an expensive outf i t. . . . I was so disheartened that I left the mosque with-out greeting him. Shortly afterwards I had a dream in which among a huge gathering of humanity I saw the Prophet Muhammad appearing on a horse (isep-esaba), he was wearing a pristine white outf i t and there was such holy light that despite my intense desire I could not gaze at his sacred face. . . .
Eventually I was able to touch his feet.”38 Qureshi goes on to say that for a long time he did not tell anyone of his dream but eventually conf i ded in an attorney friend who told him: “brother you are very lucky, you will be asked to render a great service.”39 In 1992, while performing Umrah in Medina, he met Maulana Moosa Khan, who was ecstatic to fi nd out about his dream. During that meeting Qureshi had an epiphany that made him apprehend a Quranic verse that no one ought to begrudge others’ blessings and luxuries that God had provided for his people, which made him regret his fi rst reaction to Maulana Moosa’s immaculate outf i t. Qureshi concludes his preface by saying that now it is clear to him that he was given a second life after a seri-ous car accident in 1976, because he had to make his dream a reality. That dream was realized when the Federal Shariat Court, in its historic decision, Muhammad Debating blasphemy 89 Ismail Khan V. Government of Pakistan, conf i rmed death as the only penalty for the crime of blasphemy against the Prophet.40 The rest of Qureshi’s book is devoted to establishing the unique status of the Prophet Muhammad, not only for Muslims but for humanity, and making an air-tight case that death is the only penalty for insulting the Prophet, and that such a crime was clearly understood and prosecuted wherever Muslims had political control. Qureshi takes up various questions surrounding the crime of insulting the Prophet: what kind of transgression is “insulting the Prophet?” Could it be forgiven if the accused did not actually have the intention to insult? Could it be forgiven if the accused repents? Is it a crime only for Muslims in that this will lead to irtad – leaving the faith or apostasy – and if that is the case, then what about the possibility that it is a crime against God, for which the punishment would fall in the afterlife? Are women exempt from the death penalty? To all of these questions Qureshi’s answer is: no mercy for anyone who is accused of insult to the Prophet.
Qureshi points to Maududi’s argument that Islam cannot be measured accord-ing to the modern conception of religion, in which religion is a private affair and meant to concern itself only with salvation in the afterlife. As a comprehensive ideological framework implemented by the state, an Islamic system cannot allow traitors to destabilize the very foundation of Islamic society. If a recruit leaves the army, he can be court-marshaled and shot to death; if a member leaves a revo-lutionary party, he can be killed; thus, those who join the party of Islam should know that if they leave they will be facing the prospect of the death penalty.41 Qureshi starts the section entitled ‘295-C’ with an international and compara-tive perspective by outlining what he deems to be the key sources of the Western notion of human rights: the English Magna Carta, the French social contract via Rousseau, the American Declaration of Independence, and the United Nations Human Rights Charter. He tells the reader that his in-depth study has made it clear to him that “these documents are an incomplete realization of the Quranic instructions and a faint echo of the last sermon on the Mount given by the Prophet Muhammad.”42 In Islam, he argues, humans are given greater rights to dignity than in the West, while the most important difference is that in Islamic states these rights are not under the control of governments – because they are God’s commandments, which no one has the right to amend or revoke. Qureshi points to the inadequacy of the Western human rights discourse in protecting vulnerable minorities in Bosnia, Kashmir, Palestine, and Kosovo because, he argues, “the UN is the minion of the United States,” which is why it has shown such quick action when it comes to putting sanctions on Iraq or Libya but is powerless to do anything when the U.S. violates international law.43 Quoting the Quranic verse that warns believers that killing one person is like killing all of humanity, while saving the life of one person is akin to saving the whole of humanity, Qureshi argues that a believing Muslim can never even con-template unjustly killing anyone because of fear of punishment not just in this life but the afterlife too. He argues that worries about blasphemy laws being abused are without foundation. Muslims love their Prophet so much that they would not hesitate to sacrif i ce their wealth, parents, or children to protect his honor, which is 90 Debating blasphemy why a blasphemy law against insulting the Prophet is the best way to ensure that no innocent lives are lost.44 For Qureshi, the blasphemy laws in the West are the fi nal nail in the coff i n of those who argue that PPC 295-C conf l icts with freedom of expression or freedom of religion. Qureshi cites British blasphemy law which prescribes “civil death rather than the death penalty.” He cites the 1978 blasphemy conviction against the UK newspaper Gay News to make the point that a lack of intention to cause harm cannot be considered a valid defense: “when the defendant’s attorney argued that there was no intention to commit blasphemy,” the “jury in a unanimous decision rejected that defense” because “in a blasphemy case against Jesus, ‘intention’ or ‘objective’ are irrelevant, thereby conf i rming what has been the Islamic stance all along; intentions do not matter in blasphemy conviction.”45 For Qureshi, the