TR Altay Main Battle Tank & Related Programs

[Afif]

It is the only 5th gen tank design with a weight around 50 tons. (It is one of the requirements)

 

[TheInsider]

Hyundai Rotem's K3 concept from last year. World's advancing rapidly as we play catch up.

Well, here we go 2 man design. I repeat this again and again now it is slowly becoming mainstream. Altay with an autoloader is still a 4 man tank. Altay is obsolete, Altay T3 is also obsolete before its firts prototype makes it out of the garage.

 

[Chocopie]

Hyundai Rotem's K3 concept from last year. World's advancing rapidly as we play catch up.

This is the newest Hyundai Rotem K3 concept from June 2023 (most realistic than previous sci-fi models):

• 130 mm main gun
• 12,7 mm RCWS with integrated optical/thermal sight
• Unmanned turret, full-autoloader
• Capsuled 3 men crew cockpit
• 360° surveillance & detection system
• Mine and IED detection system
• New gen composite armor and (N)ERA
• Hard-kill APS (top attack ATGM)
• 55 t combat weight

Unconfirmed features:
- vehicle mounted multipurpose drone
- integrated multipurpose missiles (AA/AT)
- smart wheel/suspension system
- composite rubber tracks
- electric or hybrid propulsion (engine, transmission)
- helmet mounted displays
- remote control from HQ

One of few English based sources:

Korea Unveils New Conceptual Design of the K3 Tank, Set to Replace the K2 Tank in the 2030s | Defense Express

The new concept of the tank retains its key feature – a combat module with the entire crew of three housed in an armored capsule

en.defence-ua.com

 

[Heartbang]

Altay is obsolete, Altay T3 is also obsolete before its firts prototype makes it out of the garage.

A lot of these tank concepts are ending up being non-starters.
Seems like modernized versions of what the Western bloc currently have is more than adequate to trump over Russia and China.

 

[UkroTurk]

Everybody( Russia/Korea/ USA)does projects of two-manned heavy MBTs. So Turkish defense industry could bring new consept such as single crew one-man medium Tank with 120mm gun ( still 120 mm cal rounds in inventories).

 

[Radonsider]

Two man designs suck, really what happens if track link decides not to be a link anymore? Wait for backups from your company for 10 hours because you cannot repair it yourself?

 

[UkroTurk]

Two man designs suck, really what happens if track link decides not to be a link anymore? Wait for backups from your company for 10 hours because you cannot repair it yourself?

That's why your product must have Perfection!

 

[Radonsider]

That's why your product must have Perfection!

That simply doesn't happen in terrain

 

[TheInsider]

Two-man design is futuristic for now but it will happen. Tanks will eventually be like attack helicopters. Meanwhile, 3 man tank designs are realistic and way to go.

In the past, I proposed a 3-man tank design with ~50t combat weight. Forum users might remember. We discussed it a lot.

 

[Afif]

That's why your product must have Perfection!

Yes, you may be able to build a super protected tank that could save crews lives from the most powerful mine, however, you simply cannot save the track from being disintegrated once hit buy such mine.

 

[uçuyorum]

Are any of the unmanned platforms being developed has the potential in terms cost effectiveness, sufficient firepower and armor to relieve some of the duties from MBT by changing the doctrines?

Because MBT are supposed to help infantry advance by enduring serious fire and by supressing the enemy with its own firepower right? However because anti tank capabilities keep getting better and more common, seems like a large number of UGV charging ahead to pave the way even if a lot of them gets blown up seems like a no brainer because otherwise MBT being blown up will cost a lot more.

Regardless, being the attacker side seems to be getting more and more costly and countries will have to keep that in mind while thinking the future of their security environment.

 

[Zafer]

It will probably be way easier to build a variety of tanks with the knowledge gained from the Altay tank development process. The elements that go into making a tank are pretty much all there so we should go for all those experimental concepts. Not just for ourselves but for the many nations that we can supply them to.

