India Army Armoured Vehicles

[Zapper]

Belt and braces will do it.

It is certainly useful to do this as a regular practice; the Pakistan Army supplements its regular formations with LAT (Light Anti-Tank) teams and at a higher level, with HAT (Heavy Anti-Tank) teams reporting direct to the higher formation leadership. They have proliferated their Chinese cloned ATGM, the Bakhtar Shikan, right through the Army.

However, they have not therefore given up their armoured fighting vehicles.

Based on available public info, the Bakhtar Shikan is no where close to what a Spike or Javelin is but again that sort of training is always a good practice and I think we've been focusing more in that regard ever since the Ladakh scuffle. IA also has decent experience using ATGMs since Konkurs are fired across LoC on PA posts and bunkers almost during every ceasefire violation

On the brighter side, DRDO's MP-ATGM or Nag or Helina are being improvised to be on par with Spike and can expect to be inducted in large scale by offering the production contract to a private firm

 

[Joe Shearer]

IA also has decent experience using ATGMs since Konkurs are fired across LoC on PA posts and bunkers almost during every ceasefire violation

True, but that is not a substitute for firing these at an enemy vehicle that can fire back at you. I think the Carl Gustaf is a more 'trusted' weapon to Indian Army operators.

On the brighter side, DRDO's MP-ATGM or Nag or Helina are being improvised to be on par with Spike

Good news, but let's let it happen.

 

[Joe Shearer]

can expect to be inducted in large scale by offering the production contract to a private firm

You know what that means.

Let it happen, sez I.

 

[RogerRanger]

If you ask me, there should be four different types of formation at root level itself. We need to walk away from the one formation fights all stereotyped doctrine.

Yes I agree. I have a book called the 4th generation warfare handbook, where you use light-infantry to defeat insurgencies, rather than heavy weapons and air power. There is more to it than this and the book gives examples to do with the legitimacy of the state. However that book wouldn't be useful for state on state warfare. So there needs to be a light maneuver warfare leadership group, a doctrine, training and equipment.

However we have the example from the Rhodesian bush war where the Rhodesians because of the sanctions against them were forced to use light weapons, aircraft and troops. Ironically this actually help them in the bush war, but when they come into contact with other state forces, they would win but it would be a much harder fight. So am I not saying the regular formations aren't still dominant. Which I view as armour, mechanized and artillery formations. So with that light warfare would be a huge change, just like Rogers Rangers were in the 1750's. Another thing is how cheap and more healthy light-infantry is, the amount of damage soldiers do to themselves training to carry massive shells, repair massive vehicles and walk with 100-150 lbs all day, compared to 20-30 lbs which the light infantry would carry. So the defence contractors wouldn't like it.

 

[RogerRanger]

Here, we have several concepts jostling for mind-space.

On the one hand, there is the atavistic look-back at what the British called the LRDG - the Long Range Desert Groups, basically Tommies on light four wheel drives looping around the southern flank of both sets of combatants in the desert, and striking unwary and unguarded assets on their right flank. If very lucky, on their left flank as well. That is possible - was possible - in the African desert north of the main Sahara, with its stony soil punctuated by basins of deep sand that swallow up vehicles and soldiers alike - not quicksand, just a smart-alecky way of saying the distances were considerable.

This doesn't work in the Thar. The sand is of a different composition and does not encourage chuntering around looking for trouble. It does encourage camel-based warfare, but somehow I don't see in my mind's eye the XVII Camel Corps giving the enemy any trouble.

It particularly doesn't work, unless someone has screwed up and not patrolled far enough, patrolled long enough, or sorted out the patrol photographs and put them up for photo-interpretation day before yesterday. Day before yesterday in the military lands up with Hannibal, nothing beyond 'now' attracts the normal military attention.

On the second hand, there is that wishful PBI thought that keeps coming up again and again and again, that some big steel monster would turn up to crouch behind, and keep the other guy skipped around with a storm of shell and shot. First, it was the Gatling Gun, without the comfort of cover behind a steel body; then the unmistakable round barrel of the water-cooled Lewis gun, on to the Rolls Royce armoured cars so beloved of the Lawrence of Lawrence of Arabia, until the tank appeared. Then onwards, there was the constant conflict between the fast-moving armoured column, sweeping around obstacles, moving with great speed, assisted on its way by lethal close air support, and the slow, reliable monster that the infantry could walk beside, and could fool itself into thinking that the bulk of steel represented safety.

