India Army Armoured Vehicles

[Zapper]

Rudra attack chopper flying over Arjun Mk-1 MBT

 

[Zapper]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1482684697616719872

 

[Nilgiri]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1486720810068840450

 

[Zapper]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1486946399258230784

 

[Zapper]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1489223443744636931

 

[crixus]

As commendable as the indigenous development of light tanks by the Indian Army is, we need to be aware of the thorny path that lies ahead.

Getty

• BATTLE TANKS
• DRDO
• INDIAN ARMY
• K-9 VAJRA
• LIGHT TANKS
• MK1A
• PLA
• SINO-INDIAN

The Modi government on 3 March 2022 announced the development of light tanks for the Indian Army (IA). This decision was taken under the Make-I category of the 2020 Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) and comes against the backdrop of India’s conversion of the K-9 Vajra mobile howitzer in to a light tank. A regiment of the K9-Vajra, which is a tracked 155mm/2 self-propelled howitzer capable of striking targets 50 kilometres away is now deployed in Ladakh in the ongoing stand-off with the Chinese. Further, deployments of the Vajra are likely in other parts of the Sino-Indian boundary. The K9-Vajra, however, was never going to be sufficient or a credible substitute for a dedicated light tank, which the government has now given an in-principle approval. The decision to deploy the Vajra was largely to meet the immediate military contingency facing India on its border with China and service some part of the firepower requirements of the IA. In terms of weight, the K9-Vajra is a 50-tonne tracked vehicle slightly exceeding the weight class of actual tanks such as the T-90 and T-72 Main Battle Tanks (MBTs), which are also deployed in Ladakh. T-90s combat weight is 48 tonnes and the older T-72s weigh 46 tonnes. Both Russian-built MBTs are equipped with 125mm guns.

The decision to deploy the Vajra was largely to meet the immediate military contingency facing India on its border with China and service some part of the firepower requirements of the IA.

Notwithstanding their current deployment, the weight of the K9-Vajras, the T-90s, and T-72s make them much too heavy for effective combat at high altitudes along the Sino-Indian boundary. In any case, even if they were effective, their deployment imposes logistical burden on the IA, which the service for several years now has been trying to reduce. The Directorate General of Mechanised Forces has been working intensively to reduce the weight of weapons systems and platforms. Apart from that, the Chinese have designed and developed a dedicated light tank called the Type-15 and deploy them due to their suitability for high altitude warfare against India. The Type-15 weighs 35 tonnes with a 105 mm gun making it significantly lighter than the IA’s T-90, T-72, and K9-Vajras. It is one of the few light tanks built in the last three decades. It is widely recognised to be a capable armoured platform, despite its smaller gun size compared to its Indian counterparts. The Chinese built the Type-15 light tanks, because they anticipated the need for low-weight armoured platforms for high altitude warfare and specifically for the kind of military contingency confronting the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) presently against the IA along the contested boundary between India and China.

How the IA got here and challenges ahead​

Against this backdrop, India had considered acquiring the Russian light tank the Sprut SDM1 following the outbreak of the current Sino-Indian boundary in May 2020. In April 2021, the Directorate General of Mechanised Forces issued a Request for Information (RFI) under the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for 350 light tanks in the weight class of 25 tonnes. Notwithstanding Russia’s offer, India has now turned to native development of a light tank rather than import them. This development should be applauded, but without obscuring the problems plaguing force planning for India’s armoured corps. The public writ large should be aware that India’s pressing need and quest for light tanks only emerged in the wake of the current Sino-Indian boundary crisis. In India, a crisis invariably tends to tip the scales lending urgency to decisions on new developmental initiatives—the government’s decision on the indigenous development of light tanks is no exception. It is also the product of the IA’s constricted vision in meeting the capability and operational challenges facing India against its primary foe—the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). Generally, the service has privileged medium to heavy weight armour over light armour. Pakistan has tended to disproportionately preoccupy the mind space of the IA’s planners. Consequently, the development of light tanks has not gained traction until the eruption of the present boundary stand-off with the PRC.
Irrespective of the merits of native development of light tanks, India’s decision-makers have to recognise that there could potentially be a minimum five-year lag before the country witnesses the emergence of the initial variant of a homemade light tank. Unless the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), the Combat Vehicles Research and Development Establishment (CVRDE), the Heavy Vehicles Factory (HVF) Limited and presumably some private sector company—the entities most likely spearheading the incipient light tank project achieve a miraculous breakthrough in less than five years.