 

[Heartbang]

What we gonna face is Iranian Syrian Iraqi T 72 T 90 Greek Cypriots hava some T 80 or Greek Leo 1 leo2A4 Leo 2A6 and we need our tank in urban envirnment I belive New Altay fits the bill. Your thank can be 5 6 7 genereation still an artilary shell or a mine or a drone or an atgm can desimate it. without considering the context and our requirements calling Altay obsolete is not wise ... obsolete against whom against what?

I concur.
What we need to focus on is to pump up those Altay unit numbers and the development of a state-of-the-art APFSDS ammo capable of penetrating 1000+ mm RHA to accompany those Altays.

 

[Xenon54]

Well, here we go 2 man design. I repeat this again and again now it is slowly becoming mainstream. Altay with an autoloader is still a 4 man tank. Altay is obsolete, Altay T3 is also obsolete before its firts prototype makes it out of the garage.

We are not far from 10 year mark from the supposed first mass production date of Altay, sry but this project is dead by now...

 

[Afif]

Are any of the unmanned platforms being developed has the potential in terms cost effectiveness, sufficient firepower and armor to relieve some of the duties from MBT by changing the doctrines?

Because MBT are supposed to help infantry advance by enduring serious fire and by supressing the enemy with its own firepower right? However because anti tank capabilities keep getting better and more common, seems like a large number of UGV charging ahead to pave the way even if a lot of them gets blown up seems like a no brainer because otherwise MBT being blown up will cost a lot more.

Regardless, being the attacker side seems to be getting more and more costly and countries will have to keep that in mind while thinking the future of their security environment.

Yes, Offence is becoming increasingly difficult in 21st century warfare. This is not only the opinion of defence enthusiasts like us but also, it is coming from the peoples who are leading expert in the field.

Listen from BGen Mark Clingan, (USMC
Assistant Deputy Commandant to CD&I and Deputy Commanding General of MCCDC) and the other experts.

Game-changers or little-changed? Implications of ground combat in Ukraine

Experts discuss what lessons policymakers should draw from land warfare in Ukraine and what adaptations the United States, as well as allies and partners, sh...

www.youtube.com

The problem with large number of UGV charging ahead is if they are not well armoured/protected as manned tanks, they would get killed more easily. The same is true if you cannot put Expensive APS on them for cost saving.


But more importantly, The issue is not so much that if you can compensate the lack of adequate armour and APS on UGVs by adding quantitative advantage through deploying large numbers of them, (or even lets say, you actually put an APS on them) rather, due to the increasing of precision and autonomy of modern weapon system the very notion of traditional Concentrated thrust/maneuverer are becoming increasingly obsolete Against a near-peer adversary.



1. I mean, the first obstacle is obviously mines, we saw Russians are making good use of them against Ukrainian counter offensive. And it doesn’t even have to completely destroy the vehicles. Just bowing up their tracks would kill the
Tanks/UGVs Mobility and make them sitting ducks.

Here you can see the devastation of an advancing Ukrainian formation from Russian mines.

2. Second killer would be the Artillery, (additionally, loitering ammunitions) even with advance counter measures like APS on each tank/UGV And (let’s say) individual Triple-A C-RAM VSHORAD organically deployed with each Tank company, (if you can practically afford such distribution of rather expensive VSHORADs) Multiple Rounds Simultaneous Impact (MRSI) from 1 battery (6x) 155mm heavy artillery (salvo of 18-20 rounds) or (in the future) interconnected autonomous swarm of loitering ammunition are simply going overwhelm the counter measures. (APS and C-RAM) And likely to kill 50% of the advancing Tank/UGV formation.

We already saw countless videos of both Russian and Ukrainian armour/mechanised formations getting taken out by precision artillery fires And loitering ammunition.

1/2 vehicle were hit by mines. (remember,

Now I saw people criticising Ukrainian army by saying that, they emulating the Russian tactics hence the disaster.
However, the fact of the matter is, the Tactics for any concentrated thrust/manoeuvre the infiltrate enemy line is more or less same for every military. (Whether it follows the Western doctrine or Eastern doctrine)

That is why BGen Mark Clingan said, (in the presentations) he is yet to see any evidence that Western tanks will fair better compare to their Russian counterparts.