case that gives the best and fi nal word on blasphemy is a 1922 American court case, State v. Mokas,46 which he included in his testimony to the Pakistan Supreme Court in Zaheer-ud-Din v. the State. He provides detailed excerpts from the deci-sion without translating it into Urdu and at the end concludes: “No more argument is required after the irrefutable reasoning of American Supreme Court to prove the law of contempt of Holy Prophet (PBUH) to be justif i able in Pakistan.”47 He dwells on the following portion of the decision: “it may be truly said that, by reason of the number, inf l uence, and station of its devotees within our territorial boundaries, the religion of Christ is the prevailing religion of this country and of this state. With equal truth may it be said that from the dawn of civilization, the religion of a country is a most important factor in determining its form of gov-ernment, and that stability of government in no small measure depends upon the reverence and respect which a nation maintains towards its prevalent religion.”48 He then explains to his readers that European lawmakers justif i ed blasphemy laws on the grounds that an attack on religion is actually an attack on the state, which is why even secular states have made blasphemy a criminal offense. He argues that American Supreme Court decisions leave no room for debate: insulting the Prophet with impunity would mean destroying the very foundation of the Paki-stani state.49 He concludes the section by once again highlighting what he sees as the hypocritical attitude of the West towards blasphemy laws in Pakistan: “West-ern countries have established secular (irreligious) systems of Government, but their desire to worship has not gone away. Now rather than worshipping Jesus, the state has been fetishized as an object of worship. Wherever there are secular governments, the rebellion against the state is considered a most serious crime with capital punishment.”50 In the preface to the second edition of the book, published in 1999, Qureshi wrote that he had made a few additions to add to the force of his argument, and one such addition is to provide a rebuttal to what he calls a misguided defense of Rushdie and a denial of the severity of shatim-e-Rasool, which had been advanced by an Indian, Maulana Wahiduddin Khan (henceforth referred to as Maulana).
Maulana is a well-known Islamic scholar who has written inf l uential commentary on the Quran and various books about Islam. This debate between Qureshi and Debating blasphemy 91 Maulana is worth exploring in more detail. Below I will fi rst provide Maulana’s key arguments, and then I will discuss Qureshi’s critique of his book.
The Prophet’s way: dawa versus law For Qureshi, an airtight law ensuring prosecution and the death penalty for any-one who dares to insult the Prophet was the fundamental pillar of the integrity of the Muslim ummah; for Maulana, dawa (invitation to Islam) constituted the foundation of Islam because that is, he argued, the Prophet’s way. “Islam is an invitation to do good, it is not a mere set of criminal laws. The central purpose of Islam is not to make criminals out of humanity and then whip them, shoot them or hang them; instead it is to make people love God.”51 Maulana argues that law and dawa employ two very different methodologies. Law does not care what people think of it, while those interested in dawa must make friends out of enemies, which will require patience, persistence, and the ability to forgive those who mock you. He argues that this is the Prophet’s way because he was the “blessing for humanity (rehmat-e-alam) and not the murderer of humanity (qatal-e-alam).”52 Maulana says that Rushdie’s book is malicious propaganda against the Prophet and his family, but argues that this is not the fi rst time that the Prophet Muhammad has been vilif i ed – history is full of examples of horrif i c propaganda against the Prophet. The protection of the Prophet Muhammad’s reputation and the integrity of his message has been promised by God because Muhammad, as the last Prophet, must be a source of guidance for humanity until the end of time.53 He argues that the duty of Muslims is to engage in calling others to Islam by living an exemplary life. He characterizes Imam Khomeini’s 1989 fatwa, which promised a reward to anyone who killed Rushdie, as a disaster for dawa because it makes Muslims appear intolerant and vengeful. Quoting reviews of The Satanic Verses, he asserts that the book was shallow, defective, and without any literary merit; as such, it would have been ignored if it was not for the overreaction of Muslims, particularly from South Asia, that made the book famous and Rushdie rich.54 Citing several examples from the life of the Prophet, Maulana argues that the Prophet showed mercy or tried to convince with logic those who taunted him with satirical poems, accused him of being a false prophet, or even attempted to malign the reputation of his favorite wife Ayesha.
By writing the book, Rushdie may have injured the feelings of Muslims, but there is no Islamic criminal punishment for ‘injury of religious feelings,’ argued Maulana.55 He pointed out that the overreaction to Rushdie’s book, which included rioting that led to the deaths of several protestors and the damage of property, has made the central mission of Islam, dawa, much harder for Muslims. He counsels Muslims to understand the reason for the strong reaction of the West to the death fatwa against Rushdie. Rather than seeing the West’s reaction as anti-Islamic, Maulana, quoting Edward Mortimer, argues that free speech has become a cen-tral part of the Western belief system.56 We should respect the importance of free speech, says Maulana, because it enables us to do the work of dawa in the West.