Again, South Asian armies have to do their homework, if they are to survive to do their classwork. They need to work out what their doctrine will be, in fact, they need to figure out if there will be one all-encompassing doctrine or different ones for different war-conditions, and consequently different inventories of soldiers, weapons and vehicles. Sweeping lunges by armoured formations have never really been tried, and where they were tried in embryo, the numbers were so small that even a comprehensive victory would have given the winning side a possible opening to the other people's jugular.

So the second conflicted concept is the question of how to use armoured vehicles, at high speed to run around the enemy's flanks, or steadily advance guiding groups of foot-weary soldiers.

The third is of protection. Walls of steel normally calm down men who are sheltering behind it, until the opposition finds the weaknesses and outlines them with a few, well-aimed shots. Sadly, even a heavily armoured battle tank cannot offer invulnerability. Consider the amount of protection of armoured vehicles; at their designed level of protecting the occupants against a reasonable chance of heated shrapnel or medium machine guns, that leaves us with an extremely fragile armoured vehicle.

Thank you for this well thought out and informative comment.

I totally understand and agree with your points. I would add that I believe there is a different option. Which is to not flank the enemy or slowly move through them or to rush them. Rather you bypass through the enemy lines, you do a dozen thrusts through the enemy lines, to divide off the companies of enemy forces, you move 15 miles then set up a defensive line, than you encircle the enemy companies. At the same time your heavy armour, artillery and infantry attack. So in the end the enemy has nowhere to go. It has lost command and control, it has lost intelligence and it can't communicate. While being shelled, bombed and having tanks moving towards it with heavy infantry. There is no flanking maneuver.

This is what I believed the Russians were doing in Ukraine, I have turned out to be totally wrong and mistaken about this, so the Russian operation was a lot less advanced than I believed 2 weeks ago. The Russians have been very impressive to me in the war, however they did basic operation mistakes, they hadn't trained their forces, they didn't have the all level doctrine and equipment. The leadership was lacking, though that could be because of the time constrains on the operation. Basically the Russians did a dozen rush attacks bypassing enemy positions to destroy their C&C and communications and intelligence, and other bases. However unsupported these units and thrusts were destroyed, but totally successful in my view. Something NATO and Ukraine didn't expect.

However this is a basic level awareness of what I view as modern 3rd generation maneuver warfare, its an early stage adoption of the concept. I want light infantry able to sustain 6 minute miles for an hour, I want quad-bikes pulling lightweight artillery, I want light helicopters, light transport aircraft and light attack aircraft/UACV's. It is basically a light combined arms brigade, with obviously light tanks which is the main tool to machine gun enemy infantry and blow up enemy positions/bases/technology with the 70-90 mm main gun. Then move on. Get to the 15 mile point, set up your defensive line and await the enemy counter-attack or the enemy retreated, which you then maneuver with allowing enemy forces to move through your lines but never attacking you. As you can just move faster than they can, you can put fire down on area's with long-range stand off weapons as well. Once you have successfully achieved the encirclement and bypassing of the enemy forces, you then move to the next 15 miles. All the time you are supported, you aren't going to be overrun and destroyed. Of course this is high level stuff, very hard to do and very hard to find men able to sustain 6 minute miles. The other thing is the goal is to not kill the enemy, but kill their ability to fight you at the operational level. You want the enemy to live, to return to their families, you are willing to accept greater casualties on your side to achieve this.

This isn't usable in every environment, but it is usable in most environment, it can be adapted and changed too. You can do the same thing in urban warfare and naval warfare and even air warfare in my view. So you can have integrated modern 3rd generation maneuver warfare within the entire armed forces of a state.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Yes I agree. I have a book called the 4th generation warfare handbook, where you use light-infantry to defeat insurgencies, rather than heavy weapons and air power.

IMO, it shouldn't even be light infantry. Given a choice, I would use combinations of gendarmerie, carefully distinguished from the armed forces, so as to ensure that the armed forces do not get into counter-insurgency ways of thinking, and so that arms, ammunition, equipment, methods all can be very clearly separated from military requirements to fight another state.

CERTAINLY use air power - for observation, NOT for interdiction.

 

[Joe Shearer]

So there needs to be a light maneuver warfare leadership group, a doctrine, training and equipment.