Similarly, UGVs just through greater numbers unlikely to make any difference, and very likely to end up like the vehicles (in the photo above) in any Traditional concentrated offense scenario. Because even though they are smaller, artillery shell doesn't need a direct hit to kill UGV's tracks. A proximity blust within 10 meters likely to do the job.)

(However, it can be argued that, an Advancing manoeuvre formation can put their own Artillery fire support to good work in combined arms tactics (like their defending adversary) to effectively disintegrate and neutralise the defensive line so an armoured breach by the advancing formation can be conducted more successfully and with less resistance. I will addresses that in a bit)

3. And after that, (mines and joint fire support) when you will reach the well prepared enemy defence line, enemy Tanks, IFVs, UGVs as well as infantry equipped with advanced ATGM will be waiting for you.

And give the advantage of pre-preparation they will make the best use of Camouflage, concealment and deception. (CCD) Thus, Defending force is very likely to see first and shoot first.

There are misconceptions that, due to incredible advance in sensor technologies like HD MWIR FLIR or AESA SAR old school Camouflage, concealment and deception (CCD) is became obsolete.

However, that is not true.
Obviously, it is no brainer that with adequate camouflage you can mask your self with terrain from cheap UAVs that only has TV sensor yet lacks FLIR.

But also, there are advance multi-spectral camouflage nets that, not only can hide light infantry against IR sensors.


(This is below SAAB's Baracuda series multi-spectral camouflage)

But also, it works for tanks/IFVs/UGVs quite well.

(MCS stands for 'mobile camouflage system' for vehicles. You can see it’s effectiveness compared to unprotected vehicle)

And here its effectiveness against Modern SAR.

Barracuda MCS | Saab

Modern military vehicles must be inconspicuous and adaptable to beat threats. This is where our Mobile Camouflage System (MCS) comes in.

www.saab.com

And if leafs are added on top MCS or it takes cover under trees lines, it becomes totally invincible even to the most modern AESA sensor like APG-81. (When it’s not moving)

(Let's not also forget that, recently with AbramsX the concept of silent watch has been introduced. Where Engine won’t be running, (almost completely eliminating the IR signature) yet Tank will remain capable of ISR, targeting and shooting its cannon.)


Now, despite you having formidable ISR assets in numbers (like small/medium UCAVs equipped with advanced IR sensors,) Modern CCD remain effective for the defending line.

Thus, (back to argument of heavy Artillery employment against well prepare defending line) employment of heavy Artillery, close air support or loitering ammunitions in support of combined arms offensive manoeuvre formation against the well prepared defending force does not nearly bring the similar effect as it brings on advancing concentrated formations for the defending force.

As concentrated advancing manoeuvre formation is simply more exposed to the defending force's ISR assets (when they are moving) than the other way around

(Also, let's keep in mind that, in a near-peer conflict both party would make extensive use of EW to disrupt and delay Adversary’s kill-chain by jamming the ISR assets and effective communication.)

But of course, that does not mean CCD can completely protect the defending line from offensive joint fire support (mostly artillery, but also CAS and loitering ammunitions)
In fact far from it, Modern ISTAR is still very formidable and likely to take out a good numbers of tanks/IFVs and infantry position in advance for the offensive manoeuvre formation.

But than again, Defending force won’t be sitting duck completely.

The most important lesson from Russo-Ukraine war seems to be, in modern conflict against near-peer adversary dispersion coupled with high mobility is the most effective tactic to increase the survivability of the friendly force.


As this RUSI report puts it-

• For land forces, the pervasive ISTAR on the modern battlefield and the layering of multiple sensors at the tactical level make concealment exceedingly difficult to sustain. Survivability is often afforded by being sufficiently dispersed to become an uneconomical target, by moving quickly enough to disrupt the enemy’s kill chain and thereby evade engagement, or by entering hardened structures. Shell scrapes and hasty defences can increase immediate survivability but also risk the force becoming fixed by fire while precision fires and specialist munitions do not leave these positions survivable. Forces instead should prioritise concentrating effects while only concentrating mass under favourable conditions – with an ability to offer mutual support beyond line of sight – and should give precedence to mobility as a critical component of their survivability.

https://static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine-Preliminary-Lessons-Feb-July-2022-web-final.pdf

Conclusion- I don’t think changing manned tanks with UGVs for traditional offensive concentration would produce desirable effect.

