In many ways the stalingrad-equivalent of the more naval-inclined pacific campaign (i.e parallels in logistical and replenishment force pressures and assurance and of course the objective w.r.t significant commitments and consequence downstream w.r.t strategic initiative transfer)
One notices the significant losses sustained by both sides in the final naval engagement and larger campaign preceding it....but yet again the superior logistics and replenishment capacity (of lost material and men) of one side relative to the other would prove instrumental in the long run.
The Japanese simply could not supply their Guadalcanal forces in late 1942 (this was about just 1 year after pearl harbour and 6 months after midway) and would shortly abandon it to a new line of defence at new georgia (which would fall in late 1943).
The assured American presence at Guadalcanal would prove decisive...just about 4 months later for example, they were able to code-break, intercept and shoot down the greatest japanese admiral (Yamamoto) of the war while he flew out of Rabaul (New Britain island).
@Kaptaan @Joe Shearer @VCheng @Paro et al.