A crisis invariably tends to tip the scales lending urgency to decisions on new developmental initiatives—the government’s decision on the indigenous development of light tanks is no exception.

Regardless of the duration of the development cycle, which hopefully will not be too long, the IA must be clear right at the outset about the technical specifications which meet its combat performance and deployment requirements for a light tank to obviate needless delays. Otherwise, it will leave tank designers at the DRDO and its subsidiaries in the “dark”. The light tank project cannot be hobbled by past native development of armoured platforms such as the nearly 70 tonne—Arjun MBT. Shifting performance benchmarks by the IA has a precedent in the Arjun MBT, which the IA has inducted with some reluctance and under the government’s directives. Despite significant improvements in the Mk1A variant, it is an overweight tank and can only be deployed in “pockets” such as the desert areas along the India-Pakistan border. The Arjun has also experienced considerable cost overruns. The delayed and lukewarm integration of both variants—Mk1 and Mk1A of the Arjun MBTs by the IA also serves as a reminder of how not to proceed with the development of an indigenous light tank, because it could compel the IA and the government importing light tanks at the cost of an indigenous capability. A heavily-sanctioned Russia in the coming months and years will be a highly risky source of supply. If India turns to an alternative source, it still condemns the country to importing hardware, grating against the current and any future government’ intent to acquire military capabilities from India’s domestic defence industry. Finally, Indian decision-makers must ensure sustained funding, despite a turnover in government at the national level and closely monitor the Research and Development (R&D) and eventual production that involves all stakeholders in realising a credible light tank capability.

https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/light-tanks-a-shot-in-the-arm-for-the-indian-army/

@Nilgiri @Jackdaws @T-123456 @Joe Shearer @Peace Lover @Lonewolf

 

[crixus]

@Peace Lover , Its clear that private partner will be L&T and I have a gutt felling that it will be based on the K21 with bigger gun

L&T ready to partner with Hanwha Defense on light tank offer to India

India's Larsen & Toubro (L&T) has said it is prepared to produce light tanks with South Korea's Hanwha Defense for the Indian Army.

www.janes.com

 

[TR_123456]

As commendable as the indigenous development of light tanks by the Indian Army is, we need to be aware of the thorny path that lies ahead.

Getty

• BATTLE TANKS
• DRDO
• INDIAN ARMY
• K-9 VAJRA
• LIGHT TANKS
• MK1A
• PLA
• SINO-INDIAN

The Modi government on 3 March 2022 announced the development of light tanks for the Indian Army (IA). This decision was taken under the Make-I category of the 2020 Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) and comes against the backdrop of India’s conversion of the K-9 Vajra mobile howitzer in to a light tank. A regiment of the K9-Vajra, which is a tracked 155mm/2 self-propelled howitzer capable of striking targets 50 kilometres away is now deployed in Ladakh in the ongoing stand-off with the Chinese. Further, deployments of the Vajra are likely in other parts of the Sino-Indian boundary. The K9-Vajra, however, was never going to be sufficient or a credible substitute for a dedicated light tank, which the government has now given an in-principle approval. The decision to deploy the Vajra was largely to meet the immediate military contingency facing India on its border with China and service some part of the firepower requirements of the IA. In terms of weight, the K9-Vajra is a 50-tonne tracked vehicle slightly exceeding the weight class of actual tanks such as the T-90 and T-72 Main Battle Tanks (MBTs), which are also deployed in Ladakh. T-90s combat weight is 48 tonnes and the older T-72s weigh 46 tonnes. Both Russian-built MBTs are equipped with 125mm guns.