92 Debating blasphemy He quotes from a letter by an English convert to Islam who complains that after the Rushdie affair she fi nds much greater hostility to Islam among her friends and neighbors.
Maulana devotes a chapter to a critical analysis of Ibn Taymiyya’s (1263– 1328) As-Saarim al-Maslul ala shatim ar-Rasul, because it is the central source for those who argue that insulting the Prophet should be punished with death. He praises Ibn Taymiyya for collecting important information about Islam, but faults him for defective analysis based on weak evidence.57 Ibn Taymiyya’s argument is that even though the Prophet forgave those who transgressed against him, now that he is not present in the world his followers cannot do the same. Quoting one Hadith in which the Prophet instructed his companion not to kill a person who had insulted him by saying, “do not give others the chance to say that Muhammad killed his companion,” Ibn Taymiyya concludes that killing is the right punish-ment for insulting the Prophet. Maulana calls this ‘childish logic’ that clearly conf l icts with the Prophet’s intent, which was to protect the reputation of the religion, since that is central to the success of his message.58 Another instance of such faulty logic in Ibn Taymiyya’s work, according to Maulana, is that the Prophet’s saying, in reference to satirical poems, that “words may be sharper than a sword” led Ibn Taymiyya to argue that non-Muslims who insult the Prophet with satire should be considered as guilty as those who attack him with the sword, which makes such transgressions punishable with death. “Ibn Taymiyya should have said that ‘words’ could be more lethal than the sword and more effective in changing people’s minds, which is why we need to respond to words with words.
Prose and poetry would be a powerful response to destroy that ‘f i tnah’ (sedition) of those who mock the Prophet. To do so would be exactly like following the Prophet’s way.”59 Maulana further argues that the many verses from the Quran used by Ibn Taymiyya to support death as the penalty for insults to the Prophet never mention punishment in this world; instead they refer to eternal punishment in afterlife.
Maulana concedes that the majority of ulama over the years have agreed that shatim must be punished with death, but says that two points need to be kept in mind – fi rst, nothing in the Quran or Hadith supports this punishment, and second, the consensus def i nition of shatim is not limited to insult to the Prophet Muhammad; it includes insult against God and all of the prophets. But he points out what constitutes shatim is so extensive – making fun, criticizing, accusing, cursing – that if we apply it to our contemporary world almost all might be accused of insult. Maulana continues, “Jews consider Jesus to be a child of an unwed mother, Christians consider the Prophet Muhammad to be a false prophet, then there are those who do not believe in one God, and socialists and communists who consider religion to be an opiate for the mind” – this makes the list of trans-gressors so long that eventually all of humanity would be considered worthy of death.60 Maulana faults Muslim intellectuals and ulama of reacting unthinkingly to perceived provocations, rather than investigating events thoroughly. He points to several instances where prominent religious and political leaders agreed with Khomeini’s call for Rushdie’s assassination but later, when their ‘jihad of word’ Debating blasphemy 93 had created a toxic environment for Islam, they moderated their stances, as the Iranian Government did, by removing the fatwa against Rushdie.61 In his response to this book, Qureshi dismisses Maulana’s arguments based on the Quran and the Hadith as a waste of time because “in the face of unanimous agreement among the ulama, a self-proclaimed maulvi’s confused musings have no value.”62 Instead, Qureshi focuses on two pages in which Maulana argues that free speech has become a cherished value in the West, and that that might be a good thing for Muslims interested in dawa. Qureshi begins his response by say-ing “India’s self-proclaimed Maulana has written a book on the issue of shatim-e-Rasool in 1996 in which he has relied on deceptive phrases such as liberty, tolerance, freedom of expression, and freedom of thought to fully litigate the case of the devilish Rushdie.”63 Qureshi argues that Maulana does not understand the concept of liberty, the danger that libertarianism will turn into licentiousness, or the West’s duplicitous attitude toward free speech. In Qureshi’s view, historical evidence shows that Rousseau learned about the concept of liberty from Islamic sources. He says that Maulana does not understand the fact that the necessity for public order limits the exercise of freedoms in every country, including India, where the integrity of the state and the boundaries of decency are some of the standards by which free speech is regulated.64 By calling Maulana secular, insinu-ating that his Indian origin makes him untrustworthy, and quoting passages from his writing out of context, Qureshi attempts to dismiss Maulana Wahiduddin Khan’s arguments about shatim-e-Rasool without ever addressing the central contention of Maulana: God has guaranteed Namoos-e-Risalat, and this has set Muslims free to focus on dawa.
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