Rather, Dispersion coupled with high mobility would likely to remain the most effective tactic in tomorrow’s battlefield against near-peer adversaries. (and UGV likely to play an important role in that)

 

[AzeriTank]

Yes, Offence is becoming increasingly difficult in 21st century warfare. This is not only the opinion of defence enthusiasts like us but also, it is coming from the peoples who are leading expert in the field.

Listen from BGen Mark Clingan, (USMC
Assistant Deputy Commandant to CD&I and Deputy Commanding General of MCCDC) and the other experts.

Game-changers or little-changed? Implications of ground combat in Ukraine

Experts discuss what lessons policymakers should draw from land warfare in Ukraine and what adaptations the United States, as well as allies and partners, sh...

www.youtube.com

The problem with large number of UGV charging ahead is if they are not well armoured/protected as manned tanks, they would get killed more easily. The same is true if you cannot put Expensive APS on them for cost saving.


But more importantly, The issue is not so much that if you can compensate the lack of adequate armour and APS on UGVs by adding quantitative advantage through deploying large numbers of them, (or even lets say, you actually put an APS on them) rather, due to the increasing of precision and autonomy of modern weapon system the very notion of traditional Concentrated thrust/maneuverer are becoming increasingly obsolete Against a near-peer adversary.



1. I mean, the first obstacle is obviously mines, we saw Russians are making good use of them against Ukrainian counter offensive. And it doesn’t even have to completely destroy the vehicles. Just bowing up their tracks would kill the
Tanks/UGVs Mobility and make them sitting ducks.

Here you can see the devastation of an advancing Ukrainian formation from Russian mines.

2. Second killer would be the Artillery, (additionally, loitering ammunitions) even with advance counter measures like APS on each tank/UGV And (let’s say) individual Triple-A C-RAM VSHORAD organically deployed with each Tank company, (if you can practically afford such distribution of rather expensive VSHORADs) Multiple Rounds Simultaneous Impact (MRSI) from 1 battery (6x) 155mm heavy artillery (salvo of 18-20 rounds) or (in the future) interconnected autonomous swarm of loitering ammunition are simply going overwhelm the counter measures. (APS and C-RAM) And likely to kill 50% of the advancing Tank/UGV formation.

We already saw countless videos of both Russian and Ukrainian armour/mechanised formations getting taken out by precision artillery fires And loitering ammunition.

View attachment 59315
1/2 vehicle were hit by mines. (remember,

Now I saw people criticising Ukrainian army by saying that, they emulating the Russian tactics hence the disaster.
However, the fact of the matter is, the Tactics for any concentrated thrust/manoeuvre the infiltrate enemy line is more or less same for every military. (Whether it follows the Western doctrine or Eastern doctrine)

That is why BGen Mark Clingan said, (in the presentations) he is yet to see any evidence that Western tanks will fair better compare to their Russian counterparts.

Similarly, UGVs just through greater numbers unlikely to make any difference, and very likely to end up like the vehicles (in the photo above) in any Traditional concentrated offense scenario.

(However, it can be argued that, an Advancing manoeuvre formation can put their own Artillery fire support to good work in combined arms tactics (like their defending adversary) to effectively disintegrate and neutralise the defensive line so an armoured breach by the advancing formation can be conducted more successfully and with less resistance. I will addresses that in a bit)

3. And after that, (mines and joint fire support) when you will reach the well prepared enemy defence line, enemy Tanks, IFVs, UGVs as well as infantry equipped with advanced ATGM will be waiting for you.

And give the advantage of pre-preparation they will make the best use of Camouflage, concealment and deception. (CCD) Thus, Defending is very likely to see first and shoot force first.

There are maybe misconceptions that, due to incredible advance in sensor technologies like HD MWIR FLIR or AESA SAR old school Camouflage, concealment and deception (CCD) is became obsolete.