Notwithstanding their current deployment, the weight of the K9-Vajras, the T-90s, and T-72s make them much too heavy for effective combat at high altitudes along the Sino-Indian boundary. In any case, even if they were effective, their deployment imposes logistical burden on the IA, which the service for several years now has been trying to reduce. The Directorate General of Mechanised Forces has been working intensively to reduce the weight of weapons systems and platforms. Apart from that, the Chinese have designed and developed a dedicated light tank called the Type-15 and deploy them due to their suitability for high altitude warfare against India. The Type-15 weighs 35 tonnes with a 105 mm gun making it significantly lighter than the IA’s T-90, T-72, and K9-Vajras. It is one of the few light tanks built in the last three decades. It is widely recognised to be a capable armoured platform, despite its smaller gun size compared to its Indian counterparts. The Chinese built the Type-15 light tanks, because they anticipated the need for low-weight armoured platforms for high altitude warfare and specifically for the kind of military contingency confronting the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) presently against the IA along the contested boundary between India and China.

How the IA got here and challenges ahead​

Against this backdrop, India had considered acquiring the Russian light tank the Sprut SDM1 following the outbreak of the current Sino-Indian boundary in May 2020. In April 2021, the Directorate General of Mechanised Forces issued a Request for Information (RFI) under the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for 350 light tanks in the weight class of 25 tonnes. Notwithstanding Russia’s offer, India has now turned to native development of a light tank rather than import them. This development should be applauded, but without obscuring the problems plaguing force planning for India’s armoured corps. The public writ large should be aware that India’s pressing need and quest for light tanks only emerged in the wake of the current Sino-Indian boundary crisis. In India, a crisis invariably tends to tip the scales lending urgency to decisions on new developmental initiatives—the government’s decision on the indigenous development of light tanks is no exception. It is also the product of the IA’s constricted vision in meeting the capability and operational challenges facing India against its primary foe—the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). Generally, the service has privileged medium to heavy weight armour over light armour. Pakistan has tended to disproportionately preoccupy the mind space of the IA’s planners. Consequently, the development of light tanks has not gained traction until the eruption of the present boundary stand-off with the PRC.
Irrespective of the merits of native development of light tanks, India’s decision-makers have to recognise that there could potentially be a minimum five-year lag before the country witnesses the emergence of the initial variant of a homemade light tank. Unless the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), the Combat Vehicles Research and Development Establishment (CVRDE), the Heavy Vehicles Factory (HVF) Limited and presumably some private sector company—the entities most likely spearheading the incipient light tank project achieve a miraculous breakthrough in less than five years.

Regardless of the duration of the development cycle, which hopefully will not be too long, the IA must be clear right at the outset about the technical specifications which meet its combat performance and deployment requirements for a light tank to obviate needless delays. Otherwise, it will leave tank designers at the DRDO and its subsidiaries in the “dark”. The light tank project cannot be hobbled by past native development of armoured platforms such as the nearly 70 tonne—Arjun MBT. Shifting performance benchmarks by the IA has a precedent in the Arjun MBT, which the IA has inducted with some reluctance and under the government’s directives. Despite significant improvements in the Mk1A variant, it is an overweight tank and can only be deployed in “pockets” such as the desert areas along the India-Pakistan border. The Arjun has also experienced considerable cost overruns. The delayed and lukewarm integration of both variants—Mk1 and Mk1A of the Arjun MBTs by the IA also serves as a reminder of how not to proceed with the development of an indigenous light tank, because it could compel the IA and the government importing light tanks at the cost of an indigenous capability. A heavily-sanctioned Russia in the coming months and years will be a highly risky source of supply. If India turns to an alternative source, it still condemns the country to importing hardware, grating against the current and any future government’ intent to acquire military capabilities from India’s domestic defence industry. Finally, Indian decision-makers must ensure sustained funding, despite a turnover in government at the national level and closely monitor the Research and Development (R&D) and eventual production that involves all stakeholders in realising a credible light tank capability.

https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/light-tanks-a-shot-in-the-arm-for-the-indian-army/

@Nilgiri @Jackdaws @T-123456 @Joe Shearer @Peace Lover @Lonewolf

Indonesia has this one,

Kaplan MT / Harimau

https://www.fnss.com.tr/en/products/kaplan-mt

 

[crixus]

Indonesia has this one,

View attachment 41445
Kaplan MT / Harimau

https://www.fnss.com.tr/en/products/kaplan-mt

As per RFE the weight should not exceed 25 tonnes with leverage of 10% , and Kaplam MT is 30-35 tonnes and I am not sure Pakistan will ever allow Turkey to collaborate with India .

