F35 has Israel made components, won't fly without Israel's consent.
The main operating system, all of codes, logistics network control and organization, software supervision, and any critical authority that could ground an aircraft in the F-35 program are directly under the control of the US government and the contractor, Lockheed.
Countries producing parts, such as Israel, the Netherlands, the UK, or Australia, have no administrative or operational authority over the ODIN system. ODIN is a cloud-based logistics and mission planning network. Only the US Joint Program Office (JPO) and Lockheed Martin control which parts an aircraft needs, from which warehouse and when those parts will arrive, and whether the aircraft is airworthy. Israel is the only country with the privilege of integrating its own local software into its ordered aircraft (F-35I Adir) with US permission, but it cannot interfere with the global ODIN network.
Israel is not one of the founding partners (Tier 1, 2, or 3) of the project; it has "Security Cooperation Participant" (SCP) status. However, Israeli companies are major producers in two very critical subsystems in the global supply chain. Israel Aerospace Industries manufactures outer wing components for all global F-35 fleets. And, Helmet-Mounted Display System (HMDS) Visors: Elbit Systems, in partnership with Rockwell Collins, manufactures the visors and display subsystems for the helmet technology that pilots use to control the aircraft and provides 360-degree vision.
Because Israel owns the intellectual property (IP) for these parts, it can say, "You cannot sell this part to Türkiye or country X" (political veto). However, technically, they are not "the only/indispensable" option. If the US wishes, it can bypass Israel by expanding Lockheed Martin's own production lines in the US or production lines in other allied countries. This is a very serious move that will directly affect both the production line and the ODIN system, and will create deep complications in its relations with the US. Israel, especially since it is vitally dependent on the US to rapidly replenish its armed forces' ammunition stocks and inventory, cannot afford to engage in such a high-level dispute.
The parts produced by Türkiye in past not sold to a single country, but distributed within a global supply chain to manufacturers in the US (Lockheed Martin), Israel, Australia, and some European countries. And even years later, supply problems persist for a portion of this work share. In Türkiye, TAI (TUSAŞ) was producing critical components of the F-35, including the center fuselage, composite outer coverings, and weapon bay covers. Kale Aviation was also producing landing gear components and locking mechanisms. We had quite extensive industrial involvement; there's no need to go into that in detail again, just as a similar example: for the Panoramic Cockpit Display Electronic Cards and Missile Remote Interface Unit (MRIU) components, we were the sole supplier within JSF. When Turkiye was removed from the program, the production burden and expanded orders for some of these parts were shifted to Israeli (IAI) and US subcontractors with similar industrial infrastructure.
At worst, we will acquire 5-6 of our aircraft and modernize them. If a combat fleet is to be established – bcs all our infrastructure is ready – Turkish aircraft will have a different HMDS within my humble opinion.
In short, the retired US officer's argument is completely flawed from a logistical standpoint. It doesn't matter who produces the part because once it's manufactured, ownership passes to Lockheed Martin and it's distributed by the US via the ODIN system. Israel's blocking of deliveries for systems where it's the sole producer affects the entire program, and its vetoing of intellectual property rights leads to the use of alternative suppliers. Therefore, this political blackmail is not a strong basis given the nature of the program. What the retired officer in this video is doing is largely an attempt to appease public opinion (especially Zionist circles). We won't fall for this bluff, because in the past our position was that if we were removed from the F-35 industrial ecosystem, the project would face difficulties; it did have some impact on costs, but the project somehow continued.