However, that is not true.
Obviously, it is no brainer that with adequate camouflage you can mask your self with terrain from cheap UAVs that only has TV sensor yet lacks FLIR.

But also, there are advance multi-spectral camouflage nets that, not only can hide light infantry against IR sensors.


(This is below SAAB's Baracuda series multi-spectral camouflage)
View attachment 59318
View attachment 59319


But also, it works for tanks/IFVs/UGVs quite well.

View attachment 59316
View attachment 59320
(MCS stands for 'mobile camouflage system' for vehicles. You can see it’s effectiveness compared to unprotected vehicle)

Saab | It´s a human right to feel safe

Saab serves the global market of governments, authorities and corporations with products, services and solutions ranging from military defence to civil security.

www.saab.com

And here its effectiveness against Modern SAR.

Saab | It´s a human right to feel safe

Saab serves the global market of governments, authorities and corporations with products, services and solutions ranging from military defence to civil security.

www.saab.com

And if leafs are added on top MCS or it takes cover under trees lines, it becomes totally invincible even to the most modern AESA sensor like APG-81. (When it’s not moving)

View attachment 59323

(Let's not also forget that, recently with AbramsX the concept of silent watch has been introduced. Where Engine won’t be running, (almost completely eliminating the IR signature) yet Tank will remain capable of ISR, targeting and shooting its cannon.)


Now, despite you having formidable ISR assets in numbers (like small/medium UCAVs equipped with advanced IR sensors,) Modern CCD remain effective for the defending line.

Thus, (back to argument of heavy Artillery employment against well prepare defending line) employment of heavy Artillery, close air support or loitering ammunitions in support of combined arms offensive manoeuvre formation against the well prepared defending force does not nearly bring the similar effect as it brings on advancing concentrated formations for the defending force.

As concentrated advancing manoeuvre formation is simply more exposed to the defending force's ISR assets (when they are moving) than the other way around

(Also, let's keep in mind that, in a near-peer conflict both party would make extensive use of EW to disrupt and delay Adversary’s kill-chain by jamming the ISR assets and effective communication.)

But that does not mean, CCD can completely protect the defending line from offensive joint fire support (mostly artillery, but also CAS and loitering ammunitions)
in fact far from, Modern ISTAR is still very formidable and likely to take out a good numbers of tanks/IFVs and infantry position in advance for the offensive manoeuvre formation.

But than again, Defending force won’t be sitting duck completely.

The most important lesson from Russo-Ukraine war seems to be, in modern conflict against near-peer adversary dispersion coupled with high mobility is the most effective tactic to increase the survivability of the friendly force.


As this RUSI report puts it-

• For land forces, the pervasive ISTAR on the modern battlefield and the layering of multiple sensors at the tactical level make concealment exceedingly difficult to sustain. Survivability is often afforded by being sufficiently dispersed to become an uneconomical target, by moving quickly enough to disrupt the enemy’s kill chain and thereby evade engagement, or by entering hardened structures. Shell scrapes and hasty defences can increase immediate survivability but also risk the force becoming fixed by fire while precision fires and specialist munitions do not leave these positions survivable. Forces instead should prioritise concentrating effects while only concentrating mass under favourable conditions – with an ability to offer mutual support beyond line of sight – and should give precedence to mobility as a critical component of their survivability.

https://static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine-Preliminary-Lessons-Feb-July-2022-web-final.pdf

Conclusion- I don’t think changing manned tanks with UGVs for traditional offensive concentration would produce desirable effect.