The requirements literally suits the K21 and the experience with L&T gained from the manufacturing of the K-9s will come handy in the development of this tank. Glad due to this Russia -Ukrainian conflict we are not going to buy the sprut .

After seeing the performance of Russian armor in Ukraine , I think this is right decision

 

[Joe Shearer]

Notwithstanding their current deployment, the weight of the K9-Vajras, the T-90s, and T-72s make them much too heavy for effective combat at high altitudes along the Sino-Indian boundary.

Who said this? The same experts who left their pants behind when the North Koreans fielded the T34 in the Korean War?

 

[Joe Shearer]

Apart from that, the Chinese have designed and developed a dedicated light tank called the Type-15 and deploy them due to their suitability for high altitude warfare against India. The Type-15 weighs 35 tonnes with a 105 mm gun making it significantly lighter than the IA’s T-90, T-72, and K9-Vajras. It is one of the few light tanks built in the last three decades. It is widely recognised to be a capable armoured platform, despite its smaller gun size compared to its Indian counterparts. The Chinese built the Type-15 light tanks, because they anticipated the need for low-weight armoured platforms for high altitude warfare and specifically for the kind of military contingency confronting the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) presently against the IA along the contested boundary between India and China.

Just to remind ourselves - ALL light tanks are essentially armoured cars up-gunned, and serve essentially as tank destroyers, provided they are not put face to face against MBTs.

Do we need to repeat the history of the nasty time that we had in 1965 against the Pakistani 12th Division? and that was an Infantry Division.

 

[crixus]

Who said this? The same experts who left their pants behind when the North Koreans fielded the T34 in the Korean War?

Dada even Chinese are using lighter armor in Laddak , may be easy to air lift . Transportation plays an important role in mountainous warfare . The silver lining is the manufacturing will be done by L&T and they will deliver the product on time

 

[crixus]

Just to remind ourselves - ALL light tanks are essentially armoured cars up-gunned, and serve essentially as tank destroyers, provided they are not put face to face against MBTs.

Do we need to repeat the history of the nasty time that we had in 1965 against the Pakistani 12th Division? and that was an Infantry Division.

I think with active protection system like Trophy even a simple armored car have some decent chances of survival and Turkish drones have literally proved the vulnerability of the Tank even MBTs .
So I think its mainly against Chinese P-15s , you remember the term mirror deployment

 

[Joe Shearer]

Notwithstanding Russia’s offer, India has now turned to native development of a light tank rather than import them. This development should be applauded, but without obscuring the problems plaguing force planning for India’s armoured corps. The public writ large should be aware that India’s pressing need and quest for light tanks only emerged in the wake of the current Sino-Indian boundary crisis. In India, a crisis invariably tends to tip the scales lending urgency to decisions on new developmental initiatives—the government’s decision on the indigenous development of light tanks is no exception. It is also the product of the IA’s constricted vision in meeting the capability and operational challenges facing India against its primary foe—the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). Generally, the service has privileged medium to heavy weight armour over light armour. Pakistan has tended to disproportionately preoccupy the mind space of the IA’s planners. Consequently, the development of light tanks has not gained traction until the eruption of the present boundary stand-off with the PRC.

Wow.

That's all I can say, until I've caught my breath.

Let's take these one at a time.

1. The public writ large should be aware that India’s pressing need and quest for light tanks only emerged in the wake of the current Sino-Indian boundary crisis.
   
   Ask the smart alec whose condescending piece has been copied and pasted here what he thought the AMX 13 and the PT76 were, cheese graters?
2. decisions on new developmental initiatives—the government’s decision on the indigenous development of light tanks is no exception.
   
   So, in an emergency, instead of buying, we want to develop in house. Yeah, right.
3. Pakistan has tended to disproportionately preoccupy the mind space of the IA’s planners. Consequently, the development of light tanks has not gained traction until the eruption of the present boundary stand-off with the PRC.
   