Even more important is to attach education, health care and law enforcement elements with them, because one of the signs of an insurgency winning is the gradual abandonment of the institutions, structures and processes built up by the state, to shift over to a more readily accessible one (or a less dangerous alternative; insurgents often force transition at gunpoint).

It is critical that people harbour resentment at their daily life being disturbed, and that they consciously want peace and, if not the status quo, some sort of modified existence that corrects the wrongs that insurgents react to. No insurgency can exist in a vacuum; the causes and troubles have to be addressed.

 

[Joe Shearer]

However we have the example from the Rhodesian bush war where the Rhodesians because of the sanctions against them were forced to use light weapons, aircraft and troops. Ironically this actually help them in the bush war, but when they come into contact with other state forces, they would win but it would be a much harder fight.

Excellent point, excellent illustration why getting into counter-insurgency is harmful for state armed forces. That way forward was how the late CDS Rawat wrecked the Indian Army's focus. We really need to re-visit our basics.

Considering the flags you display, have you come across Robert Thompson? Or his writings?

 

[Joe Shearer]

So am I not saying the regular formations aren't still dominant. Which I view as armour, mechanized and artillery formations. So with that light warfare would be a huge change, just like Rogers Rangers were in the 1750's.

This bit confused me. I don't understand.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Another thing is how cheap and more healthy light-infantry is, the amount of damage soldiers do to themselves training to carry massive shells, repair massive vehicles and walk with 100-150 lbs all day, compared to 20-30 lbs which the light infantry would carry.

In fact, they should be gendarmerie; but a special kind of gendarmerie. A gendarmerie recruited from the highest education levels available in the market, one that stresses working with the people in a democratic way, more than lurid, SWAT team Hollywood movie re-enactments; one that is trained to spot talent and point them towards people development agencies. I could go on and on...

 

[Joe Shearer]

I totally understand and agree with your points.

I liked the discussion but seriously wish you would tear my arguments to bits. Seriously.

 

[Joe Shearer]

I would add that I believe there is a different option.

AHA!

 

[Joe Shearer]

Which is to not flank the enemy or slowly move through them or to rush them. Rather you bypass through the enemy lines, you do a dozen thrusts through the enemy lines, to divide off the companies of enemy forces, you move 15 miles then set up a defensive line, than you encircle the enemy companies. At the same time your heavy armour, artillery and infantry attack. So in the end the enemy has nowhere to go. It has lost command and control, it has lost intelligence and it can't communicate. While being shelled, bombed and having tanks moving towards it with heavy infantry. There is no flanking maneuver.

I need to chew on this a bit. Fascinating!

 

[Joe Shearer]

Rather you bypass through the enemy lines, you do a dozen thrusts through the enemy lines, to divide off the companies of enemy forces, you move 15 miles then set up a defensive line, than you encircle the enemy companies. At the same time your heavy armour, artillery and infantry attack. So in the end the enemy has nowhere to go. It has lost command and control, it has lost intelligence and it can't communicate. While being shelled, bombed and having tanks moving towards it with heavy infantry. There is no flanking maneuver.

First reaction, I think I've got it, but will re-read it to be sure:

This is what the Chinese PLA GF did to IV Corps in 1962 in NEFA (=Arunachal Pradesh)(=south Tibet). Gave me a chill to read your description. You were obviously defining things as you moved forward into the concept; if you read those accounts (please DON'T ask for a reading list!), you would get a spooky feeling.

 

[Joe Shearer]

This is what I believed the Russians were doing in Ukraine, I have turned out to be totally wrong and mistaken about this, so the Russian operation was a lot less advanced than I believed 2 weeks ago. The Russians have been very impressive to me in the war, however they did basic operation mistakes, they hadn't trained their forces, they didn't have the all level doctrine and equipment. The leadership was lacking, though that could be because of the time constrains on the operation. Basically the Russians did a dozen rush attacks bypassing enemy positions to destroy their C&C and communications and intelligence, and other bases. However unsupported these units and thrusts were destroyed, but totally successful in my view. Something NATO and Ukraine didn't expect.