Rather, Dispersion coupled with high mobility would likely to remain the most effective tactic in tomorrow’s battlefield against near-peer adversaries. (and UGV likely to play an important role in that)

Either in each comment you change you mind or you got a good lesson from out comments last time.
When you called the Leo 2 a6 the best tank last time, just because of its engine power(as you mentioned that speed and maneuver is important) and i showed you those ukranian tanks stucked because of mine and mentioned that i would rather be in a tank with aps and good protection than just speed and light top armor which could be eliminated bu a simple kamikaze drone
UGV are controlled from 2km for milrem and 5km for Turkish ones(from their interviews, both fnss and otokar mentioned 5 km), imagine you develop a new system that clean mines for 2-3 km or use several of them for 5km deep from several direction to make road for them and they simply get in, give damage and return. Also help them
With long range antitank, kamikaze drones and so on. You can hide your vehicle, but once you shoot, the sniper detection system will show your location and you will be destroyed. Thats why the UGVs are getting way more important.
Top armor of leo 2 )

 

[Afif]

Either in each comment you change you mind or you got a good lesson from out comments last time. When you called the Leo 2 a6 the best tank last time,

I never called leo2 A6 the best MBT out there.
I called Leo2 A8 the best.
And that was not my position alone. Gary also explained it thoroughly.

because of its engine power(as you mentioned that speed and maneuver is important) and i showed you those ukranian tanks stucked because of mine and mentioned that i would rather be in a tank with aps and good protection than just speed and light top armor which could be eliminated bu a simple kamikaze drone
UGV are controlled from 2km for milrem and 5km for Turkish ones(from their interviews, both fnss and otokar mentioned 5 km), imagine you develop a new system that clean mines for 2-3 km or use several of them for 5km deep from several direction to make road for them and they simply get in, give damage and return. Also help them
With long range antitank, kamikaze drones and so on. You can hide your vehicle, but once you shoot, the sniper detection system will show your location and you will be destroyed. Thats why the UGVs are getting way more important.

I don’t have to imagine it.
UGV for mine sweeping and clearing would be a good idea and will reduce human casualties.

But then again, when UGV will come into open terrain to clear mind it would be vulnerable to Artillery/loitering ammunition strike.

But that is not the point of my post.
I talking about tactically concentrated employment of tanks/IFVs/UGVs.
And proposing, dispersed approach is more suitable for future battlefield.

 

[AzeriTank]

It is amazing how long I've been leaving rent free in your head.




Again, more false accusation from you.
I never called leo2 A6 the best MBT out there.
I called Leo2 A8 the best.
And that was not my position alone. @Gary also explained it thoroughly.




I don't have to imagine anything.
UGV for mine sweeping and clearing would be a good idea and will reduce human casualties.

But then again, when UGV will come into open terrain to clear mind it would be vulnerable to Artillery/loitering ammunition strike.

But that is not the point of my post.
I talking about tactically concentrated employment of tanks/IFVs/UGVs.
And proposing, dispersed approach is more suitable for future battlefield.

I just got good memory and thats why funny to see you changing your words each time. If you have not deleted the comments yet, you first said a6 and then changed it to a8 which has no rws and sniper detection sistem, also the expensive radar placement is so bad that any hit would destroy it all.
Have you heard about alkar? For now it clear 500 meters of mine but imegine using it from akinji with KGK 84 or others to clean 3-5 km deep from several direction and then the UGVs follow that line. Some countries including Turkey even use colors to show where are cleaned. UGVs could simply follow those roads and shoot and destroy 5km deep, clean and make next attack the next day

 

[Afif]

I just got good memory and thats why funny to see you changing your words each time. If you have not deleted the comments yet, you first said a6 and then changed it to a8

Lol, I simply cannot delete it when you and others already quoted my posts, it will remain there.
Instead of accusing me just go and have a look again.

Post in thread 'Leopard 2A 6/7/8 Main Battle Tank'
https://defencehub.live/threads/leopard-2a-6-7-8-main-battle-tank.9285/post-273157

Post in thread 'Leopard 2A 6/7/8 Main Battle Tank'
https://defencehub.live/threads/leopard-2a-6-7-8-main-battle-tank.9285/post-273446

Also, you can ask @Gary since he is moderator and was present in our conversation.

Edit-let's not derail this thread with anymore.

 

[Heartbang]

Murat İkinci, General Manager of Roketsan: "Roketsan's MZK turret can be used on different tanks. It will also be an alternative for various domestic platforms. We are working together with our business partners for the MZK turret."

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1683429864177557506