   That is hardly surprising considering the HVRDE track record in making armoured vehicles.
   Suggesting development now, rather than off the shelf purchase, is like recommending homoeopathy to a stage III cancer patient.
4. India has now turned to native development of a light tank rather than import them. This development should be applauded, but without obscuring the problems plaguing force planning for India’s armoured corps.
   
   Who is this expert being quoted?
   Ask him what happened to the RAPID.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Dada even Chinese are using lighter armor in Laddak , may be easy to air lift .

The Chinese have worked on their logistics and honed it to a point.

Tell me, have you read the controversy between Rommel and von Rundstedt on where to meet the Allied landings, when they happened, on the beaches or within, and why each argued what he did.

That may help understand the asymmetry between our situation and the PLA GF.

 

[Joe Shearer]

I think with active protection system like Trophy even a simple armored car have some decent chances of survival and Turkish drones have literally proved the vulnerability of the Tank even MBTs .
So I think its mainly against Chinese P-15s , you remember the term mirror deployment

I agree that having proved that a certain type of vehicle has a suddenly increased vulnerability is a great occasion to put a greater emphasis on it.

Now it is possible to brew even MBTs using drones.

Right, let's see what drones do with lighter armour than MBTs.

Perfect logic.

 

[Lonewolf]

I think with active protection system like Trophy even a simple armored car have some decent chances of survival and Turkish drones have literally proved the vulnerability of the Tank even MBTs .
So I think its mainly against Chinese P-15s , you remember the term mirror deployment

Most light tanks are design derivatives of icv designs , or bigger mbt components used for a smaller solution , drdo is going from ground up approach using fmbt as base design , will save weight , and our indigenous aps is almost ready for testing , let's see how it fares

 

[Joe Shearer]

drdo is going from ground up approach using fmbt as base design , will save weight , and our indigenous aps is almost ready for testing

Yes, this approach has a fractionally higher chance of success, but can't get away from the balancing of firepower, protection and agility. The trouble is that two of these can be achieved at a time, in any design, never all three. Protection, of course, is the joker in the pack.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Most light tanks are design derivatives of icv designs , or bigger mbt components used for a smaller solution , drdo is going from ground up approach using fmbt as base design , will save weight , and our indigenous aps is almost ready for testing , let's see how it fares

They were also aimed at providing firepower to the proposed 90,270-strong 17 Mountain Strike Corps (MSC) to counter the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) that has been shelved due to an enduring financial resource crunch.

 

[Zapper]

Glad due to this Russia -Ukrainian conflict we are not going to buy the sprut .

After seeing the performance of Russian armor in Ukraine , I think this is right decision

Sprut was never an option in the first place except for some fuss by random media outlets. It has an extremely weak protection all around, under equipped and the armament isn't effective either. The Russians themselves inducted only a nominal number. No official entity actual made any comment on IA being interested in the Sprut

think with active protection system like Trophy even a simple armored car have some decent chances of survival and Turkish drones have literally proved the vulnerability of the Tank even MBTs .
So I think its mainly against Chinese P-15s , you remember the term mirror deploymen

Turkish drones have been effective in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict since the Armenians lacked ADs...it's kinda the same issue and I don't see Russians actively deploying ADs in their invasion. Even the few deployed were of older gens while Ukranians only sent drones if they have credible intel of no AD presence in the area

If in an Indo-China conflict, both sides will fill it up with ADs primarily to restrict fighter jets. What I'm most concerned about is PLAGF's MRLS system which theoretically have a very long range compared to ours and PLA will ensure to flatten our command structures in the event of an armed conflict prior to moving in their infantry and mechanized columns. The only option we'd have in such scenarios is to use our air-power which'll again face an uphill battle to overcome Chinese ADs, EW/Jamming systems etc

Most light tanks are design derivatives of icv designs , or bigger mbt components used for a smaller solution , drdo is going from ground up approach using fmbt as base design , will save weight , and our indigenous aps is almost ready for testing , let's see how it fares

It is unrealistic to wait for an FMBT design given the urgency. Not to mention, IA's love for kickbacks will make em revise GSQRs' multiple times with unrealistic needs and timelines and we'll end up buying the Sprut or the likes

I'd rather have L&T work with DRDO & Hanhwa to utilize K9's chassis