"We are learning from the battlefield – especially in Ukraine – that aerial reconnaissance has fundamentally changed," Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. Randy George said in a statement accompanying the announcement. "Sensors and weapons mounted on a variety of unmanned systems and in space are more ubiquitous, further reaching, and more inexpensive than ever before. I am confident the Army can deliver for the Joint Force, both in the priority theater and around the globe, by accelerating innovation, procurement and fielding of modern unmanned aircraft systems, including the Future Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System, Launched Effects, and commercial small unmanned aircraft systems."
The Army's decision to cancel the Future Attack Recon Aircraft program is part of a larger shakeup in its future aviation plans.
www.twz.com
I think it is important to understand what is going on here before we reach any definitive conclusions.
See that, FARA was set to replace OH-58 Kiowa. Both are primarily reconnaissance platforms with limited attack capability. It was supposed to complement AH-64E and increase the tactical ISR capability of the field commanders.
Now, turns out, these type of UAV systems (see below) are more efficient when it comes to increasing tactical ISR capability.
See, FARA is much more expensive and complex system to manufacture. However, as a very fast & highly maneuverable rotary-wing platform (coupled with its inbuilt countermeasures) it is more survivable than these types of tactical UAV. But, simply not survivable enough to justify its cost and expense. On the other hand, these tactical UAVs are far more cost effective and simpler to built, hence highly attritable.
In essense,
US army is trading moderate survivability of limited numbers of expensive FARA, with far higher attritability of large numbers of cost effective future tactical unmanned aircraft system. (Even though FARA can carry more sophisticated & longer range sensor payload, future tactical UAS program will compensate for that by fielding higher numbers of platforms and distributing them cross the battlefield.) This is a very good trade-off.
And today's networking revolution & increasing sensor to shooter connectivity has decreased the need to mount firepower and sensor package on the same platform. Hence, wherever feasible (by prioritising modularity, cost effectiveness & ease of manufacturing) more and more simpler, separate sensor and shooter platforms are being built.
However, it does not necessarily always negate the need of combining sensor package & heavy weapons in a single expensive platform. In fact, those are also imperative in highly contested battefield and combat scenarios.
In that same spirit, heavy attack helicopters will continue to have its relevance as the primary rotary-wing heavy CAS platforms. (Note that, just 9 months ago US Army has ordered 184x latest variant of AH64E.)
Firstly, we know that AH-64 used to be an excellent ISR asset. (It still is) As it was more survivable as a low flying, highly maneuverable rortaty-wing platform compared high flying slow non-maneuverable large drones like MQ-9. Which are more vulnerable to medium and long range AD than AH-64. But now with small and highly attritable UAVs like ORLAN-30 or RQ-21B flying over the treeline without worrying much about being shot down, largely negate that unique advantage that AH-64 provided previously.
However,
where heavy attack helicopters like Apache or T929 is really unmatched, is in their ability to very rapidly concentrated heavy (direct & indirect) firepower at a time and place of necessity or commander's choosing.
That can be largely understood in three ways.
*Scenario No.1– Let's say you have lots of UAV sensoring all over the battlefield and it is totally transparent to you. Also, you have capable UAV to artillery (sensor to shooter) networking. However, you are defending a large area where you don't have sufficient numbers of tanks & IFVs (close combat platforms) to cover all the potential axis of enemy advance. (Now, artillery is very lethal when it comes to stopping enemy advance. However, it is not always sufficient nor can it replace the need for direct combat platforms. I.e. tanks & IFV.) Let's suppose with UAV sensoring you discover a rapid enemy mechanized & armored thrust through an unexpected axis of advance. Where you don't have sufficient direct combat platforms (tanks & IFVs) of your own. And artillery may not be enough here to completely halt the enemy thrust. So, what can you do? By the time you call in your mechanized and armored untis from other sectors in an hour, enemy penetration has been achieved already and serious damage is done. So, you call in your 'flying tanks', which will reach the area within 10 minutes and by engaging the enemy with heavy firepower, will buy you some very critical time until armored & mechanized units reaches there.
Scenario No. 2– Remember that Ukrainian assault in early week of the counter offensive with Bradleys & leopards that ended in disaster? Leading such assault against a prepared enemy with heavy attack helicopters In a combined arms manner will increase the chances of success and inflict more damage on the enemy. When treversing such highly prepared defesive line, attack helicopters are not vulnerable to mines, dragon's teeth, anti armor trenches & artillery like th way tanks & IFVs are. It offers greater flexibility and freedom of maneuver with tank like firepower in such restricted scenario. (Specially if it comes equipped with DIRCM.)
3.
Scenario No. 3– As a security element for the mainbody, attack helicopters offer higher flexibility compared to ground units becaues of their ability to cover large areas in a short timespan. This is very useful when conducting screening and guarding tasks. Let's say you want to advance rapidly through an avenue. Yet you don't have the time nor enough ground unit resources to set up sufficient flanking security forces along the way. So, you task these 'flying tanks' to provide security for your mainbody.
Large UAVs (even though can carry heavy firepower) can't perform these tasks the same way these rotary-wing platforms can do. As they are high-flying, slow, non-maneuverable platforms. Hence highly vulnerable to MRSAMs & LRSAM.
Thus ultimately my conclusion is, T929 is still a very relevant project for TSK,
www.defensenews.com
strasam.org
