What do you think, what was the cost of the earthquake in Turkey? Or the various operations in Syria and elsewhere? Or the necessity to import even simple things for any strategic industry?
What do you think how many flying hours Turkish Coast Guard did in the last 15 years, saving the people,who sold their cows for n order to get to the promised land?
Or what has been the cost of keeping 5 million of refugees?
Various financial games played against Turkiye???
500 bn ? 700bn?
It would need a look into things like the Turkish national budget over the years (both size and composition) and so on. The direct fiscal strain compared to management of existing spending sectors in its tax+transfer and debt needs (all nationstates by and large use some form of this).
Not just these higher spendings, but other ones too that come into picture as they do....whatever the final % of new/old work out to in the strain and so on. I don't have time and interest for it, maybe another member can do deep dive.
But that (and policy tools at govt disposal) while of course not good.... is not say inflationary by itself to any large degree.... i.e investors will price that in if govt signals a fiscal ramp....the bond market, capital market, corporates etc will respond to that and supply side is managed if you put right people and policy in right places (stability is key).
So the inflation was caused by something else largely, and it rests at the executive policy largely. There were some other persistent and new problems, but they by and large are tied to same underlying issues of concentrated executive power and executive getting it wrong.
post covid 2022 - 2024, it was discussed at some length and depth in this very thread, which one can look up and read if one is inclined to.
i.e why was the decision made to lower interest rates + keep them low + strongarm turkish central bank to comply (fire and hire new chairman there etc)....when that runs contrary to all established evidence prior to that in relation between i/r and inflation?
Hail mary expectation that higher liquidity and low credit pricing will hit the supply side before it hits demand side? At least that is what I remember the attempted reasoning was....but it has never worked like that, so it was a delusional thing to have going on as long as it did.
The executive finally reversed it after some time...but there is now lingering effect.
This was all entirely needless and has had its impact on Turkiye, making a huge noise in signal to noise ratio on economy (when you need as much good signals and low noise clutter as possible to study-analyse-respond).
There was the effect from this on the Lira too of course:
One has to realise production is downstream to investment...i.e know how (you either have it or you need to work with others that are ahead on whatever...be they local or foreign ... i.e every thing related to teaching a man to fish rather than giving him a fish).
So the capital flows of say the foreign intersection (given there are lot of countries ahead of Turkey in various domains that are beneficial for Turkey to get investment from and to engage in commerce with to grow positive sum etc) need to be studied by best economists+finance experts Turkey has and then the executive+legislature needs to listen well and set policy well in response.
I mean lets look at 5 charts that tell lot of the story to analyse:
Find the latest trade statistics and economic complexity data for Turkey.
oec.world
Turkey recorded a Current Account deficit of 3996 USD Million in November of 2025. This page provides - Turkey Current Account - actual values, historical data, forecast, chart, statistics, economic calendar and news.
tradingeconomics.com
Foreign Exchange Reserves in Turkey decreased to 84410 USD Million in January 30 from 86200 USD Million in the previous week. This page provides the latest reported value for - Turkey Foreign Exchange Reserves - plus previous releases, historical high and low, short-term forecast and long-term...
tradingeconomics.com
Obviously Turkey has a lot going for it if it plays its cards well enough.
I mean lot of folks think PRC is exporting powerhouse etc.
But Turkey in total (goods + services) exports a full 1/10th of PRC, despite PRC being something like 16 times more in population
i.e almost twice the export intensity in Turkiye per capita....with EU being dominant in that commerce (and one would expect in the upstream capital investment market etc).
Yet the import side has always been close or more (the current account surplus and deficit which also includes remit amounts each way etc).
So the underlying issue has always been to attract more capital and improve the supply side so you net a neat surplus consistently like say PRC (its 500 billion surplus 3.7 minus 3.2 etc from the total trade balance alone).
But for that you need to have stable policy for capital, bond, direct investment markets from peers and advanced equivalents. i.e study the last 30 years or more of what worked for TR clearly....and what has been upset on it.
i.e the same reason PRC has a close forex level to its import level (3 trillion).... yet TR peaked at 115 billion around 2013, and has been stuck around 85 billion since....even as the trade picture expanded to 300 - 400 billion in either direction.
i.e nowhere close to 100% coverage/leverage ratio....something like 20% now.
This is the underlying reason you see the conversation pop up now on matters like:
a) bridge monetization, other public good monetization (however much will be local and foreign controlled in end)
b) selling frigates when your military needs them
c) hot money flows, bond flows rather than sound capital flows
These are all top off short cuts to prop up that forex ratio being 20% (and its internals now also being short term rather than longer term).
I mean b) is issue with Greeks directly in that navy thread.
c) is issue with UAE and gulfies. I mean is UAE a friend of Turkiye? It is advanced knowledge economy or something? There are pages and pages here of how bad UAE is w.r.t relationship with Turkiye now. So what is impact of going for cheap easy sukuk bonds with those guys despite all of the other issues? What leverage they gain on you and then that causes another unnecessary grievance dynamic then.
This is result of bad executive policy in end compounding as it has and looking for more cheap + easy solutions....rather than delegate, promote reward actual competence.
www.dailysabah.com