However this is a basic level awareness of what I view as modern 3rd generation maneuver warfare, its an early stage adoption of the concept. I want light infantry able to sustain 6 minute miles for an hour, I want quad-bikes pulling lightweight artillery, I want light helicopters, light transport aircraft and light attack aircraft/UACV's. It is basically a light combined arms brigade, with obviously light tanks which is the main tool to machine gun enemy infantry and blow up enemy positions/bases/technology with the 70-90 mm main gun. Then move on. Get to the 15 mile point, set up your defensive line and await the enemy counter-attack or the enemy retreated, which you then maneuver with allowing enemy forces to move through your lines but never attacking you. As you can just move faster than they can, you can put fire down on area's with long-range stand off weapons as well. Once you have successfully achieved the encirclement and bypassing of the enemy forces, you then move to the next 15 miles. All the time you are supported, you aren't going to be overrun and destroyed. Of course this is high level stuff, very hard to do and very hard to find men able to sustain 6 minute miles. The other thing is the goal is to not kill the enemy, but kill their ability to fight you at the operational level. You want the enemy to live, to return to their families, you are willing to accept greater casualties on your side to achieve this.

Need to think about this.

Incidentally I have a format that might stimulate discussion, that has elements of this but perhaps a different orientation. Perhaps later; at the moment, I am interested in thinking about this.

 

[Joe Shearer]

This isn't usable in every environment, but it is usable in most environment, it can be adapted and changed too. You can do the same thing in urban warfare and naval warfare and even air warfare in my view. So you can have integrated modern 3rd generation maneuver warfare within the entire armed forces of a state.

I don't agree with two points here, but need to think the whole thing through.

 

[Joe Shearer]

I'd like to take these themes further, perhaps, as an example, exploring what combinations of doctrine, formations, equipment and training could enable us to fight a defensive offensive battle on all fronts, at the least possible .

What would we call a front, for that matter? What could be/should be the hierarchy of Front, Command, Sector?

 

[Rajendra Chola]

There is a proverb in Tamil. A person is having butter in one hand, while searching for ghee. That aptly reflects Indian situation.

There are two ways to go about it. The answer to tanks aren't necessarily tanks. One way is equip ALH Rudra with anti tank missiles. They are attack choppers basically begging for ATM for nearly a decade. If performance at higher altitudes is an problem, then induct LCH in significant numbers and again with ATM. Work in short term.

Option 2 is to go for an tank destroyer ICVs. Seen those vehicles with 8-12 anti tank missiles, while they can also transport troops, low weight, quick deployment.

Option 3 is longer strategy of light tank which can be designed for all terrains, not just for Ladakh to build significant numbers at cheaper costs.

 

[Joe Shearer]

There is a proverb in Tamil. A person is having butter in one hand, while searching for ghee. That aptly reflects Indian situation.

There are two ways to go about it. The answer to tanks aren't necessarily tanks. One way is equip ALH Rudra with anti tank missiles. They are attack choppers basically begging for ATM for nearly a decade. If performance at higher altitudes is an problem, then induct LCH in significant numbers and again with ATM. Work in short term.

Option 2 is to go for an tank destroyer ICVs. Seen those vehicles with 8-12 anti tank missiles, while they can also transport troops, low weight, quick deployment.

Option 3 is longer strategy of light tank which can be designed for all terrains, not just for Ladakh to build significant numbers at cheaper costs.

Brilliant summary.

 

[Nilgiri]

There is a proverb in Tamil. A person is having butter in one hand, while searching for ghee. That aptly reflects Indian situation.

There are two ways to go about it. The answer to tanks aren't necessarily tanks. One way is equip ALH Rudra with anti tank missiles. They are attack choppers basically begging for ATM for nearly a decade. If performance at higher altitudes is an problem, then induct LCH in significant numbers and again with ATM. Work in short term.

Option 2 is to go for an tank destroyer ICVs. Seen those vehicles with 8-12 anti tank missiles, while they can also transport troops, low weight, quick deployment.

Option 3 is longer strategy of light tank which can be designed for all terrains, not just for Ladakh to build significant numbers at cheaper costs.

This is part of the holistic approach that is to be taken.

What is the objective of something....i.e what does it have and what is it to have....in meeting what it is likeliest to face today and tomorrow.

You work deeply enough on this stuff, and you will develop the competency with time.

Sundarji had the right approach with RAPID concept and brasstacks (because he looked at and studied the best largest army at the time to implement w.r.t combined arms at scale and exercise at scale)....but it needed to be taken forward like a relay race. IA sorely dropped this opportunity to take forward and has squandered back into more reactionary piecemeal stuff again.